Accelerating environmental uncertainty and the need to cope with increasingly complex market and social demand, combine to create high value for the intuitive approach to decision-making at the strategic level. Nevertheless, despite the growing relevance intuition has in the context of top management decision-making, the topic is still under-investigated in terms of levels of analysis and degree of integration/interdisciplinarity.

First of all, research on individual intuition suffers from a marked fragmentation, with few interactions between groups of researchers and limited cross-disciplinary knowledge accumulation (Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith, 2018). One reason for such fragmentation is the lack of synergies between scholars from different disciplines and, within disciplines, from different research arenas, characterized by disciplinary silos based on diverse, apparently irreconcilable, ontological and epistemological assumptions.

Advances in research on cognition, particularly the advent of bounded rationality and the increasing relevance of the affective dimension, along with the methodological developments taking place in the field of neurosciences, intensify the need for a cross-fertilization between management and psychology. An example can be seen from the Upper Echelons Theory (UET) in its first conceptualization (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) as well as in its later co-evolutionary interpretation by Abatecola and Cristofaro, 2020, who review UET in a newfangled way. The use among upper echelon scholars of demographic characteristics of top managers as proxies for psychological ones (Finkelstein et al., 2009) is emblematic of the importance of integrating management with psychology. In view of the empirical evidence demonstrating how important psychological characteristic are (Miller et al., 1998; Samba et al., 2018), researchers find it easier to observe demographic characteristics (which can be easily measured from archival data) and draw inferences about cognitive characteristics. Recent empirical evidence suggests that such practices can lead to biased conclusions, given that demographic characteristics may not be a proxy of psychological characteristics, thus pointing to the need to integrate management studies with the most advanced psychological research acquisitions and methodologies.

As recommended by Cristofaro (2017, p. 185), a crucial challenge is to design cross-disciplinary studies which merge different approaches and provide a broader lens than those of the recent past, facing the decision-making issues from a holistic perspective.

There have been a number of attempts to develop a conceptualization of intuitive decision-making which could be testable across disciplines. The first significant attempt was Sinclair and Ashkanasy’s (2005), which drew on an extensive inter-disciplinary literature review including management, psychology and neuroscience. The two authors defined intuition as “a non-sequential information processing mode, which comprises both cognitive and affective elements and results in direct knowing without any use of conscious reasoning” (Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005, p. 7). A couple of years later Dane and Pratt, on the basis of a comprehensive review carried out within the field of management, proposed a quite similar conceptualization of intuition—“affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, non-conscious and holistic associations” (2007, p. 40)—that incorporates research studies from management, psychology and philosophy. This definition has been also followed by psychological scholars (Hodgkinson et al., 2008; Hogarth, 2010; Gore and Sadler-Smith, 2011). There have been other valuable reviews of intuition by Blume and Covin (2011) and Baldacchino et al. (2015), but their focus is limited to a specific of intuition, entrepreneurial intuition, and their construct consolidates the consensual elements of intuition proposed by Dane and Pratt (2007). For example, Baldacchino et al. (2015), starting from Dane and Pratt’s conceptualization, propose an additional element of the conceptualization of intuition, namely domain-specific experience and expertise.

Despite the fact that Dane and Pratt (2007) present their construct as a relatively non-contentious deployment of conjectures grounded in an interdisciplinary consensus, their attempts to formulate a conceptualization of intuition which is accepted across distant disciplines do not appear to have increased conceptual integration and knowledge accumulation. In particular, despite Dane and Pratt’s claim “to bridge works in psychology, philosophy and management” (2007, p. 36), there are no quotations from philosophy scholars in about 1977 works citing their 2007 article. On the whole, their cross-disciplinary conceptualization has not led to the development of a grand theory of intuition and, after more than 10 years, the matter is far from closed. Other authors who cross-disciplinarily reviewed literature on intuition, such as Carter et al. (2017), have had a limited impact to date, as proved by the limited number of quotations (22), if compared with Dane and Pratt’s quotations (1977) and Sinclair and Ashkanasy (532).

