The article investigates under what conditions regional maritime conflicts have global consequences. Specifically, it tests geographical and capability-based mechanisms, particularly chokepoint adjacency and coercive projection, that may explain how regional conflicts generate systemic maritime effects.

The study employs a structured comparison and mechanism-tracing design to assess when regional maritime conflicts generate global systemic effects. The structured comparison follows George and Bennett (2005) logic of structured, focused comparison. Both cases are examined using the same theoretically derived questions, indicators, and hypotheses, ensuring that evidence from each case can be meaningfully compared. The study identifies three common indicators: disruption to shipping flows, extra-regional naval intervention, and market effects, and evaluates each systematically across cases. This allows the analysis to hold regional context broadly constant while assessing variation in outcomes.

Mechanism tracing is then used to identify how outcomes emerge rather than merely whether they correlate with independent variables. The analysis tracks whether and how the proposed causal chain unfolds: (1) domain centrality; (2) chokepoint adjacency and coercive projection; and (3) actor characteristics and willingness to exploit chokepoints. The 2006 war is examined to see whether the absence of chokepoint penetration prevents pathway activation, while the 2023–2025 conflict is used to trace how coercion at Bab-el-Mandeb translated into rerouting, insurance shocks, and coalition naval mobilization. In doing so, the study tests whether systemic outcomes arise when the theorized mechanism activates, and remain absent when it does not, thus providing both theory-confirming and theory-infirming leverage within a most-similar systems design.

The article tests three hypotheses that link a regional maritime conflict to global systemic effects. These explore the relationship between maritime domain centrality, chokepoints, and actor type, and the effects on the global maritime arena.

H2 (projecting military power into a global maritime chokepoint) is the core causal mechanism. Chokepoint adjacency is the structural moderator that makes global reverberations possible. H1 (low domain centrality leads to low systemic perturbations) is a possible scope-conditioning hypothesis rather than a standalone causal claim: when the maritime domain is not central to the conflict (that is, low domain centrality), the likelihood of systemic effects remains low unless chokepoint penetration occurs. H3 functions as a secondary conditional hypothesis, identifying actor type as an additional moderator: among actors capable of projecting force into a chokepoint, non-state belligerents are more likely than states to exploit the chokepoint mechanism because they face fewer strategic and reputational constraints.

The three hypotheses were selected because they capture, in a theoretically coherent and empirically tractable way, the three core pathways that the paper argues might link a geographically bounded regional war to system-level effects in the global maritime domain. In part, based on extrapolating relevant theoretical arguments from the security studies literature. First, H1 addresses an intuitively powerful but under-tested assumption in both security and maritime studies: that the maritime domain must be central to a conflict for global consequences to materialize. It therefore establishes a baseline expectation grounded in classical thinking about military salience and domain importance. Second, H2 operationalizes what the study ultimately demonstrates is the decisive causal mechanism, coercive projection into a chokepoint. This hypothesis is thus theoretically essential to bridge regional events and systemic outcomes. Finally, H3 addresses the agentic side of the problem: even if chokepoints create structural opportunity, not all actors choose to exploit them. The hypothesis, therefore, draws on the literature on hybrid and proxy actors to explain variation in willingness to activate chokepoint leverage. Together, the three hypotheses build a logically sequenced explanatory architecture: from general expectations about domain centrality (H1), to the structural geography that enables systemic effects (H2), and finally to the types of actors most likely to exploit those structures (H3).

The study operationalizes systemic maritime perturbation through three measurable indicators:

The study examines two regionally bounded wars involving Israel: the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war and the 2023–2025 Middle East war, which began with Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack on Israel and escalated to include multi-front confrontations involving also the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis in Yemen.

