This study investigates how African states leverage BRICS partnerships to advance structural transformation and shape equitable multilateral trade governance in a multipolar era. Employing a constructivist theoretical framework and a qualitative, multi-method research design—including process-tracing, it moves beyond materialist analyses to uncover the ideational and procedural mechanics of African agency. The research yields original scientific findings by identifying and analyzing the specific, strategic mechanisms through which African actors convert normative solidarity into institutional outcomes. It demonstrates how African agency, operationalized through the African Union and the AfCFTA, strategically exploits BRICS’s internal diversities to forge issue-based coalitions, thereby reframing trade rules around norms of industrial justice and sovereign development. Crucially, the study provides empirical evidence of how this agency has materialized in binding contractual innovations, such as the New Development Bank’s mandate for 30% local procurement and skills-transfer benchmarks, and in the formulation of the proposed “Nairobi Principles” featuring sunset clauses for technology transfer. These findings constitute a distinct contribution to the specialized literature by delineating the precise conditions under which identity-driven coalitions within asymmetrical partnerships can generate enforceable, rather than merely declaratory, reforms. The study concludes that the translation of African strategic influence into lasting structural change remains contingent on the institutionalization of these hard-won procedural gains within the evolving BRICS architecture.
The architecture of global governance, historically underpinned by Western dominance following the Cold War, is undergoing a fundamental recalibration towards multipolarity (
Within this dynamic and contested landscape, African states encounter a complex interplay of persistent challenges and nascent opportunities. Many remain constrained by deep-seated structural vulnerabilities, including heavy reliance on primary commodity exports, limited industrial diversification, and asymmetrical trade dependencies that perpetuate their marginal position within established multilateral frameworks like the World Trade Organization (WTO) (
Despite the potential, a critical gap persists in both scholarly analysis and policy formulation. While the opportunity for engagement is recognized, there is insufficient understanding of the practical mechanisms through which African nations can transition from passive participants or adaptive recipients within emerging BRICS-led systems to proactive architects actively shaping their rules and priorities. The rhetoric of South–South cooperation holds promise but risks masking persistent power asymmetries; realizing genuinely equitable outcomes requires deliberate, evidence-based strategy focused on maximizing African influence (
This study directly addresses this imperative. It examines the principles, modalities, and concrete strategies that enable African countries to strategically navigate BRICS partnerships. The core objective is to identify how African agency can be effectively mobilized to inform and influence the development of multilateral trade frameworks under negotiation or evolution within BRICS spheres, ensuring they better serve the continent’s structural transformation goals. Employing a rigorous comparative policy analysis, the research dissects existing and proposed initiatives to pinpoint actionable leverage points for African stakeholders encompassing national governments, regional economic communities (RECs), the AfCFTA Secretariat, business associations, and civil society. Key focus areas include: mechanisms to strengthen collective bargaining power; frameworks to secure and govern beneficial technology transfer and value-addition; pathways to diversify trade relationships and reduce asymmetrical dependencies; and institutional designs to embed genuine reciprocity and solidarity within South–South cooperation paradigms (
Understanding how African states can strategically leverage BRICS partnerships to actively shape equitable multilateral trade systems necessitates a theoretical lens focused squarely on the dynamics of agency, norms, and institutional evolution within the international system. Constructivism, pioneered by scholars such as Alexander Wendt who fundamentally argued that “anarchy is what states make of it,” provides this essential framework. It posits that the international order is not a fixed structure dictated solely by material power or immutable interests, but rather a socially constructed reality continuously shaped by shared ideas, identities, norms, beliefs, and the ongoing interactions among states and other significant actors (
The need for a clear mechanism explaining how and why the standards and norms promoted by African actors are adopted by BRICS. To address this, the Constructivist framework must be refined to move beyond stating that agency exists and instead specify the precise processes of norm emergence, promotion, and adoption. Constructivism, at its core, posits that the international system is a social world, where shared ideas, identities, and norms not just material power fundamentally shape state behavior and institutional outcomes. This perspective is essential because it frames BRICS not as a fixed entity, but as a dynamic political space where the rules of the game are still being negotiated, creating openings for entrepreneurial actors to shape its normative architecture.