In this framework, the present paper critically discusses Sinclair and Ashkanasy’s construct, which has been the first significant attempt to develop a cross-disciplinary conceptualization of intuition, and Dane and Pratt’s article, which has been the most influential article related to the intuition in management literature and other disciplinary fields. Dane and Pratt’s article is regarded as the most comprehensive and most referenced definition of intuition (Okoli et al., 2021). Our paper analyzes the proposed intuition’s attributes and assesses the degree of cross-disciplinary agreement around them, with the purpose of enhancing the intuition construct in a way that facilitates inter-disciplinary dialogue. In the light of such analysis, a definition of intuition is proposed, as “knowing that emerges out of self-organizing holistic associations,” and the reasons for this emergentist account of intuition are explained in the discussion section. In the conclusive sections theoretical and practical implications are outlined as regards UET, the interaction between intuitive and deliberative processing modes, the conditions for intuition’s effectiveness, the relationship with artificial intelligence, the possibility to the escalation from individual to collective decision-making. The limitations of the study as well as the avenues for future research are also highlighted.

Space permits only a brief overview of the huge literature on decision-making (the whole review is available on request), but it is sufficient to question the mainstream conjectures. We focus on the three domains which are considered in the examined articles—philosophy, psychology and organizational science/management—and identify conceptual intersections around which potential cross-disciplinary agreement on the definition of intuition can be envisaged. Drawing on complexity science, a framework to accommodate both positions is then hypothesized, which conceptualizes intuition as emergence. Finally, some implications are explored.

In line with the aim of constructing an encompassing conceptualization of intuition, both Sinclair and Ashkanasy and Dane and Pratt propose a definition that seeks conceptual agreement across different disciplines: Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) include behavioral sciences (neuroscience and psychology) besides management, whilst for Dane and Pratt (2007, p. 39) the central characteristics of intuition are identified “based on their commonality to definitions across philosophy, psychology and management”. In addition to their commonality, the central characteristics also appear to be the most “core” features (p. 39), and account not just for what intuition is but also how it “differs from other decision-making approaches” (p. 40).

So, a critical revision of the mainstream definition of intuition implies checking whether such definition correctly sets out the “core” characteristics of intuition, and whether it adequately differentiates the concept from others, such as rationality, instincts, insight, and learning. In formal terms, this implies that the attributes (A) identified to define intuition (I), are necessary and sufficient conditions for inferring it; more precisely: each of the attributes (Ai) is a necessary condition for (I), and all the attributes (Ai…n) are, together, a sufficient condition for (I).

Such an assessment must be inter-disciplinary, since both Sinclair and Ashkanasy and Dane and Pratt target a strong inter-disciplinary agreement. Given the distance between the disciplines, various degrees of cross-disciplinary agreement are contemplated in this paper, as shown in Table 1, so that an agreement field is traced, showing the degree to which the different perspectives may experience interaction and build on common elements together synergistically. The table shows the following dimensions:

It could have been sufficient to analyze Sinclair and Ashkanasy’s construct, which is antecedent and similar to that of Dane and Pratt’s, but Dane and Pratt’s construct has been increasingly accepted in the field of management as the consensual definition; it is regarded as the most comprehensive and most referenced definition of intuition (Okoli et al., 2021): for example, Akinci and Sadler-Smith (2012, p. 115) wrote that, despite several studies flourishing throughout the years, Dane and Pratt’s is the only “comprehensive, integrated account and testable research propositions”. So the article has formed the basis of a number of subsequent influential literature reviews, conceptual contributions, and methodological and empirical works; drawing from it, scholars have differentiated intuition from related constructs (Hodgkinson et al., 2008, 2009a,b; Sadler-Smith, 2010, 2015, 2016; Salas et al., 2010; Blume and Covin, 2011; Akinci and Sadler-Smith, 2012, 2013, 2019, 2020; Baldacchino, 2013, 2019; Baldacchino et al., 2015; Healey et al., 2015; Pratt and Crosina, 2016; Calabretta et al., 2017; Okoli et al., 2021; Sadler-Smith et al., 2021). In addition, the article has spread over psychology and neuroscience (Hodgkinson et al., 2008; Hogarth, 2010; Gore and Sadler-Smith, 2011; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2011; Ben-Soussan et al., 2020; Keck and Tang, 2020; Korteling and Toet, 2020; Li et al., 2020; Stephens et al., 2020; West et al., 2020; Muñoz-Cobos and Postigo-Zegarra, 2021; Reynolds et al., 2021; Yu et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2021), as well as distant disciplinary domains, such as medicine and health sciences (Glatzer et al., 2020; Cameron and Singh, 2021; Chlupsa et al., 2021) or engineering and design (Cash and Maier, 2021; de Rooij et al., 2021; Paige et al., 2021; Park et al., 2021).