These cases were selected according to “most-similar systems” logic (Lijphart, 1971). Together, the cases provide a most-similar systems comparison that isolates the specific mechanism this study seeks to explain. Both conflicts occurred in the same broad regional system, involved overlapping belligerents (particularly Israel and Hezbollah), took place within broadly comparable strategic and technological environments, and featured some degree of maritime activity. Yet they diverge precisely along the theorized independent variables, chokepoint adjacency and actor behavior, producing radically different global maritime outcomes. This allows the study to hold constant many background regional factors while identifying why one regional war produced negligible systemic maritime effects (2006), whereas the other generated global rerouting, insurance shocks, and coalition naval mobilization (2023–2025). Other prominent cases of maritime disruption such as the Hormuz crises, Malacca vulnerability scenarios, Somali piracy, and the Turkish Straits are analytically valuable, but they differ either by being primarily criminal rather than wartime dynamics (Somalia), dominated by great power naval politics rather than non-state coercion (Malacca), or repeatedly framed as state-centered deterrence crises rather than comparative wartime episodes (Hormuz). As such, they introduce substantial contextual heterogeneity that complicates mechanism tracing. By contrast, the chosen pair uniquely enables a clean comparative probe into why some limited regional wars generate global maritime reverberations while others do not under conditions that are otherwise strikingly similar. This combination provides theoretical leverage across the key independent variables identified in the three hypotheses. The 2006 conflict serves as a case of a regional war with limited maritime engagement without global systemic effects, while the 2023–2025 conflict illustrates a regional war (also with limited maritime aspects) that led to global maritime reverberations. Together, the two cases permit a theory-confirming theory-infirming design (Eckstein, 1975), allowing both validation and refinement of the proposed causal mechanisms.

In analyzing the cases, the study uses sources that were selected according to three main criteria. First, relevance and analytical leverage: materials had to speak directly to maritime security, chokepoints, regional conflict dynamics, or global trade effects, and contribute to evaluating the proposed mechanisms. Second, credibility and methodological rigor: priority was given to peer-reviewed academic studies, authoritative institutional reports (e.g., UN, IMF, World Bank, INSS, and IISS), and carefully documented policy analyses. Third, empirical robustness and triangulation: wherever possible, multiple independent data sources such as shipping traffic datasets, insurance and freight indicators, rerouting statistics, and naval deployment reporting were used to cross-validate patterns and reduce case-specific bias. Policy papers were included where they offered timely empirical detail unavailable in the academic literature, while datasets were chosen for transparency, replicability, and recognized use in the maritime and economic policy communities.

The 2006 Lebanon War, known in Israel as Milhemet Levanon HaShniya and in Lebanon as the July War or War of 34 Days, was a major military conflict between the State of Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah that took place from 12 July to 14 August 2006. The proximate trigger was a large-scale cross-border attack by Hezbollah on the Israeli–Lebanese frontier, during which the group killed several Israeli soldiers and kidnapped the bodies of two of them. Israel responded immediately by launching Operation “Just Reward,” later renamed Operation “Change of Direction,” which quickly escalated into full-scale hostilities. Israel conducted air, naval, and ground operations throughout southern Lebanon with the declared goals of retrieving its soldiers, halting Hezbollah’s rocket fire, and degrading the group’s military capabilities. Hezbollah, heavily armed and fortified throughout southern Lebanon, responded by firing thousands of rockets at northern Israeli towns and cities throughout the conflict.

The war lasted 34 days and resulted in extensive destruction and casualties on both sides. Israel’s offensive inflicted significant damage on Lebanese infrastructure and Hezbollah positions, but the group’s entrenched guerrilla tactics, dispersed command structures, and deep fortifications limited the decisive degradation of its operational capacity. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s sustained rocket campaign exposed vulnerabilities in Israel’s civil defense and highlighted the difficulties of countering non-state armed actors embedded within civilian populations.

The conflict concluded with a United Nations-brokered ceasefire under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which came into effect on 14 August 2006. The terms called for a cessation of hostilities, deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon, and an expanded UNIFIL peacekeeping presence along the Israel–Lebanon border. While the ceasefire ended large-scale combat, Hezbollah retained its weapons and enhanced its long-range rocket capabilities, and tensions along the border persisted for years (Reuters, 2023).

