This study combines a systematic review with a comparative case study approach, following the PRISMA guidelines for policy reviews. The literature search covers major international and Chinese databases including Web of Science and CNKI, as well as official policy platforms such as the OECD and UNESCO. The search period spans from 2000 to 2024, using key terms such as “marine strategic science and technology policy,” “transition failure,” and “marine key technologies,” among other relevant combinations. After undergoing three stages of screening—de-duplication, initial screening based on titles and abstracts, and full-text review—90 core documents were finally included in the analysis.

For the case selection, we followed principles of goal orientation, regional coverage, and practical representativeness. Five cases were chosen: China’s “Ocean Decade” (Asia, focusing on breakthroughs in “bottleneck” technologies), the United States’ “Return to Sea Control” initiative (North America, emphasizing the strengthening of maritime military power), Japan’s “Marine Energy and Mineral Resources Development Plan” (Asia, centered on deep-sea resource exploitation), the European Union’s “Blue Growth Strategy” (Europe, focusing on marine industrial innovation and upgrading), and the African Union’s “2050 Integrated Maritime Strategy” (Africa, prioritizing maritime governance and basic capacity building). These cases cover high-, middle-, and low-income countries across different regions, and encompass five major policy orientations—technological breakthrough, military security, resource development, industrial upgrading, and foundational governance—thereby reducing regional bias and providing differentiated references for latecomer countries.

All data in this study are sourced from publicly available web-based platforms and authoritative institutional reports. The specific data sources are as follows: Data Sources for China’s “Ocean Decade” Program: National Marine Data and Information Service. (2024). China Ocean Development Foundation. (2024). Center for Ocean Development Studies, Ocean University of China. Geo-science Documentation Center, China Geological Survey. Data Sources for the U.S.: “Return to Sea Control” Strategy: U.S. Department of Defense. (2023). 2023 Fiscal Year Report. U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2024). Data Sources for Japan’s “Marine Energy and Mineral Resources Development Plan”: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan. (2024). Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC). (2024). Data Sources for the EU “Blue Growth Strategy”: European Commission. (2021). European Multidisciplinary Seafloor and Water Column Observatory (EMSO). (2023). European Wind Energy Association (EWEA). (2022). Data Sources for the AU “Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050”: AU Commission. (2022). AU Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD). (2023). World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). (2024). Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. (2023).

The embryonic form of the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities can be traced back to the mid-20th century, when countries launched a series of marine resource exploration and development programs to tap into the value of marine resources—such as the U.S. “Deep Sea Drilling Project (DSDP)” in the 1960s, followed by the “Ocean Drilling Program (ODP)” and the “Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP)”. The core objective was to improve the efficiency of marine resource utilization through technological innovation and support the sustainable development of the marine economy (Baker-Médard et al., 2021; Bax et al., 2021). Entering the 21st century, with the intensification of global climate change, energy shortages, marine pollution, and other issues, countries and international organizations have begun to use such policies to guide marine technological innovation, addressing the dual challenges of resource development and environmental protection (Dutra et al., 2019). Its conceptual connotation can be analyzed based on scope: the narrow-sense policy focuses on single, clear, and short-term achievable goals (Petek et al., 2022). A typical example is China’s special support policy for the development of the Fendouzhe (Striver) deep-sea manned submersible, which concentrated funding and research efforts on core technologies for a single piece of equipment, enabling rapid breakthroughs in the key technologies for 10,000-meter deep-sea exploration. While the broad-sense policy targets more complex, comprehensive, and systematic societal challenges (Sewerin et al., 2020). For instance, China’s “Ocean Decade” initiative covers multiple areas such as marine scientific and technological research, ecological protection, and the sustainable development of resources. It includes not only technological innovation tasks such as deep-sea exploration and marine new energy, but also application scenarios such as coastal pollution control and fisheries resource conservation. By linking governments, research institutions, enterprises, the public, and other diverse stakeholders, it forms a cross-cutting, cross-regional collaborative promotion system that spans the entire chain of marine development, protection, and governance, distinguishing itself from the single-objective orientation of narrowly defined policies.