In addition, compared to Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005), Dane and Pratt’s article embraces a wider interdisciplinary range which includes philosophy. This is another reason to focus attention on Dane and Pratt’s article, considering that the concept of intuition (as well as many other lemmas used in managerial or psychological disciplines) has a philosophical origin, and, consequently, cross-fertilization with philosophical studies on intuition is beneficial to allow a better understanding of the historical use as well as the variety of contemporary uses of the concept of intuition.

As mentioned in the introduction, in 2005 Sinclair and Ashkanasy proposed an overarching definition of intuition to incorporate research studies from management, psychology and neuroscience: “a non-sequential information processing mode, which comprises both cognitive and affective elements and results in direct knowing without any use of conscious reasoning” (p. 7). A couple of years later, Dane and Pratt (2007) proposed a quite similar conceptualization of intuition—“affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, non-conscious and holistic associations” (2007, p. 40) (p. 40)—that drew on an extensive inter-disciplinary literature review including management, psychology and philosophy. In this section, we critically evaluate the widely accepted definitions of intuition by Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) and Dane and Pratt (2007), with a focus on the latter. We draw on the fields of philosophy, psychology and management to identify which elements of these definitions are necessary and sufficient for a parsimonious conceptualization of intuition, on the basis of cross-disciplinary consensus (weak, strong and potential agreement, as defined in the methodological section).

The results of the analysis are synthesized in Table 2, which shows, for each proposed attribute, the sources that disagree that it is a necessary condition for intuition. Despite what declared by Dane and Pratt, for none of the attributes they identified there is full cross-disciplinary consensus: the attribute “affectively charged” is put in question by significant streams of research in the three disciplines, the attributes “non-conscious” and “fast” are questioned by significant streams of behavioral research, besides philosophy, while the attribute “holistically associative” is not in line with philosophical literature. On the whole, a strong agreement can be advocated only as regards management studies, while there is a weak agreement with psychology studies, and no intersection with philosophy: in their effort to compress the notion of intuition into mainstream psychological and managerial categories, Dane and Pratt have misinterpreted philosophical research on intuition.

Strikingly, the conceptualization provided by Sinclair and Ashkanasy 2 years before Dane and Pratt appears more appropriate: the attribute “direct” in place of “fast” appears more in line with philosophical accounts of intuition, albeit Sinclair and Ashkanasy never claim to bridge management and philosophy, while the term “knowing,” conveying the idea of both a process and its outcome, appears more appropriate than the term “judgment” used by Dane and Pratt, which only focuses on the conclusive outcome, and, moreover, implies careful reflection. Furthermore, Sinclair and Ashkanasy provide a more detailed account of affect, acknowledging that it is not always an integral component of the intuitive process: in some cases, it may be involved in the antecedent or subsequent processes.

Another weakness of Dane and Pratt is that, in their attempt to provide an encompassing account of intuition, they mistakenly treat intuition’s attributes as necessarily co-occurring. This has been widely accepted amongst scholars (Calabretta et al., 2017) and has inspired a number of empirical studies. Readers tend to align all of them, so that intuitive processing must be hot/non-conscious/holistic/fast, while analytical processing must be cold/conscious/sequential/slow. As a consequence of this, Dane and Pratt have dismissed certain forms of cognition (cold or slow intuition) as definitely non-intuitive, thus missing the opportunity to increase both the richness of their construct and its suitability for interdisciplinary dialogue. Surprisingly, Sinclair and Ashkanasy’s 2005 conceptualization is richer in that it includes cognitive processes involving incubation, or entailing affect not as component of the intuitive process, but as trigger or symptom of it.

In conclusion, contrary to Dane and Pratt’s claim, the four attributes—affective/non-conscious/holistic/fast—are not necessary features of intuition, but are simply correlate features that may occur under specific conditions.

