The total fertility rate (TFR) is a measure of the level of fertility over time. Population stability can be preserved above a TFR of 2.1 (United Nations Population Fund, 2023). Affected by rising female educational attainment, advancing urbanization, greater accessibility to contraception, reproductive health services, and reduced child mortality, fertility continue to decline (Goujon, 2025). According to the World Bank, many nations have already seen a decline in overall fertility rates below 2.1 by 2022 (World Bank, 2022). The overall fertility rate in Europe in 2022 was below 2.0, and the United States has remained at 1.7. Korea has the world’s lowest fertility rate, with an average of 0.8 children per woman, and Japan had an overall fertility rate of 1.3. Longitudinally, most developed western countries were already facing a relatively severe population crisis by the middle or end of the last century. In 2000, the number of countries which had a TFR below the replacement level of 2.1 in the world was around 70. In 2021, this number increased to nearly 110, of which nearly 40 countries and territories have experienced negative or zero population growth (Wu, 2020). The population decline and aging caused by low fertility present serious challenges to public finances, social security, pension systems, and health care, directly affecting a country’s socioeconomic development and national security (Harper, 2014).

To address the issue of declining fertility rates, governments worldwide have explored a range of family policies aimed at encouraging childbirth, which can be broadly categorized into three types: economic incentives, public service support, and cultural interventions (Gauthier, 2007). Economic incentives are the most direct approaches to promoting fertility, typically taking the form of cash subsidies, tax reductions, or housing support (Zhang et al., 2023). These measures have been shown to be more effective among low-income families, while their impact on high-income households tends to be weaker (Kalwij, 2010). Cultural intervention policies are designed to enhance fertility intentions by shifting societal norms. However, the effects of these policies are typically slow to materialize and difficult to quantify, as they often depend on the long-term construction of social consensus (Mcdonald, 2006). Public service support policies primarily include childcare services, parental leave systems, and educational subsidies. These measures have proven effective in increasing fertility intentions (Luci-Greulich and Thévenon, 2013).

While well-designed family support policies can moderately raise fertility rates or prevent them from declining further, such impacts are usually modest and far from restoring fertility to the replacement level (Gauthier and Gietel-Basten, 2025). According to the theory of demographic transition, low fertility is an inevitable outcome of socioeconomic development. At present, most regions of the world have undergone demographic transition, and more regions will experience fertility decline driven by educational advancement, urbanization, and improved child survival rates in the future. Given the inevitability of low fertility rates, the focus of policies should shift from efforts to raise fertility to a specific level toward building a fairer, more sustainable, and more caring society—one that enables people to have the number of children they desire [United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 2025]. As a key component of such a society, the enhancement of both the accessibility and quality of childcare services is strongly positively associated with the overall fertility trend (Bergsvik et al., 2021). Accordingly, this study integrates individual-level data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) database with provincial-level indicators from the China Education Database, to investigate the relationship between regional kindergarten development and individual fertility intentions (expected number of children), with a focus on elucidating the underlying mechanisms. The regional kindergarten development is a comprehensive concept in this study, including the number of kindergartens as well as the staffing of teachers and allocation of facilities.

Compared to prior studies, this research makes three significant contributions. First, to our knowledge, it provides the first empirical evidence linking comprehensive kindergarten development to fertility intentions. Unlike previous research that has focused on isolated factors such as cash subsidies or childcare quantity, this study offers a more holistic perspective, thereby complementing existing research on the determinants of fertility behavior. Second, it documents two key pathways—career aspiration and leisure accessibility—that help explain the correspondence between kindergarten development and fertility decisions. Third, the results offer actionable policy insights. Specifically, expanding kindergarten infrastructure and optimizing early childcare services emerge as viable strategies to address low fertility intentions. These findings provide critical theoretical and practical guidance for China to solve its low-fertility problem and achieve sustainable socioeconomic development.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the decline in China’s fertility rate and the policy responses. Section 3 reviews the relevant literature and formulates theoretical hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and variables. Section 5 introduces the methodology. The results are presented in Section 6. The final section discusses the results and provides conclusions.