The process begins with norm emergence, norms do not appear spontaneously; they are constructed by actors, often in response to shared experiences or perceived injustices. In the African context, norms emerge from a deliberate process of articulation and entrepreneurship. This involves regional bodies like the African Union (AU) forging collective positions, such as those surrounding the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which inherently carries a set of standards for intra-African trade (
Once norms are formulated, African actors deploy a sophisticated repertoire of strategies for promotion. This is where agency becomes visible as strategic action. The first strategy is coalition-building and collective action. African states enhance their leverage by presenting a unified front through the AU and by forging issue-specific alliances within BRICS, such as aligning with India on agricultural issues or with Brazil on tropical commodity trade (
The diffusion and adoption of these norms by BRICS members are not automatic; they are contingent on specific conditions and mechanisms. Diffusion occurs through the interaction dynamics within BRICS forums, where repeated engagement leads to socialization, persuasion, and learning. The very structure of BRICS its informal governance and its self-identification as an alternative to Western institutions creates a more permeable environment for normative change than in established, rigid organizations. However, adoption ultimately depends on a confluence of factors. First, the promoted norms must possess credibility, demonstrated by African states’ consistent application of these standards domestically and regionally. Second, they must achieve normative alignment with the collective identity and strategic interests of BRICS; a norm that enhances BRICS’ credibility as a representative Global South leader is more likely to be embraced. Finally, material and structural factors are inescapable. Africa’s growing demographic weight, its market potential, and its control over critical mineral reserves provide tangible leverage. The adoption of an African-promoted norm on resource sovereignty, for example, becomes more likely when it is framed as a shared principle of mutual benefit and backed by the strategic value of Africa’s resources and its collective vote in international fora.
Despite decades of development assistance, technical cooperation, and, more recently, substantial foreign direct investment, many African states continue to grapple with foundational limitations in governance, service delivery, and institutional legitimacy. Traditional analyses, often rooted in materialist or institutionalist frameworks, diagnose these constraints as deficits of capital, technology, or administrative skill, prescribing investment and technical training as the logical remedy. However, this approach frequently yields incomplete or disappointing results, with gleaming new infrastructure projects standing alongside persistently weak bureaucracies. Through the lens of constructivism, we critically assess the extent to which investment epitomized by long-term Chinese engagement in Africa can realistically mitigate these deep-seated constraints, concluding that while capital can alter the material landscape, its power to transform the foundational social fabric of the state is inherently limited.
At its core, Constructivism in international relations shifts the analytical focus from the distribution of material power to the power of ideas, identities, and social norms. Applied to the question of state capacity, this framework provides a radical reinterpretation of what weakness truly signifies.
Capacity as a Social Construct, Not an Objective Deficiency: From a Constructivist perspective, the very categorization of a state as weak, fragile, or failed is not a neutral, objective assessment but a political label loaded with specific historical and normative baggage. This label often derives from a comparison against an idealized Weberian model of statehood rooted in the Western experience (
The Power of Norms and Identity: State capacity is built upon a bedrock of shared understandings. Constructivists argue that effective institutions require more than rules and budgets; they depend on intersubjective beliefs the collective acceptance of the state’s right to govern, the internalization of bureaucratic norms, and a shared sense of civic identity (
The International Dimension of Capacity Building: The international system is not a passive arena but an active participant in constructing statehood. The pervasive discourse of state failure can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It shapes how international actors, from donors to investors, engage with African governments, often justifying modes of intervention—such as parallel project implementation units that bypass national ministries—that can further erode domestic institution-building (
The contemporary global order is undergoing a profound transformation, characterized by a dispersion of power away from a Western-centric core towards a more fragmented, multipolar configuration. This shift has created both opportunities and imperatives for regions historically marginalized in global governance, with Africa moving decisively from being perceived as a passive rule-taker to asserting itself as an autonomous agent in international affairs (
