One significant development in the Arctic region is the increasingly intricate relationship between China and Russia. Both nations have progressively aligned their strategic interests in this area. Since the dawn of the 21st century, the Arctic has surfaced as a potential battleground for strategic competition, despite its historical image of substantial cooperation and exceptionalism. It shall be reminded that during the Cold War, the Arctic region experienced significant militarization between the United States of America and the Soviet Union (USSR), characterized by the presence of nuclear submarines, and strategic military deployments.

Russia and China have a lengthy history characterized by varying degrees of cooperation, competition, and territorial discussions, spanning several centuries. Significant events include agreements such as the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) and the Treaty of Kyakhta (1727), which established borders and governed trade relations between Qing China and the Russian Empire (Andrieu, 2025).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has generated profound repercussions that extend far beyond Eastern Europe. One area where these changes are particularly noticeable is the Arctic. The conflict, along with the resulting sanctions and diplomatic consequences, has altered many of the incentives, constraints, and power dynamics in the engagement between China and Russia in the Arctic. Thus, within the Arctic, the tensions started in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea in March 2014.

In addition to the environmental crisis, the melting Arctic has emerged as a pretext for global rivalry and geopolitical manoeuvring. The vanishing ice caps and shifting borders are generating tensions regarding the assertion of oceanic and terrestrial territories that lie outside national jurisdictions, particularly concerning resource extraction, militarization, and commercial trade (Dutta, 2025).

The critical timeline event considered for this brief research report is the occurrence in 2007 during the expedition referred to as Arktika, when the Russian flag was planted on the seabed of the North Pole. This act is widely regarded as a significant and symbolic event that highlights the escalation of strategic competition in the region (Rodrigues, 2022). Although a considerable portion of the Arctic is under the jurisdiction of individual Arctic nations, this flag-planting served as a reminder that another area, the Central Arctic Ocean, which encompasses the geographic North Pole, remains outside the control of any single nation. Additionally, the Arctic Ocean is anticipated to become more accessible to both Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders as seasonal sea ice continue to diminish. The accelerating retreat of Arctic Sea ice is transforming the region from a frozen frontier into a strategic passageway. As the Arctic Ocean moves toward becoming seasonally ice-free, new maritime routes and shipping lanes are emerging, notably the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s northern coast, and the Northwest Passage (Canada), as well as the establishment of a direct maritime route across the Central Arctic Ocean (Tingstad et al., 2024). These developments are reshaping global trade dynamics and drawing renewed international attention. For more information on the Arctic Ocean and Arctic governance (see Box 1).

Among the most interested stakeholders is China. As global temperatures rise, Beijing has intensified its focus on the Arctic, viewing the NSR as a potential game-changer for international shipping. Melting ice could render this route navigable in the coming decades, offering a significantly shorter and more cost-effective alternative to traditional routes such as the Suez Canal. Some projections estimate that using the NSR could cut transit times between Asia and Europe by up to 9 days (Zhang, 2024).

Beyond economic incentives, the Arctic’s transformation is elevating its geopolitical relevance. Climate change is not only reducing sea ice but also unlocking access to untapped natural resources and previously unreachable maritime zones. This has positioned the Arctic at the centre of 21st century geopolitical strategy, with major powers vying for influence in a region once considered too remote to matter. This development has drawn the attention of major global powers, including China and Russia, who perceive the Arctic as a strategic and economic frontier. Their collaboration in the region, especially regarding the development of the NSR and the extraction of natural resources, carries substantial implications for global trade, energy markets, and international relations. This brief research report employs a qualitative research to provide a comprehensive analysis of Sino-Russian relations, seeking to comprehend the nature of the relationship that both nations are cultivating in the 21st century, particularly in the context of the Arctic.

Since the last minute Russia’s acceptance of China as an Observer in the Arctic Council, Wahden (2025) considers three moments that mark, since 2013, the partnership between China and Russia: (1) Starting in 2018, Russia and China established formal dialogues regarding Arctic cooperation via a consistent framework for bilateral consultations; (2) In September 2021, the Foreign Affairs Ministries of both countries announced their desire to promote Arctic collaboration in the “spirit of a comprehensive strategic partnership”; (3) In February 2022, Beijing and Moscow defined their overall relationship as a “comprehensive strategic partnership without limits” and pledged to strengthen their cooperation in the Arctic. According to the authors of RAND’s report, there exists a distinct lack of trust in the Sino-Russian relationship due to the prolonged history of geopolitical rivalry between the two nations (2024). The Arctic’s largest nation (Russia) and the world’s largest economy (China) in terms of purchasing power parity are uniting their efforts while acknowledging the potential advantages of a northern collaboration (Bennett and Dodds, 2025).

