In 2006, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications announced the Plan for the Promotion of Tabunka-kyōsei in Local Communities which marked the institutional launch of Japan's tabunka-kyōsei policies (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), 2006).⁷ The plan defines tabunka-kyōsei as “the coexistence of people of different nationalities, ethnicities, and other backgrounds who recognize each other's cultural differences and build equal relationships while living together as members of the local community” (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), 2006). This plan is based on the principle of “respect for cultural differences,” but it does not necessarily involve the protection of rights or institutional recognition of cultural groups that figure in Western multiculturalism (CLAIR, 2020).^8,9

The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is responsible for formulating policy guidelines and sharing best practices, while the implementation of policies is delegated to local governments. According to the latest 2024 survey by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 995 local governments, approximately 56% of all 1,741 municipalities in Japan, have established Tabunka-kyōsei Promotion Plans (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2024). In areas with a high proportion of foreign residents, unique initiatives are being developed. For example, Hamamatsu City in Shizuoka Prefecture issued a Hamamatsu Intercultural City Vision in 2001 and established a comprehensive support system that includes support for schools for foreign residents, the provision of medical interpreters, and the operation of an international center through citizen collaboration (Hamamatsu City, 2023). The ratio of foreign residents in the city has reached approximately 4.3%. In Iwate Prefecture, located in northeastern Japan, disaster multilingual support systems were strengthened in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake, and efforts are being made to promote disaster prevention education for foreign residents and connect them with the local community (Iwate Prefectural Government, 2016).

Japanese tabunka-kyōsei is essentially consequentialist, as coexistence seems to be considered to exist when friction is avoided (Miyajima, 2009). For this reason, understanding of different cultures and regional harmony are emphasized, while cultural differences and rights issues tend to be overlooked. For example, while Japanese language acquisition is taken for granted as a prerequisite for daily life, the preservation of one's mother tongue and the establishment of institutional interpretation services are treated as supplementary measures (Tsuda, 2003). This harmonious view of coexistence (kyōsei) tends to create pressure for assimilation into the majority culture. As a result, a structure is preserved in which minorities are allowed to participate in cohesion only by conforming to the norms of the majority.

Theoretically, the problem lies in the fact that the concept of tabunka-kyōsei is constructed from the perspective of the majority (Ishihara, 2004). As pointed out by feminist criticism, it is important to note that inclusion and coexistence can often function as strategies of domination (Fraser, 2000). Minorities are only made visible when they are deemed harmless by the majority population.

In practice, discretionary responses by local governments are the mainstay, and discussions on institutional legitimacy and rights protection remain underdeveloped (Arudou, 2015). While cultural exchange events and mutual understanding programs are widely conducted, fundamental discussions on how to define the units of recognition or boundaries of rights for foreigners and minority groups tend to be avoided.

In particular, as long as foreign residents remain a minority, problems do not surface, but once their population exceeds a certain threshold and cultural symbols such as religious facilities and signs in their native languages become visible, friction among residents and the limitations of administrative responses become apparent. Until now, tabunka-kyōsei in Japan has prioritized on-the-ground coordination and conflict avoidance over institutional recognition of culture and collective rights (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2022).

While the social pressure to conform (dōchō-atsuryoku) is often recognized and self-reflected upon by Japanese citizens themselves, its direct linkage to Confucianism remains a matter of scholarly debate. In my view, although values associated with Confucianism—such as hierarchy, filial piety, and respect for harmony—may overlap with social norms in Japan, it is difficult to establish a clear causal relationship between Confucian philosophy and Japan's current approach to cultural diversity. Furthermore, if one were to assert such a relationship, comparative studies with countries such as South Korea, where Confucian influence is arguably stronger, would be necessary. Nevertheless, some scholars have argued that Confucian legacies in East Asia may contribute to societal norms that prioritize group harmony and hierarchies, potentially shaping the assimilation-oriented tendencies seen in Japanese multicultural policies.¹⁰

Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor argued in his seminal work, The Politics of Recognition, that the demand for recognition in modern society underlies political movements such as nationalism, feminism, and multiculturalism (Taylor, 1994). According to Taylor, humans are “self-interpreting animals” who form their identities in relation to others. Therefore, misrecognition is not merely a matter of disrespect, but can become a serious wound that leads to self-hatred (Taylor, 1994, pp. 25–26, 65–66).

