As a material dimension, crisis is sometimes considered equivalent to threats “as existing in real-world form in the world.” From a subjective viewpoint, however, crisis could refer to “individual judgments and perceptions” (Kalbassi, 2016, p. 111). Hermann (1969, p. 414) saw crisis as “a situation that threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit.” In the same vein, crisis can be seen as “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a social system, which—under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances—necessitates making critical decisions” (Rosenthal et al., 1989, p. 10). Despite these definitions, the concept of crisis remains ambiguous. The seriousness of the threat, the determination of its severity, the establishment of values and norms, and the level of uncertainty in the situation are all subject to interpretation. Consequently, the main characteristics of a crisis remain open to debate.

In the realm of security studies, the logic that operates a securitization process is strikingly similar to that of a crisis. Securitization is a discursive process through which “an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labeling it as security an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26). The fact that securitization is a discursive process means that security is “language viewed in a certain way” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 7). However, discourse is not just language. Discourse is a more inclusive term that contains a meaning-making process. To put it differently, discourse does not merely depict the world as it is, but rather how we envision it to be. Discourse, therefore, emerges as the language of social practice (Fairclough, 2013). If we define discourse as the use of language in a broad manner, securitization, then, can refer to the activities using security-related languages. In the process, crisis discourse is a powerful medium through which a specific issue can be seen as something that holds a significant “position from which the act can be made” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32).

In summary, both crisis and securitization reside in the domain of interpretation, with the concept of threat at the core. As noted, a crisis begins when actors articulate something as a serious threat. The same applies to the securitization process. As soon as securitizing actors designate something as an existential threat, the utterance itself becomes the security act (Wæver, 1995, p. 55). The notion that crisis and securitization begin with the linguistic construction of existential threats implies the need for a thorough examination of the inherent characteristics of such threats. The constitution of a threat can be understood as stemming from the materiality itself (e.g., the nuclear weapons or fissile materials), the characteristics of the Other who governs that materiality (e.g., the North Korean regime), or our (the Self’s) perception that frames the Other as an antagonistic entity. If the intensity of a threat could be measured objectively, it would then be possible to gauge the objectivity of security discourse, thereby clarifying the criteria for crisis and securitization. However, this is an exceedingly challenging task. If it were feasible, the concept of the security dilemma would never have arisen in the first place. If materiality alone ensured objectivity, debates about distinguishing between offensive and defensive weapons would not occur. Similarly, disputes over the criteria for determining the beginning and end of life would not exist. Dilemmas arise from the difficulty of interpreting the motivations, intentions, and capabilities of an entity presumed to be an adversary, whether potential or actual. This represents an “unresolvable uncertainty,” inherently linked to an “existential condition” (Booth and Wheeler, 2013, p. 138).

Having gained insights into the relations between crisis and securitization, Figure 1 shows the ways in which the two concepts are parallel and complemented by each other. First, at the heart of the space where crisis discourse and securitization take place are the policymakers (i.e., securitizing actors). The policymakers refer to “actors who securitize issues by declaring something—a referent object—existentially threatened” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). Of course, the declaration does not occur in a vacuum. Despite speech acts being core components of securitization, policymakers still need to show something which is material or palpable to persuade the audience that the threat is real. Nevertheless, to reiterate, for one issue to be securitized, a discursive and interpretive process, which can be materialized through the lens of policymakers’ identities—whether they be formed by implicit assumptions, inferencing, or ideological convictions—is inevitable. In this respect, the securitizing actor straddles between the realm of events and identity.

The key here lies in the degree of the utterance, which can determine whether a specific issue can remain at a level of the normal political realm or beyond it. Regarding this, securitization is considered “a more extreme version of politicization” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). As is shown on the right of Figure 1, securitization theory categorizes public issues into three main stages. In the non-politicized stage, the issue remains off the radar and policymakers do not handle it. Once the issue becomes politicized, it demands government decisions and allocation of political resources. In the securitized stage, the issue calls for emergency measures and justifies governmental actions that exceed the normal bounds of political procedures. The problem, however, comes from the rather obscure boundaries between the stages. The ambiguity surrounding the definition of crisis aligns with the distinction between securitization and politicization. What constitutes a security threat (i.e., crisis) and what does not (i.e., non-crisis)? As pointed out by Emmers (2013), the securitization spectrum lacks a clear boundary between an act of securitization and intense politicization. The realms of security and politics exist on a continuum.