Scholarship highlights that the very architecture of BRICS, with its consensus-based, informal format and stated commitment to a just, multipolar order, resonates with Africa’s historical non-alignment and contemporary demands for a more representative global governance (
The exercise of African agency within this framework is a dominant theme. Research moves beyond viewing Africa as a mere arena for BRICS competition, instead examining how African states and the African Union (AU) actively shape agendas. This is evidenced by the AU’s admission to the G20 and the push for its deeper institutional partnership with BRICS, a move aimed at ensuring continent-wide interests are represented beyond the voices of individual member states. African agency is manifested in a strategic “diversification of partnerships,” where countries like South Africa and Egypt leverage BRICS membership alongside traditional Western ties to maximize policy autonomy and avoid overdependence (
However, a critical strand of scholarship soundly cautions against excessive optimism, outlining substantial complications. A primary concern is the tension between the desire for greater African inclusion and BRICS’s operational capacity. The informal club model that facilitated dialogue may become procedurally overloaded with expansion, risking inefficiency and diluting focus (
Most scholarly views on leveraging BRICS partnerships for Africa’s structural transformation presents a nuanced picture of assertive agency amid enduring structural constraints. The multipolar era has undeniably created space for African actors to influence the discourse on equitable multilateral trade, using BRICS as a key forum to advocate for institutional reform, market access, and a transition from commodity dependence. The integration of this agenda with continental projects like AfCFTA represents a sophisticated, forward-looking strategy. Yet, the scholarly consensus warns that the realization of these potential hinges on Africa’s ability to overcome internal fragmentation, build financial independence, and navigate the complexities of an expanding, heterogeneous BRICS without succumbing to new forms of dependency. Future research must therefore continue to critically interrogate the implementation gap between strategic vision and tangible outcomes, tracking how African agency materially alters trade flows, industrial policy, and the rules of global economic governance in the years to come.
This study employs a qualitative, multi-method research design, anchored in a constructivist theoretical framework; to investigate how African states and institutions leverage BRICS partnerships for structural transformation and to shape equitable multilateral trade systems. The methodology is explicitly designed to capture the dynamic, ideational, and procedural dimensions of African agency within a multipolar context, moving beyond purely materialist analyses of power. It integrates analytical models to systematically address the opportunities and challenges underpinning this agency, utilizing a suite of complementary research instruments to triangulate findings and ensure scholarly rigor. The core analytical approach is process-tracing, aimed at uncovering the causal mechanisms through which shared ideas, identities, and norms within the BRICS coalition are translated (or fail to be translated) into institutional innovations and tangible trade outcomes. This is operationalized through a comparative case study method, focusing on specific thematic arenas where African agency is most asserted: the negotiation and operationalization of the AfCFTA-BRICS synergy; the governance of critical minerals and green technology transfers; and the institutional evolution of BRICS financial mechanisms (e.g., NDB, BRICS PAY) and their interface with African development finance priorities.
If capacity limitations are deeply social and normative, what role can material investment play? A Constructivist analysis does not dismiss the importance of capital but insists on examining how it interacts with the pre-existing social terrain. Investment is not a magic bullet but an intervening force whose impact is mediated by the very structures it seeks to change.
From deficiency to agency: contrasting paradigms in investment frameworks.
| Analytical dimension | Traditional deficit perspective | Constructivist-informed perspective |
|---|---|---|
| Core problem | Lack of financial capital, modern technology, and technical expertise. | Contested state legitimacy, fragmented social identities, and weak intersubjective norms for institutional performance and accountability. |
| Perceived role of investment | A direct, transformative input to fill gaps, stimulate growth, and build physical infrastructure. | An external force that interacts with and is filtered through existing social structures, power dynamics, and identity politics. It can reshape, reinforce, or disrupt these norms. |
| Primary mechanism for success | Sufficient capital inflow coupled with sound technical project design and management. | Alignment with local developmental narratives and identities, and reinforcement of domestic accountability linkages between state and society (not just revenue generation). |
| Key risk | Project failure, corruption, or financial non-sustainability. | Reinforcing extractive relationships, distorting local political economies, and undermining the social contract by operating outside or parallel to state institutions. |
Source: Author’s contribution.