Taylor's argument calls for the guarantee of universal citizenship and compensatory consideration for groups that have been culturally and historically disadvantaged. He proposes a dual policy framework to balance universality and differences. For example, Quebec's language protection policies and the self-determination rights of indigenous peoples are defended on this basis (Taylor, 1994, pp. 52–61). Taylor's argument demonstrates that the existence of multiple cultures is not merely a matter of the rights of their members, but also has value in terms of the diversity and richness of the public sphere itself (Taylor, 1994, pp. 58–61, 71–73). This position is consistent with Raz's argument that diverse values and cultural options must actually exist in society for autonomous choice to be possible (Raz, 1986).

However, such cultural preservation policies also carry the risk of excessive segregation and exclusion, and it has been pointed out that separate education, for example, may hinder the integration of society as a whole. While Taylor's theory provides a humanistic and philosophical justification for multiculturalism, there is still room for consideration regarding its policy implications.

Another Canadian theorist Will Kymlicka develops a theory of multicultural citizenship based on the premise that cultural identity is indispensable for the realization of a good life for individuals (Kymlicka, 1998). A distinctive feature of his argument lies in his classification of minority groups according to their historical backgrounds, and in proposing institutional rights appropriate to the circumstances of each group. Specifically, Kymlicka distinguishes between multination states and polyethnic states, using the term “multination” (rather than “multinational”) to highlight the political and historical dimensions of national identity.

A multination state refers to a country that includes multiple nations within its borders, such as indigenous peoples or historically settled ethnic minorities who were often subjected to assimilationist policies. In such cases, Kymlicka argues for the necessity of external protections—institutional rights that allow these groups to preserve their cultural practices and self-governance as a form of collective autonomy.

A polyethnic state, by contrast, refers to societies that have experienced large-scale immigration, where cultural minorities have migrated voluntarily. Here, the primary concern is how to accommodate cultural diversity while facilitating integration into the mainstream society. Rather than autonomy, the focus is on multicultural rights within shared institutions.

Kymlicka further classifies the rights of minorities into two types: internal restrictions and external protections. Internal restrictions refer to limitations imposed within a group, such as preserving traditional norms or values, but Kymlicka is cautious about these, emphasizing that such restrictions should not infringe upon the individual rights and freedoms of group members. In contrast, external protections are justified as means to safeguard a group's practices and status from unfair disadvantages or cultural dominance imposed by the majority society.

Building on these distinctions, Kymlicka identifies three specific categories of minority rights: self-government rights (autonomy), multicultural rights, and special representation rights (Kymlicka, 1998, p. 9). These rights are all grounded in the liberal principle of individual autonomy and aim to ensure fair conditions for self-determination, cultural survival, and democratic participation.

However, Kymlicka's classification does not necessarily capture the full complexity of real-world situations. For instance, in countries like Japan, which historically have not embraced large-scale immigration or recognized themselves as multination states, the boundary between multination and polyethnic frameworks remains ambiguous. As a result, challenges persist in institutional design and policy development regarding how to recognize and accommodate diverse cultural identities in a context that lacks explicit multicultural policy foundations.

In his seminal work, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2000), British philosopher Bhikhu Parekh fundamentally criticizes Western political theory for implicitly treating Western values and lifestyles as “universal”. He points out that the “cultural premises” underlying what a state considers to be justice or equality are often unconsciously biased toward a single culture. For example, values such as freedom, rationality, autonomy, and progress originated from specific cultural traditions and may not necessarily have the same meaning for other cultures. Therefore, states should not unilaterally impose ostensibly universal values but rather listen to the unique value frameworks of diverse cultures and make value judgements in a relative and dialogical manner (Parekh, 2000). Parekh positions cultural diversity not as a “special problem within liberalism,” but as an essential challenge that demands a reconfiguration of political philosophy as a whole. In this sense, his theory differs from “cultural relativism” and instead proposes a vision of “intercultural universalism” that encompasses mutual criticism and the possibility of reconfiguration.