Based on this, this paper defines the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities as a broad-sense innovative policy paradigm addressing the “bottleneck” technology predicament in the marine sector faced by developing countries. Through systematic intervention, it aims to resolve urgent, difficult, dangerous, and arduous issues in marine science and technology, accelerating the pace of marine technological innovation.

As a subfield of public policy, the concept of policy elements frequently appears in research on the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities (Bonvin and Laruffa, 2021). Drawing on existing research on policy elements and integrating its unique connotations, this paper constructs a policy element analysis framework encompassing four dimensions: marine policy objectives, marine policy subjects, marine policy instruments, and marine policy processes (Figure 1).

Marine policy objectives are the goals and outcomes that governments aim to achieve when addressing marine-related issues, reflecting their vision and expectations (Arundel et al., 2019; Mavrot et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2025). Their setting is characterized by three key features: targeting, measurability, and time-boundness. Marine policy actors refer to individuals, groups, or organizations that directly or indirectly participate in the entire process of marine policy and play important roles (Morales et al., 2023). This policy emphasizes giving full play to the advantages of the new nationwide system to collaboratively address major marine challenges. Marine policy instruments refer to strategies and methods adopted by governments or relevant regulatory authorities to achieve established marine policy objectives (Cejudo and Michel, 2021). This policy employs a broader combination of policy instruments, such as “leader recruitment for key projects” and “horse-racing mechanism”. The “leader recruitment for key projects” solicits high-caliber research teams from across society, clearly defines core technology breakthrough tasks and outcome evaluation criteria, and focuses resources on overcoming individual technical bottlenecks. For instance, in the development of deep-sea manned submersibles, this mechanism has driven the localization of key components such as pressure hulls and propulsion systems, breaking foreign technological monopolies. In contrast, the “horse-racing mechanism” simultaneously deploys multiple research teams to tackle the same critical technology direction through competitive R&D. By conducting real-time evaluations and dynamically adjusting resource allocation, it compels teams to accelerate technological iteration, significantly shortening the time required to achieve breakthroughs in areas such as marine new energy and marine observation equipment. The marine policy process is generally understood as a dynamic mechanism of interaction among various marine-related subjects in the process of goal setting and achievement (Kuenzler and Stauffer, 2022). Its core links include the formulation, implementation, evaluation, and adjustment of marine policies.

After clarifying the constituent elements, comparing with traditional marine technological innovation policies further highlights the unique characteristics of the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities. By analyzing dimensions such as policy directional guidance, technological innovation leadership, subject collaboration models, and effectiveness evaluation mechanisms, this paper summarizes four prominent features of this policy compared to traditional marine technological innovation policies. These features collectively constitute its core advantages in addressing major marine challenges (Table 1).

Previous studies have argued that the rationale for government intervention in innovative activities primarily stems from market failure or system failure (Huang, 2023; Deng et al., 2020). As sustainable transition emerges as an emerging theme in innovation research, the concept of “transition failure” has been proposed. The theory of transition failure posits that technological innovation is the driving force behind successful transitions, requiring targeted strategic management (Capasso et al., 2019). Leveraging this theory helps illuminate the dilemmas in technological development: by identifying the root causes of failure and pinpointing the exact factors hindering technology diffusion, it provides specific goals and action directions for the implementation of this policy, while also offering a theoretical justification for the legitimacy of its intervention in marine technological innovation activities. It should be noted that the theory of transition failure, while providing a theoretical basis for this policy, also has certain limitations in practical application. It ignores the interference of external factors such as geopolitics and international governance system changes on the occurrence and solution of transition failure, which needs to be supplemented and improved in subsequent research.

The causes of transition failure in the marine sector can be further refined into four typical categories: directional failure, demand expression failure, policy cooperation failure, and reflexive failure (Blind and Niebel, 2022). First, directional failure occurs when marine policy makers lack continuity in policy formulation, with shifting attitudes toward marine technology leading to fluctuations in technological development. Second, demand expression failure manifests as a disconnect between the direction of marine technological innovation and market needs, resulting in low consumer acceptance of emerging marine technological achievements. Third, policy cooperation failure arises when different departments formulate policies based solely on their own responsibilities, leading to overlapping goals and scattered policy resources. Fourth, reflexive failure refers to the absence of regular feedback and correction mechanisms during policy implementation, making it difficult to promote rapid policy adjustments and leaving the full-cycle policy management without dynamic review and timely revision mechanisms.