This reframing reveals the central dilemma: investment can construct a dam, but it cannot easily construct the shared national identity or the legitimate bureaucratic ethos needed to manage the water authority effectively and fairly. The transaction can be monetary, but the transformation must be social.
The long-term trajectory of Chinese engagement in Africa serves as a critical case study for testing this Constructivist analysis. China’s approach, often characterized by non-interference in political affairs and a focus on hard infrastructure-for-resources deals, provides a stark experiment in attempting to boost capacity through material investment alone.
Tangible Achievements and Altered Landscapes: There is no denying the material impact. Chinese financing and construction have dramatically altered Africa’s physical infrastructure, building highways, railways, ports, stadiums, and digital networks. Projects like the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway or Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway have enhanced regional connectivity (
Persistent Constraints and Constructivist Explanations: Despite these visible gains, profound capacity constraints often persist, precisely in the areas Constructivist theory would predict.
Many Chinese investments, particularly in mining and hydrocarbons, remain anchored in the extraction and export of raw materials. The leap to local processing, manufacturing, and knowledge-intensive industries the ladder to structural economic transformation—requires more than foreign capital. It demands a complex ecosystem of supportive institutions: coherent industrial policy, reliable legal frameworks for technology transfer, and a deeply ingrained culture of innovation and skilled labor. These are normative and institutional constructs that capital alone cannot buy (
A Constructivist would observe that the dominant model can reinforce a dependency narrative, casting the host state as a perpetual recipient rather than an equal co-architect. This dynamic can stifle the emergence of a more assertive, entrepreneurial national identity in the economic sphere. Crucially, large, opaque deals negotiated directly with executives can weaken the domestic social contract by bypassing parliamentary scrutiny and civil society oversight, thereby undermining the very accountable governance that is essential for long-term capacity.
Ultimately, the outcomes of Chinese investment are strikingly divergent across the continent, and the differentiating factor is overwhelmingly domestic governance. Where African states have possessed strong, coherent national development strategies and capable, coordinated negotiating teams as seen in Ethiopia during its growth surge they have been better positioned to channel investment toward national priorities and secure more favorable terms. Conversely, where institutional fragmentation and elite capture are prevalent, large inflows of investment have, at times, exacerbated governance weaknesses, providing resources without strengthening and potentially weakening—the normative foundations of public administration.
Structural transformation, in the context of African economies, refers to a fundamental shift in economic structure characterized by a deliberate move away from heavy reliance on the extraction and export of unprocessed primary commodities towards diversified, resilient, and technologically advanced economies. This entails developing robust manufacturing and service sectors, enhancing productivity across agriculture and industry, fostering innovation, and creating higher-value-added activities that generate sustainable employment and reduce vulnerability to external shocks (
On the other hand, African agency denotes the proactive capacity of African states, regional institutions (like the African Union – AU), and other continental stakeholders to define their own strategic interests, formulate independent policies, and exert meaningful influence within the international system. It moves beyond mere participation or reaction to external initiatives, emphasizing the ability to set agendas, negotiate favorable terms, shape rules and norms, and leverage partnerships to advance continental priorities such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (
Equitable multilateral trade systems describe frameworks for international trade governance designed to ensure fairer participation and outcomes for all member states, particularly historically marginalized developing economies. Equity implies addressing inherent power imbalances by incorporating principles like Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) – allowing longer implementation periods and offering support to weaker economies – promoting transparency, ensuring inclusive rule-making processes, and striving for mutually beneficial outcomes that support development objectives, rather than perpetuating asymmetrical dependencies (
The multipolar era signifies a transition in the global power structure away from the post-Cold War period of significant U.S.-led Western dominance (“unipolarity”) towards a system characterized by the rise and influence of multiple major state centers of power. This includes established powers, resurgent powers, and emerging regional powers like those within the BRICS bloc, leading to a more distributed and contested international order where influence is diffused across several poles (
