Front. Energy Res. Frontiers in Energy Research Front. Energy Res. 2296-598X Frontiers Media S.A. 1267579 10.3389/fenrg.2023.1267579 Energy Research Original Research RETRACTED: A novel framework for photovoltaic energy optimization based on supply–demand constraints Sun et al. 10.3389/fenrg.2023.1267579 Sun Yaoqiang 1 Liu Nan 2 * Khan Imran 3 4 Park Youn-Cheol 5 * Byun Yung-Cheol 6 * Madsen Dag Øivind 7 * 1 Department of Basic Education and Research, Changchun Sci-Tech University, Changchun, China 2 Basic Department, Jilin College of Technical Education, Changchun, China 3 Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar, Pakistan 4 Islamic University Centre for Scientific Research, The Islamic University, Najaf, Iraq 5 Department of Mechanical Systems Engineering, Jeju National University, Jeju-si, Republic of Korea 6 Department of Computer Engineering, Major of Electronic Engineering, Jeju, Republic of Korea 7 School of Business, University of South-Eastern Norway, Kongsberg, Norway

Edited by: Rui Jing, Xiamen University, China

Reviewed by: Yushuai Li, University of Oslo, Norway

Michael Folsom Toney, University of Colorado Boulder, United States

 *Correspondence: Nan Liu, tong1393254528@sina.com; Youn-Cheol Park, yc.park@jejunu.ac.kr; Yung-Cheol Byun, ycb@jejunu.ac.kr; Dag Øivind Madsen, dag.oivind.madsen@usn.no 29 12 2023 25 05 2026 2023 11 1267579 26 07 2023 24 11 2023 Copyright © 2023 Sun, Liu, Khan, Park, Byun and Madsen. 2023 Sun, Liu, Khan, Park, Byun and Madsen

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Introduction: Distributed power supply has increasingly taken over as the energy industry’s primary development direction as a result of the advancement of new energy technology and energy connectivity technology. In order to build isolated island microgrids, such as villages, islands, and remote mountainous places, the distributed power supply design is frequently employed. Due to government subsidies and declining capital costs, the configured capacity of new energy resources like solar and wind energy has been substantially rising in recent years. However, the new energy sources might lead to a number of significant operational problems, including over-voltage and ongoing swings in the price of power. Additionally, the economic advantages availed by electricity consumers may be impacted by the change in electricity costs and the unpredictability of the output power of renewable energy sources.

Methods: This paper proposes a novel framework for enhancing renewable energy management and reducing the investment constraint of energy storage. First, the energy storage incentive is determined through a bi-level game method. Then, the net incentive of each element is maximized by deploying a master–slave approach. Finally, a reward and punishment strategy is employed to optimize the energy storage in the cluster.

Results: Simulation results show that the proposed framework has better performance under different operating conditions.

Discussion: The energy storage operators and numerous energy storage users can implement master–slave game-based energy storage pricing and capacity optimization techniques to help each party make the best choices possible and realize the multi-subject interests of energy storage leasing supply and demand win–win conditions.

 renewable energy photovoltaic grid station cluster game theory particle swarm optimization section-at-acceptance Solar Energy 1 Introduction

With the continuous improvement in the penetration rate of new energy, the pressure of new energy consumption on the power grid has increased unprecedentedly. Various local power grid companies have issued mandatory assessment policies, stipulating that new and existing grid-connected new energy power stations need to configure energy storage in proportion to capacity, so as to solve the impact of intermittent and random fluctuations of wind and solar output on the power grid (Wang W. et al., 2022; Han et al., 2022; Liu et al., 2022).

Energy storage is a high-cost resource (Khezri et al., 2023a). With the commissioning of independently operated energy storage power stations, the business model of energy storage leasing is gradually favored by the market (Liu et al., 2021). In order to improve the efficiency of assessment and energy storage use, the distribution network implements the centralized assessment of photovoltaic power station clusters connected to adjacent nodes and encourages all power stations to cooperate in leasing energy storage to complete the assessment task of cluster energy storage configuration. Cluster individuals need to take the initiative to undertake their corresponding energy storage allocation tasks in order to achieve collective goals, but the centralized assessment method is easy to facilitate the behavior of selfish individuals in the cluster who are unwilling to bear their responsibilities and expect to take a free ride. In such cases, they will face cluster cooperation difficulties that need to be studied and solved.

The benefit of photovoltaic power station cluster (PPSC) leased energy storage is related to the rental service price of the energy storage power station. In the distribution network, energy storage rental users of energy storage power stations include photovoltaic power station clusters, distribution networks, and large industrial users. In the face of multi-agent energy storage leasing demand, it is necessary to study energy storage leasing prices and leasing capacity optimization strategies to achieve a win–win situation for all parties.

One of the most crucial analyses in power system studies is load flow, which establishes the baseline for subsequent analyses such as contingency analysis, fault analysis, power quality, and stability assessment. For each bus in the power system, the load flow analysis yields steady-state voltage magnitude and phase-angle measurements (Huang Y. et al., 2023).

Experts and scholars at home and abroad have studied the energy storage configuration of new energy power station clusters. Miao M. et al. (2021) constructed an optimal configuration model of wind power cluster hybrid energy storage capacity to stabilize wind power fluctuations and improve wind power consumption. In order to reduce the impact of wind power output fluctuations on the grid frequency and improve the dispatchability of wind power, Naemi et al. (2022) conducted research on the optimal configuration of hybrid energy storage. Alan et al. (2023) established a model with the highest electricity sales income of the wind power cluster joint energy storage system as the optimization goal and obtained the optimal energy storage power and capacity configuration scheme of the wind power cluster. Hu et al. (2019) proposed a convex optimization scheme based on network source joint planning for the network source storage planning problem considering the static division of clusters. The above literature takes the new energy power station cluster as a whole and studies the optimal configuration and planning of energy storage but do not consider the irrational game behavior of individuals in the cluster.

