Intuitive processing involves rapid, often preconscious, intuitive feelings that are experienced as vague but compelling (Zhang et al., 2016). It is widely believed that intuitive processing affects moral judgments, values, and behavior. It is particularly relevant for condemning shocking but objectively harmless behaviors (ambiguous harmful behaviors; Schein and Gray, 2018). For example, if the judgments of such behaviors result from intuitive processing, individuals more inclined to rely on intuition are more likely to perceive these behaviors as wrong (Friesdorf et al., 2015; Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer, 2016). However, few studies have examined how moral judgments are affected by individuals’ faith in intuition in Chinese culture. Therefore, this study intends to elucidate the relationship between faith in intuition and moral judgment, expanding the empirical research on this topic and exploring the possible mechanisms underlying individual differences in Chinese culture.

Previous studies have found that intuitive processing plays a significant role in moral judgment (Gray and Keeney, 2015; Heintzelman and King, 2016). Individuals’ reflective ability (low faith in intuition) can negatively predict the moral wrongness of ambiguous hurtful behaviors (Mastrogiorgio, 2015; Pennycook et al., 2016). Both moral foundations theory (Gray et al., 2012a,b; Zhang et al., 2016) and dyadic morality theory (Haidt and Graham, 2007; Zhan and Wu, 2019) acknowledge that the condemnation of ambiguous harmful behavior is intuitive (Zhang et al., 2016; Schein and Gray, 2018; Zhan and Wu, 2019). For example, if moral judgments of ambiguous hurtful behaviors result from intuitive processing, individuals with higher faith in intuition are more likely to perceive these behaviors as wrong. Considering individual intuitive differences in the context of moral judgment helps explain people’s faith in the intuition of moral judgment regarding ambiguous harmful behaviors (Schein and Gray, 2018). As it violates deeply held intuitions about maintaining social order, harmful behaviors involving ambiguity tend to evoke individual condemnation of the unconventional. Moreover, for unambiguous hurtful behaviors, we theorize that individuals who are more inclined to rely on intuition may be more inclined to rely on social norms to guide their morality. Whether hurtful behaviors are ambiguous or unambiguous, the behavior itself violates “binding” values that preserve social customs and order (Scherer et al., 2015; Schein et al., 2016). Thus, individuals who rely more on intuition will find both ambiguous and unambiguous hurtful behaviors more immoral.

Therefore, we believe that individuals’ levels of faith in intuition predict differences in moral judgments of harmful behaviors (both ambiguous and unambiguous). In other words, individuals with higher levels of faith in intuition are more likely to make critical moral judgments through intuitive responses.

Harm plays a significant role in moral cognition, and not harming others is considered the fundamental element of morality (Park et al., 2016). Consideration of harm moderates costly moral behavior (FeldmanHall et al., 2016). When participants were asked to list a morally wrong action, for conservatives and liberals, harm was the most prevalent factor when referring to morality (Hofmann et al., 2014). Anthropological research also demonstrates that the relationship between harm and morality is cross-culturally universal, and people will consistently believe that harm is wrong and a moral offense (Barrett et al., 2016).

Dyadic morality theory also regards harm as the core issue of moral judgments and holds that an individual’s view of harm dominates the moral judgments of behaviors (Haidt and Graham, 2007; Zhan and Wu, 2019). Individuals attempt to match a particular behavior to a module of harm when making moral judgments. This module is automatically activated to create appropriate moral condemnation based on the importance of harm to human social life (Schein and Gray, 2018). If an action is judged as morally wrong, it is assumed that harm is produced (Schein and Gray, 2015, 2018).

Dyadic morality theory emphasizes the perceived harm, which need not objectively exist; instead, it only needs to be perceived to affect moral judgment (Gray et al., 2012a,b). Even ambiguous harmful behaviors can activate individuals’ perceived harm and elicit moral judgments (Gray et al., 2014). For example, pornographic images (Wright et al., 2014) and flag-burning (Welch and Bryan, 2000) are ambiguous and harmful behaviors and are also considered immoral. Notably, dyadic morality theory suggests that perceived harm is a continuum of intuition; intuition influences moral judgments and involves harm. Therefore, we suggest that the perceived harm may explain the relationship between individuals’ faith in intuition and moral judgments, thus playing a mediating role.

To sum up, this study aimed to investigate the relationship between individuals’ faith in intuition and moral judgments and the mechanism of the perceived harm in this relationship in Chinese culture. Based on the literature review, we propose the following hypotheses (theoretical model diagram; see Figure 1).

This study tested these hypotheses through two experiments: Experiments 1 and 2 verified Hypotheses 1a and 1b and Hypotheses 2a and 2b, respectively.

In Experiment 1, the relationship between faith in intuition and moral judgment was preliminarily verified in Chinese culture. In Experiment 2, real-life moral scenarios faced by participants were more appropriate for further verifying the findings of Experiment 1. Additionally, Experiment 2 asked participants to rate the levels of harm in moral scenarios to explore how perceived harm plays a role in the relationship between faith in intuition and moral judgment.

Intuitive information processing plays a significant role in contemporary moral psychology. However, few studies have explored the role of individual differences in relying on intuition in moral judgment in Chinese culture. This study investigated the relationship between faith in intuition and moral judgments in Chinese culture. The following conclusions emerged: First, individuals’ levels of faith in intuition predict greater moral wrongness regarding ambiguous hurtful behaviors but do not predict moral wrongness regarding unambiguous hurtful behaviors. Second, the perceived harm mediates the effect of individuals’ levels of faith in intuition on moral wrongness regarding ambiguous harm behaviors but not regarding unambiguous harm behaviors.