The characteristics of the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities do not exist in isolation; instead, they form a systematic response logic precisely aligned with failure issues, providing actionable intervention pathways to overcome systemic barriers in marine technological innovation (Mao et al., 2025). Addressing transition failure requires adjusting specific pathways based on the actual conditions of different countries, especially latecomer nations (LePoire, 2024). Four targeted response strategies are proposed, corresponding to the four types of transition failure: First, to mitigate directional failure, governments should guide the direction of marine innovation based on the urgent needs of national marine development. Priority should be given to supporting marine technological innovation that addresses core domestic challenges (e.g., regional deep-sea resource exploration bottlenecks or coastal ecological protection gaps), ensuring continuity in innovation priorities and stabilizing the trajectory of marine technological advancement. Second, to resolve demand expression failure, the government’s leading role in aligning innovation with market needs should be emphasized. Under government coordination, relevant entities (including research institutions, enterprises, and end-users) should collaborate on key technology R&D, with a focus on solving “bottleneck” technologies that have clear market application value. This collaboration ensures that innovative outcomes are responsive to practical demands, thereby enhancing market acceptance of emerging marine technologies. Third, to overcome policy cooperation failure, interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral, and interdepartmental collaboration mechanisms should be established. These mechanisms aim to integrate the strengths of diverse innovation actors in the marine field—such as universities, research institutes, enterprises, and government agencies—fostering coordinated R&D on key core technologies. This integration addresses issues of overlapping policy goals and scattered resources, consolidating a unified “transformation coalition” for marine technological advancement. Fourth, to address reflective failure, a comprehensive, long-term marine policy evaluation framework should be developed, accompanied by the implementation of flexible and adaptive policy measures. Regular evaluation cycles, feedback channels for frontline implementers, and dynamic adjustment mechanisms should be embedded into the full policy lifecycle, enabling timely corrections to policies and improving their adaptability to evolving marine development needs.

While the transition failure framework provides a core explanation for strengthening the intervention legitimacy of policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities, its application in the maritime domain exhibits significant limitations and struggles to fully capture the complexity of real-world situations. The theory primarily focuses on domestic technological transitions and institutional adaptation, yet it overlooks the inherently geopolitical nature of the marine sector. It fails to incorporate external factors such as the global competition for maritime hegemony, regional power dynamics, and the geoeconomic structures shaped by colonial histories (Lin and Sun, 2025). As a result, it cannot adequately explain why some countries prioritize geopolitical competition over short-term technological efficiency or ecological goals. Moreover, the framework implicitly assumes that countries participate in technological transitions on an equal footing, which contradicts the reality of power asymmetry in global marine science and technology. It does not critically address how early-mover countries establish technological dominance through rule-making, patent monopolies, and other mechanisms, nor does it account for cross-scale interest conflicts, technological ethical disputes, and other multidimensional issues. Consequently, the policy pathways it proposes often struggle to overcome external power barriers and complex value conflicts, limiting its ability to provide a comprehensive explanation of global strategic marine science and technology policies.

In recent years, while the global level of technological innovation has advanced rapidly, the demand for core technologies to support marine development and resource security has grown increasingly urgent (Cormier et al., 2022). Against this backdrop, policy practices focused on addressing marine “bottleneck” technologies have gradually emerged.

In 2021, the United Nations launched the “Ocean Decade” initiative. China responded actively to this international call, participating in global marine technological innovation while aligning its efforts with the goal of building a strong maritime nation. Focusing on key bottlenecks in marine core technologies, China has developed a distinctive set of policies for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities. In terms of policy objectives, China’s core goal is not only to participate in global marine innovation but, more importantly, to carry out research on key marine core technologies and to deeply integrate independently developed breakthroughs in marine “bottleneck” technologies into the global framework for sustainable ocean development.