Xie et al. (2022a) and Shu et al. (2022) aimed at coordinating multiple wind-storage joint systems and user energy storage sharing in the community and proposed a group benefit distribution strategy based on the Shapley value. However, in the centralized assessment scenario of photovoltaic power station cluster energy storage configuration, the income of individual on-grid electricity is settled by the distribution network according to the measurement data of photovoltaic power stations, and there is no profit distribution among individuals. Therefore, the traditional cooperative game based on the Shapely value method cannot be used. The public goods game should be used to study the problem of cooperation dilemmas.

For the energy storage leasing business model, Yuan et al. (2023) established a battery leasing model in order to reduce the purchase cost of electric vehicles and achieved a win–win situation for both electric vehicle manufacturers and customers by optimizing the leasing price. Based on the sharing economy, Zhong et al. (2020) proposed an energy bank model for community household users, which concentrates energy storage in the region and obtains rent by providing leasing services. Ramos et al. (2022) proposed a leasing operation mode of “who benefits, who pays” for the megawatt-scale battery energy storage system of the distribution network but did not study the energy storage leasing pricing strategy. Sun et al. (2020) revealed that in order to support customers to increase profits, battery sales companies adopt the strategy of sharing and leasing. However, users lease energy storage mainly to earn electricity price difference in the electricity spot market and participate in the ancillary service market to obtain income. The energy storage leasing business model and its optimal pricing model in the above literature provide an important theoretical basis for the research on the optimal pricing strategy of the distribution network-side energy storage supply and demand game in this paper. Li et al. (2018) proposed a novel approach for distributed power. It is based on an event-triggered-based distributed cooperative strategy. By successfully converting various system coordinates, the day-ahead and real-time energy management models are constructed and formulated as a type of a distributed coupled optimization problem. In terms of the optimal allocation of energy storage capacity for existing distributed photovoltaics, Rodrigues et al. (2020) optimized the capacity allocation of distributed energy storage and centralized energy storage in communities of photovoltaic producers and sellers based on internal supply and demand ratio pricing. Huang P. et al. (2021) established a two-stage energy storage capacity optimization allocation method to solve the problem of excessive energy storage capacity allocated by photovoltaic manufacturers and sellers alone. In terms of collaborative planning of distributed photovoltaics and energy storage, Li and Cai (2021) used the load shortage rate as an indicator and considered local irradiance and ambient temperature to optimize the allocation of photovoltaic storage capacity in independent photovoltaic systems. Hernandez et al. (2019) determined the optimal capacity configuration of photovoltaics and energy storage through economic indicators based on the evaluation of the aging mechanism of photovoltaics and energy storage. The above literature takes the photovoltaic producer and marketer community as the research object and examines the optimal allocation of distributed photovoltaic and energy storage capacity in the producer and marketer community. Among them, energy storage is used as a passive dispatching unit and cannot reflect the independent decision-making ability of energy storage. Moreover, the energy storage is mainly configured independently for photovoltaic producers and sellers, with high investment costs and low utilization rates. To this end, it is urgent to study new operating models that improve the flexibility and economy of energy storage.

The shared energy storage takes advantage of its scale, the spatiotemporal complementarity of different users’ energy storage needs, and time-sharing multiplexing to effectively improve the flexibility and economy of energy storage (Sekizaki et al., 2023). Xie et al. (2022b) proposed a method of applying shared energy storage on the power generation side to improve the flexibility and economy of energy storage resources in each wind farm through the sharing of energy storage. Kalathil et al. (2019) considered the sharing economy as the starting point, discussed the sharing of energy storage resources in the spot market, and established a general model of shared energy storage through a non-cooperative game method. Kumar and Palanisamy (2022) applied overbooking operation strategies in aviation and other fields to establish a joint operation model of community-distributed photovoltaics and energy storage under the sharing mode, thereby improving the utilization of energy storage resources and the economical electricity consumption of users in the community. Khezri et al. (2023b) proposed a dual-layer energy storage configuration and operation method that takes into account the investment benefits of users and energy storage suppliers in a sharing scenario and improves the flexibility of energy storage resource utilization through capacity leasing. Introducing shared energy storage as an independent decision-making subject into the optimal allocation of optical storage capacity within the community of producers and sellers can improve the utilization rate of distributed photovoltaics and shared energy storage and reduce the investment costs of producers and sellers. However, with the increase in the types of producers and sellers within the photovoltaic producer and marketer community, when each participant participates in the investment planning of distributed photovoltaics and shared energy storage as independent decision-making entities, the interaction of interests of different investment entities is important for the optimal allocation of optical storage capacity. To this end, it is urgent to study collaborative planning methods for distributed photovoltaics and shared energy storage that take into account the interests of multiple parties.

Based on the above discussion, in order to solve the dilemma of PV power station clusters’ energy storage allocation and the multi-stakeholder energy storage leasing optimization problem of distribution networks, this paper establishes a two-layer game optimization mathematical model for PPSC energy storage leasing.

The main contributions are as follows:

• Establishing the upper master–slave game leader energy storage operator optimization model and the follower industrial user and distribution network optimization model.

• Establishing the lower PV power station cluster threshold according to the threshold public goods evolution game PV power station cluster energy storage leasing strategy.

• Deducing the minimum penalty limit ratio that promotes the critical achievement of photovoltaic (PV) power station cluster energy storage capacity assessment goals by the value public goods evolutionary game model.

• Using the two-layer game method to help the participants make energy storage lease pricing and lease capacity optimization decisions, and using the particle swarm optimization (PSO) and Runge–Kutta algorithms to solve the two-layer game model.

Through the example simulation, the influence of energy storage rental price, photovoltaic power plant scale, and reward and punishment measures on whether the PV power station cluster energy storage assessment capacity can be achieved is discussed. It also analyzes the influence of different energy storage lease demand models on optimal lease pricing with changes in weather and load and verifies the correctness of the model and the effectiveness of the proposed method.

