AUTHOR=Xue Lin , He Wei 

TITLE=Evolutionary game analysis and regulatory countermeasure research on ship emission supervision

JOURNAL=Frontiers in Marine Science

VOLUME=Volume 12 - 2025

YEAR=2025

URL=https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/marine-science/articles/10.3389/fmars.2025.1702961

DOI=10.3389/fmars.2025.1702961

ISSN=2296-7745

ABSTRACT=Ship emission supervision is an important component of the development of green shipping. During the implementation of policies in the pollutant emission control areas of ships, in response to the bottlenecks in regulatory manpower, technology, and cost, a tripartite evolutionary game model was constructed between maritime authorities, shipping companies, and third-party technical service agencies. The evolutionary stability of each participant’s strategy selection was analyzed, and the impact of each factor on the choice of the tripartite strategy was explored. Furthermore, the stability of the equilibrium point in the tripartite game system was analyzed. The research results indicate that the strategic choices of three parties in the ship emission monitoring system show a high degree of correlation and dynamic evolution. Enhancing the level of rewards and punishments by maritime authorities can help promote the introduction of emission reduction technologies by shipping companies and the standardized behavior of third-party technical service agencies refusing rent-seeking; however, increasing the intensity of rewards will not be conducive to the maritime authorities fulfilling their regulatory responsibilities. The maritime authorities must establish a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism that meets the condition that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is greater than their speculative gains in order to ensure the supply of “active emission reduction” projects in an evolving and stable market environment. The possibility of third-party technical service agencies providing fair services is constrained by various factors. The administrative accountability of maritime authorities for the dereliction of duty by higher-level governments is of great significance in enhancing the robustness of shipping companies’ proactive emission reduction efforts. Improving the operational revenue of shipping companies’ proactive emission reduction and increasing the cost of their willingness to flexibly seek cooperation are also effective ways to avoid their passive coping. Therefore, it is suggested that the local government should promote the monitoring and supervision of ship emissions from four aspects: strengthening resource investment in marine monitoring and supervision, upgrading monitoring and supervision technology in ship air pollutant emission control areas, establishing a long-term incentive mechanism for the green development of shipping companies, and actively establishing a dynamic performance evaluation mechanism involving multiple stakeholders.