In terms of policy actors, central government departments are responsible for top-level design and resource coordination, while marine research institutions lead technological research. Leading marine enterprises undertake industrialization tasks, and marine universities provide talent and basic research support.

Regarding policy instruments, China has innovatively adopted research organization models such as “challenge-based bidding” and “horse-race mechanisms.” It has released public lists of key research tasks—for example, in the development of deep-sea manned submersibles—and provided long-term funding for critical technology R&D. Collaborative platforms integrating “industry, academia, research, and application” have also been established.

In terms of policy processes, China employs a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Central authorities decompose overall goals and clarify responsibilities, while institutions such as the National Marine Data and Information Service track progress and monitor indicators. At the same time, grassroots research teams and marine enterprises provide bottom-up feedback on practical challenges and market needs. Every year, expert evaluations are conducted to adjust resource allocation and research priorities, forming a closed-loop management system.

Data show that between 2021 and 2023, China’s total R&D investment in the marine field reached 156 billion yuan, with more than 60% directed toward “bottleneck” technologies such as deep-sea equipment. China’s share of global patents related to deep-sea exploration technology exceeds 25%, placing it among the world leaders.

Overall, these practices have driven achievements such as the “Fendouzhe” (Striver) deep-sea submersible to reach internationally advanced levels, contributing a Chinese approach to global marine science and technology development. They also offer valuable references for latecomer countries seeking to overcome technological bottlenecks and formulate technology-focused policies tailored to their own national contexts.

​ The deployment of maritime military capabilities serves as a fundamental means for maritime powers to secure marine interests, while also acting as a core guarantee for safeguarding national maritime security and upholding maritime rights (Tai and Qiu, 2024).

In January 2017, the U.S. Navy put forward the “Return to Sea Control” strategy and released the document Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control, which stands as a representative case of policies targeting the strengthening maritime power and ensuring global maritime dominance. Led by the U.S. Department of the Navy, the initiative aims to address challenges posed by emerging maritime powers and to secure America’s absolute advantage in global waters.

In terms of policy objectives, the core goals of the U.S. Navy’s Return to Sea Control initiative extend beyond enhancing traditional maritime combat capabilities. They also include advancing the modernization of naval technology and strengthening control over key maritime areas, thereby supporting U.S. leadership in the global economy, technology, and diplomacy.

In terms of policy actors, the U.S. Department of the Navy is responsible for overall planning and implementation, and a dedicated office was established to coordinate and oversee the strategy. Additional participants include various naval warfare commands, the Naval Research Laboratory, defense contractors, and inter-service cooperation units.

Regarding policy instruments, the initiative relies on substantial defense budgets and government procurement. The U.S. Congress has passed a series of appropriation acts, providing ample financial support for naval vessel construction, technological R&D, and personnel training.

In terms of policy processes, the U.S. Department of the Navy adopts a top-down management model, using centralized planning to ensure the consistency of strategic objectives while allowing each operational unit sufficient autonomy through hierarchical organization. During project implementation, the Department of the Navy has established a rigorous accountability mechanism. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) regularly evaluates phased outcomes, and resource allocation and strategic priorities are dynamically adjusted based on these assessments.

According to available data, between 2017 and 2023, U.S. Navy investment in maritime military technology R&D reached a cumulative total of 128 billion U.S. dollars, with annual growth of 15% in core technology areas such as unmanned combat systems and advanced ship propulsion. Patent applications related to unmanned vessels and maritime communication technologies reached 1,890, accounting for 31% of the global total, and the intensity of U.S. military presence in key maritime areas has increased significantly.

These practices demonstrate that by concentrating resources to advance naval technological modernization and enhance operational capabilities, the United States has developed a model that offers insights for global maritime security policy-making. In particular, it provides valuable lessons for latecomer countries with maritime security needs, helping them to integrate military and technological resources and to establish efficient policy implementation and evaluation mechanisms.

Deep-sea resource development is not only a critical pathway to overcoming resource constraints but also a strategic opportunity for developing countries to catch up in marine science, technology, and industry (Marlow et al., 2022).