 2 Two-layer game structure of photovoltaic power station cluster energy storage leasing 2.1 Distribution network structure with photovoltaic power station clusters

Figure 1 shows the distribution network system architecture including the photovoltaic power plant cluster. Large industrial users and distribution networks rent energy storage from the energy storage station to meet their own needs. The distribution network implements a mandatory centralized assessment of energy storage configuration for this architecture. By leasing energy storage, photovoltaic power plants can complete the energy storage configuration assessment task. Industrial users can reduce the maximum electricity charge, and the distribution network can reduce the peak load and obtain the benefits of delaying the upgrading of the power grid. Energy storage operators obtain income by leasing their energy storage for rent and participating in grid peak-shaving auxiliary services.

Proposed power distribution network architecture.

 2.2 Two-layer game framework for photovoltaic power station cluster energy storage leasing

Figure 2 is the framework of a two-tier game optimization model for energy storage leasing supply and demand multi-stakeholders. The upper layer is a master–slave game, with the energy storage operator as the leader and the photovoltaic power station cluster, industrial users, and distribution network as the followers to build a master–slave game model, to realize the optimization of energy storage lease price and lease capacity. The lower layer is the threshold public goods evolution game within the photovoltaic power station cluster, which is nested in the follower–slave model of the upper-layer master–slave game to achieve the assessment goal of the photovoltaic cluster energy storage configuration.

Proposed energy storage leasing architecture based on the game strategy.

 3 Two-layer game model of photovoltaic power station cluster energy storage leasing 3.1 Upper-layer master–slave game optimization model

The upper-level master–slave game model includes the leader energy storage operator optimization model and the follower industrial user and distribution network energy storage lease optimization model.

3.1.1 Energy storage operator optimization model

In this paper, the energy storage power station mainly adopts the business model of on-demand, day-by-day leasing services and participation in grid peak-shaving auxiliary services. Energy storage operators aim to maximize the net income F bat . F bat = F 1 + F 2 − F tz / y . 365 , F 1 = L r R 1 + R 2 + R 3 , F 2 = R 4 L tf + L f η R 4 − L g R 4 / η , R n = R 1 + R 2 + R 3 + R 4 , R n ≤ R N ,

where F 1 is the income of energy storage all-day leasing service, and F 2 is the income from peak-shaving auxiliary services (Li et al., 2018; Rodrigues et al., 2020), which is determined by the compensation income and the income from the price difference between low storage and high release. F tz is the total cost of the whole life cycle of the energy storage power station (Huang P. et al., 2021); y is the number of life cycles; L r is the rental price per unit energy storage capacity; R 1 leases energy storage capacity for the photovoltaic cluster; R 2 leases energy storage capacity for industrial users; R 3 is the leased energy storage capacity of the distribution network; R 4 is the capacity of ancillary services participating in peak shaving throughout the day; L tf subsidizes prices for grid peak-shaving ancillary services; η is the energy storage charge and discharge efficiency; L f is the peak electricity price; L g is the electricity price in valley hours; R n is the total capacity of the energy storage power station; and R N is the rated capacity of the energy storage power station.

 3.1.2 Industrial user optimization model

Industrial users establish an optimization model with the objective function of maximizing the rental energy storage income. Electricity charges for industrial users include electricity charges per kilowatt-hour and monthly maximum load demand electricity charges (Li and Cai, 2021). To reduce the monthly maximum load demand electricity bill, by renting energy storage, the stored electric energy is released during the low-peak period to reduce the maximum demand of industrial users (Hernandez et al., 2019) and obtain the arbitrage of low storage and high discharge, as shown in Figure 3.

Power demand reduction of maximum load of users.

The income model of industrial user leasing energy storage is as follows: F 1 d = F fg + F xl / 30 − L r R 2 , F fg = L f η R 2 − L g R 2 / η , F xl = L xl P r 2 , R 2 = ∑ t = 1 24 max 0 , P ld t − max P ld t − P r 2 ∆ t , max P ld t − P r 2 ≥ P T 1 ,

where F ld is the net income of leased energy storage, F fg is the peak–valley arbitrage income, and F xl is the reduction in monthly maximum load demand electricity charges. L xl is the electricity cost per unit demand per month, and P ld t is the industrial load value at the t th hour. P r 2 is the maximum discharge power of the leased energy storage during the peak period, and P T 1 is the lower bound of the maximum demand of industrial users.

 3.1.3 Distribution network optimization model

The optimization model of the distribution network is established with the objective function of maximizing the net income of energy storage leasing. With the increase in load and the large number of electric vehicles connected, the power distribution transformers in some areas are heavily overloaded during the peak period of electricity consumption during holidays (Wang H. et al., 2022). In order to ensure the reliability of the power supply, the power grid company needs to carry out power grid transformation; however, the investment is large, and the time is long. It is not economical to solve the power supply problems in special periods such as few days and short time through distribution network transformation. Therefore, it is simple and efficient to rent energy storage, which can effectively delay the upgrading of the distribution network and reduce the risk of load shedding.

Distribution network leasing energy storage cuts peak loads and delays grid upgrades. The schematic diagram is shown in Figure 4. Considering that the daily load of electric vehicles is greater than the regular daily load (including industrial loads) during the peak period of electricity consumption, the demand for power distribution is aggravated (Jiang et al., 2022; Zhang Z. et al., 2023). The leased energy storage of the distribution network stores electric energy during the off-peak period to support its peak load.

Illustration of peak load reduction in daily forecasting with discharge.