The question defined for this brief report is: how to categorise the type of relation China and Russia have in the 21st century and in the specific context of Arctic region/ocean? Is it a cooperation, a competition deal or a partnership?

The framework chosen for this brief research report is the newest approach shared by Christian Bueger, Elizabeth Mendenhall and Rebecca Strating in the book The Politics of Global Ocean Regions (2025). The book explores the intricate geopolitics surrounding the Arctic thaw and the increasing importance of the Indo-Pacific, as well as the complex interactions among states in the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans, highlighting the diverse maritime politics that influence the contemporary world. Each chapter enhances our comprehension of oceanic spaces, revealing them not as mere backgrounds but as dynamic arenas that are shaped, regulated, and contested. The governance of global commons or the relationship between regional security and ocean politics, is explored in a comprehensive and comparative context. The authors present an innovative analytical framework that reconceptualizes oceans not merely as physical areas, but as dynamic political arenas influenced by regional interactions and the complexities of governance.

This brief report is divided in five sections. The first one briefly describes the new perspective of Global Ocean Regions developed by Christian Bueger, Elizabeth Mendenhall and Rebecca Strating (idem). The second section elaborates on Russia’s Arctic policy that looks at 2035 and the relevance of the development of the NSR. The third section presents China´ s Arctic policy and its interests as well as the importance of the Polar Silk Road (PSR) for the country. The fourth section will focus on the evolution of the partnership between the two countries in the 21st century and how the War in Ukraine has influenced their connection the fifth section allows to analyse the type of relation: cooperation, competition deal or partnership. The succinct analysis will give the answer to the question defined for this paper by acknowledging if the relation between China and Russia in the Arctic is evolving into a profound alliance, or if it is developing into a pragmatic partnership in response to structural changes in the international system, or uncertainty remains about the future of this “no limit friendship.” The RAND report 2025 will be the support for this scrutiny considering the four scenarios elaborated by the authors. Table 1 allows a quick comparison overview between both actors´ policies. Finally, the findings will indicate that, as a conclusion, uncertainties persist regarding the future of this relationship, highlighting the global perspective that those two nations adopt when considering their attitude in a global ocean.

This paper seeks to contribute to research regarding the development of the Sino-Russia relation in the Arctic region and Ocean by offering a comprehensive analysis of this association in the region.

According to Christian Bueger, Elizabeth Mendenhall and Rebecca Strating (2025), International Relations (IR) scholars have traditionally viewed the oceans primarily as stages for military rivalry. Strategic studies in particular have focused on the capabilities and behaviours of major naval powers, interpreting the seas largely through the lens of strategic and resource competition, as stated by Till (2022). Patalano et al. (2023), as referenced by Bueger, Mendenhall and Strating, assert that the notion of “sea power,” defined as a state’s capacity to exert influence via naval and maritime forces, is frequently regarded as the cornerstone of maritime order. The authors also explain that states use military and material capabilities to assert control over maritime domains, enforce command of the sea, and extend their power through naval operations and maritime trade (Bueger et al., 2025). The same authors reference Liao’s (2008) research, who asserts that these strategic priorities frequently take precedence over cooperative methods, thereby restricting participation in joint resource management or the utilization of international mechanisms for resolving disputes.

Within IR it is widely accepted that regions are major and influential composites of global order and that their internal dynamics have external effects. Regionalism is a multi-dimensional research field that is not necessarily attached to one theory (Bueger et al., 2025, p. 5).

In the chapter titled “The Arctic (Ocean) Region: Emergence, Organisation, Effects and Unravelling?” Østhagen (2025) explores the Arctic as a distinct political and governance space shaped by geography, climate change, and evolving regional dynamics. The researcher examines how shifting environmental conditions, particularly those driven by a changing climate, are transforming geopolitical priorities and reshaping the structures of regional cooperation and governance. Østhagen also indicates that the increasing awareness of the effects of climate change, especially concerning local and regional pollution, resulted in the formation of practical, low-level cooperative efforts, including the creation of working groups, to tackle these evolving challenges.