As the largest developing economy, China is also faced with the issue of declining fertility rates. China’s TFR was approximately 6 in 1970, but it had declined significantly to around 1 by 2023, significantly below the replacement level of 2.1. The rapid decline in China’s fertility rate can be attributed to historical factors. In the early years of the People’s Republic of China, high fertility intentions among the population, coupled with relatively lenient government policies on childbirth, led to rapid population growth (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2024). In response to the challenges posed by overpopulation, the central government implemented the family planning policy in the 1970s, advocating for one child per couple. This policy effectively controlled population growth, with scholars estimating that it prevented the birth of 264–320 million people between 1972 and 2000 (Wan et al., 2020).

Since the beginning of the 21st century, improvements in living standards and advancements in medical technology have led to increased life expectancy. However, the decline in fertility rates has directly contributed to the deepening of China’s population aging. Recognizing the severity of the population structure imbalance, the government began adjusting its family planning policies. In 2011, the two-child policy was introduced, and in 2021, the policy was further relaxed to allow couples to have three children. Nevertheless, due to the long-tail effects of the family planning policy and the high costs of child-rearing, the relaxation of birth restrictions has had limited effect in increasing fertility. Figure 1 illustrates that China’s birth rate has been declining steadily since 2017, reaching a record low in 2023 since 1949. The birth rate has fallen significantly below the death rate, resulting in a natural population growth rate of −1.48‰. With the intensification of population aging, if fertility rates remain persistently low, it will pose significant challenges to the sustainable development of the economy and society. Enhancing fertility rates is a crucial strategy for addressing the population crisis. Specifically, effectively increasing individuals’ fertility intentions represents a key leverage point for improving national fertility rates.

In response to national fertility policies, China has prioritized the development of childcare services. During 2016–2017, the government introduced policy documents to guide and incentivize social organizations to establish non-profit women’s and children’s hospitals, affordable nurseries, and kindergartens. Qualified kindergartens were further urged to provide public early education guidance for children aged 0–3 to parents and communities (The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, & The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2015). In 2021, aligning with the three-child policy, China has promulgated policy documents that explicitly identify the establishment of an inclusive childcare service system as a key measure to enhance fertility support (The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, & The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2021). By 2024, the State Council has released a report on childcare services, which highlights persistent challenges, including insufficient supply, uneven service quality, and inadequate policy support (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2024). The report emphasized the urgent need to accelerate the expansion of childcare infrastructure and foster a socially supportive environment for childbearing to address these gaps.

This study analyzes the relationship between kindergarten development levels and fertility intentions using Poisson regression models based on five waves of CGSS data and the China Education Database. The results indicate that higher levels of kindergarten development are positively associated with increased fertility intentions. Each one-point increase in the total kindergarten score is associated with a 9% increase in the expected number of children. Hypothesis 1 is validated. Our findings are consistent with the previous research (Jiang, 2021; Chen et al., 2023). However, prior studies operated on markedly different time horizons, which range from short-term annual birth rates to long-term completed fertility, and are therefore not directly comparable in effect size or interpretation. And these studies primarily examined the relationship between kindergarten supply and fertility intentions from the perspectives of kindergarten quantity and availability, without focusing on the overall development level of kindergartens. It is worth noting that although the estimated percentage change in fertility intentions appears substantial, the corresponding absolute increase is relatively modest. This discrepancy stems from the low baseline value of expected number of children, which serves as the explained variable in our research. Therefore, while kindergarten development is statistically significantly associated with higher fertility intention, its practical relevance to the overall fertility level is limited and should not be overstated. Additionally, the potential directional nature of the relationship between fertility intentions and kindergarten development requires attention. For instance, regions with higher fertility intentions tend to have more children, which may correspond with greater investment in kindergarten construction in these regions. To address potential endogeneity issues, we employ instrumental variables, and the regression results remain consistent with the baseline findings. Robustness checks including sample adjustments, dataset replacements, and changes in dependent variables, as well as the consideration of policy implications, confirmed the stability of the baseline regression results.