Blanket labeling of any danger or risk as a security issue without considering the level and existentiality of the threat can lead to confusion, fatigue, and even numbness among security actors and audiences regarding the actual threat (habitual securitization). This is particularly important in that such a securitizing practice would lose a sense of urgency even if a genuinely imminent attack from the enemy is around the corner, i.e., the securitizing actors are “crying wolf.” The Taliban’s capture of Kabul in 2021 would be a case in point. On 14 August 2021, the US State Department proclaimed that “Kabul is not right now in an imminent threat environment” (Reuters, 2021). The Taliban seized Kabul the very next day. This marked the paradoxical conclusion of the United States’ two-decade-long habitual securitization against the Taliban. Adding to the irony, and coupled with the swift US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the newly established Taliban regime stated that there was no evidence that Osama bin Laden, regarded as the direct cause of the Afghanistan War, could be linked to the 9/11 attacks (Pannett, 2021).

In the context of habitual securitization, the crisis discourse pales into insignificance. As is illustrated on the left of Figure 1, if such discourse was formed in a rushed manner when threats are not imminent (or not genuine), the crisis is likely to be normalized as time goes by and, at some point, when the crisis-based discourse becomes so mundane, it would become the new normal. In a sense, this would be equivalent of the absence of crisis-based discourse because policymakers have to accept, at this stage, that they have no other options but to manage the crisis, which is, strictly speaking, no longer a crisis, but a reality. Conversely, when policymakers do not detect the emergency of the threat, when the threat is already imminent or not controllable, the consequence would be fatal, as in the events in Kabul in August 2021 or in Southern Israel in October 2023.¹

The need to distinguish between securitization and riskification emerges here. In the grammar of securitization, security actors construct a scenario of direct harm (presumably external) that can threaten a valued referent object. On the other hand, in the grammar of riskification, actors focus on conditions that have the potential to harm governance capacity and internal resilience. While securitization emphasizes the necessity of countering threats, riskification aims at “reducing vulnerability and boosting governance-capacity of the valued referent object itself” (Corry, 2012, p. 248). Indeed, in many cases, the seed of crisis emanates from within. Returning to the case of Afghanistan, the root cause of the Afghan Republic’s collapse was not the Taliban but rather the corrupt and authoritarian governance in Kabul, which eroded citizen trust (Murtazashvili, 2022). The Afghan Republic—whose referent object was to defend democracy—did not fall because its discourse lacked securitization against the Taliban. Instead, it failed to address or riskify its own governance shortcomings, or hamartia, and thus could not strengthen democratic resilience. Effective governance—characterized by the equitable distribution of political and economic resources throughout the state, fostering public confidence in democracy, and reinforcing the democratic rationale of government troops—should have been the outcome of a deliberate effort to address these risks (Table 1).

This analysis focuses mainly on the South Korean policymakers’ discourses for several reasons. First, South Korea is no doubt an integral player in the narrative of the North Korean nuclear threat. However much that North Korea perceives the United States as its principal enemy, it is South Korea—including policymakers and, especially, ordinary citizens—that would bear the brunt of the North’s attack, whether conventional or nuclear. This has become more evident after Kim Chŏngŭn declared the two hostile states doctrine in 2023, by which Pyŏngyang would no longer see Seoul as their compatriot. Second, Seoul and Washington’s threat perception cannot be compared in a balanced manner. South Korea and the US are staunch allies, and it is also true that Seoul counts on Washington for nuclear deterrence; however, because of the very fact that South Korea has neither wartime operational control nor nuclear deterrent capabilities, the alliance is inherently asymmetrical and, therefore, the security discourse on Pyŏngyang emanating from Seoul should be distinct from that of Washington. Third, and perhaps most importantly, given that Washington’s (or Western) narratives have dominated not only the international arena but also International Relations (IR) literature (Chagas-Bastos and Kristensen, 2025), the narratives originating from Seoul must be given greater attention when addressing the issue of the Korean nuclear crisis. That said, this should not be misunderstood as an exclusion of the US narrative or its context. When necessary, this analysis also incorporates narratives from the US side. Ultimately, the crisis discourse has largely been shaped by the combined narratives of Seoul and Washington. These narratives are inextricably interlinked, as each “exists in a fabric of relations” (Lyotard, 1984, p. 15). In this respect, this analysis serves as an important stepping stone for future research aiming to conduct a more comprehensive discourse analysis.