The Arctic Ocean is being reshaped and these new delineations lead to a new way of approaching the Arctic region when faced with the Sino Russian establishment in the region.

The Arctic region of Russia, which constitutes more than 25% of the nation’s total landmass and is rich in natural resources, features a coastline that extends for 20,000 kilometres, numerous mineral deposits, and a significant share of the world’s energy reserves.

In the 21st century, Russia’s Arctic policy is defined by a strategic combination of resource extraction, military enhancement, and targeted international collaboration, underscoring the region’s vital significance to Russia’s economic and geopolitical objectives. Russia remains committed to an ambitious development agenda in the Arctic, highlighting the region’s economic opportunities and its strategic importance for national security. This approach encompasses the expansion of infrastructure, the encouragement of private investment, and the improvement of transportation routes, particularly the NSR (Bifolchi, 2024). The government’s approach encompasses various fundamental initiatives, including economic assistance via comprehensive infrastructure projects, tax benefits, affordable housing programs, and the advancement of the NSR. A pivotal aspect of this strategy is the creation of dependable transportation infrastructure, which facilitates year-round logistical operations and ensures the security of essential maritime pathways. Giuliano Bifolchi reveals that recent directives highlight the necessity to update Arctic plans by mid-2025, taking into account revised risk evaluations and security needs.

In addition to noting that global warming serves as a fundamental factor driving heightened global interest in the circumpolar North, it appears that Russia’s focus on military security in the Arctic has intensified between the release of the 2013 and 2020 policies. The report elaborated by Pär Gustafsson, entitled “Russia’s Ambitions in the Arctic Towards 2035” outlines and reflects on Russia’s publicly articulated objectives and intentions, culminating in three primary conclusions: Natural resources, the Northern Sea Route, the security-policy importance of socioeconomic development (2021, p. 7).

In 2020, Russia presented its new Arctic policy, “Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security for the Period up to 2035” or “Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Zone Until 2035,” according to different authors such as Buchanan (2020) and Meade (2020), respectively. In short, the Russian Arctic policy. In this policy, principles outline the objectives and strategies of Moscow for executing state policy in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation up to the year 2035. The principles are:

To ensure Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

Buchanan (2020) asserts that Moscow will be prepared in the event that conflict escalates and jeopardizes Russia’s development strategy for the RAZ. Nevertheless, the military-security capabilities of the RAZ are increasingly characterized by their “dual-use” potential. The strategy outlines the need for an additional five nuclear-powered icebreakers for Russia’s 22,220 Project, three nuclear-powered icebreakers for the Leader Project, 16 rescue and tug vessels, three hydrographic vessels, and two additional ships. The acquisition of these vessels will be bolstered by a new cargo ship initiative aimed at enhancing merchant shipping in the RAZ. The Arctic policy of 2020 outlines the implementation in three distinct phases: (1) 2020–2024: marks a significant phase in establishing social services within the Russian Arctic Zone (RAZ) communities. This initiative encompasses the creation of a special economic zone, the enhancement of primary healthcare systems, and the expansion of educational infrastructure in the RAZ. Additionally, the initial phase of development will introduce new ports along the NSR and facilitate the construction of four icebreakers. The first stage of the development strategy will involve an “update” regarding Russia’s claim for the extension of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) over the continental shelf, which is presently under review by the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf; (2) 2025–2030: The primary focus appears to be enhancing the competitiveness of the RAZ through the implementation of year-round shipping along the NSR. The complete delivery of the final icebreaker from the 22,220 Project is anticipated, alongside the initiation of construction for the nuclear-powered icebreakers under the Leader Project. In the next 5 years, Russia intends to commence the establishment of a RAZ ‘hub’ system aimed at facilitating trans-Arctic shipments. Additionally, the deployment of Arctic fibre-optic communication cables and a military space system capable of providing high temporal resolution hydrometeorological data is planned. This phase also encompasses the creation of a research fleet for the Russian Federation, indicating aspirations to extend beyond the RAZ and integrate into the Changing Arctic Oceans initiatives, potentially as a strategic counterbalance to Beijing; (3) up to 2035: Starting in 2031, Russia intends to substantially enhance the capabilities of all liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil initiatives within the RAZ. This development strategy serves as a preliminary framework for the regions of the RAZ. For example, the Murmansk region, which houses Russia’s only non-freezing Arctic port, is set to receive new terminal facilities. The region will prioritize the swift development and construction of large offshore structures for the production, storage, and transportation of LNG. Additionally, Murmansk will conduct geological surveys to assess the mineral resource potential of the Kola Peninsula. In the Yamal-Nenets area of the RAZ, efforts will concentrate on advancing the Sabetta seaport and dredging a maritime shipping channel to the Gulf of Ob. There will be an expansion of railway networks, with a focus on establishing a pipeline gas system for the Gulf of Ob, while gas projects in the Yamal Peninsula will be expanded. By 2035, the NSR is anticipated to emerge as a competitive global transportation corridor, with the delivery of Leader Project icebreakers and the anticipated operation of a new research fleet.