Domestically in Israel, the outcome sparked intense political and public debate. Many Israelis viewed the war as a strategic failure due to the high cost relative to limited territorial gains and the survival of Hezbollah as a potent military actor. This perception led to sharp criticism of political and military leadership, including the establishment of the Winograd Commission to investigate the war’s conduct and the subsequent resignations of senior military figures such as Chief of Staff Dan Halutz.

In Lebanon, the war caused widespread displacement and civilian suffering, significantly damaging infrastructure and exacerbating political divisions within Lebanese society. Despite the formal ceasefire, Hezbollah’s strengthened strategic position and the unresolved status of its armaments continued to shape both Lebanese domestic politics and the broader Israel–Lebanon security landscape (Cordesman et al., 2007; Matthews, 2008).

The maritime domain was not central in this war compared to the ground and air domains. This, despite Israeli–Lebanese disagreements over border demarcation, including in the sea (Eiran, 2017). Israeli combat operations focused on a massive air campaign, coupled with limited ground raids from Israel into areas close to the border in the south of Lebanon. Indeed, in the introductory chapter reviewing the overall picture of Israeli military activities in the war, an official Israeli commission mentioned mostly the air campaign, and briefly the ground raids. No mention was made of the maritime aspects of the war (Winograd Commission, 2006, pp. 33). Of the 164 deaths of Israelis in the war, only 4 were killed when deployed at sea, on a navy vessel targeted from the Lebanese shore. No Israelis were killed by fire from the sea.

Although Israel’s navy blockaded Lebanon during the war (and a few weeks after it ended), the effort was not a core strategic effort, not least, as Lebanon had an open ground border with Syria. Indeed, the official Israeli investigation of the war concluded that it is “hard to point out a direct connection between the blockade and the overall results of the war” (Winograd Commission, 2006, p. 333). Other contributions remained marginal: The Israeli navy conducted littoral surveillance, fired on coastal targets, and launched limited raids by Navy Seals on sites in Lebanon’s shores (Winograd Commission, 2006; Damari, 2016).

It did suffer, as noted, a humiliating failure, though, again, it was not central to either the Israeli or Hezbollah operations. Two days into the war, on 14 July 2006, Hezbollah fired a missile at an Israeli navy vessel, INS Hanit, killing four sailors (Polmar, 2006; Matthews, 2008). This was the first successful anti-ship missile hit by a non-state actor against a modern warship. Hezbollah also sank one non-Israeli commercial vessel by mistake. Hezbollah extended pressure to Israel’s maritime-adjacent infrastructure in Haifa, Israel’s key northern port complex. On 16 July 2006, a 220 mm rocket hit Israel Railways’ maintenance hangar in the port area, killing eight railway workers and injuring others. This was the deadliest single home-front incident in the war to that date. Follow-on barrages periodically disrupted Haifa’s urban-industrial operations, including power and petrochemical areas adjacent to the port, prompting temporary slowdowns and safety-driven pauses in cargo handling and gate activity during alerts. This led to operational interruptions and heightened risk management across Haifa’s waterfront during peak rocket days (Human Rights Watch, 2007a). Hezbollah, however, did not threaten or use force against Israeli or international shipping, although it had the capacity to do so. Its behavior could be explained by its position as a hybrid actor that is simultaneously a militia, a political party, and a welfare provider to its Lebanese Shiite base. The hybrid-actor literature stresses that such organizations must balance “resistance” with responsibility for constituencies and state institutions, rather than maximizing military harm in every domain where they have capabilities (Wiegand, 2009; Cambanis et al., 2019; Lecocq, 2020). If Hezbollah had launched into a broad maritime campaign, it would have been hard to present it as “defensive resistance” and far more likely to draw international opprobrium, sanctions, and counter-measures that would constrain the very foreign-policy and governance space hybrid actors seek to expand. Saouli (2019) account of Hezbollah’s long-term “socialization” emphasizes that by the 2000s, the organization’s paramount goal was survival as a dominant Lebanese actor, not maximal confrontation in every available arena, which helps explain why it treated the maritime domain as a signalling theatre rather than a primary front.

