Since its creation, the European Union has gradually evolved into one of the most influential political-economic entities worldwide, with a significant role in global politics (Dinan, 2014; Lelieveldt and Princen, 2023). This evolution has increased the complexity of the decision-making process and underscored the need for informed and balanced public policy that takes into account the diversity of opinions, interests, and stakeholders involved (Buonanno and Nugent, 2020).

Pressure groups or lobbies occupy a prominent position in this common political space, representing a wide range of interests and exerting influence in numerous areas (Crombez, 2002; Dür and Mateo, 2012). The participation of lobbies in the European Union is a dynamic and evolving phenomenon, raising questions about the transparency, accountability, and ethical implications of their interactions with policymakers (Dinan, 2021). One explanatory factor for the priority position of lobbies operating in Europe stems from the decision-making system of the supranational entity, which is characterized by the involvement and convergence of multiple institutions and actors. This, together with other issues, enables pressure groups to capitalize on favorable circumstances to advance their agendas, i.e., to exert influence (Coen, 2007; Woll, 2006).

In this regard, it is important to consider that the influence of pressure groups depends on several factors. Nine conditioning dimensions stand out, which will be further developed in this article. The independent direct dimensions include financial strength (Chand, 2017; Stevens and De Bruycker, 2020), the ability to mobilize supporters (Klüver, 2013; Walker, 2012), the willingness to form coalitions (Grose et al., 2022; Hula, 1999), the alignment of the claims with dominant social norms (Ihlen and Raknes, 2020), and access to gatekeepers and authorities (Bouwen, 2002; Serna-Ortega et al., 2024). The dependent direct dimensions involve the stage of the policymaking process in which influence is sought and the communication strategies employed (De Bruycker and Beyers, 2019). Additionally, the indirect conditioning dimensions refer to media coverage (Moreno-Cabanillas et al., 2024) and public perception of the organization (Kollman, 1998).

This theoretical research is based on the general objective (GO) of analyzing the influence capacity of pressure groups at the different phases of the European Union’s public policy formulation process: emergence of the problem in society, agenda setting, consideration of policy options, decision-making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. That is, it seeks to delve into one of the two dependent direct conditioning dimensions mentioned.

Derived from this general objective, three specific objectives are outlined. The first (SO1) aims to explore the differences in influence capacity across the phases based on the organizational nature of the lobby and the interests it defends. The second specific objective (SO2) seeks to study the interdependencies and interrelations that the analysis presents with the other independent direct and indirect conditioning dimensions. The last specific objective (SO3) aims to examine the communication strategies most commonly employed by lobbies throughout the various phases of the process.

In this way, the contribution of this article to the literature is threefold. First, it offers a clearer understanding of how the influence capacity of pressure groups changes across the various phases of the European Union’s policy process, a conditioning dimension that remains one of the least explored in the scientific literature. By analyzing it through the lens of organizational nature and the interests represented, the study offers new insights into the differentiated impact of various types of lobbies. Second, it analyzes the interplay between conditioning dimensions, highlighting how these factors interact with different stages of the policy process, and offering an integrative approach that transcends isolated analyses to provide a comprehensive perspective. Thirdly, the research explores the role of communication strategies across different phases, identifying which tactics are most effective in each stage. This analysis is useful for both scholars and practitioners, as it bridges the gap between theory and practice.

One of the aspects that most underscores the relevance of this study is its international focus. It is evident that the policy process in the European Union shares similarities with those of its member states (van et al., 2024; Buonanno and Nugent, 2020; Chari and Heywood, 2009). Both systems operate through multilevel governance, stakeholder participation, and consensus-driven decision-making. They also follow analogous stages, prioritizing transparency, accountability, and public communication to maintain legitimacy and inclusiveness. However, the supranational framework is notably more complex due to the diversity of actors, overlapping jurisdictions, and competing interests it must balance (Ackrill et al., 2013). This added complexity makes the European Union a valuable case for studying lobbying, as it offers pressure groups a broader range of access points. Closely related to this, it must be considered that the European Union’s decision-making processes extend beyond its borders (Bradford, 2020), influencing global economic and political dynamics, making the examination of lobbying at the supranational level crucial for understanding its impact and strategic importance.

Subsequently, considering the significance of the European context in lobbying practices and the growing public scrutiny and political debates surrounding the role of lobbying in democratic systems (Barron and Skountridaki, 2022; Crepaz, 2021), studying how pressure groups operate has become more crucial than ever. In this regard, this research contributes to the ongoing dialogue on ensuring that lobbying practices align with democratic values and serve the public interest, while also enhancing the understanding of political advocacy by all the actors involved in the process.

