The article analyzes the role of information as a strategic resource in the power structure within the context of Tunisia’s evolution, with the aim of studying how control of information has shaped the political context since the Tunisian Uprising. The study focuses on the reemergence of elite control over the media and public discourse, particularly during the term of President Kaïs Saied, drawing parallels with the regime of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. The analysis adopts the theoretical framework of the sociology of power, which conceptualizes power as a continuous competition between actors seeking to maintain or improve their hierarchical positions through the use of resources such as information. The methodology combines historical analysis with a case study focusing on recent developments in the country. The results indicate a trajectory in which the 2011 revolution is interpreted as a ‘linear’ temporal transformation of power, led by a mobilized population, with a return to ‘circular’ power relations marked by competition between elites and the marginalization of citizens, which has redefined the media landscape under Saied’s leadership. It concludes that control of information remains a central mechanism for sustaining hierarchical structures in Tunisia, showing continuity between past and present authoritarian practices.
With the re-election of Kaïs Saied as the president of Tunisia in October 2024, both ‘media freedom’ and the freedom of expression have been considered to have experienced significant decline (
The main question that the present article attempts to address is how the changes in the media landscape in recent decades may be explained, using the theoretical framework of the sociology of power as its main tool of analysis. The sociology of power, an innovative ontological proposal for better understanding the inner workings of power relations within large hierarchical systems, which will be outlined in the following section, allows for an alternative interpretation of motives behind the actions of key actors in the media and political landscape. The convenience of this type of analysis results from the ability that the sociology of power provides to identify such motives without, or at least, with less, distractions from ‘justifications of elites that may be simply discourse, used as a resource of power’ (
Information control is undoubtedly a fundamental pillar of power, and one that has already been widely recognized and analyzed (
The theoretical framework on which the present article is based is the sociology of power, a relatively recently arising theoretical approach, although one which has already generated significant theoretical work, debate, and analysis in its brief lifetime (
The sociology of power can be defined as a ‘system theory’ for exploring the functioning of large hierarchical societies taking into account the underlying dynamics implied by said hierarchical nature. The theory provides the methodical instruments for interpreting the behavior of elites in the system, based on the premise that these individuals or groups of individuals are in a ‘continuous competition’ for the ‘accumulation of power’, not necessarily because they wish to be constantly competing, but as a result of the dynamics of the system itself (
The need for elite-actors to maintain and accumulate power implies that the decisions made by said actors revolve around preserving or bettering their positions through the use of power resources, which include concepts such as the state, capital, coercion, ideology and, of particular importance with regard to the present analysis, information (
The present analysis is carried out as a case study, in line with the definition proposed by Gerring, as an ‘intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units’ (
The reliance on predominantly secondary sources reflects the nature of the focus of the article, the aim of which is not to generate new primary data, but rather to provide an alternative interpretation of existing data through a new analytical lens. Additionally, access to certain forms of primary material, including some media content, could be considered to be limited in certain periods of the Tunisian context examined, due to restricted public and online availability, or accessibility only through third-party archives and repositories, the content of which was, in many cases, unable to be contrasted with the original sources to confirm authenticity. Accordingly, the importance given to triangulated secondary sources was a deliberate methodological choice to ensure analytical rigor, while acknowledging the inherent limitation in terms of empirical originality.
During the Ben Ali regime and throughout the Tunisian Uprising, the media was used as a power resource to spread propaganda and carry out political marketing. Ownership and management of media sources was dominated by those linked to Ben Ali, his clan, and others connected to the regime, typically controlled by actors associated with the government, with both entry into and permanence within the media sector dependent on these actors and under their control (
Publications by opposition parties, such as those of
Information thus, can have been considered a mechanism of controlling the population, as well as influencing the decisions made within Tunisia throughout the entirety of the Ben Ali Regime. From the standpoint of the sociology of power, this may be interpreted as follows:
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The population under Ben Ali may be considered to be another power resource during this period, up until the beginning of the revolution, when, as a mobilized body, it may be interpreted that it transformed temporarily into an actor. While the power relationship between competing elites is always one of a circular nature, with ‘relative aspirations’ in which they constantly struggle to better their positions and accumulate more power in comparison from other competing actors in order to maintain their positions or move up in the hierarchies of their respective systems, the power relationship held by the population, as an actor, must be defined in a different manner (
During the Tunisian Uprising, the population of Tunisia consciously identified its needs and mobilized, marking the beginning of a linear power relation Symbolically speaking, the ‘needs’ included putting an end to injustice, corruption, repression, and poverty, and, more literally speaking, overthrowing the elites ruling over the hierarchies, especially at a governmental level, with Ben Ali in the spotlight (
This phenomenon has been extensively studied by several authors, who comment on the ways in which channels such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube were used for the diffusion of information in order to reach ‘a larger portion of the Tunisian society’ and to serve as sources of information for journalists and international media channels (
Following the fall of Ben Ali in 2011, there were significant changes in the media and in public information. The results of the mobilization of the population of Tunisia, those key moments arising from their conversion from power resource into actor, led to the country being perceived as a ‘success story’ within the MENA region, although one left in a phase of transition and with continuing issues and manipulations by various actors (