In 2023, Russia updated its Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) in which it highlights Russian national interests in the region more prominently and omits explicit references to collaboration within the Arctic Council (Bennett and Dodds, 2025; Humpert, 2023a, 2023b). The revised FPC states that Russia seeks to collaborate with partners who support a “constructive policy” (Bennett and Dodds, 2025, p. 14) regarding Moscow. The partners are China, India, and others that want cooperation in trade and security.

The Arctic holds critical significance for Russia’s national security and economic advancement, being abundant in natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals essential to the nation’s economy. Additionally, the region functions as a strategic military area, where Russia upholds a considerable military presence to reinforce its sovereignty and safeguard its interests.

The Northern Sea Route (known as NSR or Glavsevmorput) administered by Russia, represents a crucial segment of the Northeast Passage linking northwest Europe to northeast Asia. Over the past several decades, it has garnered increasing global interest, primarily due to the dual factors of reduced ice coverage and Russia’s efforts to enhance maritime traffic. This situation has opened up avenues for international shipping firms to engage in transit journeys between the Pacific and Atlantic, in addition to facilitating the movement of Arctic resources to global markets. The NSR is a maritime passage situated along the Siberian coastline, extending from the western region of the Kola Peninsula to the Bering Strait in the east. This route represents the most direct and accessible maritime corridor between East Asia and Europe. It serves as a vital transportation link, integrating the ports of Russia and China in the Asian and Far Eastern regions with the deltas of navigable Russian rivers, thereby forming a cohesive shipping network.

Since the early 1930s, the Northern Sea Route has served as a vital shipping corridor for the USSR, facilitating the transport of goods, supplies, fuel, and equipment to remote regions and settlements throughout the Russian Arctic mainland and its islands. This logistical endeavour, known as “northern deliveries” (Gunnarsson and Moe, 2021, p. 8) depended on Russian inland waterways and was predominantly carried out during late summer and early autumn, periods when sea ice conditions were most favourable for navigation. The NSR also played a crucial role in the transportation of raw materials, including timber, coal, and minerals, extracted from production sites located near coastal or riverine areas; among these, the mining and metallurgical complex in Norilsk became the most significant contributor of cargo for the NSR. The Soviet nuclear icebreaker fleet was primarily created to escort vessels to and from Dudinka, the loading port for Norilsk, located at the mouth of the Yenisei River. Starting in 1978, this escort service was available year-round, allowing for the transport of non-ferrous metals via the Kara Sea to Murmansk and, on occasion, directly to various destinations in Europe (Gunnarsson and Moe, 2021; Kontostathi and Ananina, 2023).

The NSR was officially opened to international maritime traffic on January 1, 1991, following Gorbachev, 1987 speech in Murmansk, where he emphasized the importance of international cooperation in Arctic shipping. To explore the potential for enhanced use of this maritime passage, Russia initiated the International Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP), which operated from 1993 to 1999. As part of this initiative, the cargo ship Kandalaksha, belonging to Norilsk Nickel, undertook a ground-breaking demonstration voyage in August 1995, sailing from Yokohama, Japan, to Kirkenes, Norway. This voyage represented the first commercial international transit along the NSR in modern times. In 1997, the Finnish-flagged tanker Uikku, managed by Neste Oil Shipping, traversed the NSR from Murmansk to the east, passing through the Bering Strait into the Asia-Pacific region. After loading additional cargo in Asia, it returned to Murmansk, delivering fuel to various ports in the Russian Arctic during its round trip. Furthermore, in the same year, NSR authorities confirmed the successful passage of a Latvian-flagged tanker through the route.