The end of the Cold War and subsequent events, such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Beijing, collectively engendered a heightened sense of vulnerability within North Korea. Meanwhile, Seoul found itself confronting a novel paradigm of security threat, with intelligence reports indicating that North Korea possessed a reprocessing facility in Yongbyŏn, capable of extracting weapons-grade plutonium from fuel (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2013). Following the collapse of communism, suspicions regarding the North’s covert nuclear program began to escalate significantly. Despite North Korea being considered a threat for a prolonged period due to its bellicose image coupled with conventional weaponry, South Korea’s perspective on North Korea has been reshaped around the nuclear issue since the end of the Cold War.

The initial securitization of the nuclear issue took place during the Roh T’aeu administration (in office from 1988 to 1993). On 2 July 1991, during his meeting with then US President George H. W. Bush, Roh expressed deep concern, stating, “The North Korean nuclear threat has entered a serious phase. This poses a grave threat not only to the Korean Peninsula but also to Northeast Asia” (italics added). Roh’s apprehension about the nuclear threat was evident in his Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (8 November 1991), where he asserted, “The North’s nuclear weapons development is a serious problem, entirely different from past issues.” In Roh’s speeches, the nuclear threat was considered existential and necessitated immediate and exceptional measures.

President Kim Yŏngsam’s (1993–1998) speech pattern was not significantly different from that of Roh. The nuclear issue was not definitively resolved during the Roh administration and persisted into the Kim administration. Kim (2001) personally recalled enduring anguish between March 1993 when Pyŏngyang declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and October 1994 when Pyŏngyang and Washington reached the Agreed Framework. In this context, Kim Yŏngsam withheld all plans for economic cooperation with the North. In 1994, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 1998) “leaked its assessment that North Korea might have enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons” (Albright, 1994, p. 64). On 6 June 1994, during a meeting with journalists accompanying him to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Kim stated “I will acknowledge neither a single North Korean nuclear weapon, nor its half-baked nuclear program. It is a matter of life and death for Koreans, and peace for the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and the world.”

Interestingly, during his presidency, Kim did not explicitly label the situation as a crisis. Later, in his memoir, he recalled the period as a crisis. It was the looming specter of a potential outbreak of the second Korean War, triggered by the US surgical strike on North Korea’s nuclear site, that left Kim uneasy and agitated. For Kim, the US plan of bombing Yongbyŏn posed an extremely perilous scenario. As part of his efforts, Kim summoned James T. Laney, then US ambassador to South Korea, and emphasized:

However, Kim’s speeches flip-flopped as the negotiations between Pyŏngyang and Washington entered the final phase toward the Agreed Framework. In an interview with the New York Times in October 1994, Kim asserted, “We [South Korea] know North Korea better than anyone. […] the United States should not be led on by the manipulations of North Korea.” He further emphasized that “compromises might prolong the life of the North Korean government,” underscoring North Korea’s precarious state, and suggested that “time is on our [South Korea and the United States] side” (Sterngold, 1994).

Can this phenomenon-at-large be called a crisis? For Kim Yŏngsam, it was the actions of the United States that led to a real crisis. What is certain is that the US securitizing actors at that time, including influential political figures and media outlets, extensively referred to the North Korean issue as a crisis. Even as early as the 1990s, the New York Times reported that North Korea was only 4 or 5 years away from producing effective nuclear weapons (KBS, 1991). The Washington Post (Will, 1994; italics added) labeled Pyŏngyang’s nuclear ambitions “a decisive event for the 21st century,” citing former US senator and presidential candidate, John McCain, who referred to it as “the defining crisis of the post-Cold War period.” The analysis of the US discourse on the North Korean nuclear problem surely warrants further investigation, as Seoul’s security discourse has been closely linked to that of Washington.

The administrations of Kim Taechung and Roh Muhyŏn (1998–2003 and 2003–2008, respectively) marked a period of both highs and lows in the context of the North Korean nuclear quandary. The first-ever inter-Korean summit was held during Kim’s tenure (June 2000), and the first Joint Statement addressing the nuclear issue was achieved (September 2005). However, these administrations also navigated the stormy waters of the so-called second nuclear crisis (2002–2003) and subsequently confronted North Korea’s inaugural nuclear test in October 2006.

