Radicalization identifies the process by which a person comes to adopt extreme political, social, or religious ideologies and attitudes, often to the point of supporting or engaging in acts of violence (see Borum, 2011; Hafez and Mullins, 2015). Conspiracy ideation involves the perception that groups of social agents might be colluding to achieve nefarious objectives (Imhoff et al., 2022). Political radicalization, violent extremism, and conspiracy ideation are often lumped into the selfsame family of phenomena. For instance, that conspiracy beliefs would be at the source of extremism and violence is repeatedly advanced in mass media (Kunzelman, 2022) and within academic circles (e.g., van Prooijen et al., 2015; Jolley et al., 2022). Might these distinct phenomena actually partake of shared psychologies? Both conspiracy ideation and radicalization involve the adoption of extreme beliefs and ideologies and a similar sense of paranoia and/or distrust of the established order (e.g., van Prooijen et al., 2015; Vegetti and Littvay, 2022). Anxiety, humiliation, shame, guilt, contempt, pride, and elation, among other emotions, have been linked to the above-mentioned social pathologies (e.g., Cottee and Hayward, 2011; Tausch et al., 2011; van Stekelenburg, 2017; Wolfowicz et al., 2020; Cottee, 2021). However, the contribution of envy, in effect, has been left unexplored (but for some discussions see, Meloy et al., 2004; Vetlesen, 2006; Fiske, 2011; Knoll and Reid Meloy, 2014; Myketiak, 2016; Trip et al., 2019).

Envy is a complex emotion motivating the agent to track the advantages others are perceived to have, to be sensitized to the purported fitness-suppressing consequences those might have for the envious individual, and to attend to the eradication of the differential (e.g., Schoeck, 1966; Smith and Kim, 2007; Fiske, 2011; Sznycer et al., 2017, 8421).¹ We propose that the functional structure of envy may serve as the mediator to subsequent downstream emotional and cognitive states studied in relation to the phenomenon of radicalization, violent extremism, and, potentially, conspiracy ideation. Why? The motivational feature of envy promotes the monitoring of potential welfare risks (Hill and Buss, 2008), which are revealed by proxy cues of social differentiation (van de Ven and Zeelenberg, 2020). A negative appraisal of one’s social condition, associated with frustration, uncertainty, and the desire to improve one’s situation, characterize the oft-cited catalyst of the radicalization process (e.g., Borum, 2003; Horgan, 2005; Moghaddam, 2005; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Silber et al., 2007; Sageman, 2008; Hafez and Mullins, 2015). We argue that the functional structure of envy constitutes the core element necessary, but not sufficient, for the process of radicalization to be set in motion. Furthermore, envy may also factor in the development of conspiracy beliefs, as an individual who would feel envious of others may attribute others’ success to collusion (see Winiewski et al., 2015).

An examination of envy’s functions (see, Hill and Buss, 2008; Cohen-Charash and Larson, 2016; Sznycer et al., 2017) reveals striking characteristics that may contribute to explaining essential and conspicuous features of the radicalization process: the motivation to monitor social differentials, the identification of the source of postulated welfare costs, the impulse to eliminate or depower competitors, and the derivation of pleasure at the misfortune of the envied.² Indeed, several features of envy-motivated behaviors and attitudes are ostensibly observed in extreme, radicalized or conspiracy theory comportments:

To the authors’ knowledge, the strong resemblance of envy-motivated behaviors and attitudes with radicalized, violent extremist and conspiracy-theorist mindsets and comportments has not yet been empirically examined. How might they be related? Moncrieff and Lienard (2021)⁴ argued that radicalized individuals volunteer rationalizations that are unlikely to reveal the etiology of the process of radicalization followed and that more fundamental causes, such as emotions, most probably precede radical and extremist belief formation. Thus, the progression from conspiracy to the display of radical comportments should not be granted any significant explanatory privilege in the process of radicalization. On the other hand, envy could indirectly facilitate the adoption of conspiracy beliefs via radicalization. Note too that this does not imply that radicalization or envy should necessarily precede conspiracy beliefs, as such beliefs may be held for other reasons (e.g., to coordinate with others; see, Mercier and Altay, 2022).

We examine the relationship between dispositional envy, central aspects of radicalization (i.e., extremist attitude and endorsement of violence), and conspiracy mentality. We make the following predictions:

The study adhered to the Swiss national ethical guidelines for research involving human participants. It is in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional research committee and the 1964 Helsinki declaration. Institutional review boards are not mandatory for certain types of exempt research activities in the country where the investigator responsible for the present study is employed (Switzerland). All data and study materials are available online on the Open Science Framework.⁵ The study was preregistered prior to the start of data collection.⁶

As hypothesized (Hypothesis H₁), the data showed small (r = 0.22) to moderate (r = 0.40) statistically significant positive correlations for envy with extremism, pro-violence, and conspiracy (see Table 1). Controlling for age, sex, and political orientation the partial correlations remained statistically significant for envy with extremism (r = 0.40, p < 0.001), pro-violence (r = 0.36, p < 0.001), and conspiracy (r = 0.23, p < 0.001).

To examine the relationship between the variables we deviate slightly from the preregistration plan and use Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) instead of Multivariate Regression. While both analyses use general linear modeling, SEM offers several advantages. SEM is robust to measurement error, allows the modeling of latent variables, permits the simultaneous testing of relationships including direct and indirect effects, and the identification of best-fitting models (Nunkoo and Ramkissoon, 2012). We rely on Stata Statistical Software (Release 17; StataCorp LLC. 2021) to complete the analyses.

