The study of coalition governments is one of the most advanced and progressive areas in political science (Druckman and Roberts, 2008, p. 101). Research on coalition governments encompasses several important classic themes, including the composition, duration, fulfillment of electoral pledges, decision-making processes, and the allocation of ministerial portfolios. Among these topics, the ministerial portfolio allocation is the least studied (Müller and Strøm, 1999; Mershon, 2001a, p. 278; Ecker et al., 2015, p. 802). However, ministerial portfolio allocation is one of the most critical aspects of coalition bargaining and formation (Bäck et al., 2011, p. 441), representing the bottom line of the political process in parliamentary democracy (Laver and Schofield, 1990, p. 164; Laver and Shepsle, 1996).

This is because, on the one hand, ministerial portfolios are typically the pinnacle of a political career for politicians and one of the most crucial resources for parties to provide rents and patronage (Druckman and Warwick, 2005; Verzichelli, 2008, p. 237; Saijo, 2020, p. 4). On the other hand, ministers, as the most important policymakers in parliamentary democracy, are the most tangible manifestations of policy payoffs. Controlling relevant ministerial portfolios in the government is a crucial intervening link between party policy and government action, giving a party a significant advantage in implementing its preferred policies in the relevant sector and bargaining capital to trade with parties controlling other issue areas. This, in turn, affects the overall policy output of the government and ultimately has a profound impact on the stability of the government itself (Browne and Franklin, 1973; Bäck et al., 2011; Bäck and Carroll, 2020). Therefore, regardless of a party's strategic goals—whether office-seeking, policy-seeking, or vote-seeking—all parties should be highly concerned with both the quantitative (i.e., how many ministerial portfolios they can secure) and qualitative (i.e., what types of ministerial portfolios they can obtain) aspects of ministerial portfolio allocation (Budge and Keman, 1990, p. 89; Strøm and Müller, 1999; Verzichelli, 2008, p. 238; Bäck and Carroll, 2020, p. 314).

Many past studies have shown that traditional mainstream parties strictly adhere to the principle of proportionality in the quantitative allocation of ministerial portfolios. This means that the share of ministerial portfolios they receive closely corresponds to their share of seats in the coalition government, maintaining an almost one-to-one relationship. This proportionality is largely unaffected by factors such as each party's bargaining power or the varying importance or policy salience of different ministerial portfolios. Regarding the qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios, traditional mainstream parties are also often seen as being able to secure the ministerial portfolios they desire.

While postwar RRPs differ in many respects from the fascist movements of the interwar era, continuities in historical context and ideology can no longer be overlooked—particularly in terms of socio-economic conditions marked by widening class inequality and rising economic distress, policy orientations toward protectionism and authoritarian, xenophobic agitation, and political emotions fueled by anti-establishment sentiment and demands for radical change. Accordingly, the current surge of RRPs has been described by scholars of fascism as a period of “post-fascism” (e.g., Traverso, 2017). RRPs have also traditionally been treated as “pariah parties”, excluded from coalition politics due to their perceived threat to parliamentary democracy (van Spanje and van der Brug, 2007; Bäck et al., 2024; Calvo et al., 2024). Consequently, they have long been subject to political (Downs, 2002) and societal cordons sanitaires (Art, 2011). Only in the twenty-first century did they begin to normalize and gradually gain mainstream acceptance, leading to a growing number of RRPs entering coalition governments (Mudde, 2019, p. 3). However, within such coalitions, RRPs are almost always weak junior partners (McDonnell and Newell, 2011, p. 448–449). Moreover, due to their hostility toward liberal democracy (Mudde, 2007, p. 155–157, 2019, p. 113–128), they are seen not only as undermining democratic

quality at the national level but also as posing significant risks to European and North Atlantic integration (Liang, 2007). These features raise reasonable doubts as to whether RRPs follow the same patterns as traditional mainstream parties in the quantitative and qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios. Yet this important question has received surprisingly limited scholarly attention.