Against the backdrop of intensifying global competition in marine resource exploitation, Japan—a pioneer in this field—has launched its Marine Energy and Mineral Resources Development Plan, which is explicitly designed to address the challenges of deep-sea resource development. This plan, driven by the new round of technological revolution, is a major national strategy and a representative case of policies aimed at industrial catch-up and technological innovation.

In terms of policy objectives, Japan’s overall goal is to achieve parity or even surpass international leaders in deep-sea resource development, while also setting quantifiable, time-bound milestones. The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI)’s Marine Energy and Mineral Resources Development Plan (2020–2035) stipulates that by 2030, Japan’s deep-sea resource development technologies should reach an internationally advanced level, and commercial exploitation of deep-sea mineral resources should be realized.

In terms of policy actors, METI and the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC) are responsible for formulating and organizing the plan, while the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) serves as the primary implementing body.

Regarding policy instruments, Japan has established several interministerial coordination mechanisms, such as the Liaison Conference for the Promotion of Ocean Science and Technology Development, which is chaired by the Chief Cabinet Secretary and includes officials from 14 ministries. This structure ensures comprehensive coordination and facilitates the advancement of marine development technologies.

In terms of policy processes, Japan’s deep-sea resource development plan exhibits a strong top-down character. The central government acts as the core decision-maker, guiding the formulation and implementation of the strategy. At the same time, local governments, enterprises, research institutions, and universities have actively responded to central government initiatives, gradually becoming important participants in deep-sea resource development and contributing to practical applications and research in this field.

Relevant data show that between 2020 and 2023, Japan’s cumulative R&D investment in deep-sea resource development reached 2.3 trillion yen, accounting for 41% of total investment in the marine industry. More than 80% of this funding was allocated to key technologies such as deep-sea rare earth exploration and methane hydrate extraction. Japan filed 860 patents related to deep-sea mineral exploration technologies and expects to achieve commercial exploitation by 2030, with an annual production capacity of 12,000 tons—sufficient to meet 30% of Japan’s domestic rare earth demand.

For developing countries, deep-sea resource development needs to be promoted in a phased manner that aligns with their own resource endowments and technological capabilities. This approach can turn deep-sea development into a strategic window for overcoming resource constraints and achieving catch-up in marine science, technology, and industry, while avoiding inefficient or wasteful investment.

Against the backdrop of global low-carbon transitions and industrial upgrading, the marine industry—with its dual economic potential and ecological value—has become a key focus for countries seeking to foster new growth engines. As a result, policy practices centered on promoting the innovation and upgrading of the marine industry have gradually taken shape (Sun et al., 2024).

The European Union launched its “Blue Growth Strategy” in 2012, which was further upgraded in 2021 in alignment with the European Green Deal. This has formed a policy framework for marine industry development driven by innovation and low-carbon transition, making it a representative case of how developed economies promote the coordinated upgrading of their marine sectors. In terms of policy objectives, the core aim is to unlock the potential of the blue economy, advance emerging industries such as marine renewable energy and marine biotechnology, and achieve synergies between economic growth and ecological protection.

In terms of policy actors, the European Commission takes the lead in top-level design and goal coordination, while member states are responsible for implementing policies tailored to their specific maritime advantages. Specialized bodies such as the European Multidisciplinary Seafloor and Water-column Observatory (EMSO) and the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) provide technical support. Meanwhile, multinational enterprises including Siemens Gamesa and research institutions such as the Netherlands Institute for Sea Research (NIOZ) participate in technology development and technology transfer, forming a multi-actor collaborative network.

Regarding policy instruments, the EU leverages funding from the Horizon Europe program to provide dedicated financial support, uses carbon pricing mechanisms to guide low-carbon industrial transitions, and offers green patent incentives to encourage technological innovation. It has also established cross-border research platforms such as Euro Sea to facilitate resource sharing and collaborative research.

In terms of policy processes, the EU adopts a dual synergy model of “EU-level coordination + national-level implementation.” The EU formulates unified technical standards, ecological conservation red lines, and industrial development guidelines, while member states develop differentiated implementation rules based on the resource endowments of regions such as the North Sea and the Mediterranean. Every three years, the European Commission publishes a “Blue Economy Progress Report” to conduct dynamic evaluations and adjust resource allocation and policy priorities accordingly.