Parekh's central argument is that in a multicultural society, each culture should relativize itself in relation to others and transform itself through dialogue. In other words, the key to social integration lies not in unilateral “assimilation” but in “mutual transformation” (Parekh, 2000). In this process, it is necessary to critically examine each other's values and customs, accept partial revisions, and build a common public sphere.

He also argues that the state should not pretend to be culturally neutral, but should aim to be a “morally self-aware state” that guarantees the recognition and participation of diverse cultural groups (Parekh, 2000). This is a proposal for institutional and ethical change based on reflection on the past, when the state used neutrality as an excuse for substantive exclusion. Rather than focusing on specific groups such as indigenous peoples and immigrants, his argument is characterized by its focus on the general structure of cultural diversity and the principles of governance, and its theorization of the reconstruction of the relationship between the state, citizens, and cultures.

The core of multiculturalism policy lies in respecting and recognizing the identities of groups with distinct cultural attributes such as religion, language, and lifestyle. This goes beyond mere tolerance and includes support through public institutions and budgets. For example, in the United Kingdom, policies such as mother tongue education, approval of religious ceremonies, and provision of places of worship have been implemented since the 1980s (Modood, 2007).

While multiculturalism has been justified in Canada, cautionary arguments have been raised regarding the separatist tendencies of minorities in Quebec and other regions (Bibby, 1990). In the early 2000s, voices pointing out the limitations of multiculturalism spread across European countries. This was due to a tendency for cultural groups to form closed communities and avoid engagement with the rest of society. Such trends were viewed as problematic, as they could lead to radicalization among some young people and serve as a breeding ground for homegrown terrorism. In various European countries, concerns about national integration and social cohesion have led to political reassessments of multicultural policies. In Germany, then Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked in 2010 that attempts to build a multicultural society had not achieved their goals, sparking renewed debates on integration models (The Guardian, 2010). In the United Kingdom, then-Prime Minister David Cameron similarly critiqued “state multiculturalism” in a 2011 speech, arguing for a stronger national identity and shared values (Government UK, 2011). These political framings, though controversial, reflect broader societal anxieties rather than empirically established causal relationships. More recently, Sweden's coalition government, supported by right-leaning parties including the Sweden Democrats, has adopted more restrictive immigration measures, citing challenges of integration and public sentiment (Ringstrom and Johnson, 2022).

In response to such criticism, many countries are shifting their policies toward striking a balance between “cultural recognition” and “social integration.” In the United Kingdom, “community cohesion” policies are being promoted, while Germany and Denmark are advancing “integration policies,” focusing on language education, employment support, and fostering mutual understanding (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). The key to such policies lies not only in supporting minorities but also in holding the majority population responsible for understanding other cultures and engaging in dialogue. School education, community events, and media awareness campaigns are central to this approach.¹³

“Multiculturalism” in countries such as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom is based on the institutional recognition of cultural groups, with explicit provisions for the maintenance and respect of specific cultures in education, welfare, and language policies (Kymlicka, 2001; Parekh, 2000). In contrast, Japan's “tabunka-kyōsei is an administrative term led by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications that lacks a clearly defined philosophical concept and does not explicitly state that “cultural diversity contributes to the public interest,” thereby differing from multiculturalism (CLAIR, 2020). Japanese “tabunka-kyōsei is not a concept that has been carefully thought out philosophically but a slogan reminiscent of the phrase “harmony is to be valued” that is said to have been established by Prince Shōtoku in the early 7th century as the first article of Japan's first written constitution, “The Seventeen Article Constitution”. It cannot be said to define the rights of cultural groups or the meaning of coexistence. Given this nature, “tabunka-kyōsei can be interpreted as a utilitarian term aimed at avoiding trouble and maintaining peaceful daily life. Furthermore, the ultimate goal of tabunka-kyōsei seems to be adaptation to Japanese society, and it does not appear that the preservation of cultural diversity among cultural groups is regarded as an important right. As a result, “tabunka-kyōsei seems to have been widely accepted as an abstract slogan on the same level as “everyone should get along” in general moral education through campaigns implemented by the government and educational institutions. A Japanese Sociologist Naoto Higuchi acknowledges a significant gap between tabunka-kyōsei as a general idea and as a policy term. However, he states that “the concept of tabunka-kyōsei itself is not meaningless; depending on how it is restructured, it can be made effective and serve as an ideological goal.” [Translated by author] (Takaya et al., 2019, p. 130).