For Kim Taechung, the political pressure surrounding the nuclear issue was relatively mitigated, largely due to the Agreed Framework. Though its implementation was gradual, the agreement between Pyŏngyang and Washington effectively froze and monitored North Korea’s plutonium-based program prior to the onset of the second nuclear crisis in late 2002. The five-megawatt reactor, capable of producing approximately seven kilograms of plutonium annually, remained suspended and subject to inspections. Furthermore, the construction of two larger reactors in Yongbyŏn and Taechŏn, with capacities of 50 and 200 electrical megawatts, respectively, was halted.

Within this context, James Kelly, then serving as US Assistant Secretary of State, made a significant announcement on 17 October 2002. He claimed to have presented “documentary evidence” to North Korean officials during his visit to Pyŏngyang earlier that month, and they had “confessed” to operating a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. US officials accompanying Kelly reported that Kang Sŏkju, the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister at the time, was assertive and even alluded to the existence of more powerful weapons. This perceived threat suddenly morphed into an existential one in the rhetoric of relevant securitizing actors. For instance, the CIA asserted that “North Korea likely could produce an atomic bomb through uranium enrichment in 2004” (Niksch, 2003, p. 1).

Kim Taechung’s language increasingly aligned with the discourse of securitization. He depicted the nuclear issue as an urgent and existential threat not only to the Korean Peninsula but to the entire East Asian region. As with Roh T’aeu and Kim Yŏngsam’s words, Kim Taechung called the North’s nuclear issue a grave threat in his address to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in Mexico on 27 October 2002. Kim then proposed three principles to tackle the nuclear issue: (1) South Korea can never condone the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the Korean Peninsula; (2) North Korea must relinquish their nuclear program; and (3) the nuclear issue must be resolved peacefully.

Upon assuming office in 2003, Roh Muhyŏn began securitizing North Korea in his speeches on the nuclear issue (Roh, 2003a, 2003b). During his tenure, Roh often referred to the North Korean nuclear problem as nothing short of a grave crisis (Yoon, 2019). Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, it becomes evident that the second crisis fell short of being genuinely classified as a crisis. Just as the first crisis emerged due to suspicions surrounding North Korea’s hidden nuclear materials, the core of the second crisis was driven by concerns that “North Korea may have hidden some nuclear materials from inspectors before the verification measures of Agreed Framework” (Gill, 2002; italics added).

Perhaps, then, Roh, whether consciously or not, was effectively in a “pre-crisis phase that takes the form of an incubation period that is difficult to interpret and during which ill-defined problems are difficult to see” (Roux-Dufort, 2007, p. 111), rather than in a full-blown crisis phase. Concurrently, however, akin to the precedent set by Kim Yŏngsam, Roh also pursued the securitization of the plausible eventuality of a US offensive against North Korea. This act of securitizing the United States was a significant issue, as it could be seen as a move jeopardizing the US–South Korea alliance. Roh was deeply concerned about the possibilities of such an attack. Lee Jong-sŏk, former Unification Minister and Chief of the National Security Council under the Roh administration, confirmed that Roh believed the United States might attack North Korea (Bush, 2010; Cheney et al., 2011; Lee, 2014).

Nevertheless, it is important to note that Roh’s securitization against the Bush administration bore no implication of desecuritization of the North Korean nuclear issue. Desecuritizing moves would have entailed scant perception of nuclear threats, minimal articulation of relevant referent objects, and paucity of extraordinary measures. However, all the core components of securitization were present in Roh (2003b, 2006) speeches, all revolving around the North’s nuclear threat.

On a positive note, the aftermath of the second crisis led to a tangible outcome during Roh’s tenure: the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005. This Joint Statement was a major result of the Six-Party Talks, a series of multilateral negotiations held between 2003 and 2008 involving South and North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the United States. The main contents of the statement included verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, normalization of the United States–North Korea relationship, and negotiating a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Despite this achievement, the implementation of the agreement was contingent on the willingness of Pyŏngyang, Seoul and Washington to engage. More to the point, the Joint Statement was only the beginning of resolving the nuclear problem, and the crisis-driven discourse per se was not sufficient to guarantee a smooth implementation process.

From the realm of policy discourse emerges a question about the notion of the elusive third Korean nuclear crisis. Surprisingly, to date, no unequivocal consensus has been reached regarding its existence or the precise juncture of its occurrence. Some voices within academic circles contend that the third crisis unfolded during North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009 (KNSI, 2009). Lee (2023) argued that the third crisis has existed since December 2008, when the last round of the Six-Party Talks halted. Another viewpoint suggests a period of heightened tension between the United States and North Korea in 2017 (INSS, 2017; Lee, 2018). During this time, former President Donald Trump tweeted a provocative warning to Pyŏngyang, stating they would be “met with fire and fury.” Trump also mentioned that his “Nuclear Button [&] is a much bigger & more powerful one.” than Kim Chŏngŭn’s, prompting a derisive response from North Korea, who labeled him “the spasm of a lunatic” (Al Jazeera, 2019).