To address this issue, this paper aims to compare the characteristics and differences between RRPs and traditional mainstream parties in both the quantitative and qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios. It does so by constructing a more comprehensive and transparent dataset, applying widely accepted and standardized methodological approaches, adopting a pan-European perspective while remaining attentive to the political, economic, and cultural differences between Eastern and Western Europe, and combining primarily quantitative analysis with qualitative insights. In doing so, the paper contributes to the broader literature on ministerial portfolio allocation, RRPs, and the interrelationships between them.

This study finds that, regardless of whether ministerial portfolio importance is considered, and across all of Europe, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe, similar to other traditional mainstream parties, the seat share of RRPs shows an imperfect but still strong proportional relationship with their ministerial portfolio shares. However, though seat share shows higher explanatory power, the power index/vote weight of RRPs demonstrates a better proportional relationship with their ministerial portfolio shares than does their seat share. Particularly when considering ministerial portfolio importance, there is an almost perfect proportional relationship between the power index/vote weight of RRPs and their ministerial portfolio shares in all of Europe, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe. This indicates that, unlike traditional mainstream parties, for RRPs, bargaining power has a stronger proportional relationship with the ministerial portfolio shares they receive in coalition governments compared to their seat share.

Meanwhile, the ministerial portfolio shares that RRPs receive in coalition governments are often less than their seat share. However, the proportional relationship between seat share and ministerial portfolio share for RRPs in Eastern Europe is stronger than that for RRPs in Western Europe, regardless of whether ministerial portfolio importance is considered. Lastly, unlike traditional mainstream parties, RRPs often do not secure the ministerial portfolios they desire when entering coalition governments. Nonetheless, Eastern European RRPs still find it somewhat easier to obtain specific ministerial portfolios they prioritize compared to their Western counterparts, whereas Western European RRPs rely more heavily on their “hard power” (i.e., seat share) to secure specific ministerial portfolios than their Eastern counterparts. All in all, while RRPs have largely achieved normalization/mainstreaming in the quantitative allocation of ministerial portfolios, they still have a considerable way to go in the qualitative allocation before fully reaching that status.

In the next section, we will first provide an overview of the quantitative and qualitative theory of ministerial portfolio allocation, summarizing their longstanding key conclusions and highlighting the importance of studying the ministerial portfolio allocation to RRPs. In Section 3, we will explore the potential characteristics of ministerial portfolio allocation to RRPs, present our hypotheses, and critically assess the conclusions of the limited existing research. In Section 4, after introducing the dependent, independent, and control variables, we test each hypothesis using ordinary least squares regression and conditional logit regression, followed by a concise comparative case study to provide a more robust empirical foundation for the analysis. Finally, Sections 5 and 6 will discuss the empirical analysis results, highlight the academic contributions and limitations of this paper, and conclude with suggestions for future research directions.

Regarding the quantitative allocation of ministerial portfolios (i.e., how many ministerial portfolios each coalition party secures), Gamson (1961, p. 376, p. 379) proposed over 60 years ago: “Any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition”, meaning parties' demands reflect the proportion of resources they control.

The primary resource for each party is its seat share. Browne and Franklin (1973, p. 457) argued, “The percentage share of ministries received by a party participating in a governing coalition and the percentage share of that party's coalition seats will be proportional on a one-to-one basis”, meaning “the percent ministries received by parties in governing coalitions is directly proportional to the percent seats they contribute to the coalition” (Browne and Franklin, 1973, p. 467). Their calculations confirm this, showing a correlation coefficient of 0.926 between seat share and ministerial portfolio share, and a simple regression analysis (ministerial portfolio share as dependent variable, seat share as independent variable) yielding a constant of −0.01 and regression coefficient of 1.07 (Browne and Franklin, 1973, p. 460). Hence, Browne and Franklin's (1973) one-to-one proportionality hypothesis is supported.²

