Regarding the materials, documents such as ECOWAS legal texts, scientific articles, electronic works, press articles, and content from reliable websites were used to obtain some of the results presented in this article.

The documentation chosen for the analysis presented in this article concerns documents dating from 1979 to 2025, as some of these documents were developed since the advent of ECOWAS on May 28, 1975 (Economic Commission for Africa, 2025), and others due to their appearance over time.

For the legal texts, this refers to Protocol ECOWAS/A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance, supplementing the Lomé Protocol of 10 December 1999 relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, peacekeeping, and security. This text reflects the awareness of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government of the need to prevent internal crises by ensuring good governance of public affairs, the democratic rotation of power, the promotion of the rule of law, and the safeguarding of human rights (ECOWAS, 1999).

Subsequently, other written and electronic documents of an academic and scientific nature, discussing monetary issues or European trends in Morocco, including, respectively, those of Laffiteau and Samaké-Konaté (2016), Carretero (2018), and Al Qays Talha Jebril (2020), provided the basis for some of the results of this article.

YouTube also played a key role in gathering the results presented in this article. YouTube is an online video hosting and streaming service that integrates social features for sharing and commenting on content. It is among the most visited websites in the world (Futura, 2023). Thus, the videos viewed, which were used to provide data for the analysis of this article, are official videos dating from 2016 to 2018, because the period from 2016 to 2017 was the time when the issue of Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS was most discussed on television channels and by the media. Nowadays this issue is no longer the center of interest in the media, perhaps due to other issues that seem much more important, such as conflicts and crises (wars, military coups, terrorism).

In addition, objective visual observation and listening to the media interactions between ECOWAS and Morocco made it possible to obtain the results presented in this article.

Some individuals with the expertise to comment on Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS were consulted via WhatsApp phone calls in the preparation of this article. These individuals are four university professors (three professors of public international law and one professor of process engineering, all over 32 years old). Knowledgeable about and interested in the issue of Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS, they provided answers based on their expertise, experience, and knowledge, resulting in telephone interviews.

In terms of methods, a documentary analysis was first conducted, consisting of examining all documents related to the causes of Morocco’s non-membership. This analysis was carried out using a text reader, highlighting passages of ideas relating to Morocco’s non-membership in ECOWAS, and simultaneously carrying out reflection and deduction. Some documents were searched directly on the Google search engine, an American internet giant known for its search engines (Google Search and Google Chrome) (Futura, 2020), and other documents in a university library.

Moreover, a non-participant observation allowed for an objective observation of the issue of interactions between ECOWAS and Morocco, the measures taken by ECOWAS, the membership decisions of the Moroccan authorities, the points of view of various people, newspapers, special editions of Africa 24 (Korchi et al., 2017a, 2017b, 2017c) and other international channels like Medi1 TV Africa (Cisse Lo, 2017; Gaye, 2017; Dupuy, 2018) and The360.ma (Fassi and Boniface, 2018; Nasser and Marcel, 2017; Kaboré, 2017). This non-participant observation was carried out using an unknown method, which is one of the observation techniques of the human and social sciences (Norimatsu and Cazenave-Tapie, 2017). It took place in Morocco, more precisely in the city of Fes.

The non-participant observation focused on the various arguments put forward, during media interviews, by the leaders of Morocco and ECOWAS [for example, the president of ECOWAS Parliament on Cisse Lo (2017), or Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation, and Moroccans Abroad on Nasser and Marcel (2017) and other qualified personalities, regarding Morocco's accession to ECOWAS on Kaboré (2017) or on Gaye (2017)].

Regarding the interviews, the objective of the interview was first explained to each person and, once they had fully understood the study, direct questions concerning Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS were asked of them.

First, when looking at the legal provisions established by ECOWAS, many of them do not correspond to the realities of Morocco. From the point of view of the form of ECOWAS member States, these are States at the head of which there is a President of the Republic democratically elected by the people, called to serve presidential terms, which is not the case in Morocco where monarchy and royalty is the means of ruling the country, at the head of which is a King for life. ECOWAS ensures that presidential mandates are respected to guarantee democratic alternation, i.e., the transfer of presidential power from a democratically elected president to another democratically elected president, by the sovereign people. To this end, ECOWAS has adopted a protocol (protocol A/SP/1/12/01) on good governance based on democracy.

All 12 ECOWAS member countries are democratic, federal, or unitary states, within which presidential, legislative, and municipal elections are held. Morocco, for its part, remains a kingdom without presidential elections. Indeed, from its independence until 2025, Morocco has been governed by a King.

For ECOWAS, this means that any accession to power must be through free, fair, and transparent elections (ECOWAS, 1999). Thus, any country wishing to join ECOWAS must meet this criterion, which can be described as a factor linked to the mode of governance, or even the political mode in certain circumstances.

Furthermore, ECOWAS countries are interconnected, except Cape Verde, located a few kilometers from Senegal, while Morocco is in the far north and separated by Mauritania and other countries such as Algeria. Geographical location is an important strategic factor for the integration of a regional community like ECOWAS. Indeed, geographical proximity represents the distance in kilometers between two things (individuals, organizations, networks of organizations, cities, etc.), multiplied by the monetary and hourly cost of crossing it (Younes and Hocine, 2022).