The NSR presents clear benefits as a maritime trade corridor linking ports in northwest Europe with those in northeast Asia, notably through significantly shorter transport distances—ranging from 30 to 50% less—and decreased sailing durations of 14 to 20 days when compared to the Suez route, given that sailing speeds remain constant. Over the last decade, numerous studies have investigated the economic feasibility of the NSR relative to the conventional Suez route, focusing on various cargo types. Björn Gunnarsson and Arild Moe present in their article “Ten Years of International Shipping on the Northern Sea Route: Trends and Challenges” (2021) a select group of researchers has analysed and evaluated transit statistics pertaining to the NSR from the period 2010–2019.

International shipping along the NSR involves multiple aspects. Its role as a transit corridor for the movement of energy resources to European and Asian markets has recently become increasingly important, particularly in light of the rapid development of oil and LNG projects in West Siberia. The dynamics of both transit and destination shipping to global markets highlight the relationship between this maritime route and the international economy, irrespective of whether the shipping activities are undertaken by Russian or foreign companies. Nevertheless, the participation of international shipping firms in the NSR and their capacity to offer shipping services constitutes a unique aspect of internationalization. During the Soviet Union, access to the region was largely restricted for foreign vessels. However, in the early 21st century, there is considerable optimism that the NSR can become a focal point for international shipping enterprises (Gunnarsson and Moe, 2021).

From a legal perspective, Kontostathi and Ananina (2023) explain that the NSR encompasses Russian internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extends 200 nautical miles from the baseline of its coasts. Consequently, Russia has implemented management and administrative frameworks within this region. Notably, Russia characterizes the NSR as a national maritime route grounded in historical precedent. In its Federal Law No. 155-FZ, enacted on July 31, 1998, titled On Internal Sea Waters, Territorial Sea, and Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation, the NSR is described as “the historically established national transportation lane of communication of the Russian Federation.” Based on this legal foundation, Russia asserts that the straits along the NSR, including the Kara Gate Strait, Vilkitsky Strait, Sannikov Strait, and Dmitry Laptev Strait, are classified as internal waters, thereby granting Russia complete jurisdiction over them. As a result, Russia contends that there are no implied rights to navigate these waters, necessitating that foreign vessel seek permission to enter and traverse the NSR through these straits. However, this stance is challenged by several other states and the European Union, which argue that the aforementioned straits qualify as straits used for international navigation, thereby subject to the regime of transit passage. The request for permission to navigate within the Russian EEZ along the NSR appears to prima facie apparently contradict the principle of freedom of navigation as enshrined in Article 87 of the UNCLOS. In this context, any rights or jurisdiction exercised by the coastal State must be carried out with due consideration for the freedoms of other States. Nevertheless, the authors of the article “The Northern Sea Route: New Opportunities, New Challenges” alert to the fact that the Article 234 of UNCLOS grants coastal States significant authority to regulate marine pollution caused by vessels in “ice-covered regions” within their EEZ. Russia, having ratified UNCLOS in 1997, has maintained that its administration of the NSR is warranted under Article 234 concerning ice-covered areas. Therefore, in accordance with both international law and customary law, Russia is entitled to enforce necessary measures aimed at safeguarding marine environmental protection, ensuring navigational safety, conducting search and rescue operations, and establishing the requisite infrastructure in the area.

Mia Bennett and Klaus Dodds indicate in their recent book Unfrozen (2025) that China is demonstrating a growing interest in regional governance and development, as well as in establishing itself as a polar power. In 2003, China opened its research station in Svalbard, received its initial invitation to participate in Arctic Council meetings as an ad hoc Observer in 2006, and subsequently applied for full observer status in the following year. The approval of China’s Observer status, in 2013, stemmed from its extensive involvement in Arctic matters (Sun, 2014). The same year, five other non-Arctic states joined the Arctic Council as Observers: India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea.

Junhua Zhang asserts, in the article “Russia clears the path for China in the Arctic” (2024), that China entered Arctic exploration relatively late. While European countries commenced their expeditions to the region in the 16th century, China did not significantly participate until the late 20th century. Nevertheless, despite this delayed involvement, Beijing is now resolutely aiming to establish itself as a prominent actor in Arctic affairs.

The chronology of China’s activities in the Arctic can be outlined as follows, according to the details provided in Chapter II of the 2018 White Paper:

1925, China joined the Spitsbergen Treaty and started to participate in addressing the Arctic affairs. Since then, China has exerted more efforts in the exploration of the Arctic, expanding the scope of activities, gaining more experience and deepening cooperation with other participants.