Hezbollah’s embeddedness in Lebanon’s sectarian political economy further raised the costs of maritime escalation. Cammett (2014) shows how Hezbollah’s welfare and reconstruction networks anchor the movement in the everyday livelihoods of the Shiite communities in the south and in Beirut’s southern suburbs. These networks depend on a minimally functioning national economy, including ports, coastal infrastructure, and seaborne trade. The 2006 war already imposed multibillion-dollar losses on Lebanon in direct damage and foregone output; official and World Bank-linked estimates at the time clustered approximately US$3–6 billion in reconstruction needs and roughly US$10–14 billion in total economic impact (Reuters, 2007; Washington). A deliberate effort to extend the war to commercial shipping almost certainly would have provoked heavier Israeli strikes on Lebanon’s coastline and invited tighter international restrictions and possibly intervention, costs that would fall on the community to which Hezbollah represents, provides, and protects. Moreover, Hezbollah’s justification for commanding a security apparatus that competes with the state is that it is for defending Lebanon, filling the space the state fails to fill. Therefore, massive damage to Lebanon, as a result of its use of force against international shipping, will undermine the basis of its legitimacy in holding arms.

Finally, broader maritime escalation would have inflicted high costs on domestic support and coalition partners (Fearon, 1994). In 2006, the scale of destruction meant that the leadership faced potential audience costs from both its Shiite base and its cross-sectarian allies if it were perceived as recklessly endangering Lebanon’s economic lifelines. Saouli’s analysis and subsequent EU-focused work on Hezbollah underline that the movement has invested heavily in presenting itself as a responsible national actor rather than a purely Iranian proxy indifferent to Lebanese welfare (Saouli, 2019; Lecocq, 2020). Hezbollah chose, then, a calibrated maritime approach. It demonstrated an anti-ship capability once, for deterrence and prestige, but deliberately avoided a sustained naval or anti-shipping campaign that would have undermined its hybrid role, its embedded economic base, and its domestic political standing.

Indicator 1: Disruption to global flows (rerouting, delays, insurance): Flow effects were localized. The Israeli blockade shut Lebanese ports, mostly Beirut, Tyre, and Sidon, and limited some shipping activity in the Israeli port of Haifa. Two ships were hit off the shore of Lebanon in a single Hezbollah attack on 14 July 2006. One Israeli naval boat and one Cambodian-flag cargo ship with an Egyptian crew (Polmar, 2006). The Israeli blockade halted sea access to Lebanese ports, forcing vessels to defer or reroute cargo via Syria (mostly to Tartus and Latakia) or to overland corridors. While this was material for Lebanon, it was not system-wide for Mediterranean trade lanes.

On the Israeli side, risk periods in Haifa led carriers and consignees to delay berthings or shift calls to Ashdod, again localized rather than global. On 16 July 2006, a 220-mm rocket struck Israel Railways’ maintenance depot in the Haifa port area, killing eight workers and generating episodic safety pauses and tactical diversions to the southern port of Ashdod (Human Rights Watch, 2007a; Human Rights Watch, 2007b).

For Israel’s broader economy, the Bank of Israel notes the war’s short, sharp shock to activity in Q3-2006, with effects concentrated in the north (tourism, services, some logistics), followed by recovery (Bank of Israel, 2006).

In summary, while both Israeli and Lebanese maritime operations were affected, broader regional operations, and, of course, global ones were not affected.

Indicator 2: Intervention by extra-regional naval powers. External involvement took the form of institutionalized maritime stabilization rather than convoy or escort for the global commons. Moreover, it was deployed only after hostilities ended. Under UNSCR 1701, a UN maritime task force was deployed to support the Lebanese Navy with monitoring and surveillance.

In short, no systemic effect via significant deployment of extra-regional naval forces.

