The concept of “identity” originates from Erikson’s 1950s psychological research, which conceptualised it as a developmental process that shapes individuals’ worldviews, behaviors, and even social power structures (Weiner and Tatum, 2021). Influenced by psychology and sociology, political scientists in the 1990s began to examine how identity affects political behavior and institutional functioning (Chen and Urminsky, 2019). Today, political identity is an analytical and theoretical lens for understanding how individual identity interacts with broader ideologies and institutional structures (Weiner and Tatum, 2021).

In developmental and social psychology, political identity is a dual-dimensional concept. It is both an internal self-concept and an external social expression. Individuals continuously interpret and present themselves within a political community, and these orientations are shaped and reconstructed through ongoing social interactions (Gentry, 2018). This duality of internal self and external interaction explains why identification with a party or a specific ideology carries strong emotional resonance while also constrained by social norms (Huddy, 2001). Political identity, therefore, is neither purely self-constructed nor entirely externally imposed; instead, it emerges through the dynamic interplay between self-categorization and external recognition. This interactive nature leads scholars to distinguish between personal and social identities as two analytical paths for studying political identity, though the two are not entirely independent (Malka and Lelkes, 2010). From this perspective, political identity is both subjective and relational; an individual’s self-understanding only gains meaning in contrast to others, which helps explain why political identity often takes on a polarized dimension. In democracies, this polarization is commonly expressed through the left–right political spectrum. Labels such as “liberal” and “conservative” signify not only ideological differences but also important markers of identity (Bennett, 2012). However, theoretical frameworks derived from Western contexts cannot be uncritically transplanted to other societies. In China, socialist ideology serves as the dominant framework for political identity construction. Individuals’ political belonging is not expressed along a left–right continuum but rather through their acceptance or distancing from the core socialist values systematically embedded in the education system and broader ideological discourse. This highlights that the construction of political identity is profoundly shaped by the institutional and cultural context in which it occurs.

Consequently, political identity must be understood within its institutional framework. It is simultaneously a product of individual construction and reflects political institutions and ideology. For Chinese youth, political identity cannot be captured by “liberal–conservative” ideological typologies. Instead, it is embedded in state-led socialist ideological education and influenced by social factors such as digital media practices and corruption perception. Accordingly, this study treats socialist ideology as a key indicator of political identity. It explores how youth political identity is shaped in the context of everyday digital media use and perceptions of corruption.

For a long time, the media have been regarded as a core political apparatus (Boomgaarden and Schmitt-Beck, 2019). By shaping and disseminating political narratives, audiences can internalise these narratives as “common sense,” thereby influencing political identities (Chahal, 2023). Traditional media typically plays a dual role; on the one hand, it reinforces political cognition by controlling the content of information; on the other, it acts as a “gatekeeper,” selecting issues and suppressing alternative viewpoints to maintain homogeneity of identity (Qin et al., 2023). Scholars once hoped the media would fulfil its “fourth estate” function by supervising government and ensuring transparency (Amodu et al., 2014). However, growing criticism highlights that corporate and state control over media restricts viewpoint diversity and deepens ideological bias (Street, 2010). As public trust in traditional media declines and audiences drift away, its influence has further weakened (Hariyanto et al., 2025). Against this backdrop, social media has reshaped the landscape of political communication. Unlike the passive audiences produced by traditional media, digital media has enabled interactive participation, turning users into consumers and producers of political content. Individuals can freely express their views, mobilise around issues, and take personalized action without relying on traditional political institutions. This transformation has facilitated a shift from collective, institutionalized participation to more individualised and networked forms of engagement (Bennett, 2012). However, a key question remains: if traditional media once functioned as a political tool, can decentralised, fragmented, user-driven social media still play the same role?

This debate is particularly salient in authoritarian contexts. The state maintains strict control over traditional media in China, using it as an important channel for political socialization and ideological dissemination (Street, 2010). Social media complicates this landscape. Although not entirely free, it still allows for bottom-up interaction, user-generated content, and personalized political communication (Shao and Wang, 2017). Based on self-disclosure and social interaction on social networks, Cheung et al. (2015) classified social media content into four dimensions: information sharing, building new relationships, self-presentation, and enjoyment. Later studies confirmed that these dimensions represent the core drivers of social media use (Jacobson et al., 2020). While initially applied to media consumption and diffusion studies, these behavioral patterns are equally relevant in political contexts. In digital political communication, information sharing facilitates the dissemination of political narratives and ideological cues; building new relationships enables individuals to connect with like-minded others; self-presentation allows individuals to visualize and express their political identities; and entertainment sustains political engagement through emotional and symbolic practices. These four dimensions are thus not merely general patterns of social media use but also mechanisms through which political identity is expressed, reinforced, and negotiated in online spaces. Even under conditions of tight control, such “micro-spaces” supplement, complicate, and sometimes challenge state-led ideological socialization.