Since ministerial portfolio allocation visibly reflects the outcome of bargaining processes (Schofield, 1976, p. 36; Falcó-Gimeno, 2011, p. 393), bargaining theory—which analyzes how coalition gains are distributed among parties with conflicting preferences (Lasswell, 1936)—is often viewed as challenging Gamson's proportionality principle. However, empirical studies comparing seat share with the “power index/vote weight”—a widely used proxy for bargaining power, measuring how often a party is pivotal in coalition orderings—that is, when it transforms a losing coalition into a winning one (Shapley and Shubik, 1954; Banzhaf, 1965)—consistently find that seat share provides stronger explanatory power for ministerial portfolio allocation, both substantively and statistically. Bargaining power only occasionally slightly distorts proportionality³ (Mershon, 2001a; Warwick and Druckman, 2006; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013; Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason, 2013; Ceron, 2014; Cutler et al., 2014), and in fact, differences in bargaining power frequently reinforce proportionality (Martin and Vanberg, 2020).

Another challenge is posed by importance/salience theory. Coalition parties negotiate not only over the number of ministerial portfolios but also over specific ministries (Browne and Franklin, 1973, p. 458). This occurs because certain ministerial portfolios are inherently more critical (e.g., Prime Minister), or because particular ministries become especially significant in specific contexts (e.g., the Finance Ministry after a financial crisis) (de Mesquita, 1979; Druckman and Warwick, 2005). Thus, ministerial portfolio allocation among parties may vary according to the relative importance or salience of individual ministries or policy domains.

These assumptions appear reasonable, yet empirical studies find that the impact of these factors on the quantitative allocation of ministerial portfolios is minimal. Even when considering variations in the importance or policy salience of ministerial portfolios, their quantitative allocation still largely adheres to the proportionality principle (Browne and Franklin, 1973, p. 465; Warwick and Druckman, 2001; Indridason, 2015, p. 21; Martin, 2016, p. 26–27; Martin and Vanberg, 2020). Some scholars further argue that despite methodological variations, research approaches emphasizing qualitative dimensions consistently support Gamson's proportionality principle (Raabe and Linhart, 2013, p. 482).

Besides bargaining model theory and importance/salience theory, even when considering factors such as geographical context—Eastern or Western Europe (Druckman and Roberts, 2005)—time spent in opposition (Falcó-Gimeno, 2011), voter perceptions (Lin et al., 2017), or examining different actors such as intra-party factions (Mershon, 2001a,b; Ceron, 2014), junior ministers (Manow and Zorn, 2004), the European Commission (Franchino, 2009), regional party branches (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013), or regional coalition governments (Raabe and Linhart, 2013), Gamson's proportionality principle maintains robust statistical significance.⁴ Therefore, there is no compelling methodological or empirical reason to question the validity of this proportionality principle (de Mesquita, 1979, p. 62–63).

This principle, applicable to all aspects of coalition payoffs (Browne and Frendreis, 1980, p. 753; Schofield and Laver, 1985, p. 158), is among the most reliable, widely recognized, and robust empirical regularities. It is described as the “Nash equilibrium” and “iron law” in parliamentary democracies (De Winter, 2001, p. 190; Verzichelli, 2008, p. 239; Bäck et al., 2009, p. 28), coalition studies since the 1970s (Carroll and Cox, 2007, p. 300), comparative politics (Lin et al., 2017, p. 915), political science (Budge and Keman, 1990, p. 105; Laver, 1998, p. 7), and even across social sciences broadly (Laver and Schofield, 1990, p. 171; Warwick and Druckman, 2001, p. 627, 2006, p. 635).

In addition to the quantitative theory, the qualitative theory (i.e., what types of ministerial portfolios coalition parties can obtain) is another critical area of research. Qualitative theory argues that coalition parties not only seek ministerial portfolios proportional to their seat share but also target specific ministerial portfolios that are significant, govern salient policy areas (as noted earlier), or align closely with their ideological and policy priorities. Securing these ministerial portfolios enables parties to implement preferred policies or fulfill campaign promises (Budge and Keman, 1990).