Indicators of a return to politically controlled media and current context have since marked the Tunisian context with the shifts in power the country has seen in more recent years. Saied was elected in 2019, and, not yet halfway through the presidential term, in 2021, he shut down parliament, removed Hichem Mechichi from his position as prime minister, carrying out a ‘power grab’, and further adding to his own accumulated power while working to reduce the power of other actors in the system. A negative image of the party, Ennahda, for instance, was generated, working to turn the population against it and draw away from the power of the actors in the party, while ‘consolidating’ Saied’s own power (
Through a constitutional reform, Saied accumulated further power through his political position, adding to the powers of the presidency while reducing checks and balances in place through the other branches. The use of power to silence opposers and opponents in this manner has drawn comparisons to that of the context prior to the revolution, with some going so far as to comment that ‘the generally repressive environment of the Ben Ali era…has been restored.’ (
As a result of several key events, the ‘state of media freedom’ has been cited to be in decline in recent years in Tunisia (
The definitions contained in the law for such crimes were notably ‘vague’, allowing for the interpretation in whatever way best suited the underlying interests in play, and leaving excessive room for manipulation and misuse of the law. A particularly noteworthy example can be found in Article 24, which states:
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Under the provisions of the article, arrests such as that of journalist Mohamed Boughalleb have been carried out. Boughalleb, who had recurrently spoken out against the president, was detained for the alleged spreading of false news (
The 2022 Decree-Law has also resulted in ‘self-censorship’, possibly due to the fear generated in journalists and others in the communication sector (
The findings commented on in the present article show that, while there have been significant shifts in the dynamics of information control in Tunisia since the Tunisian Uprising and the end of the regime of Ben Ali, the competition for the differential accumulation of power by Tunisia’s elites remains a key underlying factor, and, while the elites in power may change, the importance of information as a power resource, does not. Control over the resource remains of utmost importance in the competition, and the transition from a relatively more open media environment during the first post-revolution years, to more recent situations, under Saied, can potentially be explained by this fact. With the expansion of Saied and his government’s power, information has been consistently used to shape public opinion and prevent opposition and narratives that could challenge those beneficial to them, with developments such as the introduction of Decree-Law 54 in 2022 further illustrating the ‘backsliding’ into authoritarian patterns. These contexts demonstrate that information has been a key power resource for Saied, just as it was for Ben Ali. On the one side, the ‘silencing of critics’ and continuous censorship of media professionals and activists prevents the public from being able to have full access to the information regarding relevant circumstances. On the other side, the use of the media as a propaganda tool spreads the information that those in power wish for the public to receive, influencing, or attempting to influence, their opinions and positions. Both means of information control prevent the public from being able to make informed decisions.
The present article emphasizes the pivotal nature of information as a power resource in Tunisia in both the past and present. Despite the initial optimism following the Tunisian Uprising within the field of media freedom, freedom of expression, and similar rights, the trend back towards centralized media control under Saied’s presidency marks the short-lived disruption from the typical patterns in the system following the population’s conversion into an actor. The control over information will likely persist as a power resource for as long as the actors remain competing for differential power within the system of Tunisia, which is to say, indefinitely. Thus, the recent fall back into patterns of censorship and media control should come as no surprise. The temporary change following the fall of Ben Ali in 2011, in which freedom of expression and independent media thrived, could potentially be considered a result of the change in the condition of the general population from power resource to actor with the mobilization that took place.
With the reconversion of the population back into a power resource, having reached its goal and arrived at the endpoint of the linear power relation it represented, the political elite and other actors quickly rose once again to seize and manipulate the resource. The article suggests that information control is not a temporary strategy, but simply an integral and constant part of the power competition, and the ongoing use of both legal and institutional mechanisms to suppress opposition and limit access to critical information. The sociology of power clearly shines a spotlight on the nature of the phenomenon: ‘It is paradoxical that the field of information, one of the most symbolic from the point of view of liberal democracy, is one of the most elitist and least democratic that exists.’ [translation by the author from the original Spanish text] (
While the present analysis focuses on the Tunisian case in particular, performing a temporal rather than a spatial comparison, the mechanisms commented with regard to the Tunisian case can also potentially be considered to be applicable to other contexts. Other authors, such as Johansson-Nogués and Rivera-Escartin, in the process-tracing they carry out regarding causal mechanisms of re-autocratization in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, include ‘control over the domestic narrative’ among the key conditions of authoritarian reemergence in recent decades, representing clear examples of the use of information as a power resource for the consolidation of power by the actors of each system (
The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
DL: Writing – original draft, Writing – reviews & editing.
The framework of the sociology of power employed in this article was inspired by the research of Dr. Guillem Farrés-Fernández and Dr. Ferran Izquierdo-Brichs. Their works were instrumental in shaping the theoretical basis of the analysis carried out, however it is important to clarify that neither reviewed or validated the content of this article. Additionally, the author would like to thank the two reviewers, whose comments and contributions were invaluable in improving the content of the analysis.
The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the scientific content of the article.
The author(s) declared that Generative AI was not used in the creation of this manuscript.
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