Regarding indigenous peoples (Ainu in northern Hokkaido and Ryukyu in southern Okinawa), cultural promotion measures are being implemented, but there has been no apology or compensation for their historical oppression, nor has affirmative action been taken. In particular, regarding the Ainu people, the Ainu Policy Promotion Act (Act No. 16 of 2019) enacted in 2019 recognized the Ainu people for the first time as an “indigenous people,” and the law aims to promote policies to realize a society where the pride of the Ainu people is respected. However, under the Hokkaido Former Indigenous People Protection Law, which was in effect prior to the Ainu Cultural Promotion Law enacted in 1997, the derogatory term native (dojin, used since the Meiji era in the 19th century) was still in use (Siddle, 2014). To this day, the Japanese government has not issued an official apology for the discriminatory treatment of the Ainu people since the Meiji government's rule, and in this regard, its response can be considered insufficient in terms of multiculturalism.

Old-comers—mainly Zainichi Koreans, referring to Koreans and their descendants who either migrated from the Korean Peninsula during Japan's colonial rule (1910–1945) or were born in Japan to such families—are generally indistinguishable from Japanese people in appearance. Especially from the second generation onward, they are often regarded as effectively integrated into Japanese society, due in part to their native-level Japanese language proficiency. However, issues related to permanent residency status and the acquisition of Japanese nationality remain central to their situation.

New-comers—Brazilian, Filipino, Vietnamese and others—have been accepted since the 1990s as a necessary labor force for economic growth, but they have been treated as “tolerated” as “those who are expected to return to their home countries in the future”. “The Japanese government does not officially recognize these people as “immigrants”.¹⁴

In Japan, mother tongue education to nurture minority cultural identity relies on private international schools and ethnic schools (Korean schools, Brazilian schools, etc.). Public schools in Japan have taken measures such as assigning teachers to support minority students' learning, but public support for mother tongue education is limited to cultural introduction and international exchange programs. This is because the original purpose of tabunka-kyōsei as a public policy in Japan is not to maintain the cultural identities of minorities from other countries, but rather to promote understanding of and exchange with Japanese people (Takaya et al., 2019, p. 106–128).

Overall, the theories of multiculturalism proposed by Taylor, Kymlicka, and Parekh provide a political philosophical basis for “recognition at the level of cultural units” (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 2001; Parekh, 2000). However, Japan's tabunka-kyōsei policies lack clarity regarding their ideal and philosophical foundations, and they appear to be weak in their connection to political philosophy and rights discourse, instead leaning heavily toward pragmatism.

Recognition refers to the acceptance of one's existence and identity by others, which has a profound impact on one's self-evaluation and self-esteem beyond mere material benefits. A lack of recognition may lead to psychological distress, social exclusion, and even alienation from social relationships (Honneth, 1996). For instance, when people voluntarily pick up trash in their neighborhoods, their actions can be interpreted not only as altruism but also as an effort to be recognized as contributing members of the community. From this perspective, unilateral support for cultural minorities—when it frames them merely as vulnerable recipients of aid—can unintentionally undermine their dignity and hinder their desire to be acknowledged as equal members of society. Social recognition requires not only compassion but also acknowledgment of minorities' capacity to contribute. When individuals from minority backgrounds engage in community service or other forms of social contribution, it strengthens their recognition within society as citizens with equal status and capabilities, rather than as passive beneficiaries.

Honneth's distinction between three domains of recognition—love, legal recognition, and recognition in the social sphere—is significant in that it enables analysis of social recognition in addition to administrative and legal recognition (Honneth, 1996). This is similar to the achievement of Hannah Arendt, who, in The Human Condition, introduced the category of “action” in addition to “labor” and “work” as forms of human existence (Arendt, 1958). In other words, Honneth's social recognition serves as a perspective for evaluating the significance of citizens' social participation. For example, in a multicultural society, there may be cases where members of minority groups have certain legal recognition (citizenship) but lack social recognition in the social sphere, or conversely, cases where non-regular residents who lack legal recognition obtain social recognition through community participation.