It is worth noting that between Morocco and Senegal, the nearest ECOWAS member country, there are 2063 km as the crow flies (Distance Calculator, 2025a, 2025b), while on the contrary, between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, both (2) ECOWAS member countries, there is only a distance of 500 km as the crow flies (Distance Calculator, 2025a, 2025b).

Figure 1 perfectly illustrates how geography puts Morocco, which is completely to the north and separated by a non-ECOWAS member country (Mauritania), at a disadvantage in its attempt to join ECOWAS. This demonstrates the uncertainty of Morocco’s membership in ECOWAS.

Another source of uncertainty regarding Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS lies in the various measures Morocco has taken concerning foreigners on its territory. These measures have legal consequences for the mobility, residency rights, and stay rights of nationals of ECOWAS member states.

Nationals of West African countries are exempt from entry permits, visas, and residence permits for short stays in ECOWAS member states. An ECOWAS passport is sufficient for travel, and they can settle or reside in any of these countries without having to pay stamp duty to obtain a short-term residence permit.

Indeed, while citizens of ECOWAS member states benefit from visa-free entry and do not pay residence stamp duty for short stays, it is important to note that for longer stays, an ECOWAS residence permit application is required, which entails the payment of long-stay residence stamp duty, collected by the host state. This is because the visa exemption only applies to travel between ECOWAS member states, and a residence permit is not required for temporary stays (Globetrotting Investor, 2025).

It is also worth recalling that freedom of movement is a fundamental right enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Serge, 2025).

It should be noted, however, that Morocco does not require entry visas for citizens of certain West African countries. Indeed, according to a non-participant observation, Morocco does not require visas or entry permits for Senegalese citizens, and Senegalese citizens are not subject to residency stamp duties to establish or reside in Morocco. The same could apply, at Morocco’s discretion, to the entry and establishment of other nationals of ECOWAS member states.

Regarding ECOWAS, its protocol on freedom of movement, residence, and establishment allows nationals of member states to travel without a visa or entry permit, and to reside and establish themselves temporarily without a residence permit. As for Morocco, it generally requires a visa and entry permit for certain countries and sets a three (3) month deadline for regularizing any travel, stay, or establishment within its territory. Once this deadline has expired, the individuals concerned can no longer regularize their situation. They then have the choice of leaving the country and returning, or remaining in Morocco and obtaining a laissez-passer if they need to travel. In this case, the possibility of finding formal employment disappears, and these individuals find themselves in a precarious situation.

Regarding ECOWAS, in accordance with the Protocol on Freedom of Movement, Residence and Establishment (ECOWAS, 1979), citizens of the Community have the right to enter without a visa or residence permit, to conduct business, and to establish themselves in the territory of Member States (with ECOWAS residence permit, if it’s for long stays).

According to Suleiman et al. (2024), more than half of the ECOWAS Member States do not require a full entry visa, as clearly illustrated in Table 1. This diplomatic policy, far from being judicious for Morocco within ECOWAS, jeopardizes its future integration. Although most of these member countries, unlike Morocco, do not impose visa requirements on Moroccan nationals, let alone establishment and residence fees for short stays, Morocco’s approach to its territory creates uncertainty regarding its possible accession to ECOWAS.

In addition to these preliminary factors, which make Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS uncertain, there is the time factor, which is more specific to ECOWAS. Indeed, documentary analysis and non-participant observation demonstrate that Morocco submitted its application to ECOWAS more than eight (8) years ago, but has still not received a favorable response, it has only obtained an agreement in principle.

In principle, membership should not have been delayed, especially after ECOWAS gave its agreement in principle, and after its promise, which can be described as consent. Indeed, according to Aujourd’hui Le Maroc (2017), according to the President of the ECOWAS Commission (Marcel Alain de Souza), Morocco’s accession would only be a matter of time, because the process is well underway and will be confirmed at a forthcoming ordinary session of the Community, held on December 16, 2017, in Lomé. This leaves something to be desired, because to date (in 2025), this confirmation has not been real. This is nothing more than a false promise to be interpreted, as ECOWAS’s words and actions do not align on the issue of Morocco’s membership.

As for the second factor, the literature review shows that the monetary geography of ECOWAS includes, on the one hand, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries and Cape Verde, whose currencies are pegged to the euro and operate according to the principles of the franc zone, and, on the other hand, the English-speaking countries of West Africa and Guinea, which have independent currencies (Laffiteau and Samaké-Konaté, 2016). However, these currencies are particularly accessible outside their country of origin, unlike the Moroccan dirham, a closed currency, which makes it difficult to obtain outside Morocco. Furthermore, finding a currency exchange office abroad is expensive, and the currency (dirham) is non-convertible outside Morocco (Moroccan Dream Safari, 2025). The Moroccan dirham is by far the most distinctive currency among those with a fixed exchange rate relative to the euro and operating within the CFA franc zone, as described in Table 2.