These results suggest that individuals more inclined to rely on intuition are more likely to condemn unethical behavior in ambiguous harmful scenarios than in unambiguous ones. This verifies Hypothesis 1a but not 1b. We theorize that this may be because the morality of the behavior is unclear in ambiguous harmful scenarios; therefore, individuals are more inclined to make moral judgments through intuition (Gray et al., 2014). In contrast, in unambiguous harmful scenarios, the action is immoral; therefore, individuals are more likely to use rational thinking rather than intuition to make judgments (Schein and Gray, 2018). This study suggests that individual differences in intuition are associated with attitudes toward certain types of behavior. Individuals who rely heavily on intuition condemn ambiguous harmful behaviors characterized by violations of social norms or conventions. Condemning ambiguous but harmful behavior is unsurprising; throughout human history, monitoring the social behavior of others and punishing those who do not conform to social norms and customs has been paramount. As a result, people are extremely sensitive to information that suggests they may be unstable or unreliable (Graham et al., 2009).

Experiment 2 showed that the perceived harm mediated the relationship between faith in intuition and moral judgment in ambiguous harmful scenarios and did not mediate the above relationship in unambiguous harmful scenarios. This verifies Hypothesis 2a but not 2b. This may be because, in ambiguous harmful scenarios, it is uncertain whether the behavior will cause harm and whether the individual will predict the actual harmful situation by intuition. However, in unambiguous harmful scenarios, the action is to ensure that a certain level of harm has been caused so that the individual need not use intuition to make predictions (Gray et al., 2012a,b; Schein and Gray, 2018).

Consistent with dyadic morality theory, these findings highlight the importance of harm in moral judgment (Ward and King, 2015). The relationship between perceived harm and moral judgment suggests that perceived harm is central to moral theory. The current research indicates that the moral judgment process of action requires attention to individual differences in intuition, moral value, and harm perception (Dienes, 2014; Gray et al., 2014). The moral foundations theory provides a rich value explanation for moral judgments and correctly anticipates the character and diversity of the moral landscape. However, previous studies have neglected to explain why people hold specific moral values (Pennycook et al., 2014; Royzman et al., 2015). Given a strong link between perceived harm and moral condemnation, it seems possible to understand why some people view behavior as harmful. This would elucidate significant individual differences in moral perception. Dyadic morality theory provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the cognitive processes that drive moral judgments.

Actions that evoke moral condemnation without actual harm are associated with primary motives, such as evaluating social relationships and avoiding pathogens. Intuitive processing has a long evolutionary history and is used by humans and animals. Owing to the holistic and associative nature of such thinking, intuitive processing may blur the line between actions that merely violate social conventions and those that involve harm, as both actions may reflect evolutionarily significant and long-term social and moral problems (Zhang et al., 2016). The moral condemnation of violations that lack apparent harm or victims is often interpreted as irrational and difficult to change. This study’s results provide further evidence that these ambiguous behaviors are condemned because they are considered harmful (Gray et al., 2012a; Baumard et al., 2013). It is difficult for individuals who rely strongly on intuition to change their intuitive perception of these situations as morally wrong.

The findings have theoretical implications for understanding the nature of faith in intuition and its role in moral judgment. Faith in intuition reflects the degree to which people rely on or prefer intuitive/empirical processing. Individuals with higher levels of faith in intuition experience more negative reactions to ambiguous harmful scenarios. The habitual tendency of individuals to trust their intuition may prompt them to focus more on such intuition; thus, faith in intuition involves not only a high reliance on intuitive processing but also a tendency to have a higher intuitive response to certain stimuli. A direction for future research is to explore whether the higher intuitive response experience of individuals with higher levels of faith in intuition applies to domains other than the moral domain. Additionally, the results of this study have certain practical significance, which may lead to a better understanding of moral judgments and reasons in life. It is helpful to deepen people’s understanding of their moral judgment and provide a new perspective for explaining moral judgment.

This study had several limitations. First, we measured individuals’ moral judgments by reading different moral scenarios influenced by the practice and social expectation effects (Ajzen, 1985, 1991). Future research could verify the findings of this study through field experiments. Second, this study showed a relationship between faith in intuition and moral judgments; however, it remains unclear whether individuals engage in similar behaviors. Future research could explore the relationship between faith in intuition and moral decision-making. Third, this study proposed perceived harm as a mediating variable based on dyadic morality theory. However, this is not unique. Future studies can also explore the relationship between faith in intuition and moral judgment from other perspectives, such as meaning in life (Heintzelman and King, 2016). Fourth, this study was conducted in the context of Chinese collectivist culture, which may be influenced by certain cultural factors. Future studies can further discuss the contents of this study from a cross-cultural perspective. Finally, studies can further explore the cognitive neural mechanisms of the relationship between faith in intuition and moral judgments through brain imaging.

The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be made available by the authors, without undue reservation.

The studies involving human participants were reviewed and approved by Ethics Committee of Hunan Normal University. The patients/participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study.

SJ was involved in the conceptualization, data analysis, and interpretation and wrote the manuscript. SD was involved in the data collection and data analysis. DD was involved in the manuscript editing, ethical approval, and interpretation. All authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.

This paper was supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China (19BSH127).

The authors declare that the research was conducted without any commercial or financial relationships that may be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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