Although these factors may not substantially influence the proportionality principle in the quantitative allocation of ministerial portfolios, numerous studies have found that parties emphasizing specific ministerial portfolios in their electoral programs or belonging to party families traditionally associated with particular ministerial portfolios have a higher likelihood of obtaining those ministerial portfolios (Bäck et al., 2011; Raabe and Linhart, 2013; Ecker et al., 2015; Greene and Jensen, 2016; Saijo, 2020; Däubler et al., 2024).

For example, Socialist parties typically obtain ministerial portfolios such as Social Affairs, Health, and Labor; Conservative parties commonly secure Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Defense portfolios; Liberal parties frequently receive Finance, Economy, and Justice portfolios; and Agrarian and Green parties usually hold Agriculture and Environment portfolios, respectively⁵ (Browne and Feste, 1975; Bäck et al., 2011).

The characteristics of quantitative or qualitative ministerial portfolio allocation discussed above are, to our knowledge, almost non-existent when applied to RRPs, with very few exceptions (e.g., Bichay, 2021). However, this issue is very important for several reasons. First, RRPs have traditionally been regarded as “pariah parties”, viewed by traditional mainstream parties as posing serious threats to parliamentary democracy and therefore considered non-coalitionable (van Spanje and van der Brug, 2007; Bäck et al., 2024; Calvo et al., 2024). As a result, they have long faced cordons sanitaires in both political systems (Downs, 2002) and social life (Art, 2011). It was only after entering the twenty-first century that they began to normalize and gradually achieve mainstream status, leading to an increasing number of RRPs participating in coalition governments⁶ (Mudde, 2019, p. 3). These innovative governing formulae (Mair, 1997, p. 209) involving RRPs are widely regarded as a reluctant outcome of strategies—such as co-optation, collaboration (Downs, 2001), accommodation (Meguid, 2008), or adoption (Bale et al., 2010)—that traditional mainstream parties were compelled to pursue after becoming unable to bear the high costs of continually excluding RRPs from coalition governments (Backlund, 2023, p. 894). Therefore, there is good reason to believe that the quantitative and/or qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to RRPs may significantly deviate from previously established patterns.

Second, there are marked regional differences in RRPs' government participation: over half of the cabinets involving RRPs are in Eastern Europe⁷ (about 52.7%), followed by Southern Europe (about 23%), Western Europe (about 16.2%), and the least in Northern Europe (about 8.1%)⁸ (see also Figure 1, Appendix 1). This suggests that political institutions or issue salience in different regions significantly impact RRPs' government participation. Third, RRPs in coalition governments are always typically weak junior partners (McDonnell and Newell, 2011, p. 448–449). During coalition formation or to maintain coalition stability, RRPs generally make significant concessions to senior partners (Heinisch, 2003). Furthermore, considering the characteristic of RRPs being adversaries of Liberal Democracy (Mudde, 2007, p. 155–157, 2019, p. 113–128), it is highly questionable whether other coalition partners would be willing to allocate important ministerial portfolios—such as Justice, Interior, Economic Affairs, and Immigration—to RRPs, even if these are highly desired by them.

Therefore, given the unique nature of RRPs, potential regional differences in institutional or issue salience, and their weaker position in coalition governments, the purpose of this paper is clear and straightforward: to examine whether the ministerial portfolio allocation to RRPs follows the same quantitative and qualitative patterns as those for traditional mainstream parties.

Many scholars have long argued that, due to the populist nature of RRPs, these parties—even when they enter coalition governments—struggle to implement their often unrealistic policy promises, which were primarily designed to attract votes. As a result, the policy influence of RRPs has generally been considered quite limited in the past (Canovan, 1999, p. 12; Mény and Surel, 2002, p. 18; Heinisch, 2003, p. 123–124; Taggart, 2004, p. 270; Hopkin and Ignazi, 2008, p. 61; McDonnell and Newell, 2011, p. 448–449; Mudde, 2013, p. 13–14).

