Rumor has it that psychology is in deep crisis. Based on the observation that many psychological studies cannot be replicated (Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Marsman et al., 2017), this crisis has often been termed a replication crisis (Simmons et al., 2011; Pashler and Wagenmakers, 2012). Most recommendations for addressing this crisis and for ensuring the quality of psychological science have either focused on improving existing statistical and quantitative-experimental methods or emphasized the importance of embracing open science practices (e.g., through preregistrations as well as sharing data and materials; Nosek et al., 2015). At the same time, however, there are also researchers suggesting that psychology should additionally be more open to embracing cultural diversity (Henrich et al., 2010; Apicella et al., 2020), cross-temporal variation (Hutmacher and Mayrhofer, 2021, 2023; Muthukrishna et al., 2021; Hutmacher, 2022) as well as the insights that the psychological humanities have to offer (Teo, 2017; Malich and Rehmann-Sutter, 2022). Arguably, such a diversified understanding of the subject matter of psychology would also be mirrored in the application of a diversified set of research methods that could account for the complexity and multilayeredness of the phenomena under investigation (e.g., Mayrhofer and Hutmacher, 2020; Hutmacher and Mayrhofer, 2021).

While moving (Western) academic psychology toward more methodological pluralism—in the sense that a greater range of different methods is accepted as legitimate and used for studying psychological phenomena—may sound desirable, it is far from clear what embracing methodological pluralism would mean for everyday research practices. On the one hand, there are researchers arguing in favor of an “anything goes” attitude that allows researchers to use the methods they prefer and asks them to develop tolerance for other researchers subscribing to other methodologies (cf. Zitzmann and Loreth, 2021). On the other hand, it has been pointed out that methodological pluralism should not be equated with such an “anything goes” attitude but has to be based on a thorough analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches and paradigms (Yanchar and Slife, 1997, 2000; Healy, 2012). In line with this, Teo (2021) emphasized that methods need to “do justice” to the psychological phenomena under investigation, implying that a particular method may be adequate under certain conditions but not under others. Of course, this leads to the intricate key question as to which method is appropriate for studying which phenomenon. One attempt to answer this question was made by Groeben (1986) in his book Handeln, Tun, Verhalten als Einheiten einer verstehend-erklärenden Psychologie (Acting, Doing, Behaving as Units of an Interpretive-Explanatory Psychology). Although it is almost 40 years since the book has been published, it may still help to start thinking about what “doing justice” to psychological phenomena would entail.

Groeben distinguishes between two ways of investigating human mind and behavior that can be traced back through the entire history of academic psychology. On the one hand, those who share a natural science perspective on psychology typically approach human behavior using quantitative-experimental methods and aim at establishing covering laws that can explain this behavior. On the other hand, those who hold a perspective grounded in the humanities typically approach human behavior using hermeneutic methods and aim at describing behavior. Groeben criticizes both approaches as being incomplete. The natural science perspective is reductionist as it neglects the fact that humans are not passive objects in a pre-determined universe but rational and autonomous beings who are able to act intentionally and to communicate in meaningful ways. As Groeben sees it, the perspective grounded in the humanities, which puts great emphasis on acknowledging the subjectivity and the freedom of the individual and thus has a richer understanding of human nature, does not offer a viable alternative as it has abandoned the idea of explaining human behavior and is satisfied with merely describing it.

Even though Groeben's theoretical framework provides an interesting attempt to address the question as to how methodological pluralism can be put into action, it comes with several limitations. To begin with, it has been demonstrated that it is notoriously difficult to reconstruct the meaning of an observable behavior (cf. Shweder, 1977), casting doubt on the possibility of determining beyond any doubt whether one is facing an instance of acting, doing, or behaving. In line with this, it appears far from clear that the three levels of analysis are as independent as postulated by Groeben and that their investigation needs to be put into a hierarchical order. Quite the contrary, it seems reasonable to assume that conscious goals and intentions, unconscious motives, and hard-wired behavior tendencies often all contribute to a specific observable behavior. If this were the case, one could still hold that contemporary psychology devotes too little attention to analyzing humans as intentional agents, that all levels need to be taken into account to arrive at an adequate understanding of psychological phenomena, and that researchers should reflect in more detail about the level of analysis at which they are operating. That is, keeping in mind the distinction between acting, doing, and behaving may help researchers to improve the conceptual clarity of their theories and the methodological rigor of their investigations (cf. Bringmann et al., 2022). However, choosing a level of analysis would ultimately be up to the researcher's focus and interest.

Apart from that, academic psychology has developed a host of quantitative and qualitative as well as mixed methods suited for specific purposes (cf. Bryman, 2006; Schoonenboom and Johnson, 2017), which do not fit with the narrow set of methodological categories that Groeben has proposed. Hence, strictly adhering to the scheme proposed by Groeben may ultimately rather endanger than support a productive and methodologically diversified academic psychology. In the worst case, one runs the risk of introducing new methodological norms: That is, taking Groeben's framework as the last word on how researchers can “do justice” to the psychological phenomena under investigation would mean putting a premature end to a debate that is in fact still ongoing. One aspect of this debate that has not been mentioned so far and that also does not play a role in Groeben's framework is the complicated question whether the different perspectives on the human psyche are commensurable in the sense that different methodological approaches associated with these perspectives simply capture different aspects of the same phenomena or whether these different perspectives are linked to ontologically different phenomena (cf. Koch, 1993). In accordance with this, Teo (2021) argued that a method that is “doing justice” to a certain kind of psychological phenomenon may be problematic when being applied to another kind of psychological phenomenon, suggesting that there are limits to the application of each method. Taken together, this demonstrates that implementing a version of methodological pluralism that goes beyond a mere “anything goes” attitude and that “does justice” to the psychological phenomena under investigation is not only desperately needed but also far from trivial to achieve. While Norbert Groeben may ultimately not be able to offer a viable framework, he at least offers a thought-provoking starting point for reflecting upon a version of methodological pluralism that could provide a satisfying answer to psychology's current crises.

FH developed the research idea and wrote the manuscript.