To achieve the proposed objectives, a structure divided into three parts is established. The first part explores the nine conditioning dimensions that shape the influence capacity of lobbies, as understanding these dimensions is necessary for effectively analyzing their implications across the different phases of the policy process. In the second part, the bulk of the theoretical review on the influence capacity of lobbies during the various stages of the European policy formulation process is developed, using a phase-specific structure. The content in each phase is organized systematically according to the specific objectives −except for the last phase, whose particularities require a description starting from communication strategies and concluding with the differences between types of lobbies. The third part, corresponding to the discussion, presents a general comparative analysis of the phases, examines the overall connections with the other dimensions, suggests possible future lines of research on the topic, and develops the implications and applications of the findings in the political, media, and social spheres.

In practical terms, this research primarily relies on a bibliographic analysis of existing literature. The framework is grounded in political science, communication theory, and institutional analysis. It involves systematically reviewing and synthesizing academic studies to identify and establish conceptual relationships among the various elements under investigation. Comparative analyses of perspectives, theoretical mappings, and syntheses using figures and tables are employed. All these methods are aimed at providing an integrative proposal that examines the subject of study in the most representative way possible.

The research approach first requires identifying and understanding the conditioning dimensions that shape lobbies’ capacity to exert influence in the European context. As mentioned, these dimensions are grouped into three categories, depending on whether the conditioning they exert is direct or indirect and whether they are dependent or independent of particular scenarios or strategical proposals. Table 1 describes the type of conditioning exerted by the dimensions within the three categories of conditioning.

First, there are the independent direct conditioning dimensions, of which five main ones have been identified. The most evident is financial strength, which decisively determines the entity’s ability to act–either directly or through the corporate and business bias already embedded in the status quo, which ensures that wealth and influence are structurally advantaged−(Almansa-Martínez et al., 2022; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Hernández Vigueras, 2013; Stevens and De Bruycker, 2020; Woll, 2019). Another crucial factor is the ability to mobilize supporters, both in person and online, as well as the willingness to form coalitions to increase collective influence (Bernhagen and Trani, 2012; Grose et al., 2022; Klüver, 2013; Walker, 2012). Simultaneously, the alignment of the group’s initiatives with dominant social norms is relevant (Ihlen and Raknes, 2020; Scott, 2014), as those that meet this condition are more likely to succeed and reinforce the organization’s reputation. Lastly, the identification of gatekeepers and access to authorities are also essential for adjusting strategies and achieving effective influence (Bouwen, 2002; Serna-Ortega et al., 2024). In some cases, lobbies themselves may act as gatekeepers (Hirsch et al., 2023). From the perspective of scientific research in the European Union, economic capacity and access to authorities are aspects that can be objectively assessed due to the information available in the European Union Transparency Register. In contrast, the ability to mobilize supporters, the willingness to form coalitions, and the alignment of demands with predominant social values involve a greater degree of subjectivity.

As mentioned in Table 1, these five dimensions operate independently, meaning their influence is not tied to any specific stage of the policymaking process or the communication strategies employed by lobbies to achieve their objectives. In fact, these two issues constitute the two dependent direct conditioning dimensions, as, despite being internal to the organization, the course of action also depends on other external elements.

The stage of the public policy formulation process in which influence is sought is undoubtedly an aspect that determines the level of potential impact. Each phase requires the adaptation of action strategies. This is the dimension on which this research is focused. The phases used in the article are those proposed by Jordan and Adelle (2012), who study the phenomenon in the European Union and identify six sequential stages: emergence of the problem in society, agenda setting, consideration of policy options, decision-making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation.

With respect to the communication strategies used by pressure groups, their fundamental character in the effectiveness of operational approaches is highlighted (De Bruycker and Beyers, 2019; McGrath, 2007; Mykkänen and Ikonen, 2019). These strategies can be direct, targeting decision-makers through contacts and participation in legislative exercises (Moreno-Cabanillas et al., 2024; Palau and Forgas, 2010), or indirect, known as grassroots lobbying, which seeks to create a favorable public opinion climate through media and citizen mobilization (Bergan, 2009; Walker, 2009). They can also be classified by duration: long-term strategies, medium-term, or specific, depending on the objective and context (Correa Ríos, 2019; Martins Lampreia, 2006).

Beyond the seven direct conditioning dimensions−internal to the lobby−there are two indirect dimensions that help explain the differences in the influence capacity of pressure groups through aspects ultimately beyond the control of the organizations−external to the lobby.

On one hand, there is media coverage, which plays a key role in the influence process by giving political weight to claims and acting as an amplifier between pressure groups, citizens, and governments (De Bruycker and Beyers, 2015; Moreno-Cabanillas et al., 2024; Sobbrio, 2011). In theory, the media operates under a principle of independence, which means they may reflect the interests of pressure groups as a result of indirect lobbying strategies or through spontaneous coverage. Regardless of the reason for publication, for lobbies, it is necessary that this visibility is both positive and consistent, as the goal is not merely to achieve visibility but to use it to contribute to the group’s objectives (Mykkänen and Ikonen, 2019; Castillo, 2011).