BRICS partnerships refer to the formal and informal collaborative arrangements emerging from the association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Established as a forum for dialogue and cooperation, BRICS aims to enhance coordination on global economic and political issues, promote reforms in international financial institutions (e.g., advocating for greater voting shares in the IMF/World Bank), and develop alternative institutions (like the New Development Bank – NDB) and mechanisms (e.g., discussions on local currency trade) intended to offer pathways distinct from traditional Western-dominated paradigms (
The convergence of multipolarity, BRICS ascendancy, African agency, structural transformation, and the pursuit of equitable trade systems defines the critical nexus of this study. By 2025, the multipolar era has demonstrably accelerated, characterized not only by the sustained economic weight of traditional BRICS members but also by the bloc’s formal expansion to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (
Concurrently, African states remain acutely focused on structural transformation. Persistent challenges include heavy reliance on primary commodity exports (evident in recent price volatility impacting budgets), limited industrial diversification hindering job creation, and asymmetrical trade dependencies exposed by ongoing global supply chain reconfigurations and climate-related disruptions (
However, the path from potential avenue to transformative outcomes is fraught. Realizing benefits demands the proactive exercise of African agency, moving far beyond passive membership or reactive engagement. Current developments highlight both opportunities and challenges:
Leveraging Expansion & Internal Dynamics: African members (South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia) and the AU collectively can strategically utilize the expanded BRICS platform to amplify continental priorities like the AfCFTA’s implementation or climate-resilient infrastructure needs. However, navigating internal BRICS power asymmetries remains crucial. China’s dominant economic role within the bloc and divergent strategic interests among members (e.g., regarding Ukraine, relations with the West) necessitate sophisticated African diplomacy to build issue-specific coalitions and prevent marginalization on key trade and investment agendas (
Shaping BRICS-Led Initiatives: African agency is being tested in real-time concerning specific BRICS mechanisms:
New Development Bank (NDB): African stakeholders are actively advocating for increased NDB funding allocation to continent-specific priorities like regional energy grids and transport corridors under Agenda 2063, alongside streamlined, less bureaucratic approval processes aligned with African capacities (
Trade & Investment Frameworks: Negotiations within BRICS on mechanisms for local currency settlement and trade facilitation offer platforms. African actors, leveraging the AfCFTA’s market size (now operationalizing Phase II of its Guided Trade Initiative), are pushing for these frameworks to explicitly incorporate provisions supporting African industrialization, SME integration into regional value chains, and technology co-development – ensuring they evolve into genuinely equitable systems, not merely replicating old dependencies under new management (
Digital Governance & Critical Minerals: Africa is asserting its interests in emerging BRICS discussions on digital trade rules and critical mineral supply chains, crucial for its structural transformation. Agency involves advocating for rules that support digital industrialization and ensure African mineral wealth contributes to local value addition, not just extraction for external industrial bases (
The AfCFTA as an Agency Multiplier: The AfCFTA remains the cornerstone instrument for amplifying African agency in all external engagements, including with BRICS. Its ongoing implementation, particularly efforts to harmonize standards and reduce non-tariff barriers, strengthens the continent’s collective bargaining position. By presenting a more integrated market, Africa can negotiate more favorable terms within BRICS initiatives, whether for market access, investment protection, or technology partnerships, transforming continental scale into tangible leverage (
Thus, the multipolar era and expanded BRICS offer unprecedented platforms and potential leverage points for African agency seeking structural transformation through more equitable trade systems (
The BRICS framework has evolved beyond rhetorical commitments into a structured ecosystem for fostering technology transfer, value addition, and industrial diversification among member states. Central to this effort is the Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR) Innovation Center in Xiamen, which coordinates policy, talent development, and project incubation. Since its inception, the center has launched over 100 pilot projects and 60 + training programs across nearly 100 countries, creating a pipeline for knowledge exchange and capacity building (