Furthermore, there is also the issue of money transfers, which is very difficult from Morocco to an ECOWAS member State. From all ECOWAS member States, there is the possibility of transferring money to Morocco, as also noted by non-participant observation. Another point could make Morocco’s membership in ECOWAS uncertain.

Morocco has a strong European vocation, due to its proximity to Europe via the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Indeed, according to Carretero (2018), the distance between Morocco and Spain is estimated at only about 14 km. Furthermore, Al Qays Talha Jebril (2020) points out that Morocco’s candidacy has since failed because West African economic actors fear that goods imported under free trade agreements concluded by Morocco with Europe and other countries will flood their market and constitute unfair competition. Added to this is their desire (West African economic actors) to maintain customs duties on imported goods, as these represent a considerable portion of government revenue. Documentary analysis revealed that Morocco’s policies and actions towards migrants, particularly those from Europe, do not inspire confidence among West Africans, and that economic and political considerations constitute obstacles to Morocco’s full membership in ECOWAS, with West African economic actors complicating negotiations for this membership (Al Qays Talha Jebril, 2020).

Indeed, with the support of non-participant observation based on audiovisual materials, it appears that former Senegalese President Macky Sall subtly opposed Morocco’s membership in ECOWAS. The former President reportedly stated in 2017 that before Morocco’s accession, the ins and outs of the ECOWAS membership project would first be studied, which is one of the reasons why Morocco’s membership was not automatically refused. Furthermore, this position taken eight (8) years ago by former President Macky Sall could now cost him the cost of leaving Morocco following the establishment of his company Semo Holding, founded in December 2024, and his residence in Marrakech. Indeed, according to Sylvanus (2025), the Moroccan authorities reportedly asked the former Senegalese president to leave Moroccan territory.

Furthermore, incognito non-participant observation also allowed us to observe that there is a strong European influence in Morocco compared to the African influence, on several levels (religious, dietary, lifestyle, or clothing, etc.). But, for example, regarding the adoption of the European lifestyle or clothing in Morocco, this can also be considered the most suitable for the Moroccan climate. Indeed, the Moroccan climate is like that of Europe, as demonstrated in Figure 2.

According to the report of the General Directorate of Meteorology of Morocco (2023), rainfall and temperatures are strongly influenced by the Atlantic Ocean to the west, the Mediterranean Sea to the north, and the Sahara Desert to the south and southeast. Most of the country’s rainfall occurs between September and May, which is considered the rainy and growing season in Morocco.

Most of Morocco, particularly along the coast, experiences a typically Mediterranean climate, with mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers (General Directorate of Meteorology of Morocco, 2023).

However, this strong European bias in Morocco is not solely due to its proximity to Europe or its climate; it is also due to its civilization. This means that it is a factor that could make Morocco’s membership in ECOWAS uncertain.

The final factor making Morocco’s membership uncertain relates to the economic and commercial advantages that ECOWAS integration brings. Documentary research and analysis reveal that these benefits will benefit Morocco more than West African States.

Indeed, according to Ndiaye (2017), integration is an important economic tool, and Morocco wishes to become a full member of ECOWAS, rather than a mere observer, to benefit from the advantages offered by its membership. Morocco benefits from significant trade and economic flows across Africa thanks to its air network and a significant banking presence on a continental scale. Morocco also wishes to strengthen its private sector with the help of Africa and is seeking an appropriate integration framework to increase its economic, financial, and commercial influence (Ndiaye, 2017). For Babou (2017), Morocco, as a member of ECOWAS, will benefit from the expansion of its market, and the ECOWAS market will be more easily accessible thanks to the advantages of full membership, thus stimulating its investments in the subregion and Africa. Moreover, according to Babou (2017), ECOWAS countries will not be able to benefit from the Moroccan market due to its severe closure. Morocco is a major industrial, mining, agricultural, artisanal, oil, and financial producer. Ultimately, it is Morocco that opens the doors to a vast market in the ECOWAS region, where it has much to gain in terms of production, investment, and consumption. On the other hand, ECOWAS countries have little to offer to an already saturated and closed Moroccan market. Morocco’s integration will therefore appear as an unfair and unequal exchange (Babou, 2017).

Indeed, it emerges from Dodo (2019), that even as a non-member, Morocco’s imports from ECOWAS had an estimated value of 2.7 billion dirhams in 2011, then decreased to 0.8 billion dirhams in 2017. While trade between Morocco and ECOWAS countries has experienced an upward trend in recent years, reaching 10.3 billion dirhams in 2017 compared to 1.5 billion in 2000. This significant rebound particularly reflects the dynamism of Moroccan exports, which increased from 2.8 billion dirhams in 2008 to 9.4 billion in 2017. This demonstrates that the overall trade balance is in surplus in favor of Morocco (more than 8.5 billion dirhams in 2017 after 0.2 billion in 2000) (Dodo, 2019).

We can therefore already get an idea of Morocco’s economic and commercial growth compared to the current ECOWAS member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea (suspended), Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo). Thus, we can consider that the economic and commercial advantages more in favor of Morocco are therefore one of the factors making Morocco’s membership in ECOWAS uncertain.