If the number of heavy overload days of the distribution network in a year is N d , the net income model of the distribution network energy storage lease is calculated as follows: F w = C e 1 − e − α 0 ∆ N d ∆ N d N d − L r R 3 , ∆ N d = log 1 + δ log 1 + ω , δ = P t 3 max P L t , R 3 = ∑ t = 1 24 max 0 , P L t − max P L t − P t 3 ∆ t , P L t = P LD t − 1 − β % τ ∑ i = 1 N P pv i , t − ∆ P bat t , ∆ P bat t = P ld t − max P ld t + P r 2 + P kz t , max P L t − P r 3 ≥ P T 2 ,

where C e is the cost of upgrading and transforming the distribution network; α 0 is the benchmark interest rate; and ∆ N d is the number of years for delaying upgrading and transformation (Sekizaki et al., 2023). δ is the peak-shaving rate achieved after renting energy storage; ω is the annual growth rate of load; P L t is the net load of the distribution network at time t during the peak period; P r 3 is the maximum discharge power of the energy storage leased by the distribution network during the peak period; P LD t is the actual load at time t ; τ configures the assessment penalty state coefficient for the energy storage of the photovoltaic power station (Min et al., 2023). When τ = 0 , the assessment passes, and all photovoltaic output is allowed to be connected to the grid, β % . When τ = 1 , the output is the sum of the leased energy storage discharge power of photovoltaic power plants and industrial loads; ∆ P bat t is the sum of the leased energy storage discharge power of photovoltaic power plants and industrial loads (Liu et al., 2023a); P kz t is the discharge power of PPSC energy storage; and P T 2 is the peak load reduction height of the distribution network.

 3.2 The lower-threshold public goods evolutionary game model

In order to solve the energy storage leasing cooperation dilemma caused by the selfish individual’s betrayal behavior in the photovoltaic cluster, an energy storage leasing strategy based on the threshold public goods evolution game is proposed, and a follower photovoltaic cluster threshold public goods evolution game model is established based on this strategy.

3.2.1 Description

The evolutionary game of public goods refers to obtaining the maximum group benefit through the cooperative investment of all individuals and then forming the maximum individual benefit (Xie et al., 2022b). In the threshold public goods game (TPGG) group, the sum of individual cooperator’s investment needs to reach the threshold; otherwise, the public goods cannot be generated (Liu et al., 2023b; Han et al., 2023). Since there are selfish betrayers in the group, they will choose not to cooperate as their best policy. The conflict between the “betrayal” individual optimal strategy and group optimal strategy, that is, social dilemma (Kalathil et al., 2019; Kumar and Palanisamy, 2022), is the key problem to be solved by TPGG.

The photovoltaic cluster individuals lease energy storage capacity from energy storage power stations and pay lease fees, and the distribution network assesses the total energy storage lease capacity of the photovoltaic cluster. Individuals in the cluster mainly consider the group evolution process under two pure strategies (Guo M. et al., 2023; Khezri et al., 2023b), namely, the energy storage leasing strategy (cooperator) and the non-renting strategy (betrayer). Suppose there are N photovoltaic power plants in the cluster, the number of partners is n and the set of partners is Ω n . The number of traitors is N − n , and the set of traitors is Ω N − n .

α % is defined as the ratio (threshold) of the energy storage capacity to the rated power of the photovoltaic power station that meets the assessment requirements, that is, the target of the energy storage allocation capacity assessment that PPSC needs to complete. γ % is the ratio of the partner’s individual leased energy storage capacity to its rated power (Jiang et al., 2023; Mo and Yang, 2023). m is the threshold number of collaborators corresponding to when the total capacity threshold of the cluster energy storage is reached, as shown in formula (17), and round ()+ means rounding up. m = round N α % γ % .

When the total capacity reaches the energy storage configuration assessment requirements (threshold), that is, m ≤ n ≤ N , all photovoltaic power plants in the cluster are allowed to go online and return the energy storage rental incentives exceeding the quota n − m (Wu et al., 2022).

When the total capacity of the energy storage leased by the cluster does not meet the assessment requirements, that is, 0 ≤ n ≤ m , β % of the electric energy of each photovoltaic power station is restricted to be connected to the grid (Lu C. et al., 2022).

Under the above reward and punishment measures, the threshold public goods evolution game of cooperation and defection is carried out within the PPSC (Huang S. et al., 2021; Ma et al., 2023). Assuming that x and y are the proportions of cooperators and defectors, then x + y = 1 . If the income of the cooperator is U x and the income of the defector is U x , then the expected average income of the group is U ¯ = x U x + y U y .

In the process of the evolutionary game, individuals adjust their strategies through continuous learning and evolution, and the dynamic equation of game evolution replication (Falabretti et al., 2022) is F x = d x d t = x U x − U ¯ .

When F x = 0 , all individuals tend to a stable strategy and reach evolutionary equilibrium.

 3.2.2 Photovoltaic threshold public goods evolutionary game model

Let P pv i , t be the output of photovoltaic power station i in period t (the time segment is 1 h) (Li et al., 2023), k i be the per unit value of the whole-day power generation of power station i , and rated power P N i be the reference value, then k i is given as k i = ∑ t = 1 24 P pv i , t P N i .

According to the photovoltaic cluster threshold public goods evolutionary game strategy, the unit power net income B ^ C i , n and B ^ D i , n of the cooperators and defectors in the cluster are shown in formula (21) and formula (22), respectively. B ^ C i , n = k i L d − γ % L r + n − m n γ % L r , m ≤ n ≤ N , 1 − β % k i L d − γ % L r , 0 < n < m , B ^ D i , n = k i L d , m ≤ n ≤ N , 1 − β % k i L d , 0 < n < m .  

Here, L d is the photovoltaic on-grid benchmark electricity price. Assuming that the same area has the same sunlight and temperature and the output characteristics of photovoltaic power stations are the same, then the k -value of each photovoltaic power station is the same (Huang X. et al., 2023; Luo et al., 2023).