The heading of this section draws upon the terminology found in China’s Arctic Policy, which asserts that the Government considers China as “one of the continental States that are closest to the Arctic Circle” (p. 1). In the same document, China asserts that non-Arctic nations, including itself, possess rights within the region. The White Paper highlights China’s commitment to various activities such as scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, and the installation of submarine cables and pipelines, alongside resource exploration and utilization. Furthermore, China’s Arctic policy, as detailed in the white paper, showcases a strategic integration of scientific inquiry, economic ambitions, environmental responsibility, and multilateral engagement, underscoring principles of “respect, cooperation, win-win result and sustainability” (People’s Republic of China (RPC), 2018, p. 2) as stated in the 2018 White Paper.

Chapter III of the Arctic Policy considers goals and basic principles as indicated below:

To achieve the aforementioned policy objectives, China will engage in Arctic matters in alignment with fundamental principles: “respect, cooperation, win-win result and sustainability” (idem).

In what concerns Chapter IV, it develops China’s Policies and Positions on Participating in Arctic Affairs by considering:

Deepening the exploration and understanding of the Arctic;

This document expresses assertiveness in the goals to be achieved in regards the Arctic at a regional and global scales.

China and Russia share a complex historical relationship characterized by alternating phases of collaboration and intense strategic competition.

Andrieu (2025), in his article “China-Russia Relations Since the Start of the War in Ukraine” gives an overview of the relation between China and Russia by affirming that for centuries, early Chinese and Russian entities were separated by formidable deserts, dense forests, and towering mountains, resulting in minimal direct interaction, mainly through trade, prior to the 16th century. In the 13th century, the Golden Horde, a Mongol khanate led by Batu, the grandson of Genghis Khan, conquered the Russian principalities. Simultaneously, another grandson, Kublai Khan, subdued China and founded the Yuan dynasty. The subsequent Pax Mongolica only partially closed the extensive cultural and civilizational divide between the two areas. The same author presents Russia and China’s relations as having deep roots. As early as the 15th century, the merchant Afanasy Nikitin may have made one of the first Russian references to China in his travelogue A Journey Beyond the Three Seas. Over time, rulers like Ivan the Terrible recognized the value of ties with China, especially after Russia broke away from the Golden Horde. Direct contact between what was then Muscovy and China (later the Russian Empire) began in earnest in the early 1600s, as Russia expanded into Siberia, the Pacific coast, and Central Asia.

Conflict soon followed: Russian settlers moved into regions such as Lake Baikal and along the Amur River, areas under Qing China’s control. The Qing court viewed Russians as “barbarians” within its hierarchical worldview. It took nearly two centuries for full diplomatic relations to be regularly maintained. The Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) set the first formal border agreement; the Treaty of Kyakhta (1727) solidified trade routes and diplomatic norms. Subsequent agreements in the 19th century, such as the Treaties of Aigun (1858), Beijing (1860), Saint Petersburg (1881), and Chuguchak (1884), expanded Russian territory, often at China’s expense.

Andrie (idem) keeps going on with its historical relation by informing that after 1917, the Soviet regime, despite its revolutionary rhetoric, retained most territorial gains inherited from the Tsarist era. While officially supporting various Chinese political factions, Moscow was cautious, and relations remained strained. The tension climaxed during the Sino-Soviet split, which saw ideological and border disputes escalate through the Cold War. With the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev, more pragmatic diplomacy emerged, and long-standing border disputes were officially resolved in agreements signed in 2003 and 2008.

Over the last 10 years, the two nations have enhanced their connections, yet there is scepticism regarding the robustness of their strategic alliance, suggesting that their partnership is primarily motivated by a mutual opposition to the United States rather than any inherent compatibility. Historically, tensions between the two countries have escalated over various issues, including ideological differences related to communism and the management of their extensive 4.184 kilometres border. Nevertheless, and as mentioned by Fong and Maizland (2024), since the early 2000s, the relationship between China and Russia has significantly improved, with both nations successfully resolving their border disputes in the 2000s and engaging in increased security collaboration through joint military exercises and arms agreements. Both countries have established a practical alliance in the Arctic, focused on mutual economic and strategic objectives. According to Rebekka Åsnes Sagild and Christopher Weidacher Hsiung (2024) it can be asserted that China will not jeopardize the hard-earned Sino-Russian relation due to the Ukraine crisis. Alternatively, while not entirely aligned with Russia, this relationship is perceived as a source of stability for long-term prospects. In their article “Chinese Re-Examinations of Russia? The Strategic Partnership in the Wake of Russia’s War Against Ukraine” the above-mentioned authors add that the fact that Russia is China’s largest neighbour, sharing an extensive border and a history of confrontation (especially during the latter stages of the Cold War) is central for fostering amicable and collaborative relations. Such evaluations have been consistently maintained by Chinese experts on Russia (Sagild and Hsiung, 2024).