However, this leaves us in a conundrum, with academics and policymakers failing to agree on a specific period for anointing as the third (or subsequent) crisis. Beyond the elusive categorization lies another revelation. As the second nuclear crisis discourse waned, the discursive structure of the nuclear crisis had already become habitual (or institutionalized). As French philosopher François Jullien pointed out, “the notion of event is intrinsically related to the idea of time … we would have no consciousness of time without the events that punctuate it” (cited in Roux-Dufort, 2007, p. 109). This notion prompts us to reassess the discourse on the North Korean nuclear crisis. Truly significant events related to the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, such as conducting physical nuclear tests and launching solid-fueled ballistic missiles, have actually occurred long after the end of the second crisis period.

During both the first and second crises, North Korea was rather on the defensive, showing reluctance to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the US on technical and intelligence matters. However, after the collapse of the Agreed Framework, which was caused by the second nuclear crisis discourse, North Korea’s nuclear discourse became notably emboldened and assertive. As mentioned, North Korea “quickly breached red lines in US policy” by reactivating “its long-suspended plutonium program” (Pollack, 2011, p. 132).

A cascade of materially threatening events followed. Pyŏngyang declared itself as a nuclear state in 2005, and conducted its first nuclear test the following year. After a brief hiatus between 2007 and 2008, the North more “forcefully expanded its claims to standing as a nuclear-weapons state” (Pollack, 2011, p. 157). In 2012, the revision of their constitution served as a reaffirmation of their nuclear-armed status. Since their proclamation of the Byŏngjin policy in 2013, aiming to develop nuclear capability alongside the economy, North Korea’s nuclear displays have consistently increased and expanded. In addition to the thermonuclear weapon test in 2017, it has tested advanced ballistic missiles with various ranges and hypersonic missiles. In 2022, it passed a law officially declaring itself a nuclear weapons state, and in 2024, it signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with Russia, committing to strengthened military ties.

Where, then, does the third crisis discourse lie? Have the subsequent South Korean presidents (Yi Myŏngbak, Pak Kŭnhye, Mun Chaein, and Yun Sŏgyŏl) failed to articulate threats with the same gravity as their predecessors? The answer is unequivocally no. For instance, during his presidency from 2008 to 2013, Yi Myŏngbak pursued the ambitious goal of achieving complete securitization of the nuclear issue (Lee, 2009a, 2009b). He implemented extraordinary measures in the form of his flagship policies, known as Vision 3,000: Denuclearization and Openness. However, paradoxically, after the Chŏnan and Yŏnpyŏng incidents in 2010, Yi’s focus shifted toward seeking apologies from Pyŏngyang (Snyder and Byun, 2011). Consequently, the once-urgent nuclear issue took a backseat on the priority list for a significant period. Yi later remarked, “We came to a realization that it no longer makes sense for us to anticipate that the North would abandon its nuclear program” (Lee, 2010).

Yi’s consternation turned into a boycott on resuming the Six-Party Talks, the apparatus of diplomacy on which he himself placed an emphasis in order to realize Pyŏngyang’s denuclearisation. Yi also turned his eyes to a more distant (and ambiguous) future of unification by proposing a unification tax in a rather abrupt manner (Oliver, 2010). This proposal seemed to have little to do with the impending and existential nuclear threat posed by North Korea. Ironically, the absence of the third nuclear crisis discourse during Yi’s era led him to be somewhat distracted from fully contemplating the gravity of the North’s nuclear threat.

Albeit demonstrating somewhat different manners, the same logic applies to Yi’s successor, Pak Kŭnhye (2013–2017). Despite Pyŏngyang’s third nuclear test in February 2013, less than a month before her inauguration, Pak emphasized the concept of trust as the central pillar of her securitizing moves regarding the nuclear issue. However, in her words, trust seemed to be something that should be considered more like a by-product of the North’s denuclearization, rather than a precondition for eliciting denuclearization. For example, in her Dresden speech on 28 March 2014, Pak addressed that “North Korea must choose the path to denuclearization so we can embark without delay on the work that needs to be done for a unified Korean Peninsula.” She defined the nuclear threat as the “single-greatest threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia” (italics added).