Social Identity Theory (SIT) provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between social media content and political identity. SIT emphasises that individual identity derives from membership in social groups, including political communities. Social media offers a crucial arena for expressing, forming, and reinforcing such identities. Specifically, information sharing provides shared narrative resources that strengthen cognitive and emotional cohesion within the group while sharpening group boundaries and distinguishing “us” from “them.” Building new relationships allows individuals to transcend geographic and social boundaries, expand group networks, and broaden the reach of political identity. Self-presentation enables individuals to display their political stance and values, achieving self-categorization and making identity more visible, reinforcing group-based identification. Enjoyment allows users to engage with politics in a light and approachable way, normalizing political expression, lowering participation thresholds, and sustaining political identity through affective practice.

Existing research shows that social media exerts a positive influence on political identity. Through self-expression online, individuals make their political views visible, connect with others, and enhance their “political visibility,” strengthening their sense of identity and willingness to participate (Bennett, 2012). Even among Chinese small-town youth, often regarded as politically apathetic, social media, especially short-video platforms, has stimulated political interest and identification (Qin et al., 2023). Therefore, social media is not merely a channel for political information dissemination but a complex arena where political identity is constructed, negotiated, contested, and reinforced. For Chinese youth, social media plays a dual role; it complements state-led ideological socialization while enabling individuals to be seen and connected in broader communities, thereby strengthening political identity.

Building on SIT and previous research, this study proposes the following hypotheses:

Corruption is commonly defined as using public power for private gain (Sampford, 2006), but its impact extends far beyond this narrow definition. It undermines democratic principles such as justice, transparency, and accountability, erodes citizens’ trust in political leaders and institutions, and profoundly shapes individuals’ political attitudes (Jameel et al., 2019). Therefore, it is not merely an economic or administrative problem but an important contextual factor influencing political attitudes and behavior.

In China, corruption has persisted and become more widespread due to economic reforms and large-scale privatization of state-owned enterprises (Dong and Torgler, 2013; Shivakumar, 2005). It has reached epidemic proportions since the reform and opening-up era, fueling discontent with political identity (He and Jiang, 2020; Orjuela, 2017). Scholars have further emphasised that corruption is culturally embedded, functioning both as a widespread social problem and a phenomenon rooted in cultural practices (Keliher and Wu, 2016). Measuring corruption is a key challenge in corruption research. Unlike direct indicators such as conviction rates, corruption perception captures how citizens evaluate public power for private benefit, reflecting individual experience and broader social narratives (Charron, 2016; Melgar et al., 2010). When corruption perception is high, norms of fairness are weakened, political trust declines, and identification with dominant political values is reduced. Given its corrosive effects, the Chinese government has conducted sustained anti-corruption campaigns since 2012. These efforts, from investigating and punishing corrupt officials to launching educational and publicity initiatives, aim to rebuild public confidence in the ruling party and the political system.

Existing empirical studies on the relationship between social media and political attitudes and behaviors have produced inconsistent findings. Some research highlights the positive effects of social media, arguing that online self-expression enhances individuals’ political visibility, thereby strengthening their sense of identity and willingness to participate (Bennett, 2012). For example, studies show that even Chinese small-town youth, often considered politically apathetic, can gradually develop political interest and a sense of identification through platforms such as short video apps (Qin et al., 2023). However, other studies have revealed adverse effects. Social media news use has been found to correlate with increased political cynicism (Song et al., 2021), and some research indicates that social media use may harm political attitudes and even erode trust in political institutions (Kiratli, 2023). To explain these conflicting findings, researchers have begun to examine moderating effects. For instance, Zhu et al. (2019) explored the moderating role of online political expression in the relationship between social media use and political participation. Other studies have investigated moderators such as gender (Alodat et al., 2023) and content type (Matthes et al., 2023). Lorenz-Spreen et al. (2023) emphasised that these relationships often vary across national contexts, suggesting that country-specific factors may function as important moderators. Corruption, a significant feature of the political context, has also been shown to moderate political outcomes. Empirical evidence suggests that corruption weakens the ability of e-government initiatives to build political trust (Jameel et al., 2019). Following this logic, corruption perception may also dampen the positive influence of social media content on political identity. Although online practices such as information sharing can promote the construction of a shared political identity, their positive effects may be offset by perceptions of injustice when corruption is widely perceived, potentially leading to political alienation rather than identification.

Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) provides a theoretical framework for understanding this dynamic. RDT argues that individuals evaluate their social status through comparison with others. When resources and opportunities are perceived as unfairly distributed or misused, individuals experience a strong sense of injustice, which reduces their sense of belonging. When corruption violates the socialist ideals of fairness and justice, citizens’ value identification and political identity may be undermined. In this way, corruption is not merely a background variable but a key condition shaping how political identity is formed and sustained. The conceptual framework of the current study is shown in Figure 1.

Building on RDT and previous research, this study proposes the following hypotheses:

This study adopts a positivist paradigm and employs a quantitative research design to examine the relationships among variables, aiming to provide scientific evidence for objective facts (Park et al., 2020; Sarantakos, 2017; Quick and Hall, 2015). Specifically, data were collected through a questionnaire survey. In the data analysis stage, this study combines Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and hierarchical regression analysis to test the direct and moderating effects among variables. This design allows for assessing the reliability and validity of the measurement instruments and provides robust statistical estimates for the hypothesised relationships proposed in this study.

University students are a key group in political socialization, and a combination of civic education, digital environments, and broader social contexts shapes their political identity. To enhance the study’s external validity, undergraduate students from a comprehensive university in central China were selected as the survey population. This region has been designated a priority area for addressing systemic and collective corruption during China’s anti-corruption campaign, making it typical and contextually significant. It thus provides a unique setting for examining the relationship between social media use, corruption perception, and political identity.

The university has a total student population of 20,189. To ensure statistical power and representativeness, the target sample size was determined following Krejcie and Morgan’s (1970) sample size table and Christopher Westland (2010) minimum sample size formula, with a requirement that it exceed 377 and meet the “five-times rule” relative to the number of scale items.

A simple random sampling method was employed, and questionnaires were distributed in class between September 11, 2024, and September 19, 2025. Before distribution, the university’s ethics committee reviewed and approved the research protocol to ensure compliance with academic research standards. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. A total of 700 questionnaires were collected, and after data cleaning and screening, 633 valid responses were retained for analysis. The effective response rate was 90%, which meets the requirements of statistical research.

All variables in this study were measured using five-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The scales were adapted from well-established instruments in prior literature, and their reliability and validity were confirmed through back-translation and pilot testing. The final questionnaire consisted of 18 items and included basic demographic information at the end.

The social media content scale was adapted from Jacobson et al. (2020) and comprised four dimensions: information sharing (IS), sample item as “Social media is convenient for informing all my friends about my ongoing activities” (IS); building new relationships(BNR), sample item as “I connect to new people who share my interests through social media”; self-presentation(SP), sample item as “I try to make a good impression on others on social media” (SP); and enjoyment, sample item as “When I am bored, I often go to social media”.

Political identity was measured using a scale adapted from Yang and Stening (2012), which has been further validated in studies on political socialization in China. The scale reflects ideological commitment to socialist principles and measures core ideological orientations in the Chinese context. Items were directly drawn from the writings and speeches of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, representing the core of their political and economic philosophies. For instance, Maoist items emphasise values such as “distribution according to need” and a sample item is “Everyone should contribute according to ability and be rewarded according to need.” Whereas post-Maoist items reflect the pragmatism of the reform era and endorse values such as “allowing some people to get rich first” and a sample item is “To be rich by one’s efforts is glorious.” Importantly, this study operationalises political identity as an ideological commitment rather than a behavioral outcome. This choice reflects the Chinese institutional and cultural context, where political identity is manifested more through value alignment and ideological commitment than overt political behavior, as authoritarian regimes often restrict direct citizen participation in the public sphere (Åström et al., 2012). The final political identity scale contained three items, with a Cronbach’s α above 0.70.

In corruption research, scholars typically distinguish between “grand corruption” (high-level corruption) and “petty corruption” (everyday corruption) (Heinrich and Hodess, 2011). For university students with limited exposure to complex political and economic processes, petty corruption, particularly bribery, is the most salient and directly perceived form. Thus, the corruption perception scale was adapted from Gbadamosi and Joubert (2005) and focused on bribery and informal payments, with items such as “Individuals pay bribes and tips to get things done.” This operationalisation has high clarity and face validity and aligns well with students’ direct experiences of corruption.

All scales demonstrated strong internal consistency, with Cronbach’s α coefficients exceeding 0.80. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) further supported good convergent and discriminant validity.

This study employed a series of data analysis procedures to ensure the rigor and reliability of the results. First, before formal analysis, the raw data were preprocessed and subjected to quality control, including the treatment of missing values, detection of outliers, and tests for normality, to ensure data integrity. Second, to address potential common method bias (CMB), Harman’s single-factor test and the Unmeasured Latent Method Construct (ULMC) technique were applied to the measurement model to statistically control for method effects and enhance the study’s internal validity. Third, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was conducted using Amos 26 to assess the latent constructs’ convergent and discriminant validity, ensuring the measurement model’s stability. Fourth, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was employed to examine the direct effects of the four dimensions of social media content on political identity. Finally, hierarchical regression analyses were performed using the PROCESS macro v2.4 in SPSS 28 to test the moderating role of corruption perception. The significance of the ΔR² values for the interaction terms was used to evaluate the existence and robustness of the moderation effects, thereby strengthening the explanatory power and credibility of the findings.

Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was employed to test the hypothesised relationships between the dimensions of social media content and political identity. As shown in Table 5, three dimensions, Information Sharing (IS), Self-Presentation (SP), and Entertainment (EM), were found to exert significant and positive effects on Political Identity (PI). These results support Hypotheses H1, H3, and H4. Specifically, when individuals actively share political information, express their political values online, and derive enjoyment from these activities, they are more likely to develop a stronger political identity.

Information sharing promotes the accumulation of collective knowledge and strengthens group narratives, consolidating group boundaries and encouraging political self-categorization. Self-presentation allows individuals to publicly express and communicate their political positions, reinforcing the alignment between personal attitudes and group identity. Enjoyment is an affective amplifier; the positive emotions associated with online participation motivate sustained engagement and consolidate political identity over time. Together, these findings suggest that political identity formation in the digital era is not a passive cognitive process but a dynamic one shaped by online interaction and emotional experience. Social media provides users with information and offers positive emotional feedback, creating a virtuous cycle that reinforces political identity.

However, an important finding of this study is that the hypothesised relationship between Building New Relationships (BNR) and political identity was not supported (see Table 5). This result appears to contradict the general expectation of Social Identity Theory (SIT), which posits that building relationships strengthens group belonging and identification. A plausible explanation is that relational activities on social media are often oriented toward personal or entertainment-related purposes rather than political goals (Caldeira et al., 2020). Consequently, the new connections formed tend to be weak ties or non-political, limiting their direct capacity to reinforce political identity. Furthermore, political risk and censorship pressures make young people cautious about forming overtly political relationships online (López-Fraile and Alonso Guisande, 2025), reducing BNR’s effectiveness as a vehicle for political identity formation. These findings suggest that BNR’s role in constructing political identity is more complex than SIT might predict. In the present model, BNR’s effects may operate through indirect pathways, such as mediation by political discussion or trust, that were not directly captured, resulting in a statistically nonsignificant direct effect.

In summary, the current findings highlight that specific forms of social media, particularly information sharing, self-presentation, and enjoyment, may play a meaningful role in shaping political identity. However, other dimensions of social media activity, such as creating new relationships, do not directly influence political identity.

This study used the PROCESS v2.4 macro to conduct hierarchical regression analysis and test the moderating role of corruption perception (CP) in the relationship between social media content (SMC) and political identity (PI). The results show significant interaction effects on PI between CP and all four dimensions of SMC, information sharing, building new relationships, self-presentation, and enjoyment (see Table 6). The confidence intervals for all interaction terms excluded zero, indicating that the moderation effects were robust. Simple slope analyses (see Figures 3–6) further revealed that when individuals reported high levels of CP, the positive effects of SMC on PI were significantly weaker. When CP was low or at the mean level, the positive effects of these SMC dimensions on PI were stronger and more pronounced. These findings suggest that CP plays a critical “contextual gatekeeping” role in constructing political identity. It diminishes the identity-strengthening effect of social media and reduces the likelihood that young people will build political trust and value resonance through digital platforms. In other words, although social media provides interactive space and informational resources for identity formation, its positive function depends on individuals’ perceptions of institutional justice and social fairness.

This result is consistent with the Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT). RDT holds that when people perceive corruption as widespread, they interpret political content with suspicion and a sense of injustice, leading to political apathy and alienation. This ultimately limits social media’s positive role in constructing political identity. These findings imply that improving institutional transparency and credibility may be necessary for unlocking social media’s potential in political education and fostering political identity among youth.

Overall, the results support Hypotheses H1a, H3a, H4a, H1b, H2b, H3b, and H4b. Expressive and participatory forms of social media, such as information sharing, self-presentation, and enjoyment, are more conducive to forming political identity. In contrast, relationship-oriented use (BNR) shows limited effects, which may be closely linked to censorship pressures in the Chinese cultural context. In addition, corruption perception, as a key indicator of the sociopolitical environment, significantly weakens the positive role of social media in constructing political identity. These findings suggest that the digital construction of political identity depends on institutional credibility and a shared sense of social fairness. They deepen our understanding of the mechanisms of political identity formation under authoritarian conditions and highlight the need to consider both platform characteristics and governance context when designing digital civic education initiatives and youth ideological guidance strategies.