Indicator 3: Market indicators (freight and insurance). War-risk premia for Israel-calling voyages rose to some 1% at the conflict’s apex. On top of that, some chemical cargoes were deferred or diverted (Brown, 2006). Lebanese schedules ceased under the blockade. Haifa saw alert-driven pauses. Crucially, global price/volume benchmarks showed no persistent deviation attributable to the war. While global cargo costs of insurance did rise, the Global Marine Insurance Institute showed that the rise was mostly the result of changes in USD exchange rates (Seltmann, 2007).

In short: This was a coercive maritime episode with some local costs (blockade, INS Hanit attack, Haifa strikes) but minimal systemic spillover.

The war began on 7 October 2023, when over a hundred Hamas squads breached the border fence separating Gaza from Israel at 06:29 a.m. Here, as well, the maritime domain was not central for the major warring parties compared to the ground and air. Israel’s adversaries generally refrained from sea-borne attacks. The one exception was a sea-based attack on 7 October. A small yet coordinated seaborne Hamas assault targeted the coastal area near Zikim, a kibbutz with nearby military bases, just two kilometers north of Gaza. Seven boats carrying 38 fighters attempted to land on Israeli shores. Israeli naval forces destroyed two of the vessels and partially damaged a third, but the remaining boats reached land. The militants murdered 17 civilians and engaged in skirmishes with Israeli forces until 12 October. Yet, this was a limited operation. Less than 0.5% of Hamas’ total assault force arrived by sea. The casualties, while tragic, represented only approximately 1% of Israel’s losses that day.

Israel used the maritime domain to launch attacks on Hamas in Gaza, though these were generally limited. The Israeli navy maintained a blockade of Gaza and targeted coastal positions with naval gunfire. Israel’s elite naval unit also conducted a small number of seaborne operations. Most notably, in November 2024, the Israeli navy seals abducted a Hezbollah activist, who was engaged in maritime activity, from the seaside town of Batroun, Lebanon some 150 kilometers north of the Israeli–Lebanese border (Ward et al., 2024). In an effort to remain relevant, the elite unit participated in a broader set of operations, but acted as a regular ground force, not a particular maritime aspect (IDF, 2025).

Red Sea-based U.S. and Israeli naval assets also intercepted missiles and drones launched from Yemen. By December 2023, for example, a single vessel, the USS Carney alone had intercepted 22 projectiles and drones, most likely aimed at Israel (Epstein, 2023). The Israeli Navy deployed its C-Dome system, the naval variant of the Iron Dome, in the Red Sea close to Israel’s shores to neutralize some aerial threats (Fabian, 2024). Despite these efforts, maritime intercepts were secondary to the large-scale ground-based and aerial defense operations led by Israel, the U.S., and their allies. This imbalance is partly due to geography. The actors that fired the most projectiles on Israel, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, have mostly land-based access to Israel.

The war’s maritime arena extended far in the Red Sea with Houthi attacks in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. This is a narrow pass that crosses the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, by extension of the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. A sizable share of global maritime trade transits through it. Approximately one-third of global container traffic and roughly 12–15% of world merchandise trade normally move through Bab-el-Mandeb (and via there through the Suez Canal), including significant oil and product volumes (UNCTAD, 2024).

The effects of the war diverged. For Israel, this was a peripheral arena, located some 2000 km south of the main arena of the war in Gaza and Lebanon. For global shipping, effects were significant. From November 2023 to February 2025, the Houthis in Yemen have launched attacks against 113 commercial vessels passing through Bab-el-Mandeb. In November 2023, they also hijacked the Galaxy Leader, a Japanese-operated vessel that is partly owned by an Israeli businessman. The crew was held in Yemen and released only in January 2025. The Houthis used multiple types of weapons systems, including anti-ship ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, as well as uninhabited aerial, surface, and underwater vessels (Paes et al., 2024). The attacks effectively turned the chokepoint of Bab-el-Mandeb into a persistent anti-access-area denial (A2/AD) environment despite the absence of large-scale naval battles. These attacks have forced over 2,000 ships to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, with container traffic through the Red Sea decreasing by 90% between December 2023 and February 2024. The Suez Canal’s cargo traffic dropped by 50%, leading to a significant decline in revenues, from $10.25 billion in 2023 to $3.9 billion in 2024. Major shipping companies, including Maersk and MSC, suspended operations through the Red Sea, worsening supply chain disruptions (Mandra, 2023).