To have an agreed definition of intuition, it would be necessary to identify defining features, namely attributes, that are cross-disciplinarily considered necessary conditions, and, all together, sufficient conditions for intuition. Indeed, managerial and psychological literature, on the one hand, and philosophical literature, on the other, appear incommensurate: they have no common denominator. Nevertheless, to benefit from interdisciplinary dialogue and cross-fertilization, it is still worthwhile searching for potential agreement across the three disciplines. So, we identified two potential intersections.

The anti-intuitionist account differs significantly from the intuitionist alternative, as can be highlighted by expressing both in formal and compacted terms.

In the intuitionist view, X has the intuition that Y, merely on the basis of grasping Y; in the anti-intuitionist view, X has the intuition that x, based on holistic extraction of the pattern y from the space of possibilities Y.

These schematized differences can be ascribed to the opposite underlying paradigms, synthesized below.

The intuitionist interpretation of intuition is consistent with a positivist perspective, focused on a phenomenal world irreducibly and unproblematically intuited by a disinterested actor who remains external to what is being intuited and passive (the world is given to the intuitor).

The anti-intuitionist account of intuitive judgments is consistent with a constructivist perspective, where the role of the subject is active, contextually embedded, and time-situated.

In light of the above considerations, two questions emerge. Firstly, does there exist an overarching framework that encompasses the two accounts of intuition, or are the two incommensurable in a Kuhnian sense? Secondly, would such a framework offer new theorizing or would it resemble a 1:1 scale map, which includes everything and provides no additional value? To tackle these questions, an overarching framework is hypothesized, and its implications are evaluated.

From a theoretical point of view, the conceptualization of intuition as emergence appears consistent with empirical evidence, particularly relevant for upper echelons. It corroborates in particular the evidence that the intuitive information processing is not necessarily analogous to the actual use of intuitive processes (Blume and Covin, 2011; Baldacchino, 2013) since, in contrast with earlier studies (Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005; Evans, 2010), depends on self-organizing processes. Further research is required to explore intuition preferences at the strategic level vs. the actual use of intuitive processes, as well as their relationships with experience and various features of context. Furthermore, the emergentist conceptualization relies on a complexity narrative that, with its capacity to transcend antinomies, can accommodate opposed views in a true Hegelian fashion. In particular, the use of intuition alongside analysis should be explored, to shed light on how these two processing modes interact in shaping upper echelons’ strategies, and to enhance our understanding of dual-process theories.

Moreover, the emergentist account of intuition renders futile the search for a deterministic relationship of intuition effectiveness with static antecedent conditions, such as the complexity of cognitive schemas or the structuredness of tasks. Dane and Pratt model suggests that “cognitive schemas must be domain relevant and complex to generate accurate intuitive judgments” (p. 50), while tasks must be unstructured. This proposition can be enriched by asserting that specificity and complexity of cognitive schemas must be regarded in relation to the specific task/environment, in line with our view that intuition emerges from the relationship between the intuiting subject and a set of cues characterizing his/her task/environment. This can be articulated by taking into account the development of behavioral research on decision-making, which focuses on the interplay between the task/environment and the decision-maker, taking the move from the seminal studies of “fast and frugal heuristics” (Gigerenzer et al., 1999), the “adaptive toolbox metaphor” (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999), and the “adaptive behavior and cognition” (Gaissmaier et al., 2008; Newell and Bröder, 2008; Rieskamp, 2008). According to Gigerenzer, the repertoire of mental shortcuts that human mind uses to arrive at a reasonable judgment, capitalizing on its cognitive limitations as well as on environmental limitations, is not generically effective or ineffective but rather it is ecologically rational, contingent upon its match with the demands of the task and the environment. Consequently, it is insufficient to look separately at persons and tasks, rather it is important to look at their interaction: the level of expertise of a person can be evaluated in relation to a specific task, while the level of structuredness/novelty of a task depends on the decision-maker (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). In other words, we could say that people are experts in particular tasks and not in others, and tasks are complex or emotion-laden for some decision makers and not for others. In this perspective, the “mental model of the task” is the key driver, thus challenging the idea that tasks/environments are objective and stable entities, and building a bridge toward philosophical research. The practical implications are notable: for example, executive team composition should be engineered to match diverse tasks’ expertise with different decision-making scenarios, and career paths should be designed to acquire expertise useful for different decision-making contexts. The phenomenal plurality of intuition outcomes could be explained, too, thus providing suggestions in case of intra-personal inconsistency and possible strategies.