Moreover, Honneth's theory of recognition offers a complementary framework for reinterpreting T.H. Marshall's classic theory of citizenship (Marshall, 2021). Marshall describes a historical development of citizenship progressing from civil rights (18th century), to political rights (19th century), and finally to social rights (20th century). While this trajectory is often viewed as the expansion of legal entitlements, it can also be interpreted as a deepening of societal recognition. Marshall's stages and Honneth's categories align as follows: civil and political rights correspond to the sphere of legal recognition, fostering self-respect, whereas social rights resonate with the dimension of social solidarity, enhancing self-esteem. Importantly, legal recognition continues to play a role even in the realization of social rights, underscoring the layered and overlapping nature of recognition across institutional domains. Taylor and Kymlicka's multiculturalism theory emphasizes the “double guarantee” of legal recognition for cultural groups and civic recognition for the state, and justifies this (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995). However, Honneth's theory stresses that social recognition from the whole society through public social participation is indispensable, beyond the legal recognition of collective identity. This is compatible with Parekh's argument in that it recognizes the necessity of engagement with society as a whole and the risk of community separation (Parekh, 2000).

This three-stage theory of recognition is useful not only for analyzing individual cases but also for comparing recognition structures in different multicultural societies, i.e., for understanding the differences in institutional designs and ideologies in countries such as Canada, Germany, and Japan. Furthermore, Honneth's perspective that the three domains are interrelated contributes to a dynamic analysis of whether the enhancement of one domain (e.g., legal recognition) leads to the enhancement of other domains (e.g., social evaluation). In this way, the theory of recognition serves as a “framework for recognition and organization” that provides a theoretical foundation for everything from describing the current situation to identifying issues and designing institutions.

While Honneth emphasizes that social recognition is grounded in individuals' perceived contributions to society, it is crucial to distinguish his notion of “achievement” from a narrow meritocratic or economic perspective. Rather than referring solely to professional or productive success, Honneth's concept of achievement includes diverse forms of social contribution, such as caregiving, volunteerism, or cultural engagement, provided they are valued within a given social context (Honneth, 1996, p. 121–125).¹⁵

Honneth's argument regarding the necessity of social recognition is also mentioned in Taylor's (1994) examination of The Politics of Recognition, but it raises the question of whether recognition from a more inclusive society is unnecessary in cases where isolated communities such as the Amish in the United States are satisfied with recognition within their own group.

Furthermore, it is theoretically possible to treat such communities as objects of “tolerance” from an inclusive society. However, because this carries the risk of severing public engagement, social recognition is indispensable for (Honneth 1996). In this way, treating social recognition as a “normative theory” makes it possible to visualize imbalances and deficiencies in recognition, thereby providing a normative theoretical tool that can give direction to future social policies.

Honneth, following Hegel, tends to view the struggle for recognition in society as a process of historical progress that is, the expansion of freedom (Honneth, 1996). Social friction and conflict are said to expand the realm of recognition and lead to the realization of more universal freedom and autonomy. However, this framework may not necessarily apply to current or future societies. In modern society, the concepts of freedom and autonomy are becoming ambiguous through new forms of domination and governance, such as nudge theory (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) and technology (e.g., algorithmic preference guidance). Even when individual free choice appears to be respected on the surface, it is often the result of unconscious guidance and cannot be considered true autonomy in the original sense. Therefore, a skeptical perspective is necessary regarding Honneth's linear progression from - struggle for recognition → institutional reform → advancement of freedom. As a result, the value of Honneth's theory is limited to demonstrating the probability of mutual recognition, and it does not necessarily mean that the struggle for recognition will be realized and institutional progress will follow.

Honneth's three-category classification (love, legal recognition, solidarity) allows for a careful understanding of the structure of recognition, but in actual application, one should not be overly fixated on this classification (Honneth, 1996). This is because, in social phenomena, multiple domains of recognition often overlap and influence one another, making clear distinctions difficult in many cases. Furthermore, in a comparative social context, there are diverse forms of recognition depending on the country and system, such as cases where legal status is guaranteed but social esteem is lacking, or cases where “human rights can be asserted but recognition is not granted at the national level.” For this reason, rather than strictly applying the classification, it is desirable to apply the conceptual framework flexibly.