Technology transfer within BRICS operates through specialized platforms prioritizing co-ownership and local adaptation. The Transfong International Technology Transfer Center accelerates the transformation of scientific breakthroughs into market-ready solutions, particularly in green tech and digital infrastructure (
Value addition is enforced through mechanisms that anchor production and skills locally. The Technical Committee on BRICS Technology and Skills in Xiamen has pioneered mutual skill-recognition standards ratified by Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa, enabling workforce mobility and harmonizing certifications for advanced manufacturing (
BYD’s electric vehicle plant in Bahia, Brazil, mandates R&D co-investment and component manufacturing, transferring core battery technology rather than mere assembly. The Russia Home (Xiamen) Collaborative Innovation Center links Russian raw materials with Chinese processing capabilities to elevate mineral exports beyond extraction. These models institutionalize reciprocity, ensuring foreign investment builds domestic industrial capabilities. The NDB’s Africa Regional Centre explicitly ties loan disbursements to technology-sharing agreements, preventing debt-driven dependency while advancing Agenda 2063 infrastructure goals (
Industrial diversification leverages BRICS members’ complementary strengths through targeted coalitions: Resource-Processing Integration: Egypt and Ethiopia advocate for critical mineral frameworks requiring local processing, using BRICS’ collective market power to negotiate joint ventures with Chinese battery manufacturers. This shifts Africa’s role from raw material supplier to integrated participant in green value chains (
The effectiveness of any collaborative framework hinges on its capacity to mitigate inherent power asymmetries. While the BMG pilot’s design within the NDB reflects an institutional shift toward risk-sharing models (
Recent U.S. tariff impositions—including a 10% baseline on BRICS imports and 50–200% sectoral duties—have accelerated local currency trade via BRICS PAY and BRICS Bridge (
The BRICS ecosystem’s maturation—from dialogue forums to enforceable partnerships—reflects strategic institutional entrepreneurship. Brazil’s, 2025 presidency advanced “variable geometry” engagement, prioritizing less contentious areas like climate-aligned trade facilitation while sidelining divisive issues like de-dollarization. India’s upcoming 2026 chairmanship aims to refine this model by focusing on digital governance and WTO dispute settlement reform, leveraging its bridging role between Global South innovators and traditional powers. Critically, the AU’s formal observer status ensures African priorities inform BRICS agenda-setting, transforming peripheral participation into co-ownership.
The inclusion of Egypt and Ethiopia within the expanded BRICS framework, coupled with the African Union’s formal observer status secured at the 2024 Kazan Summit, marks a strategic inflection point for African agency in multilateral trade governance. This institutional foothold enables proactive continental engagement beyond symbolic participation, shifting African states from rule-takers to agenda-setters within BRICS-linked trade architectures. The AU’s establishment of a dedicated BRICS-AU Working Group on Trade and Industrialization exemplifies this agency, consolidating negotiating positions across RECs and aligning them with Agenda 2063’s industrialization targets before BRICS ministerial meetings. This structural coordination counters fragmentation, allowing African actors to leverage collective priorities—such as value-addition mandates for critical minerals or technology co-development clauses—during negotiations over emerging mechanisms like the BRICS Local Currency Settlement Framework (
African agency manifests most tangibly through the AfCFTA’s operationalization. By harmonizing rules of origin, implementing the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), and advancing Phase II of its Guided Trade Initiative, the AfCFTA transforms Africa’s 1.3 billion-consumer market into a unified bargaining tool (
Coalition-building remains central to amplifying influence within BRICS’ asymmetrical power dynamics. African states exploit intra-bloc divergences through targeted alliances: Partnering with India and Brazil on agricultural SSMs at the WTO, leveraging shared vulnerabilities to Northern subsidies to push for carve-outs in BRICS-led digital trade rules. Aligning with Indonesia and UAE on critical mineral governance, demanding BRICS-wide standards requiring minimum local processing thresholds for lithium and cobalt exports.
Collaborating with Russia on payment autonomy, integrating PAPSS with the BRICS Bridge system to reduce dollar dependency while resisting unilateral financial conditionalities (
Sunset clauses in technology transfer agreements to prevent perpetual dependency.
Tripartite arbitration panels (host state-BRICS investor-AU) for dispute settlement.
Mandatory impact assessments evaluating industrial diversification outcomes before NDB project approval.