The PSR initiative from China complements Russia’s ambitions for the development of the NSR and the exploitation of Arctic resources. Their partnership encompasses collaborative efforts in LNG projects and the enhancement of infrastructure along the NSR. Nevertheless, Russia asserts that its Arctic strategies are not directed against any external entities. The Kremlin has reiterated that its partnership with China aims to foster stability and predictability in the Arctic region, particularly in light of the ongoing Western sanctions imposed on Russia.

Looking at the evolution of the partnership between China and Russia in the 21st century, three moments can be considered as a turning point: (1) 2001: China and Russia have formalized the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, committing to refrain from employing nuclear weapons against one another and vowing to enhance their collaborative efforts, (2) The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 has intensified the collaboration between China and Russia, despite Beijing’s lack of recognition of this annexation (Fong and Maizland, 2024); it is added in this article (3) the war in Ukraine gets both country closer. In the weeks leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the two nations announced a “no limits relationship”as stated in their Joint Statement (Bennett and Dodds, 2025).

The People’s Republic of China has historically adopted a cautious and restrained approach in the Arctic, largely influenced by Russia and its fleet of icebreakers. However, during July and August 2024, three icebreakers (Xuelong 2, Ji Di, and Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di) significantly marked China’s increasing involvement in the Arctic for the first time. This move indicates Beijing’s more ambitious aspirations, and the development of a heavy icebreaker could facilitate China’s establishment of a permanent presence in the Arctic Ocean. This situation reached a notable peak in October 2024, when the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published the headline: “The Arctic is becoming Chinese” (Paul, 2025, p. 1).

It is already well-known that the Arctic region possesses abundant untapped natural resources, encompassing oil, natural gas, and various minerals. Notably, Russia maintains considerable reserves, especially in the Yamal Peninsula and the Taymyr area. Furthermore, China has made significant investments in these industries, with firms such as CNPC and CNOOC securing interests in Russian liquefied natural gas initiatives, including the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2 projects (Odgaard, 2024). One reason for this is that most Arctic states have rejected such projects, like the recent engagement of China’s state-owned shipping giant COSCO in Kirkenes, which wants to become the European Singapore in an ice-free future. This makes Chinese-Russian cooperation in the Arctic all the more important, as it links an emerging world power with the largest Arctic player, which is increasingly falling into the role of junior partner, and thus into a position of dependency. In addition to long-term interests, one of the main factors for the increased activity and interest in the Arctic is Russia’s weakness as a result of its war of aggression against Ukraine.

China has emerged as one of the few beneficiaries of the ongoing conflict. According to Paul (2025), this situation has resulted in a reduced subordinate role for Russia, as evidenced by Vladimir Putin’s deferential conduct during Xi’s visit to Moscow in March 2023. In his quest for greater power, Putin has inadvertently undermined his own nation. In return for its support of the war, China stands to benefit from lower prices for oil and gas, enhanced access to natural resources, and the acquisition of sensitive military technology from Russia. Furthermore, China can anticipate a more accommodating Russian stance towards its proposals for Arctic governance and its expanding influence in geopolitically sensitive regions, including the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and the NSR.

This shows that the collaboration between China and Russia extends beyond economic interests. In 2022 and 2023, Chinese and Russian destroyers conducted joint naval operations near the Aleutian Islands of Alaska, and they continued this cooperation in 2024, operating further north in the Bering Sea, as recalled by the authors of the article “China-Russia Relations in the Arctic: What Are the Northern Limits of Their Partnership?” published by RAND.

In April 2023, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between China and Russia to strengthen collaboration in maritime law enforcement, with an emphasis on combating terrorism, smuggling, illegal migration, and the protection of marine resources. This memorandum was signed in Murmansk (Russia) by the coast guard of the People’s Republic of China and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, as informed by Reuters (2024).