In this section, selected local practices are illustratively introduced to explore how recognition theory can illuminate the challenges and potential of Japan's tabunka-kyōsei.¹⁶ The concept of tabunka-kyōsei promoted by the Japanese government primarily focuses on differences in nationality, ethnicity, language, and culture. Policies formulated by local governments and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications have been implemented with a focus on coexistence with foreign residents and immigrants.¹⁷ However, specific goals vary depending on the minority group in question. For example, the Ainu are targeted for cultural exchange and awareness programs, with an emphasis on promoting traditional culture. Regarding “legal recognition,” it is granted within the framework of residence status. For groups such as Zainichi Koreans (Korean ethnic communities residing in Japan) and technical trainees, the focus is on cross-cultural communication and Japanese language education, and policies aimed at preserving and ensuring cultural identity are not a priority. Within the framework of Honneth's recognition theory, the fundamental goal of tabunka-kyōsei can be explained through the “social recognition” of minority groups in Japan.

Movement in this direction is evident in the revision of the 2006 Tabunka-kyōsei Promotion Plan implemented in September 2020 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2020). The revised plan, updated in line with the diversification of foreign residents and changes in Japan's socio-economic situation, outlines the following four strategic priorities: (1) Building a “new normal” through the promotion of a diverse and inclusive society; (2) Promoting the contribution of foreign residents to regional revitalization and globalization; (3) Promoting the active participation of foreign residents in local communities and diversifying the number of people involved; and (4) Establishing a decentralized framework for accepting foreign residents to prevent excessive concentration in urban areas. This revised plan supports the employment and social integration of international students while encouraging local governments to engage with foreign residents not merely as “objects of support” but as “active partners” in community development. These revisions signify a policy shift from one-way support to mutual engagement and recognition, aiming to expand the concept of “tabunka-kyōsei from a framework of cultural tolerance to one of inclusive participation and shared responsibility in community governance (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2020).

Japan's tabunka-kyōsei policies are implemented through collaboration among local governments, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, NPOs, and other relevant actors, based on the number and characteristics of foreign residents in each region. The revised plan outlines directions for addressing these challenges, and while some progress has been made in the implementation of tabunka-kyōsei policies to date, structural challenges remain.

First, while physical coexistence exists, there is a lack of psychological and social interaction with “invisible others.” In particular, prejudice, discriminatory attitudes, and indifference hinder the building of mutual understanding and trust. In response to this situation, staff members of international exchange associations and NPOs in various regions are actively working with limited resources, but cuts in financial support from the national government and a shortage of human resources are placing serious constraints on the continuation of activities and the treatment of staff (e.g., SPIRA in Saga Prefecture and HICE in Hamamatsu City; see institutional overview in Section 2). This is not unrelated to the fantasy of a “single-ethnic nation” that is deeply rooted in Japanese society. Japan's immigration policy has been consistently selective and restrictive, and despite professing to promote tabunka-kyōsei, there are virtually no substantive “institutional integration policies.” As a result, policy resources and implementation systems to support tabunka-kyōsei are inadequate, creating the risk of a vicious cycle of policy indifference → marginalization of minorities → self-fulfilling prophecies.

Regarding public recognition and institutional responses to the protection of ethnic identity among minority groups, “integration” into the host society (i.e., Japanese society) is often taken for granted, while the preservation of individual cultural traditions and languages is often viewed as a secondary issue. In fact, while there are cases in which teachers proficient in foreign languages provide individual support in public schools, this is not systematically implemented as a policy, unlike Canada's multilingual education policy. As an exception, in Ōizumi Town, Gunma Prefecture, several Brazilian schools offer Portuguese language education to support children and residents who may return to Brazil (Jōmō Shimbunsha, 2022). For other language groups, however, such as American, French, and Korean schools are private institutions, and receive only limited support from public authorities.

With regard to education, the “right to education” as stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child is not fully guaranteed for foreign children in Japan, and the Japanese compulsory education system does not apply to foreigners. Furthermore, since children's residence status is linked to that of their parents, their enrollment in school tends to be unstable. The failure to fulfill the “right to education” for foreign children not only poses functional issues that hinder their social integration but also raises universal human rights concerns, specifically regarding “legal recognition.” Such institutional vulnerabilities pose serious risks of adversely affecting children during their identity formation period. In particular, parents' feelings of social alienation and stress can spread to the intimate sphere of the family, potentially adversely affecting children's self-esteem and social participation through parent-child relationships.