However, in recent years, as RRPs have more frequently entered coalition governments, some of these parties are even considered to have gained sustainable governance capabilities (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015, p. 165–166). These parties are increasingly exerting significant policy influence in the areas they govern or are concerned about. For instance, scholars have pointed out that under coalition governments involving RRPs, criminal policies have become stricter (Bale, 2003); immigration, refugee, and integration policies have become more stringent (Schain, 2006; Bale et al., 2010; van Spanje, 2010; Akkerman, 2012; Akkerman and De Lange, 2012); language, education, and cultural policies have become more conservative, foreign policies have become more aggressive (Minkenberg, 2015); and welfare policies have become more restrictive (Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2016; Falkenbach and Greer, 2018; Chueri, 2021).

The influence of RRPs on these policies can, of course, be indirect—such as through blackmailing or bargaining with other parties to achieve their policy goals—but it can also be direct, such as by controlling ministerial portfolios that oversee these policy areas. Especially as RRPs gain more experience and governance capabilities through repeated participation in coalition governments, they are increasingly likely to independently manage a ministerial portfolio and exert greater policy influence within its domain.

In this context, Nicolas Bichay made a valuable initial contribution to the study of RRPs' ministerial portfolio allocation. In a short article, he noted that RRPs consistently secure a ministerial portfolio share proportional to their seat share in the coalition government. Moreover, RRPs often succeed in obtaining the ministerial portfolios they prioritize (Bichay, 2021). Therefore, building on the conclusions of scholars presented in Section 2 and Bichay's preliminary observations on RRPs, it seems reasonable to assume that RRPs, like traditional mainstream parties, align with existing research findings on the quantitative and qualitative theories of ministerial portfolio allocation. More specifically⁹:

However, the hypotheses outlined above are not necessarily valid, as certain characteristics of RRPs cast doubt on them. For instance, under the governance of RRPs, minority rights, judicial and central bank independence, and freedoms of expression, press, association, and research have been undermined, leading to varying degrees of democratic backsliding in countries like Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (Rosenbluth and Shapiro, 2018, p. 214–228; Batory and Svensson, 2019; Norris and Inglehart, 2019, p. 183–185). Furthermore, the rule of RRPs not only undermines the quality of democracy domestically but also negatively impacts international politics, as RRPs are often regarded as pursuing self-centered and sovereignty-focused foreign policies. This tendency results in actions that exclusively consider national interests and contradict the principles of liberal democracy on the international stage (Rathbun, 2004, p. 197–198, p. 213–214). Consequently, although RRPs do not share a uniform or monolithic set of foreign policy preferences, the main features of their foreign policy—characterized by nativism, anti-pluralism, anti-globalism, and anti-establishment sentiments (Destradi et al., 2021, p. 665, p. 671–676; Ostermann and Stahl, 2022, p. 5)—are widely seen as posing significant risks to European and North Atlantic integration (Liang, 2007).

Given the above, coalition partners are likely reluctant to allocate ministerial portfolios that oversee critical domestic and/or international policy areas to RRPs, which are considered adversaries of liberal democracy. This reluctance may impact the quantitative and/or qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to RRPs. In other words, although the normalization/mainstreaming of RRPs has become more frequent and significant in the twenty-first century, the allocation of ministerial portfolios to these parties may not follow the established patterns and principles of quantitative and/or qualitative allocation observed for other traditional mainstream parties.

Simultaneously, although Bichay's research fills an important gap in the study of ministerial portfolio allocation to RRPs, we cannot conclude that his findings are entirely accurate for several reasons: First, Bichay does not provide the source or detailed content of the dataset used, which raises concerns about data transparency and reliability. Second, in his analysis of the quantitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to RRPs, Bichay does not employ the most standard and widely accepted method in ministerial portfolio allocation research—ordinary least-squares linear regression (Indridason, 2015, p. 10, p. 15; Martin, 2016, p. 18). Third, his study focuses only on the seven most common ministerial portfolios¹⁰ shared among European governments, overlooking other significant ministerial portfolios such as Social Welfare, Health, Labor, Economic Affairs, and Culture, which are also often assigned to RRPs. Fourth, some of Bichay's specific conclusions regarding the qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to RRPs are inaccurate. For instance, he claims that RRPs are most likely to control the Defense and Justice portfolios and almost never manage the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, as demonstrated in Appendices 1, 2,¹¹ these assertions do not hold. One of the main reasons for this inaccuracy appears to be Bichay's failure to account for the significant East–West divide in ministerial portfolio allocation to RRPs. The differences between Eastern and Western Europe in this regard can be attributed to a variety of factors—including, but not limited to, their distinct political, economic, and cultural contexts.