Relevant data show that between 2012 and 2023, the EU invested more than 35 billion euros in marine research and development, with 75% allocated to emerging fields such as marine renewable energy and marine biotechnology. From 2018 to 2023, the EU filed 1,243 patents in marine biotechnology, accounting for 31% of the global total, and its share of global offshore wind power technology patents exceeded 40%. In 2022, the EU’s blue economy added value reached 860 billion euros, with contributions from emerging marine industries increasing by 180% compared to 2012, and cumulative carbon emissions reductions reaching 120 million tons.

These practices demonstrate that through the dual drivers of technological and institutional innovation, the EU has developed a model that supports the high-quality development of the global marine industry. In particular, it offers valuable lessons for latecomer countries with a certain industrial foundation, helping them to cultivate emerging marine industries while balancing economic development and ecological protection.

For regions rich in marine resources but constrained by weak governance capacity, strengthening maritime governance and protection, as well as enhancing regional coordination, has become a key approach to addressing maritime security threats and ecological crises.

The African Union (AU) adopted its “2050 Integrated Maritime Strategy” in 2014 and revised it in 2022, focusing on regional maritime security, ecological protection, and governance capacity building. This makes it a representative case of how low-income countries can improve maritime governance through regional collaboration. In terms of policy objectives, the core aim is to tackle the multiple challenges of maritime security, resource exploitation, and ecological protection through coordinated regional action.

In terms of policy actors, the AU Commission takes the lead in designing the overall framework, while the AU Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) is responsible for cross-regional coordination. National maritime and fisheries authorities of member states implement policies at the country level, and international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) provide financial, technical, and training support. Together, they form a top-down “regional–national–international” governance system.

Regarding policy instruments, the AU has established regional marine research funds to support the development of practical technologies. It has also built technology transfer platforms in cooperation with the EU and China to provide training in marine observation, ecological restoration, and other key areas.

In terms of policy processes, the AU formulates unified regional rules for maritime governance, frameworks for security cooperation, and standards for ecological protection. Member states then develop specific implementation plans based on their own marine resources and governance capacities, and leverage international funding and technical support to address capacity gaps. Every five years, a regional assessment of maritime governance capacity is conducted to optimize policy implementation pathways.

These policies have achieved notable results. Between 2014 and 2023, Africa’s cumulative investment in marine research and development reached approximately 4.5 billion euros, 60% of which came from international assistance. Eighty percent of this funding was allocated to practical technology areas such as coastal observation, sustainable fisheries development, and ecological restoration. From 2018 to 2023, Africa filed 187 patents in the marine field, mainly in practical domains such as fisheries technology and coastal observation equipment, with a patent conversion rate of 42%.

Such practices demonstrate how regional coordination and international cooperation can help address governance deficits. They provide valuable lessons for latecomer regions seeking to improve maritime governance and protection, particularly resource-rich but governance-weak regions such as Africa and Southeast Asia, offering insights into balancing resource development, security, and ecological conservation.

Although this study has constructed an analytical framework for policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities and has conducted case and theoretical analyses, it still has several limitations that leave room for future expansion. First, while the case selection covers multiple regions and development stages, it remains insufficiently representative of policy practices in South America, Oceania, and other regions. Future research could expand the scope of cases to enhance the global applicability of the findings. Second, the quantitative analysis focuses primarily on explicit indicators such as R&D investment and patent counts, and does not adequately measure the long-term social and ecological benefits of policies. Subsequent studies could develop a more comprehensive, multidimensional indicator system to deepen quantitative research in this area. Third, the theoretical framework relies mainly on the transition failure perspective and does not sufficiently integrate interdisciplinary insights from geopolitics, power structures, and other fields. Future work could incorporate multiple theoretical lenses to enrich the interpretation of strategic marine science and technology policies. Finally, this study focuses on existing policies and practices, and offers limited discussion of policy evolution driven by technological change and adjustments in international rules. Future research could adopt a more forward-looking approach by analyzing the implications of emerging technologies for marine strategic science and technology governance.