For a designated cooperator, the probability of j other cooperators and N − 1 − j defectors forming a group of N people is a binomial distribution N − 1 j x j y N − 1 − j , defined by the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function (Chen et al., 2022), and ∑ j = 0 N − 1 N − 1 j x j 1 − x N − 1 − j = 1 (Li et al., 2021; Liao et al., 2022). The unit electricity income expectations of the cooperator and the defector are shown in formula (23) and formula (24), respectively. F C = ∑ j = 0 N − 1 N − 1 j x j 1 − x N − 1 − j B ^ C j + 1 = k L d − γ % L r m n ∑ j = m − 1 N − 1 N − 1 j x j 1 − x N − 1 − j − β % k L d + γ % L r ∑ j = 0 m − 2 N − 1 j x j 1 − x N − 1 − j , F D = ∑ j = 0 N − 1 N − 1 j x j 1 − x N − 1 − j B ^ D j = k L d − β k L d ∑ j = 0 m − 1 N − 1 j x j 1 − x N − 1 − j .

The dynamic differential equation for the proportional evolution of cooperators and defectors is x ˙ = x F C − F ¯ , y ˙ = y F D − F ¯ . Here, F ¯ is the expected mean value of the individual unit power net income in the cluster: F ¯ = x F C + y F D .

The dynamic evolution differential equation of the proportion of collaborators is x ˙ = x 1 − x F C − F D = x 1 − x β % k L d N − 1 m − 1 x m − 1 1 − x N − m − γ % L r ∑ j = 0 m − 2 N − 1 j x j 1 − x N − 1 − j − γ % L r m n ∑ j = m − 1 N − 1 N − 1 j x j 1 − x N − 1 − j .

When the bracketed items in formula (28) are zero, i.e., x ˙ = 0 , the evolutionary game reaches a stable equilibrium (Zoest et al., 2021). If the number n of collaborators is equal to the threshold number m , then the energy storage capacity of the photovoltaic cluster reaches a critical state, and the ratio of collaborators is x LJ = m / N (Cao et al., 2021; Liang et al., 2023), which can be obtained as the minimum penalty to promote the achievement of photovoltaic energy storage capacity and limit the proportion of photovoltaic power grid connection β min : β min = γ % L r k L d N − 1 m − 1 m N m − 1 N − m N N − m .

Equation 29 can provide the reference and basis for the distribution network to formulate the punishment and restriction measures. According to the stable equilibrium solution formula (A8) in the Supplementary Material, when the incentive return measures are not considered, the stable equilibrium solution of the cooperator ratio is given as x eq * = m − 1 N − 1 + 2 m − 1 N − m N − 1 3 1 − γ % L r β % k L d N − 1 m − 1 . N − 1 N − 1 m − 1 m − 1 N − m N − m .

Through the analysis of the influence of each parameter in formula (30) on the stable equilibrium solution x eq * of the cooperator ratio, it can be seen that the cooperator ratio decreases with the increase in the lease price L r , increases with the increase in the penalty restriction ratio β % , and decreases with the increase in the cluster size N (Deng et al., 2023).

When the photovoltaic threshold public goods game reaches an evolutionary stable equilibrium, the partner ratio x can be obtained (Li P. et al., 2022), and the total energy storage capacity R 1 leased by the photovoltaic cluster when the energy storage lease price is L r can be obtained according to formula (31). R 1 = x N P ¯ N γ % .

4 Pricing optimization and model solution of energy storage lease based on the double-layer game 4.1 Pricing optimization of energy storage leasing based on the two-layer game

In the two-layer game shown in Figure 2, the leader energy storage operator formulates the energy storage lease price L r and distributes it to each follower, and the follower PPSC conducts the group threshold public goods evolution game according to the lease price and obtains the leased capacity R 1 when the evolution is stable and balanced. Follower industrial users and the distribution network, respectively, make decisions on leased capacity R 2 and R 3 according to their respective optimal target responses L r and return them to the leader (Zhang et al., 2023b; Zhang et al., 2023c). The energy storage operator adjusts L r according to the total leased capacity returned by the lower layer to maximize its comprehensive income. The game interaction between the leader and the follower is iterated until each subject no longer changes the strategy and reaches equilibrium. The leader’s energy storage lease pricing and the follower’s energy storage lease capacity optimization strategy L r * , R r * , R 2 * , and   R 3 * are obtained, as shown in formulas (32–34): L r * = arg max L r * F bat L r , R 1 * , R 2 * , R 3 * , R 2 * = arg max R 2 F ld L r * , R 1 * , R 2 , R 3 * , R 3 * = arg max R 3 F w L r , R 1 * , R 2 * , R 3 ,

where F bat , F ld , and F w are the net income objective functions of energy storage operators, industrial users, and distribution network shown in formulas (1), (5), and (10), respectively; L r * is the optimal lease price of the energy storage operator at the Nash equilibrium point of the master–slave game; R 1 * is the energy storage lease capacity of the cluster when the distribution network implements energy storage allocation assessment rewards and punishment measures for the photovoltaic power station cluster (Lin et al., 2023a); L r * is the energy storage lease price, which is obtained from the lower-level photovoltaic cluster threshold public goods evolution game; and R 2 * and R 3 * are the optimal leased energy storage capacity of industrial users and distribution network at the equilibrium point, respectively. At the Nash equilibrium point, the game leader energy storage operator cannot obtain higher returns by unilaterally changing the lease price (Lin et al., 2023b). The game follower photovoltaic power station clusters, industrial users, and distribution network cannot increase their respective incomes by unilaterally adjusting the leased capacity.

 4.2 Game model solution

This paper proves the unique existence of the equilibrium solution of the one-master–multi-slave game model and the stable equilibrium solution of the photovoltaic cluster threshold public goods evolution game dynamic differential equation (see Supplementary Material). The particle swarm optimization algorithm is used to solve the master–slave game optimization model, and the Runge–Kutta method is used to solve the evolutionary game differential equation (Zhang et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2023). The solution steps are as follows:

1) Initialization. Data initialization of load or output forecast value of industrial users, distribution network, and photovoltaic power station; energy storage operator rental price L r particle swarm initialization, and the number of iterations is K = 0 .