These mechanisms institutionalize mutuality beyond declaratory diplomacy. As Ethiopia’s BRICS sherpa noted: “Agency isn’t rejecting partnerships—it’s redesigning them to lift our factories, not just our export volumes”. The success of this recalibration hinges on sustaining coalitional discipline amid great-power competition while converting observer status into enforceable rule-making authority a transition testing Africa’s capacity to transform systemic access into structural influence.
The expanded BRICS bloc demonstrates how collectively constructed identities and shared norms drive strategic coalition-building to reshape trade governance. A shared identity as advocates for a multipolar order and challengers to Western institutional exclusion underpins issue-based coalitions, despite significant economic asymmetries among members. India, Brazil, and South Africa frame demand for WTO Special Safeguard Mechanisms (SSMs) as essential tools for food sovereignty against developed-economy subsidies, leveraging agrarian vulnerabilities and climate justice narratives to counter market distortions (
Institutional innovations anchor these coalitions by codifying alternative norms. The operationalization of BRICS Bridge and BRICS PAY facilitates local currency settlements, institutionalizing “monetary sovereignty” while insulating intra-bloc trade from dollar volatility and extraterritorial sanctions (
African agency illustrates Constructivism’s emphasis on social learning within asymmetrical partnerships. The African Union’s formal observer status enables procedural innovations, such as inserting “special and differential treatment” clauses into BRICS investment frameworks—a direct challenge to universalist approaches (
Significant tensions persist, however, revealing the limits of socially constructed solidarity. Sino-Indian rivalry frequently fragments non-trade coalitions, while Russia’s Ukraine-war-driven insistence on ruble transactions clashes with other members’ financial caution (
The evolution of the expanded BRICS bloc represents a pivotal experiment in constructing an alternative multilateral order rooted in collective identity, institutional entrepreneurship, and adaptive coalition-building. Through a constructivist lens, BRICS demonstrates how shared grievances against Western-dominated governance—coupled with converging aspirations for sovereign development—can generate substantive institutional alternatives. The bloc’s transformation from a loose coalition into a rule-setting force hinges on three interdependent achievements:
First, identity-driven solidarity has enabled issue-based coalitions that transcend material asymmetries. Members leverage shared historical narratives of exclusion to reframe trade rules as instruments of justice—whether in agriculture (SSMs as food sovereignty), digital governance (data flows as developmental rights), or critical minerals (processing mandates as industrial reparations). This ideational alignment allows divergent economies like India and China or oil producers and green industrializers to coalesce around normative objectives, converting demographic and economic weight into bargaining leverage. The institutionalization of the African Union as an observer further amplifies this dynamic, enabling African states to articulate unified positions that reframe partnerships from dependency to mutual interest.
Second, purpose-built institutions have materialized declaratory norms into actionable frameworks. Mechanisms like BRICS PAY and the BRICS Bridge system codify monetary sovereignty, insulating intra-bloc trade from dollar hegemony. The BRICS Multilateral Guarantees (BMG) initiative transforms solidarity into enforceable reciprocity, de-risking technology transfers while binding investors to local value addition. Crucially, the New Development Bank’s Africa Regional Centre (NDB-ARC) now embeds equity into financing through 30% local procurement mandates and skills-transfer benchmarks—direct concessions to African agency. These innovations reveal how external pressures (e.g., U.S. tariffs) accelerate institutional learning, fostering alternatives that prioritize developmental conditionalities over profit-centric models.
Third, adaptive governance balances cohesion with flexibility. Brazil’s “variable geometry” presidency exemplifies pragmatic coalition stewardship, advancing less contentious agendas like climate-aligned trade while sidelining divisive issues like de-dollarization. African states exploit this fluidity through procedural entrepreneurship, inserting “special and differential treatment” clauses into BRICS frameworks and leveraging the AfCFTA’s unified market to extract binding concessions. The proposed Nairobi Principles featuring mechanisms such as sunset clauses for technology transfer and tripartite arbitration represent a formal attempt to institutionalize collaborative gains. However, the critical question is whether this framework translates declared intentions into binding mechanisms or merely codifies aspirational rhetoric. While the design suggests a move toward enforceable cooperation, its efficacy hinges on the political will to enact sanctions for non-compliance and the availability of legal recourse for weaker parties. Ultimately, the principles must be evaluated not by their procedural innovations alone, but by their capacity to concretely rebalance underlying structural asymmetries and define benefits in tangible, operational terms.