These global developments had a marginal effect on Israel. They did limit access to shipping to Israel’s small port on the Red Sea, the port of Eilat. However, as a Bank of Israel study showed, this had no effect on Israel’s economy, including prices (Etkes and Feldman, 2024).

In response, the U.S. launched Operation Prosperity Guardian in December 2023. Led by the U.S. Navy’s Combined Task Force 153, the operation was designed to ensure the safe passage of commercial vessels through the Red Sea. A parallel European operation, code-named Aspides, focused on defensive measures. By March 2025, the U.S. initiated a more aggressive campaign, Operation Rough Rider, aimed at reducing Houthi missile and drone threats. As of April 2025, the U.S. had launched over 1,000 airstrikes, reducing Houthi attacks: 50% for drones and 69% for ballistic missiles (Mongilo, 2025). However, on 6 May 2025, a ceasefire brokered by Oman has halted U. S.–Houthi hostilities. Yet, the Houthis continued their attacks on Israel, signaling that their campaign is far from over. The attacks also have second-order effects on the maritime aspects of the U.S.–Egypt relations. In April 2025, President Donald Trump proposed that U.S. military and commercial ships should be allowed to pass through the Suez Canal without paying tolls. The logic is that the US Navy is supporting Egyptian commercial interests by securing maritime transport through the Suez Canal. This proposal, though politically charged, ran counter to international treaties governing these critical chokepoints. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi rejected the proposal, reaffirming Egypt’s commitment to the 1888 Constantinople Convention, which guarantees the free passage of ships but does not permit exemptions from tolls.

Indicator 1: Disruption to global flows (rerouting, delays, and insurance): in 2023, before hostilities began, the Red Sea-Suez corridor carried approximately 15% of global maritime trade, including approximately 22% of world container shipping by weight and 7–10% of seaborne energy flows (Etkes and Feldman, 2024). Following the onset of Houthi attacks on commercial vessels, starting in November 2023, container shipping through the Red Sea collapsed by approximately 90% between December 2023 and February 2024, while ship transits through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait fell by approximately 55% (ITF, 2024). By early 2024, the volume of trade passing through the Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb had roughly halved relative to a pre-crisis baseline, whereas traffic rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope increased by 70–100% (Reuters, 2024; Drewry, 2024; UNCTAD, 2024). Tonnage crossing the Gulf of Aden fell by 76% and Suez Canal tonnage fell by 70% by mid-2024 (UNCTAD, 2024). For Egypt, this translated into a reduction in Suez Canal transits from approximately 26,400 vessels in 2023 to 13,213 in 2024 and a fall in canal revenue from US$10.25 billion to US$3.99 billion, a decline of nearly two-thirds (Khaled, 2025).

Rerouting around Africa added between 10 and 14 days to Asia-Europe loops, absorbing 5–7% of effective global container capacity for extended periods and tightening schedules through distance-driven capacity sequestration (Reuters, 2024; Drewry, 2024).

Concurrently, container spot rates on Asia-Europe spiked, while cargo insurance voyage climbed for Red Sea/Suez transits. The mid-January 2024 insurance report noted that war-risk premiums around the Red Sea before the conflict were very modest, approximately 0.05% of ship value, rising into the 0.1–0.35% range as the conflict escalated.

Once Houthi attacks became persistent and frequent in late 2023 and continued through 2024, insurers responded by raising war risk insurance costs substantially.

In early 2024, war-risk premiums climbed to approximately 0.3–0.35% of ship hull value for a Red Sea transit. By mid-January 2024: Some underwriters quoted premiums as high as 1% of vessel value for hull/war-risk cover on Red Sea transits—a three- to five-fold jump compared to pre-crisis pricing (Osler, 2024; ITF, 2024). These rises in the risk premia are consistent with threat-weighted expected loss in a conflict environment (Drewry, 2024; Reuters, 2024).