Conceived as emergence, intuition is unpredictable but intelligible, in the sense that it should be possible to identify its evolution pattern. That something might be irreducible does not prevent hypothesizing a theory of how this irreducibility emerges as a consequence of agent interaction: there is an inherent rationale for how the system unfolds; a generative process that transcends the connection of causes and effects. This is another important avenue for research. Barney and Felin (2013, p. 147) recommended that appeal to emergence should not be a means to obfuscate explanation “by hiding the actual mechanisms, processes, and actors that lead to the emergent outcome.” In line with this, the “emergentist” view of intuition should be regarded as a reason to study the phenomenon in depth, seeking—not escaping—scientific explanations.

Such a view opens up to study the use of artificial intelligence in support of managerial decision-making, allowing investigation of whether complex domain-relevant schemes could be transferred to automated information systems, a question posed by Dane and Pratt (2007, p. 49). In fact, it allows a clear distinction between what can be automated (rational processes) and what is irreducible (intuitive processes—emergent, so not reducible). However, this distinction holds ex ante. The outcome of intuition cannot be predicted, but once it has emerged, the process can be automatized (transformed into a machine-compatible representation language), since machines can be “trained” and can therefore compactly store and quickly use decision models developed intuitively.

The combination of intuition and AI will be useful when the conditions of intuition’s effectiveness are met, related to the effectiveness of the expertise of the human decision-maker in relation to the properties of the task. As suggested by Vincent (2021, p. 431), “if the decision maker is a novice, it may be prudent to delegate decision-making authority to AI regardless of whether the task is structured or not, since the novice will not have the capacity to supplement or correct a decision derived through extensive computation. Likewise, if the task is structured and an accurate decision can be derived through logical analysis, the decision should be delegated to AI because not even expert humans can match the speed and analytic capabilities of computer systems.”

The challenge is to integrate human and IT resources so as to automate everything automatable, thus freeing human energies for intuition. The equilibrium is dynamic: as the environment evolves, with cues changing or new cues emerging, the automated system should be reassessed. Human intuition is needed for this, and broad, open and vigilant mindfulness is required. So, while advances in IT reduce the use of intuition in the workplace, human beings will always be the guiding force (Sibanda and Ramrathan, 2017).

It is important for future studies to connect the two areas of intuition and information technology, since such research has been quite limited to date (Sibanda and Ramrathan, 2017). Further studies are particularly needed regarding human resources training and development. To ensure that each level of the organization can take full advantage of available IT tools, it is important to study how to reskill the workforce. Knowledge is also required on how to create new roles (such as Chief Analytical Officer or Chief Information Officer) to act as a bridge between business and IT. To avoid deskilling from automation, studies should focus on how to develop human intuition: as Levinthal (2011) observes, it is more important to develop intuition than rationality, since analytic thinking can be supported by automation while intuitive thinking cannot.

The conceptualization of intuition as emergence is also suited to the task of analyzing intuition across levels of analysis, considering in particular the escalation from individual to collective decision-making, which are common dynamics at the basis of management decisions in organizations (Cristofaro, 2019). Although scholars have traditionally explored intuition at the individual level, it may occur at any level of a human organization: it may emerge within a group through the complex interactions among individual intuitions, thus generating a cognitive system that cannot be reduced to the intuitions of individual group members (Huber and Lewis, 2010; Healey et al., 2015). While the findings of research on individual intuition have application to group situations, research on group intuition as a unique phenomenon is quite scarce. In particular, business applications of intuitive processes at the group level have yet to be fully explored.

We need also to explore how individual and group intuition aggregates at the organizational level, including how intrapersonal and interpersonal processes combine to produce emergent phenomena, and how the organization itself, as a social context, affects and shapes individual and group intuitions. As articulated by Heath and Sitkin (2001), cited by Barney and Felin (2013), we need theories of intuition in and of organizations. As reported by Stinchcombe (1990, p. 341) and Barney and Felin (2013) argued that “any theory of organization must explain how organizations can be more rational than individuals (though of course they are not always).” We could enrich this argument by adding “and more intuitive.”