In contexts with low-quality childcare services, the negative relationship between work-family imbalance-induced time pressures and fertility intentions becomes more pronounced (Begall and Mills, 2011). This suggests that higher quality of childcare services is associated with a reduction in the negative linkage between work-family imbalance and fertility intentions. We utilize the Bootstrap method to examine the mechanisms that help explain the linkage between kindergarten development and fertility intentions. Our study provides preliminary evidence suggesting that career aspiration and leisure accessibility may act as potential mediating factors in the relationship linking kindergarten development to fertility intentions. In contexts with higher kindergarten development levels, we observe less parental involvement in time-intensive childcare, alongside greater time allocated to career goals and leisure activities among parents. Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b are also validated. It should be noted that data constraints have limited our options in selecting proxies for mediating variables. While self-socioeconomic status can reflect the degree of career aspiration attainment to a certain extent, it is more indicative of attitudinal dimensions and neglects the impact of behavioral engagement on the realization of occupational aspirations. Moreover, access to leisure is not confined to social interaction, learning, and rest alone. Although our findings cannot fully capture the pathways through which kindergarten development is associated with fertility intentions, they can to some extent illustrate the linkages underlying this relationship.

The association between kindergarten development and fertility intentions varies across different demographic groups, which reflects the documented linkage between kindergarten availability and the mitigation of work–family conflicts, as well as corresponding trends in fertility intentions. Our findings indicate that compared to women with lower education levels, kindergarten development exhibits a stronger positive correspondence with fertility intentions among women with higher education levels. Compared to individuals with lower education levels, highly educated individuals often face more demanding and rapid lifestyles, making it challenging to balance household responsibilities and professional work (Schieman and Glavin, 2011; Rubenstein et al., 2022). High-quality kindergartens provide superior childcare services, a characteristic that corresponds with better work-family balance among parents. Therefore, these groups exhibit greater sensitivity to variations in kindergarten development levels.

The findings that high-quality kindergartens are associated with improved fertility intentions provide preliminary insights for addressing low-fertility challenges, though interpretations and applications of these insights should be cautious. This is because the empirical evidence is based on fertility intentions rather than realized fertility outcomes—with the translation of intentions into actual fertility behavior still requiring further verification. Nevertheless, the observed evidence may offer potential directions for optimizing demographic structures and fostering sustainable socioeconomic development in low-fertility countries, especially those where parents face more severe work–family conflicts. First, governments may warrant recognizing the potential role of kindergarten development in policies aimed at shaping fertility intentions and could consider proactive measures to expand the supply of kindergartens, enhance their accessibility, and thereby alleviate the childcare burden on families. Second, policymakers might focus on improving the quality of kindergarten services as a potential means to support fertility intentions. Feasible measures could include strengthening kindergarten teacher training, optimizing the allocation of educational resources, and upgrading supporting infrastructure. Finally, governments could explore encouraging and supporting eligible organizations and enterprises to establish on-site kindergartens and other welfare-oriented childcare facilities. Promoting social participation in the provision of kindergarten services may also help build a network of reliable, affordable, and accessible childcare resources.

There are still some limitations to this study. First, the price of kindergarten services, pedagogical quality, staff-child ratios, or parental satisfaction are important indicators for measuring the development of kindergartens. However, due to data constraints, we are unable to integrate these variables into the comprehensive kindergarten development index or investigate the characteristics of their linkage with fertility intentions. Second, the observed association between kindergarten development and fertility intentions may be partially moderated by family support, where reduced access to informal extended family childcare is associated with increased reliance on formal childcare provisions. Limited by data availability, we are unable to control for factors such as family support in the model. Third, with respect to the mechanisms that underpin the correspondence, the two indirect linkages identified in the study account for a relatively small share of the overall relationship, indicating limited explanatory power. Therefore, the specific pathways that characterize the association between kindergarten development and fertility intentions require further empirical investigation.