Indicator 2: external intervention (Intervention by extra-regional naval powers): The crisis triggered direct securitization of the commons. Announced by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on 18 December 2023, Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) was framed as a multinational, explicitly defensive maritime security mission under Combined Maritime Forces Task Force 153, mandated to protect freedom of navigation and commercial shipping in the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden in response to escalating Houthi attacks on merchant vessels (U.S. Department of Defense/War, 2023; Childs, 2023). This was a coalition of more than 20 states, including the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Denmark, and others, tasked with providing air and missile defense and close protection for merchant shipping (U.S. Central Command, 2024). The naval force package was centered on the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier strike group, with its embarked air wing and escorts, while allied contributions included a Danish frigate and multiple British Royal Navy warships, ensuring a continuous presence of high-end surface combatants along the main shipping lanes (Associated Press, 2023; U.S. Navy, 2024). The force’s active combat role is winding down after the U.S.–Houthi ceasefire of 6 May 2025, when Washington announced an immediate halt to strikes in exchange for a Houthi pledge to stop targeting international shipping (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2025).

On 19 February 2024, the EU launched EUNAVFOR ASPIDES Its mandate under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is to accompany merchant vessels, enhance maritime situational awareness, and protect freedom of navigation and global trade routes through defensive measures while strictly operating in self-defense and compliance with international law; the operation also gathers information on arms trafficking and shadow fleets to share with relevant international organizations (EEAS, 2024). EUNAVFOR ASPIDES operates over a vast area extending from the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and the Persian Gulf, reflecting both the scope of the Houthi threat and the strategic importance of these sea lines of communication for EU trade. In its initial deployments, the mission relied on approximately four frigates contributed by France, Germany, Italy, and Greece, supplemented by additional support from the Netherlands (including logistics support), though the operational force has remained modest relative to the vast area of operations (Atlantic Council, 2024). By late 2024 and in 2025, Aspides had escorted hundreds of commercial vessels, with reports indicating more than 640 merchant ships supported and over 370 receiving close protection escorts in its first year of operations, underscoring its role in bolstering maritime security amid continued commercial vulnerability (Maritime Executive). Initially mandated for one year, the EU Council extended Aspides’ mandate until 28 February 2026, formalizing its continued contribution to freedom of navigation and regional stability (Maritime Executive, 2025; Council of the European Union, 2025).

Indicator 3: Market indicators: Suez volumes declined by 50% year on year (Jan–Feb 2024) alongside elevated voyage distances and schedule elongation (Kamali et al., 2024). Liner benchmarks (e.g., Drewry World Container Index) surged in early 2024. Similarly, insurance costs rose as underwriters repriced Red Sea/Suez exposure (Drewry, 2024; U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, 2025). The Baltic Exchange’s dry bulk sea freight index (BDI) showed mixed dynamics, but the systemic footprint is visible in volumes, distances, capacity utilization, and rate levels. Global container spot rates rose some 130% from early November 2023 to early March 2024 (ITF, 2024), with additional surcharges and schedule buffers on Asia-Europe strings (ITF, 2024). Market reporting through 2025 shows lingering disruptions and risk premia even as some carriers intermittently returned: e.g., Bab-el-Mandeb transits rose 10% month over month in August 2025 (1,044 voyages), indicating cautious, partial re-engagement rather than normalization (Minchin and Diakun, 2025). Commodity and shipping intelligence tracked higher war-risk insurance and freight during renewed attack bursts in mid-2025, while noting transits remained well below pre-crisis norms (Lin, 2025). EU and Middle East/Central Asia saw a 5.3% decline in port calls (January–February 2024, year on year), while sub-Saharan Africa ports saw a 6.7% decline in port calls (Kamali et al., 2024).