Yet persistent tensions underscore the limits of constructed solidarity. Sino-Indian rivalries fragment non-trade agendas, while capacity gaps in African trade ministries impede implementation. Green tech partnerships risk “dependency 2.0” when core intellectual property remains unshared, and Russia’s Ukraine-related financial demands strain collective priorities. These contradictions reveal a central challenge: BRICS must transition from reactive resistance (against Western norms) to proactive rule-setting that institutionalizes equity.
The bloc’s future as a credible alternative hinges on two imperatives:
Institutionalizing agency: Formalizing the AU-BRICS Secretariat and AfCFTA associate membership to codify agenda-setting power for smaller economies.
Binding mutuality: Enforcing the Nairobi Principles’ arbitration mechanisms and industrial impact assessments to prevent sub-imperial outcomes.
As India assumes the 2026 presidency with a digital governance mandate, BRICS stands at an inflection point. Its legacy will depend not on dismantling existing systems, but on proving that interest-based coalitions—anchored in shared identities and fortified by adaptive institutions—can deliver equitable, functional multilateralism. In this laboratory of post-Western governance, the experiment’s success rests on converting solidarity into structures that outlast geopolitical friction.
This analysis, while seeking to provide a concrete and scholarly examination, is inherently subject to certain limitations. Primarily, its focus on agency and institutional innovation within the BRICS framework may inadvertently underrepresent the persistent, material constraints of the global political economy. The power of incumbent systems entrenched financial networks, existing supply chain dependencies, and the sheer inertia of dollar dominance poses a formidable counterforce to the normative and institutional alternatives described. The study’s constructivist emphasis, though illuminating the how of coalition-building, risks attributing premature causality to declaratory politics; the announced mechanisms (BRICS PAY, BMG) require rigorous, longitudinal study to assess their real-world uptake, scale, and developmental impact beyond pilot projects. Furthermore, the analysis is necessarily constrained by the non-transparent nature of many intra-BRICS negotiations, relying on official statements and agreed texts that may obscure deeper bilateral bargaining and power asymmetries not captured in multilateral declarations. Finally, the concentration on state-level agency and continental institutions like the AU sidelines the critical role of sub-national actors, domestic political economies within African states, and non-state capital—all of which significantly determine the ultimate distribution of benefits from any BRICS partnership.
These limitations delineate clear avenues for future research. First, empirical, field-based studies are urgently needed to track the implementation of specific initiatives, such as the NDB-ARC procurement mandates or the Nairobi Principles’ arbitration cases, to measure their tangible effects on industrial capacity, technology diffusion, and trade diversification. Second, comparative research analyzing BRICS’s institutional trajectories against other historical attempts at alternative order-building (e.g., the Non-Aligned Movement, G77) would help distinguish which strategies are novel and which may recapitulate past pitfalls. Third, a deeper investigation into the domestic political settlements within key African states is crucial to understand how BRICS engagements are leveraged by local elites, contested by civil societies, and integrated into national development plans. Lastly, future scholarship should engage more directly with the fragmentation vs. innovation debate in international law and economics, assessing whether the BRICS-sponsored rules genuinely create a more equitable plurilateral system or simply fragment global governance into competing, equally hierarchical blocs. The enduring scholarly question remains whether identity-based solidarity can ultimately discipline capital and power to forge a genuinely transformative, rather than merely reconfigured, multilateral trade system.
FL: Formal analysis, Writing – review & editing, Conceptualization, Investigation, Methodology. OI: Investigation, Writing – review & editing, Conceptualization, Formal analysis. SA: Supervision, Formal analysis, Writing – original draft, Investigation, Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing – review & editing.
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This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the scientific content of the article.
The author(s) declared that Generative AI was not used in the creation of this manuscript.
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