Upon examining the perspectives of Russia and China regarding the Arctic region and ocean, both separately and in light of their historical relationship, this section aims to address the question (how to categorise the type of relation China and Russia have in the 21st century and in the specific context of Arctic region/ocean? Is it a cooperation, a competition deal or a partnership?) posed in this paper by determining the nature of the relationship between China and Russia in this century within the specific context of the Arctic region and ocean.

The answer will be based on the information shared in the previous sections and on the scenarios of the Sino-Russian Relations in the Arctic by 2035 presented by the authors Tingstad, Pezard, Shokh published by RAND (2024), as below:

China leverages its relationship with Russia for China’s economic security and diversifies its Arctic investments, which leads to a growing presence of its military and law enforcement.

The two key factors considered by the authors for the hypothetical futures are: (1) the broader bilateral relationship between China and Russia and (2) the diversity of the overarching Arctic economy.

In the present context, it is also essential to look at the role and transformation of the international order, particularly regarding the United States´ position within the Sino-Russian relationship. Is it possible for the U. S. to disrupt this dynamic? Furthermore, there may be emerging economic opportunities for India in the Arctic region.

Thus, Reuters (2024) consider that while China is expected to maintain its partnership with Russia, the likelihood of the United States and its allies successfully creating a rift between the two nations appears minimal. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that China aims to preserve its strategic alternatives in the Arctic region. The economic and trade interactions with other Arctic nations, including Canada and Norway, have persisted, even in the face of increased examination.

For Fong and Maizland (2024) the major challenges of the no limits relationship are distrust and the war in Ukraine. Although China and Russia have common interests in the Arctic region, Hong (2024) asserts that there exist fundamental tensions and competitive dynamics between the two nations. Russia expresses concern regarding China’s expanding influence within its traditional areas of dominance, while China remains apprehensive about becoming excessively dependent on Russia for Arctic access. This mutual distrust may constrain the extent and effectiveness of their collaborative efforts and could result in conflicting interests. Historically, Russia has been sceptical of foreign participation in Arctic affairs, especially from non-Arctic countries, and only reluctantly endorsed China’s Observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013. Furthermore, Bennett and Dodds contend that Russia is likely to refrain China in its pursuit of the “polar great power status” (2025, p. 267).

The connection between China and Russia is characterized by significant ambivalence. One should be aware of the lengthy history of misunderstanding, conflict, exploitation, and mutual distrust, elements that were once anticipated to separate the two nations. Conversely, current circumstances have drawn them nearer, cultivating a strategic alliance primarily based on pragmatism. From Pierre Andrieu’s lens, this situation is expected to endure as long as both parties require each other to address the common challenges presented by the United States and the wider international turmoil (2025).

Addressing the question appears challenging, as uncertainties persist even when one attempts to classify it as a pragmatic relationship, based on the information provided in this brief report.

The ocean framework reconceptualizes oceans not merely as physical environments, but as active political arenas influenced by regional interactions that align with the aspirations of those two nations, Russia and China, aiming to establish themselves as future maritime powers. They both are recognizing the significance of the globally interconnected ocean (Bueger et al., 2025; Hull, 1967), strategizing from various fronts: Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic.

In the 21st century, the relation between Russia and China has evolved and got closer in the last 3 years due to the War in Ukraine. Even if some tensions exist between both, it is observable that over the past decade, the collaboration between both countries in the Arctic has significantly increased, now including cooperative efforts in infrastructure development, energy security, military drills, and diplomatic alignment within the Arctic Council (Jouan et al., 2024).

The brief report demonstrated that the partnership is characterized by a convergence of interests. Both nations seek to enhance their economic prospects, secure energy resources, military, and assert their influence in the region. The conflict in Ukraine has hastened existing trends in Sino-Russian Arctic collaboration: rather than cautious cooperation, the two nations have forged stronger connections in energy, infrastructure, and transit. Nevertheless, this relationship does not constitute a complete alliance, as it is accompanied by underlying tensions and negotiations. When trying to identify the type of the relation between Russia and China in the Arctic, pragmatic partnership seems to be the most adjusted term. Though, doubts and uncertainty remain about how long this will endure and how it will evolve.

This brief research report will expectantly lead to further investigation on the topic relating to the future of multilateralism in the Arctic region and ocean.