Lastly, Bichay did not take into account the potential influence of bargaining model theory and/or importance/salience theory. While previous research has shown that a party's seat share is crucial for dividing ministerial portfolios within coalition governments, this logic may not necessarily apply to RRPs. In particular, for RRPs operating in highly unfavorable contexts—such as in Nordic countries like Sweden or in Germany—seat share alone may carry less weight. Instead, the key factor may be whether these parties can convince traditional mainstream parties that their inclusion would enhance the coalition government's policy viability. In other words, bargaining power may replace seat share as the decisive factor (Martin and Vanberg, 2014)—especially when the importance or policy salience of specific ministerial portfolios is considered (Bassi, 2017)—not only in determining RRPs' ministerial portfolio allocation, but also in whether mainstream parties are willing to collaborate with them in the first place (Backlund, 2023). In summary, the hypothesis that RRPs have achieved normalization/mainstreaming in the quantitative and qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios warrants further investigation.

While the critiques mentioned above may seem overly stringent for research that is less methodologically rigorous, Bichay (2021) still deserves high praise for addressing the research gap in the quantitative and qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to RRPs. Building on this perspective, this paper aims to advance the research in this area by creating a more comprehensive and transparent dataset, incorporating a broader range of variables, and applying more standardized research methods. In doing so, it seeks to make a further contribution to the study of ministerial portfolio allocation, RRPs, and the relationship between the two.

Ministerial portfolio allocation is one of the most critical aspects of coalition formation, representing the foundation of the political process in parliamentary democracies. The study of ministerial portfolio allocation generally focuses on two dimensions: quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative allocation of ministerial portfolios examines how many ministerial portfolios each party receives, while the qualitative allocation focuses on which specific ministerial portfolios are assigned to each party. In terms of the former, the proportionality principle is regarded as one of the most reliable, well-known, and strongest empirical relationships in social science. As for the latter, scholars have argued that the more a coalition party emphasizes specific ministerial portfolios in its electoral program, the higher the likelihood that the party will secure those ministerial portfolios.

This paper explores the characteristics of the quantitative and qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to RRPs, which were once considered “pariah parties”. However, since the early twenty-first century, they have gradually undergone a process of normalization/mainstreaming. Increasingly, RRPs have entered coalition governments, accumulated governing experience, and begun to exert significant policy influence. Some RRPs are even seen as having achieved sustainable governance capabilities. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that in countries governed by RRPs, there has been a varying degree of democratic backsliding. Additionally, RRPs are perceived as significant threats and challenges to European and North Atlantic integration in international politics. Given that RRPs are typically junior partners in coalition governments, other coalition partners might be reluctant to allocate important ministerial portfolios overseeing domestic and/or international policy areas to them, or even to ministerial portfolios that RRPs themselves desire. This may result in the quantitative and/or qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to RRPs differing from that of traditional mainstream parties.