On the other hand, there is public perception (Kollman, 1998). A positive image strengthens the legitimacy of the lobby’s demands and fosters additional support through citizen mobilization and media coverage. In contrast, a negative perception can hinder the persuasion of policymakers, who prefer to avoid controversies and align themselves with dominant public opinion (Lax and Phillips, 2012).

The summary of the direct and indirect conditioning dimensions that affect the influence capacity of lobbies in the European Union’s policy formulation process is presented in Figure 1.

The identified dimensions will serve as analytical lenses to assess the influence capacity of lobbies throughout the policymaking process. Analyzing the operation and interplay of each dimension enables a detailed mapping of their role in shaping lobbying strategies and outcomes. This approach facilitates the establishment of connections between the bibliographic analysis and the research objectives.

Also, aside from these nine elements, explaining the influence capacity of pressure groups requires considering two defining characteristics of these entities: the nature of the organization and the interests it represents. Although these issues, being intrinsic to the group, are not conditioning factors in themselves, they must be mentioned as they serve as primary references when making comparisons and differentiations based on potential influence.

After presenting the conditioning dimensions of lobbies’ influence capacity, the research proceeds to develop the phase-specific analysis across the six stages of the policy process. In each phase, the differences in the influence potential of various lobbies are explored, the interdependencies with the independent direct and indirect conditioning dimensions are studied, and the most common communication strategies used are examined.

The interdependencies between dimensions represent the most complex element. To facilitate their understanding, Table 2 presents a summary of the interdependencies of each dimension across the phases of the public policy formulation process.

The public policy formulation process in the European Union, following the six stages defined by Jordan and Adelle (2012), demonstrates a progressive inclusion of actors: it begins with civil society, moves through the media, and ultimately involves the decision-makers. Analyzing the influence capacity of lobbies depending on their organizational nature or the interests they represent was outlined in SO1. In this regard, following the analysis, it is emphasized that this variation is strongly conditioned by this order of inclusion of actors. In phases involving public engagement, groups with social interests, occupy a prominent position (Grose et al., 2022). When the media comes into play, a dual scenario emerges: if media influence targets the public, social lobbies gain the upper hand, whereas influence directed at decision-makers tends to favor economic groups (Baumgartner and Leech, 2001; Lowery and Gray, 2004; Moreno-Cabanillas et al., 2024). Finally, phases requiring direct interaction with legislators consistently benefit organizations with economic interests (Binderkrantz et al., 2015; Dür and Mateo, 2013; Klüver, 2012; Serna-Ortega et al., 2024).

However, these differences are beginning to blur, as economic and social groups increasingly converge on issues like the environment, driven by globalization’s push toward a more collectivist approach to problem-solving (Genc, 2023). This convergence phenomenon is being studied as it could mark a turning point in the dynamics of interactions between citizens, lobbies, and the state. Researchers indicate that, in recent years, these interactions have changed due to the sophistication and increasing complexity of lobbying actions, which sometimes surpass the regulatory procedures they attempt to influence (Coen et al., 2024). This field of analysis undoubtedly opens a promising avenue for future research, exploring the causes and effects of this potential merging of interests.

Complementary to the organization’s interests, variations in influence potential all over the policy cycle are largely marked by the relationships with independent direct and indirect conditioning dimensions. SO2 of this study aimed to explore this issue.

Regarding independent direct conditioning dimensions, the first notable element is the economic capacity of the pressure group (Stevens and De Bruycker, 2020). Economic resources have a general connection, especially when multiple lines of action need to be developed or when strategies require a serious investment for implementation (Castillo-Esparcia et al., 2023). Moreover, this economic capacity acts as a collateral conditioning factor in stages involving legislators, who face structural pressure to favor economic development through the private market (Benson and Jordan, 2015; Halkos and Trigoni, 2010; Lelieveldt and Princen, 2023). As a result, the influence of economic advantage should be evaluated through its diverse nature, considering the systemic advantage it represents and the ongoing debate in the scholarly literature regarding its connection to success, either directly or tangentially (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Chand, 2017; Stevens and De Bruycker, 2020; Woll, 2019).

In the phases involving interactions with decision-makers, a close relationship is also observed with the dimension of the ability to identify and access these authorities. Therefore, the scenario is very similar in the two objective direct conditioning dimensions.