According to Honneth's recognition theory, this can be interpreted as a structural vicious cycle in which the lack of solidarity, as recognition in the social sphere “recognition in the intimate sphere.” Furthermore, when foreign children are unable to maintain their native language and cultural heritage, they face the risk of communication breakdown with their parents and reversal of social status, which may make close communication between parents and children difficult. As a result, the home, which should function as a safe place, may fail to provide a safe space, potentially leading to problems with “approval in the intimate sphere” in parent-child relationships. Furthermore, these family circumstances may compel children to hide their foreign roots or try to make them less noticeable, which could pose a risk to “social recognition.” (Takaya et al., 2019, p. 118).

Regarding language ability, according to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (2024) Survey on the Acceptance of Children and Students Requiring Japanese Language Education, the number of children and students in public elementary, junior high, and high schools who require Japanese language instruction reached 69,123 as of May 2023. This represents an increase of 10,816 students (18.6%) compared to the previous 2021 survey, and nearly double the number from 2008. Of these, 57,718 were foreign nationals (a 21.2% increase from 2021), while 11,405 were Japanese nationals, including children of returnees and those with foreign-born parents (a 6.7% increase). Among students identified as needing language support, 90.4% of foreign nationals and 86.6% of Japanese nationals received instruction with special consideration from schools. However, these support rates slightly declined compared to the previous survey, suggesting that schools are struggling to keep up with the rising number of students in need. Moreover, while 90.3% of Japanese language learners proceed to upper secondary school (a slight increase from 89.9% in 2021), this remains significantly lower than the overall transition rate of 99.0%. The dropout rate among such students is 8.5%, a sharp contrast to the national average of 1.1%. University enrollment among these students stands at 46.6%, compared to 75.0% of all high school graduates, while the non-regular employment rate among those who do find work is 38.6% (vs. 3.1% nationally). These disparities highlight serious structural barriers to educational attainment and social mobility for students requiring Japanese language instruction. Furthermore, despite the Japanese government's emphasis on the importance of Japanese language education in daily life in language support programs for adult immigrants, the level of Japanese required for their daily lives appears to be far from sufficient for employment purposes. Language education for foreign workers, such as technical trainees, who are essentially immigrants, is inadequate because it is based on the assumption that they will return to their home countries after a few years. It has been pointed out that Japan's language support is far weaker than language training programs aimed at integrating immigrants into the labor market in countries such as Germany, France, Australia, the Netherlands, and Denmark (OECD member countries) (Takaya et al., 2019, p. 33–34; OECD, 2018; MIPEX, 2020). These circumstances are considered to pose serious risks to “social recognition” achieved through language-mediated communication and mutual understanding, as well as the related “recognition within the intimate sphere”.

As mentioned above, current tabunka-kyōsei policies face numerous challenges. Additionally, since these policies vary in content depending on the number of foreign residents and regional characteristics in each municipality, it is difficult to evaluate the status of efforts to address these challenges in a generalized manner. However, in the area of “social recognition,” which is the primary focus of tabunka-kyōsei policies, some advanced initiatives are also emerging.