To date, the multiplicity and fragmentation of intuition studies, albeit affording much richness and breadth, have resulted in atomistic evolution of research, with few exchanges across disciplines and unrelated groups of researchers, increased replications and redundancies in fieldwork, and limited conceptual integration and knowledge accumulation.

Both Dane and Pratt and Sinclair and Ashkanasy provide a coherent integration of seemingly disparate findings and theories of intuition, bringing order to the anarchy and valuably opening a dialogue with psychology and philosophy. The openness to philosophy is beneficial to allow a better understanding of the historical use as well as the variety of contemporary uses of the concept of intuition but, notwithstanding Dane and Pratt’s claims, no significant dialogue with philosophers has developed, as confirmed by the lack of philosophy scholars commenting on or quoting their work. Dane and Pratt’s authoritative and conceptually appealing statements are widely employed but rarely challenged, risking the perpetuation of contestable assumptions and discouraging efforts toward a richer conceptualization of intuition. After 10 years, a grand theory of human intuition is still lacking.

Standing on the shoulders of giants, we have sought to build on these works by proposing a framework that facilitates interdisciplinary dialogue. Our critical analysis indicates that there is no strong interdisciplinary agreement on Dane and Pratt’s conceptualization, which is far from offering a consolidated philosophical account of intuition.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of finding agreement between distant disciplines such as philosophy and management, we identified two areas of potential agreement—an intuitionist and an anti-intuitionist view of intuition—that can be broadly associated with the two contrasting paradigms of positivism and constructionism. Both views can be considered valuable: the first strengthens intuition’s conceptual framework by reference to its epistemological heritage, thus favoring legitimacy and potential dialogue with important pieces of classic philosophy; the second directs the dialogue to twentieth-century philosophers so as to encompass a post-modern conceptualization of intuition, sensitive to both time and context.

Exploring the possibility of connecting the two contrasting positions without imposing an artificial unity, we conceptualized intuition as emergence. This account of intuition offers a theorization of a different logical type, just like binocular vision: the extra depth offered by three-dimensional vision is of a different logical type to the two-dimensional vision each eye offers to the brain (Bateson, 1979, p. 84).

An important limit of paper is that it addresses just the two definitions by Sinclair and Ashkanasy and by Dane and Pratt. Future scholars can enhance this research by including other points of view. Therefore, it is premature to posit this conceptualization as shared territory for the evolution of intuition theories, and, as shown in the previous paragraph, in-depth studies are needed to evaluate it. However, the paper undoubtedly helps to tackle a multi-faceted challenge. It provides a broader account of intuition, which encompasses relevant cognitive processes such as cold intuitive processes or those (creative, problem-solving, insight) that are contingent on an incubation period, as well as a range of behavioral possibilities other than engaging in conscious thinking or acting immediately upon instant judgments. Besides, it recognizes the interpenetrative and indivisible character of intuitive experience, resisting the overwhelming tendency to spatialize time, which is the dominant, positivist mode of thought governing most studies on intuition, such as that by Dane and Pratt, who conceive intuition and insights as discrete moments deterministically caused by discrete antecedent factors. Finally, with awareness rising that scientific progress is likely to be enhanced from seeking a wider perspective acknowledging the potential contributions of other source disciplines, it can favor fruitful dialogue with scholars from different fields of study, particularly philosophy, thus contributing to the shared cross-disciplinary construction of a grand theory of intuition, like a multi-voice harmony in a jazz ensemble.

There is still a long way to go, and it is not an easy journey for many management scholars, who have been trained to see orderly and linear patterns, lacking the metaphors that allow them to see non-linearity. The difficulty of breaking from positivist views that have dominated our western thinking is evident from the two articles discussed: they embrace a positivist approach that sits uneasily with the epistemology that their own intuition construct implies. Undoubtedly, using emergence as a metaphorical device requires stepping out of the metaphysical comfort of positivism.

Both authors wrote, reviewed, and commented on the manuscript, read, and approved the final manuscript.

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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