Based on the results of this paper's analysis, we find that regardless of whether ministerial portfolio importance is considered, and across all of Europe, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe, seat share shows imperfect but still strong proportional relationships with ministerial portfolio shares. However, while seat share typically shows higher adjusted R² values compared to power index/vote weight, the regression coefficients of power index/vote weight are generally closer to one than those of seat share. Especially when considering ministerial portfolio importance, whether in all of Europe, Western Europe, or Eastern Europe, the power index/vote weight of RRPs shows an almost perfect proportional relationship with their ministerial portfolio shares. This indicates that, unlike traditional mainstream parties, for RRPs, bargaining power has a stronger proportional relationship with the ministerial portfolio shares they receive in coalition governments compared to their seat share. This result somewhat confirms our previous conjecture: because RRPs in coalition governments are always typically weaker junior partners—and particularly given their anti-liberal democratic tendencies and their incomplete mainstreaming (see also text footnote 6), that is, operating within highly unfavorable contexts—their ability to obtain ministerial portfolios proportional to their contributions depends more on their bargaining power.

Moreover, RRPs often receive fewer ministerial portfolio shares in coalition governments than their seat shares would suggest—a pattern that runs counter to the classic “relative weakness effect” (see also text footnote 2) and may further reflect the unique ideological and reputational features of RRPs. However, Eastern European RRPs show a better proportional relationship between their seat shares and ministerial portfolio shares in coalition governments than Western European RRPs, regardless of whether ministerial portfolio importance is considered. This implies that, compared to Western Europe, Eastern European RRPs encounter fewer obstacles on their path to normalization/mainstreaming—possibly due to the region's distinct post–World War II history, the challenges of nation-building amid ethnic diversity, limited democratic experience, the rapid transition from state socialism to a market economy, and a relatively less institutionalized and more fluid party system (Minkenberg, 2002; Buštíková, 2018). Therefore, although Eastern European RRPs are generally less successful overall than their Western counterparts (see also Figure 1), their characteristics in quantitative ministerial portfolio allocation more closely resemble those of traditional mainstream parties.

Finally, the Qualitative Hypothesis of this paper is found to be unsupported. This result confirms our earlier conjecture that coalition partners are often reluctant to grant ministerial portfolios that are likely related to critical domestic and/or international policy areas, or even the ministerial portfolios RRPs desire—such as those responsible for Family Policy, Economic Affairs, Public Administration, and especially Immigration policy. This conjecture is also partially supported by Kimberly A. Twist's research. By examining six traditional mainstream right parties and the coalition governments they participated in across five countries—Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway—she found that these parties tend to hold slightly more key ministerial portfolios in coalitions with RRPs than in those without them, regardless of the role of policy preferences (Twist, 2019, p. 25–26).²⁴

Furthermore, the influence of seat share and power index on the allocation of specific ministerial portfolios is more pronounced for RRPs in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe. At the same time, seat share, as a form of “hard power”, plays a more crucial role than bargaining power, considered “soft power”, in determining whether RRPs in Western Europe can secure specific ministerial portfolios. In contrast, the reverse is true for RRPs in Eastern Europe. These observations further highlight that, although Eastern European RRPs are relatively weaker than their Western counterparts, they face fewer barriers to normalization/mainstreaming—potentially making it somewhat easier for them to secure the specific ministerial portfolios they prioritize.

Taken together, the above findings are further corroborated by the concise comparative case studies presented in this paper, which reinforce the empirical credibility of the results. In summary, although RRPs have made notable progress toward normalization/mainstreaming in the quantitative allocation of ministerial portfolios, they continue to encounter substantial challenges in the qualitative allocation, where normalization/mainstreaming remain largely unrealized.

This paper makes significant contributions to advancing research on ministerial portfolio allocation, RRPs, and the relationships between them. However, we also acknowledge some limitations. First, since RRPs' participation in government has increased only gradually since the early twenty-first century, this study, being a “small-N” study, employs the most traditional and straightforward analytical methods. As the sample size increases, however, it is reasonable to expect that previous results—particularly those from the conditional logit regression—may change. At the same time, this study does not incorporate control variables in the quantitative analysis that could also potentially influence the quantitative and/or qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to RRPs—such as a communist past, the duration of democratic rule, the length of EU membership, prior electoral success or government participation, and the policy distance between coalition partners.