In the SEM for testing our second hypothesis (H₂), envy was located in an antecedent position to extremism and violence, the latter two preceding conspiracy (Figure 1). We suspected that common method bias might be an issue because of the potential for social desirability effects, particularly with the envy measure, and because we used the same participants for the collection of the independent and dependent variables. Harman’s single-factor test indicated that the variance accounted for by the common latent factor was within an acceptable range < 31% (Harman, 1960). To further reduce the plausibility of method biases as a rival explanation for the relationships observed in our study, we relied on the unmeasured latent method factor technique to conservatively correct the estimates in our model (Podsakoff et al., 2012, 553). The more conservative estimates did not significantly impact our interpretation of the model. Several items of the Dispositional Envy Scale and Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire appeared to measure the same information and modification indices indicated a better model fit by allowing correlated residuals among these items (see Supplementary Information).

The data were non-normally distributed. Satorra–Bentler adjustments are robust to nonnormality and therefore used in the reporting of goodness of fit statistics. Based on the calculations of Stata SEM using maximum likelihood estimation, related indices of model fitness (with Satorra–Bentler adjustments) were: Normed Chi-square (χ²/DF) = 1.95, TLI = 0.945, CFI = 0.954, RMSEA = 0.047, 90% CI [0.46, 0.59], SRMR = 0.056. All the indices indicated that the research model yielded an acceptable fit.

The model indicated that envy had significant direct effects on extremism and violence (Table 2). The demographic variables accounted for only 7% of the variance in envy, while the combination of demographic variables and envy accounted for 40% of the variance in extremism and 32% of the variance in violence. When a path from envy to conspiracy was introduced into the model, envy had no statistically significant direct effect. However, envy had a significant indirect effect on conspiracy (B = 0.60, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.37, 0.84]), supporting the second hypothesis (H₂). Extremism had a positive direct effect on conspiracy in the model (B = 1.255, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.75, 1.764]). Violence did not reach significance. Overall, the model accounted for 32% of the total variance in the observed variables.

The strong direct effect between extremism and conspiracy supports the idea that the endorsement of extremism could prepare an individual for the acquisition of conspiracy beliefs. The direct effect of political orientation on conspiracy is also noteworthy. When controlling for the effects of envy, extremism, and violence on conspiracy in a partial correlation, age and sex are no longer statistically significant, however, political orientation is still significantly correlated with conspiracy (r = 0.251, p < 0.001). This finding suggests that an individual can hold conspiracy beliefs without the facilitating effects of envy or extremism attitudes, however, extremism may also play a prominent role for certain individuals in their adoption of conspiracy belief. We tested a range of competing models placing conspiracy before extremism, violence, and/or envy. We used AIC model selection to compare that set of plausible models to the model we have selected. In support of our second hypothesis (H₂), our model has the best-fit (Table 3).

We find support for the hypothesis (H₁) that envy has an impact on core aspects of radicalization, particularly the endorsement of extremism and acceptance of violent means. Few studies currently examine the relationship between envy, radicalization and violent extremism (but see, Moncrieff and Lienard, 2021). Our SEM suggests that investigating further this linkage might lead to novel insights. For instance, programs to ‘prevent’ or ‘counter’ violent extremism (P/CVE) may be more successful if they tackle envy as a core component of the process of radicalization. In line with our assumptions, a deradicalization intervention provider in the United Kingdom notes how his method involves “[persuading] clients to take responsibility [emphasis added] for their views or prejudices rather than blaming external factors” (Warrell, 2019). We also find support for the second hypothesis (H₂) that conspiracy ideation can be related to envy, but indirectly, via the endorsement of extremism. Our model supports the position that a core aspect of radicalization may precede conspiracy beliefs in some circumstances, but be unrelated in other circumstances. Our research suggests that fundamental causes, such as emotions, are likely to be more important than explicit beliefs when it comes to engagement in costly behaviors. Further research will be required to tease apart the sequence of such events.

The obtrusive nature of some survey statements (e.g., “I feel envy everyday”) appears to pose a significant limitation. If revealed to others, envy comes with many social risks (Smith, 2004). Individuals may be unwilling to openly admit to having such feelings. The authors intend to conduct further studies using implicit measures of envy to mitigate potential response bias. Indeed, future studies should seek evidential diversity – using different methods and measures – to test the proposed model. Another limitation is the sample used in this study. Our sample was singly from the United States and did not target specific extremist communities. Future studies should examine the linkages between envy and radicalization in populations that are known to have a greater proportion of radicalized members (e.g., online extremist communities). Indeed, the effect of envy on radicalization may be significantly weaker in our general sample than in extremist social milieus. Future research should also examine the relationship between envy and its potential mediation effect on downstream emotions typically noted in the radicalization process (e.g., hatred, humiliation, shame, contempt, elation). Only with additional research will we know if envy is truly the core emotion constituting radicalization or if it is merely a related but noncausal aspect of the phenomenon.

The datasets presented in this study can be found in online repositories. The names of the repository/repositories and accession number(s) can be found at: https://osf.io/rjxsd.

Ethical review and approval was not required for the study on human participants in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. The patients/participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study.

MM responsible for the design, data collection, statistical analyses, and writing of this paper. PL responsible for the design, interpretation of the findings, and writing of this paper. All authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.

MM was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation grant number 176781.

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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