2) Calculation of R 1 of PPSC. According to L r , the photovoltaic conducts the threshold public goods evolution game, solves the dynamic differential equation to obtain the partner ratio x , and calculates the PPSC energy storage lease capacity R 1 according to formula (31).

3) R 2 calculation for industrial users. According to L r , the particle swarm optimization iteration of industrial user rental capacity is carried out, and the particle fitness is calculated and compared with the individual historical optimal value and group optimal value to obtain the optimal industrial user energy storage rental capacity R 2 (Cai et al., 2022).

4) Calculation of distribution network R 2 . Depending on whether the photovoltaic energy storage lease capacity threshold is reached, the on-grid electricity is calculated, and the net load P L t of the peak period of the distribution network is calculated according to formulas (14) and (15). According to L r and P L t , the distribution network particle swarm iteration is performed to calculate the particle fitness of the energy storage rental capacity of the distribution network (Yang et al., 2023), which is compared and updated with the individual historical optimal value of the particle and the group optimal value, and the optimal energy storage rental capacity R 3 of the distribution network is obtained.

5) Calculation of energy storage operator L r . According to R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 , the energy storage operator particle swarm fitness is calculated, compared with the individual historical optimal value and the optimal value of the group, and the speed and position are updated to obtain the adjusted L r .

6) Convergence judgment. The last step is to determine whether the iteration termination condition or the maximum number of iterations is reached. If the convergence accuracy or the maximum number of iterations is reached, the iteration is terminated, and the optimal lease price and the energy storage capacity leased by each stakeholder are output. Otherwise, the lease price of the energy storage operator is returned to step 2 for the next iteration.

5 Case analysis

Using the double-layer game model in this paper, the TPGG results of the photovoltaic cluster and the influence of parameter changes are analyzed through examples (Guo R. et al., 2023), and the impact of energy storage user demand changes on energy storage lease pricing and user benefits is analyzed to verify the correctness of the model and the effectiveness of the method.

5.1 Calculation parameters

Taking the 35-kV distribution network in a certain area of my country as an example, the simulation analysis is carried out. The energy storage power station and the photovoltaic power station cluster are connected to the 35-kV bus (Wan et al., 2023). The industrial load curve and the distribution network load curve are shown in Figures 3, 4. Distribution transformers with a load rate exceeding 80% are considered heavy loads, and the annual heavy overload time is 90 days. ω is 5%, and α 0 is 8% (Miao Z. et al., 2021). The rated power and capacity of the energy storage power station are 1 MW and 2 MW h, respectively, and η is 95%. L d is 0.065 USD, L xl is 6.68 USD/kW, L f is 0.17 USD, and L g is 0.049 USD. See Rodrigues et al. (2020) and Huang P. et al. (2021) for energy storage construction costs and related parameters for participating in peak-shaving auxiliary services.

 5.2 TPGG result and parameter impact

By comparing whether the cooperation rate x = n / N of the photovoltaic reaches the critical cooperation rate threshold x LJ = m / N , it is judged whether the energy storage configuration assessment capacity of the photovoltaic cluster is achieved (Liu X. et al., 2023). The impact of energy storage leasing price, incentives and punishments, and cluster scale on the cooperation rate, that is, the impact on the achievement of the assessment threshold, is analyzed.

Taking the energy storage configuration assessment threshold α % = 10%, the number of PPSC individuals is 20, and the total rated power is 300 kW, of which photovoltaic power stations 1–5 account for 75 kW, 6–10 account for 80 kW, 11–15 account for 60 kW, and 16–20 account for 85 kW. Considering that the illumination and temperature in the same area do not change much, the output curves of photovoltaic power plants change in the same way. Taking photovoltaic power plant 1 as an example, its power curve is shown in Figure 5.

1) The impact of the energy storage lease price on the cooperation rate

Output power forecasting of power station 1.

When the collaborator’s individual energy storage allocation ratio γ % and distribution network’s restricted photovoltaic power access ratio β % remain unchanged (Lu S. et al., 2022), the impact of changes in energy storage rental price L r on the cooperation rate x is investigated, and the results are shown in Figure 6.

Cooperation rate evaluation of power station under different values of L r .

When γ % = 13% and β % = 34.5%, the cooperation rate threshold x LJ = 80%. It can be seen from Figure 6 that x decreases with the increase in L r . When L r = 3.06 USD/(kW h), x is 79.8%, which is lower than the threshold. When L r = 0.28 USD/(kW·h), x is 82.9%, which is higher than the threshold. When L r is lower, the photovoltaic energy storage leased capacity will have more over-quota. It can be seen that when γ % and β % are constant and when L r is higher, the cooperation rate of photovoltaic is lower, and the energy storage assessment goal is more difficult to achieve, which will cause light curtailment loss under the restriction and punishment measures of the distribution network. When L r is too low, there will be an over-allocation situation, causing this part of the energy storage capacity to be idle and wasted.

2) The impact of punitive restrictions on the cooperation rate

When L r and γ % are constant, the influence of β % change on the cooperation rate x is examined, and the results are shown in Figure 7.

Impact of β on the cooperation rate of power station.

In Figure 7, L r = 0.29 USD/(kW·h), γ % = 13%, x LJ = 80%, and β min % = 33% are calculated according to formula (29). When β % = 32%, x = 0. Due to the failure of the assessment task, 32% of the electricity in the photovoltaic power station will not be connected to the grid or will be abandoned. When β % = β min % , x is 80%, the energy storage assessment task is critically achieved, and the photovoltaic power station will realize full power grid connection. When β % = 50%, x is 87% and there will be excess energy storage capacity. Therefore, when L r and γ % remain unchanged, the smaller the punishment and restrictive measures are, the more unfavorable it is to achieve the cluster energy storage threshold, and the greater the risk of light abandonment. However, when the punitive and restrictive measures are too strong, over-quota energy storage capacity will be generated, resulting in idle energy storage.