Indeed, Pak’s position on practicing trustpolitik underwent a significant change, as her extraordinary measures culminated in the closure of the Kaesŏng Industrial Complex in February 2016, a month after North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test. The decision was based on an unconfirmed story suggesting that wages for North Korean workers in the complex were being diverted to upgrade Pyŏngyang’s nuclear weapons (Wyeth, 2020). In stark contrast to Seoul’s expectations, however, North Korea aggressively tested a series of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons during the remaining 2 years of Pak’s tenure. Meanwhile, the core pattern of security discourse on the nuclear threat posed by the North remained largely unchanged; i.e. “Completely abandon your nuclear weapons that pose a grave threat to the world, otherwise, you’ll be isolated continually.”

In 2017, North Korea’s nuclear threat reached another critical juncture. Following the fourth and fifth nuclear tests in the preceding year, the North conducted its sixth nuclear test, releasing an estimated minimum of 140 kilotons of energy. The test, claimed by Pyŏngyang to be a hydrogen bomb, was later confirmed by international scientists (Lester, 2019). This was not universally recognized as a third crisis, despite some referring to it as such, as mentioned earlier. After Pak’s impeachment in 2017, Mun Chaein (2017–2022) passionately attempted to broker a deal between Kim Chŏngŭn and Donald J. Trump while securitizing the nuclear threat from North Korea. The three inter-Korean summits and the historic North Korea–US Singapore summit in 2018 were the tangible results of these efforts. However, similar to the situation in 2005 with the September 19 Joint Statement, both the inter-Korean Panmunjom Declaration and the Joint Statement between North Korea and the US eventually stalled due to differing views on implementation.

Amidst these developments, rather than explicitly highlighting the nuclear threats posed by North Korea, Trump’s statement underscored the equivocal nature of the discourse surrounding the Korean nuclear crisis. This shifted from warnings like “[North Korea] will be met with fire and fury” to the assertion that “there is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea” (Reuters, 2018). Furthermore, even when Pyŏngyang resumed launching ballistic missiles prohibited by United Nations Security Council resolutions, Trump dismissed them as “some small weapons, which disturbed some of my people, and others, but not me” (Trump, 2019).

A similar change in tone was apparent in statements by Mun. When North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test and launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), Mun (2017; italics added) called it an “utterly absurd and strategic blunder,” further asserting that “our government will ensure that North Korea has no choice but to abandon its nuclear weapons and missile programs in a verifiable and irreversible manner.” However, when the IAEA chief stated in 2021 that North Korea’s nuclear program was going “full steam ahead,” the official response from Mun’s administration was simply, “[We] have no specific position on it” (Lim, 2021). Neither a sense of urgency nor extraordinary measures were evident in the statements of the latter half of his presidency.

The discourse surrounding the nuclear threat has remained the same during the Yun Sŏgyŏl government. Notably, Yun floated the idea of South Korea possessing nuclear weapons (Choe, 2023). If that happens, it would be a paradigm shift for South Korea’s policy in terms of setting an extraordinary measure against the North. However, it is essential to recognize that this idea did not emerge in isolation but rather as part of a bargaining strategy, as evidenced by the subsequent Washington Declaration in 2023 reaffirming the US commitment to extended deterrence for South Korea. The same goes for the US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (since 2023) and the US-ROK Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations (since 2024). The basic logic of these measures declared by Seoul and Washington is essentially the same: extended nuclear deterrence or, in other words, the nuclear umbrella. In addition, although claims advocating for Seoul to acquire nuclear weapons have slowly transitioned from the political fringes to the mainstream political space, South Korea recognizes the considerable difficulties in pursuing such a path (Lind and Press, 2023).

The crux of the matter here lies not in the weakening perception of the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Rather, it is the habitual securitization of the North Korean nuclear issue that has led to its institutionalized measures—measures that are difficult to refer to as extraordinary—without sufficient time for introspection on the existential nature of the nuclear threat. As a result, the articulation of the threat by various actors has become relatively locutionary, detached from its original function or purpose, and consequently distanced from being perlocutionary, which would involve problem-solving discourse. This situation has led to a shift in focus from devising efficient and effective measures to more ambiguous and less practical actions and concepts. While a certain level of securitizing moves has continued in South Korea, the North has unabashedly expanded its nuclear capabilities (Table 2).