Second, although the significant development of RRPs' normalization/mainstreaming over time has been confirmed by previous scholarly research, the additional analyses conducted in this paper, which included time as a control variable, found that time was not statistically significant (Appendix 5). This result could be attributed to a small sample size or other technical factors, but it may also be because time represents only the visible tip of the iceberg, while the potential control variables mentioned earlier constitute the massive, hidden iceberg beneath the surface. We encourage other scholars to utilize the publicly available dataset (Appendices 1, 3, 4) to replicate this study, evaluate its findings, and refine its conclusions using alternative research methods.

Third, compared to more meticulous case studies, this study, being a “large-N” study, may overlook important national contexts, such as Switzerland's “magic formula,” the oversized coalitions in Southern European countries, the tradition of minority coalitions in Northern European countries, or the “red-brown alliance” in Central and Eastern European countries. These factors are also likely to influence the quantitative and/or qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to RRPs.

Fourth, some crucial variables related to political party interactions could also impact the quantitative and/or qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to RRPs. For instance, the willingness of other parties to govern with RRPs. Given that policies adopted in parliamentary systems reflect a compromise among the policy positions of coalition parties, and that coalition parties may allocate ministerial portfolios with future policy-making in mind, RRPs' non-cooperative nature or their excessive policy distance from other coalition parties in certain policy areas (e.g., immigration) could significantly affect their coalitionability (Martin and Vanberg, 2014; Bassi, 2017; Backlund, 2023). Another example is the RRPs' willingness to enter a coalition government. If RRPs are unlikely to obtain their desired ministerial portfolios, why would they choose to join a coalition government in the first place? Could it be, as Riker (1962, p. 22) argued, that gaining access to power is the ultimate goal in party politics—leading RRPs to accept concessions in ministerial portfolio allocation as the price for entering government? The case of the Rassemblement National (RN) in France appears to support this view. Since 2011, the RN has pursued a strategy of “dédiabolisation”—aimed at gaining governmental credibility—by making significant efforts to moderate its rhetoric and policies in pursuit of its long-term ambition of assuming government power, even going so far as to soften its stance on core issues such as immigration (Ivaldi, 2016). It is therefore conceivable that, in order to join a coalition government (as forming a government alone remains unimaginable), the RN would be willing to forgo some ministerial portfolios it considers important. Beyond these factors, instances where coalition entry is enforced due to sheer party size (Tronconi, 2015) could also influence the quantitative and/or qualitative allocation of ministerial portfolios to RRPs. The factors mentioned above warrant further investigation.

This paper may also offer potential directions for future research. First, do the characteristics of ministerial portfolio allocation to RRPs in national governments also apply to RRPs in regional governments? Given the lower importance and sensitivity of ministerial portfolio allocation in regional governments, will RRPs be more similar to other traditional mainstream parties in receiving a better proportional allocation of ministerial portfolios and/or obtaining the ministerial portfolios they desire? Second, can specific case studies further substantiate or refute the important conclusions of this paper, such as “RRPs need to rely more on their own bargaining power” or “coalition partners are often unwilling to allocate ministerial portfolios related to important domestic and/or international policy areas to RRPs”? Third, do the characteristics of ministerial portfolio allocation to RRPs apply to Radical Left Parties like Syriza, Podemos, and the Socialist People's Party of Denmark, or Valence Populist Parties like Italy's Movimento 5 Stelle (Zulianello and Larsen, 2024), which, like RRPs, are increasingly entering coalition governments? What are the similarities and differences in ministerial portfolio allocation to these different types of parties that are in the process of normalization/mainstreaming? Fourth, a more important and challenging question concerns the role of these diverse radical and populist parties after entering government: How do they influence policy-making? What kinds of policy outcomes do they produce? What impact do they have on the overall quality of democracy? Exploring these questions through the lenses of historical political culture, institutional structures, media discourse, and elite behavior could prove especially useful in explaining cross-national variation and differences across party families. We believe that pursuing these research avenues would significantly advance the broader scholarly understanding of ministerial portfolio allocation, RRPs, and their interplay with democratic governance.