3) The impact of reward return measures on the cooperation rate

When L r and β % remain unchanged, the influence of considering and not considering the over-quota incentive return measures on the cooperation rate x is measured, and the results are shown in Figure 8.

Impact of reward return on the cooperation rate of power station.

In Figure 8, β % = 35% and L r = 0.29 USD/(kW·h). It can be seen that the cooperation rate considering the rent reward return of energy storage over-quota capacity is higher than the cooperation rate without reward. It can be seen that the reward return measure can further stimulate the enthusiasm of individual energy storage leasing, which is conducive to promoting the achievement of the photovoltaic cluster energy storage leasing threshold.

4) The impact of the photovoltaic power plant cluster size on the cooperation rate

Taking β % = 35% and L r = 0.29 USD/(kW·h) and considering the incentive return measures, the influence of photovoltaic scale N on the cooperation rate x is analyzed, as shown in Figure 9. It can be seen that as N increases, x decreases, and when N = 30, x decreases to 0. Under the same L r and rewards and punishments, when N increases, x decreases. It can be seen that the larger the scale N of photovoltaic, the more unfavorable it is to achieve the energy storage quota.

Impact of photovoltaic cluster size on the cooperation rate of power station.

 5.3 Analysis of the impact of energy storage user demand changes on energy storage lease pricing and user benefits

With the change in weather and load, the leasing demand of different energy storage users in different periods will change, which will affect the optimal pricing of leasing, the size of user leased energy storage, and user benefits. Using the master–slave game model in this paper, the impact of energy storage user demand changes on energy storage leasing pricing and user benefits is analyzed. The simulation results and analysis are as follows:

1) Mode 1: Only a single subject has energy storage leasing demand, and the results are shown in Figures 10–13.

Comparison of leasing price of the power system under different usage conditions.

Comparison of leasing capacity of the power station under different operation conditions.

Comparison of net income of power station under different operation conditions.

Energy storage operator evaluation under different operation conditions.

When only the distribution network has leasing demand, L r is 0.35 USD/(kW·h), the leased capacity is 239 kW·h, the net income of the distribution network is 16.96 USD/day, and the net income of the energy storage operator is 101.47 USD/day. When only the photovoltaic cluster has leasing demand, L r is 0.30 USD/(kW h), the leased capacity is 150 kW·h, the average individual net income of cooperators in the cluster is 34.61 USD/day, the average individual net income of defectors is 39.06 USD/day, and the net income of energy storage operators is 78.26 USD/day. When only industrial users have leasing needs, L r is 0.23 USD/(kW·h), the leased capacity is 140 kW·h, the net income of industrial users is 11.12 USD/day, and the net income of energy storage operators is 480 yuan/day. From Figures 10–13, it can be seen that in the process of iterative convergence, as the lease price rises, the individual lease capacity decreases, the net income of each lease entity decreases, and the net income of energy storage operators increases until the lease price of energy storage operators and the lease capacity of each lease entity reach a game equilibrium.

2) Mode 2: Photovoltaic power plants have no demand for energy storage leases.

The optimization results when only industrial users and distribution networks participate in energy storage leasing are shown in Table 1. L r is 0.33 USD/(kW h), the net income of energy storage operators is 62.94 USD/day, the net income of peak shaving auxiliary services is 50.23 USD/day, and the total net income of the whole day is 113.17 USD. The number of years to delay the upgrade of the distribution network is 0.7204 years. Comparing mode 2 with mode 1, we can see that the L r of mode 2 is between the L r of the distribution network lease only and industrial user lease only. Comparing the income of mode 2 with that of mode 1, the net income of industrial users decreases, the net income of the distribution network increases, and the net income of energy storage operators increases. Since the L r of mode 2 is lower than that of distribution network leasing only, the net benefit of the distribution network increases compared with mode 1. However, the L r of mode 2 is higher than the L r of only industrial users leasing; therefore, compared with mode 1, the net income of industrial users decreases. In addition, due to the increase in total leased capacity, the storage operator’s net benefit increases compared to distribution-network-only leases and industrial-user-only leases.

3) Mode 3: Industrial users have no demand for energy storage leasing.

Photovoltaic optimization when only industrial users and distribution networks participate in energy storage leasing.

Stakeholder Rental capacity (kW·h) Rental cost (USD/day) Net income (USD/day)
Industrial users 100 33.25 0.38
Distribution network 250.42 83.77 19.24
Energy storage operator 350.42 53.90 113.86

The optimization results when only photovoltaic and distribution network participate are shown in Table 2. L r is 0.30 USD/(kW h), the net income of energy storage operators is 60.18 USD/day, the net income of peak-shaving auxiliary services is 48.40 USD/day, and the total net income of the whole day is 108.58 USD. The number of years to delay upgrading and transformation of the distribution network is 0.7513 years. It can be seen from Table 2 that the average net income of defectors in the photovoltaic cluster is 4.45 USD higher than that of the cooperators. Since the selfish betrayer has no energy storage rental expenditure, the collaborator leases the energy storage to complete the collective assessment goal and obtains the electricity grid income, that is, increases its own income by free riding.

Optimization results when only photovoltaic and the distribution network participate.