In relation to this second dimension, while access does not always guarantee effective influence, as it depends on various contextual factors (Fraussen and Halpin, 2018; Beyers and Braun, 2014), it undoubtedly offers a strategic advantage (Castillo, 2011; Serna-Ortega et al., 2024), especially when informational asymmetry occurs (Bouwen, 2004; Potters and Van Winden, 1992). The ability to engage directly with decision-makers allows pressure groups to present their arguments more persuasively and to shape policy discussions in their favor, thereby enhancing their potential to influence the outcome (Hanegraaff et al., 2019; Hirsch et al., 2023). In this context, it is worth noting that in the European Union, the Transparency Register has been in operation for over a decade as a tool to monitor interactions between pressure groups and institutional officials, thus promoting transparency in these processes (Greenwood and Dreger, 2013; Năstase and Muurmans, 2020). Future research could further explore the need to promote ethical and transparent lobbying practices and the development of strategies to foster a regulatory environment that encourages responsibility and accountability.

With respect to the subjective direct explanatory dimensions, such as the capacity to mobilize supporters or alignment with prevailing social norms, there is a strong interdependence with phases involving the society and the media. From the societal perspective, the power of visibility in bringing an issue to the forefront is evident, making social support extremely relevant (Grose et al., 2022; Rasmussen et al., 2018; Walker, 2009). Additionally, for example, in the agenda setting stage, these subjective factors have a high impact (Klüver, 2013; Ihlen and Raknes, 2020). The visibility and social support that these groups can gain partially determine the process of issue prioritization, reinforcing the importance of the relationship between mobilization, public perception, and agenda setting.

Closely related, when examining indirect or tangential conditioning dimensions, media coverage stands out as a crucial factor (Castillo, 2011; Moreno-Cabanillas et al., 2024). Its relevance is particularly noticeable in the first two phases, where media acts as amplifiers of demands, granting them social presence and political dimension (De Bruycker and Beyers, 2015; Sobbrio, 2011). In fact, in the agenda setting period, media coverage is the primary objective of lobbying communication strategies. Besides these two stages, in the final phase of policy evaluation, media presence plays an important role in helping to diversify lines of action, as at this point, its potential for application and influence involves all the actors engaged in the process (Castillo, 2011; De Bruycker and Beyers, 2015; Mykkänen and Ikonen, 2019). A future research avenue could focus on analyzing which specific indirect lobbying strategies are most effective in ensuring that the demands of pressure groups receive media coverage.

Figure 2 illustrates the degree of media coverage conditioning in each of the six phases of the public policy formulation process in the European Union.

In the same line of analysis, the conditioning effect of public perception of the organization exerts a general influence throughout the entire policy cycle (Kollman, 1998), although not as much as public support (Rasmussen et al., 2018). It is a complex dimension of understanding, as it generally needs to be evaluated based on the organization’s previous interactions with the public and decision-makers (Hanegraaff et al., 2019). It significantly influences the impact a demand can have on society and the media coverage it receives. Similarly, the final phase of the policy process is highly interdependent with public perception, as it facilitates the closure and reorientation of interactions with the involved actors. This interdependence arises not from direct influence but from the importance of managing the group’s perception at that point. In this sense, evaluating actions is decisive. Burstein and Linton (2002) point out the difficulties it presents in the operational context of lobbies, but it is necessary for adjusting strategies and improving the public perception in the future (Lowery, 2013).

Regarding the predominant communication strategies across different phases, the analysis of which was proposed in SO3, a clear differentiation is observed between lobbies with economic interests, which tend to use direct strategies, and those with social interests, which prefer indirect strategies (Awad, 2024; Chamberlain et al., 2023; Moreno-Cabanillas et al., 2024; Mykkänen and Ikonen, 2019). The effectiveness of these strategies is highly variable (De Bruycker and Beyers, 2019). In stages involving interaction with the public and media, lobbies usually opt for grassroots lobbying strategies. In contrast, in stages requiring contact with decision-makers, direct strategies are more common, with indirect strategies relegated to a complementary role or as an alternative course of action in case the anticipated scenario proves unfavorable for the lobby’s interests. The only exception is the point of evaluating the political decision, where, as mentioned, all actors and communication strategies intersect.

Taking the above into account, this research has successfully achieved its GO of analyzing the influence capacity of pressure groups in the different phases of the European Union’s public policy formulation process. The findings have important implications and potential practical applications. As mentioned in the introduction, the structural complexity of the supranational entity creates a conducive environment for the operational development of pressure groups. The analysis of their influence across different phases improves the understanding on the matter and deepens insights into the transformations in lobbying dynamics. Policymakers can use these findings to design regulations and frameworks that promote transparency and accountability in lobbying, ensuring that advocacy efforts do not disproportionately benefit specific interests. On the other hand, lobbyists can benefit from understanding how their strategies may need to adapt depending on the phase of the policy process they are targeting and the nature of the actors involved.

In terms of media implications, the study provides an educational and synthesizing perspective on how pressure groups interact with the media at different stages. In this way, the insights have the potential to assist journalists in developing more informed and balanced coverage of the interests at play. Similarly, the findings also contribute to the social understanding of the instrumentalization of social mobilization by lobbies; therefore, they serve as a tool for developing citizens’ critical analysis and fostering a more informed public debate.