Disruption was brief, bounded, and quickly absorbed. Despite the INS Hanit strike, there was no sustained diversion of commercial shipping from the Eastern Mediterranean. Temporary caution did not convert into an enduring reconfiguration of routes. There were no external naval interventions during the war. This implies that states and insurers did not perceive the maritime threat as systemic. Insurance premiums and freight rates did not structurally shift. Pricing remained within normal volatility bands, indicating market interpretation of risk as localized and transitory. Together, contained flows, no external naval activity, and stable pricing patterns converge to support H1: the maritime dimension remained peripheral and system-resilient.

No diversion around major trade corridors occurred. Crucially, Suez and Bab-el-Mandeb traffic remained stable. No chokepoint securitization. Absence of global price or insurance shock confirms non-activation of global chokepoint spillover dynamics. Because none of the indicators shift in a sustained global direction, H2 is supported negatively. There was no chokepoint, and indeed, the conflict did not trigger systemic reverberation.

Hezbollah, a non-state actor, did not generate systemic disruption. Although it had the capability to strike commercial shipping, as it did by mistake once, it did not target such vessels. However, the organization is not a typical non-state actor. A year before the war, Hezbollah joined the Lebanese government, and thus emerged to be a hybrid state-nonstate actor, which might explain its behavior. As a member of the government, Hezbollah was more sensitive to international pressure on the state of Lebanon.

Shipping flows were disrupted and massively rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope with measurable knock-on effects on global trade timing and costs. Naval intervention escalated to fully operational multinational escort regimes (U.S. OPG; EU ASPIDES). This signals a perception of structural risk, incompatible with H1. Sharp and sustained rises in insurance, freight costs, and volatility confirm widespread belief that risk had transformed from local to systemic. As every indicator moves decisively against bounded disruption, H1 is rejected.

Chokepoint avoidance behavior occurred for shipping flows. The Red Sea became a risk zone; the Cape surged as a substitute route, an empirical hallmark of chokepoint cascade. Extra-regional military actors established coercive protection architectures. This demonstrates security governance transformation. Markets repriced the system, signalling belief that risk was structural and persistent. In sum, convergent movement across flows, security, and markets yields a strong verdict in favour of H2: chokepoint adjacency converted regional violence into global systemic shock.

Houthi attacks generated rapid avoidance because non-state unpredictability raised perceived risk beyond traditional state deterrence logics. External actors could not assume rational signaling. This forced rapid securitization escalation and coalition formation. Insurance reacted sharply because underwriters assess escalation as harder to contain, reflecting higher uncertainty premiums. Indicators align with the argument that non-state actors near chokepoints amplify maritime system shock, supporting H3. This non-state behavior could be contrasted with the behavior of Iran. A major state actor that similarly had access to a crucial choke-point. Iran also attacked Israel directly twice in 2024 and once in 2025, after an Israeli attack. Moreover, the US also attacked Iran in June 2025. Although Tehran could have blocked the straits of Hormuz, and indeed the suggestion was raised in its Parliament, it was restrained and did not use this option, even when under Israeli and American attacks (Jie, 2025).

The analysis comparison leads to three insights. First, chokepoint adjacency is the pivotal moderator (H2 as lynchpin). The same region, similar state/non-state mix, and even demonstrable non-state sea-denial (2006) did not produce systemic turbulence without chokepoint leverage. When coercion pierces a chokepoint (2023–2025), flows, navies, and prices move in globally salient ways.

Second, the centrality of the chokepoint leads to possible reinterpretation of H1 (low domain centrality leads to low global interruptions). Perhaps the issue is not the limited relevance of the maritime domain in a war, but rather the location of the conflict? Either way, this H was rejected.

Third, intensity matters to a limited degree and is not separable from geography. Maritime combat intensity is amplified when situated at a global artery. The Houthi campaign’s tempo and persistence at Bab-el-Mandeb translated into network-wide rerouting and coalition naval protection. These dynamics were absent in 2006.

Finally, full non-state actors such as the Houthis can be more likely to accept high escalation risk and are less sensitive to international pressure. Hezbollah, on the other hand, was part of the Lebanese state apparatus in 2006, which may explain its reluctance to attack international shipping, though it had the capabilities.