As a good example of promoting exchange between foreign residents and local residents and supporting Japanese language education, we would first like to highlight Hamamatsu City in Shizuoka Prefecture, which is working to promote the participation of foreign residents in the local community by shifting the perception of foreigners from “people who need support” to “equal residents.” In Hamamatsu City, which has a high foreign resident population and proportion, the Hamamatsu International Center for Exchange (HICE), a public interest incorporated foundation, has established multilingual websites and consultation desks for foreigners, and implemented awareness campaigns including resident training sessions and interview booklets (based on an interview with HICE representatives on April 22, 2025). Hamamatsu City is the only municipality in Japan officially recognized as an “Intercultural City” by the Council of Europe (Council of Europe, 2008), and Oizumi Town's initiatives are clearly aligned with this direction. Oizumi Town in Gunma Prefecture, which has a large foreign population similar to Hamamatsu City and the highest percentage of foreign residents in Japan, has been accepting Brazilian Japanese as necessary labor for local industries since the early 1990s. The Oizumi Town Office Multicultural Collaboration Division and the Oizumi International Exchange Association have been at the forefront of implementing Japanese language classes for foreign residents and actively supporting their participation in community activities. Oizumi Town, with its large population of Japanese Brazilians, actively hosts events such as the “Samba Festival” and “World Gourmet Alley,” which feature professional performers from Brazil. These events serve as a platform for cultural exchange between minority groups and local residents (Jōmō Shimbunsha, 2022; based on interviews with Ōizumi Town Hall staff and a member of the Ōizumi International Association on April 23, 2025). The Council of Europe (2008) has been promoting The Intercultural Cities Programme (ICC) as a model for multicultural societies since 2008, aiming to actively utilize the cultural diversity brought by immigrants and minority groups to revitalize cities and foster creativity. Even in areas where the number and proportion of foreign residents are not high, there are regions that are actively promoting tabunka-kyōsei. For example, in Saga Prefecture, the Saga Prefectural Multicultural Promotion Division and the Saga Prefecture International Exchange Association (SPIRA) are at the forefront of promoting community-based tabunka-kyōsei, providing Japanese language education support and consultation services in three formats: community-based, corporate-based, and online. Additionally, the organizers create opportunities for residents to interact directly through “town meetings.” (based on an interview with staff members of the Saga Prefectural Multicultural Promotion Division on May 19, 2025).

Tabunka-kyōsei policies are also being promoted by entities other than local governments. The NPO “Multicultural Center Tokyo” in Tokyo operates a paid free school four days a week, offering Japanese language education and supplementary lessons on the curriculum taught in Japanese middle and high schools (Multicultural Center Tokyo, 2025). The center prioritizes academic performance improvement, fostering self-esteem, and promoting social interaction (based on an interview with center staff on April 24, 2025).

The tabunka-kyōsei initiatives of these local governments and NPOs are significant in that they have the potential to bring positive feedback to intimate areas by promoting the realization of “social recognition,” which is a key component of Honneth's recognition theory. For example, foreign children and students who are unfamiliar with Japanese are at a higher risk of bullying and isolation in school life, and in some cases, may face difficulties in their daily lives. As globalization progresses, English is useful as a common international language, but Japanese is the foundation of daily life in Japan, and its acquisition is indispensable. From this perspective, enhancing Japanese language education is essential, and multicultural education that addresses prejudice and discrimination is considered a meaningful policy for building the foundation of social recognition.

This section has examined how selected local practices in Japan, when viewed through the lens of Honneth's theory of recognition, exemplify both the strengths and the limitations of tabunka-kyōsei. In light of the innovative initiatives undertaken by local governments and NPOs, these policies hold certain potential and prospects despite the various challenges already mentioned. For example, continuing and strengthening existing measures such as Japanese language education, intercultural understanding education, and promoting resident exchanges could expand social recognition of cultural minorities and reduce barriers between cultural groups. This is also important from the perspective of preventing the “ghettoization” of specific ethnic groups. In the legal domain, it is necessary to guarantee universal human rights such as the right to education within the framework of residence status. However, policies that promote changes in civic awareness through multicultural education and intercultural exchange are also important in terms of fostering understanding and support for the protection of the rights of foreign residents. The asymmetry in legal status between nationals and non-nationals is an unavoidable issue within the framework of national sovereignty, but even if attempts are made to equalize legal status through naturalization or the introduction of multicultural citizenship, there is a risk that nominal equality will not lead to substantive integration if social recognition is lacking. In this regard, in a multicultural society based on the framework of national sovereignty, efforts to build social recognition within the institutional framework are essential for both the host society and minority groups. From this perspective, the concept and policies of tabunka-kyōsei are considered to have significance and potential for realization. Furthermore, the realization of solidarity, understood as recognition in the social sphere, is considered to contribute to the enhancement of recognition in the intimate sphere and self-respect, which are inseparable from it. For example, when foreign residents contribute to local communities, this leads to social recognition, both of which in turn stabilizes recognition relationships within intimate circles such as family relationships and further promotes social participation, creating a virtuous cycle.