Stakeholder Rental capacity (kW·h) Rental cost (USD/day) Net income (USD/day)
Distribution network 261.34 78.74 23.65
Photovoltaic cluster 149.17 44.94 Collaborators: 34.82
Betrayers: 39.30
Energy storage operator 410.51 63.15 109.24

Comparing mode 3 with mode 1, we can see that the L r of mode 3 is between the L r of only distribution network lease and only photovoltaic power plant lease, but it is closer to the optimal price of only photovoltaic power plant lease. From the analysis of the influence of L r on the cooperation rate in Section 5.2, it can be seen that when the lease price is higher than 0.31 USD/(kW·h), the photovoltaic energy storage leasing target is not achieved, part of the electricity of the photovoltaic power station is restricted from being connected to the grid, and the income will be greatly reduced. Therefore, L r is clamped below 0.31 USD/(kW·h). In addition, since the L r of mode 3 is lower than that of distribution network leasing only, the net benefit of the distribution network increases compared with mode 1. However, the L r of mode 3 is basically the same as the L r when only photovoltaic power plants are rented, so the average net income of photovoltaic power plant cooperators and defectors is the same as that of mode 1. Due to the increase in the total leased capacity, the net benefit of the energy storage operator increases compared to distribution-network-only leases and PV-only leases.

4) Mode 4: There is no demand for energy storage leasing in the distribution network.

The optimization results when only the photovoltaic cluster and industrial users participate are shown in Table 3. L r is 0.30 USD/(kW h), the net income of energy storage operators is 35.60 USD/day, the net income of peak-shaving auxiliary services is 53.65 USD/day, and the total net income of the whole day is 89.25 USD. Comparing mode 4 with mode 1, we can see that the L r of mode 4 is between the L r of leasing only for industrial users and leasing only for photovoltaic power plants. Since the L r of mode 4 is higher than that of only industrial users leasing, the net income of industrial users is reduced compared with mode 1. The L r of mode 4 is slightly lower than that of only photovoltaic power plant leasing, and the average net income of photovoltaic power plant partners and defectors is basically the same as that of mode 1. In addition, due to the increase in total leased capacity, the storage operator’s net benefit increases compared to industrial-only leases and photovoltaic-only leases.

5) Mode 5: All stakeholders have energy storage leasing needs.

Optimization results when only photovoltaic and industrial users participate.

Stakeholder Rental capacity (kW·h) Rental cost (USD/day) Net income (USD/day)
Industrial users 100 29.51 4.28
Photovoltaic cluster 152.03 44.86 Collaborators: 34.82
Betrayers: 39.30
Energy storage operator 252.03 38.77 89.25

All stakeholders have energy storage leasing demand optimization results as shown in Table 4. When all stakeholders participate in energy storage leasing, L r is 0.30 USD/(kW h). The net rental income of energy storage operators is 75.50 USD/day. The net income of peak-shaving auxiliary services is 45.54 USD/day. The total net income for the whole day is 121.04 USD. The number of years for the distribution network to delay the upgrading of the power grid is 0.7587 years. Comparing mode 5 with the abovementioned modes, energy storage operators have the highest income; that is, when there are more entities participating in energy storage leasing in the distribution network, the greater the competitive advantage of the energy storage operator in the market game, the higher the income.

Optimization results of all stakeholders.

Stakeholder Rental capacity (kW·h) Rental cost (USD/day) Net income (USD/day)
Industrial users 100 30.08 3.74
Distribution network 263.99 79.40 23.70
Photovoltaic cluster 149.46 321.56 Collaborators: 34.82
Betrayers: 39.30
Energy storage operator 513.45 78.96 121.01

The charging and discharging curves of the leased energy storage of each entity are shown in Figure 14. The energy storage leased by industrial users is charged at 2:00–4:00 at the valley of the load curve and discharged at 9:00–10:00 and 16:00–17:00. The distribution network leased energy storage is charged at 4:00–6:00 during the valley of the distribution network load curve and discharged at 20:00 during the peak time. According to dispatching instructions, the leased energy storage of photovoltaic power station clusters will be charged at 13:00–15:00 at its output peak and discharged at 20:00 at its peak load on the distribution network. The total charging power of each leasing entity throughout the day is equal to the total discharging power, which is the respective leased energy storage capacity. The charging and discharging capacity of the energy storage leased by the energy storage power station per hour is the sum of the charging and discharging capacity of the leased energy storage of each leasing entity.

Comparison of charge and discharge capacity of the power system in different usage scenarios.

Figure 15 shows the comparison between the convergence of the proposed and existing algorithms. As can be seen from Figure 15, the convergence speed of the proposed algorithm is faster than existing algorithms, which validates its optimality.

Convergence comparison of algorithms for power forecasting with increasing number of iterations.

 6 Conclusion

This paper establishes a two-tier game model for photovoltaic power station cluster energy storage leasing and proposes a PPSC energy storage leasing allocation strategy based on threshold public goods evolution game and an energy storage leasing pricing optimization method based on two-tier game. The correctness of the model and the effectiveness of the method are verified by simulation examples, and the conclusions are as follows:

1) By implementing appropriate reward and punishment measures, the cooperation dilemma of photovoltaic energy storage lease allocation can be effectively solved.

2) Combining the energy storage allocation assessment measures of photovoltaic power plants with the market-oriented energy storage leasing model can not only reduce the high investment pressure of new energy power plants but also bring net profits to energy storage power plants, and the business model of on-demand leasing is more economical.

3) This paper deduces the minimum penalty to limit the proportion of photovoltaic electricity connected to the grid and the TPGG evolutionary stable equilibrium solution model that promotes the critical achievement of the photovoltaic energy storage capacity assessment target. This model can provide a reference and basis for the distribution network to formulate reasonable reward and punishment measures.

4) The implementation of master–slave game-based energy storage pricing and energy storage leasing capacity optimization methods between energy storage operators and multiple energy storage users can help each participant make optimal decisions and realize the multi-subject interests of energy storage leasing supply and demand win–win conditions.

5) The net revenue of industrial users, distribution network, photovoltaic cluster, and energy storage operators is 3.74, 23.70, 39.30, and 121.01 USD per day, which indicates the effectiveness of the proposed strategy.

The proposed algorithm can provide a reference for energy storage configuration assessment and energy storage leasing operation management brought about by the access of new energy to the grid. Future work will focus on prosumers, integrated energy systems, demand-side users, and other entities that can be added to the energy storage demander list. To further enhance the energy storage business model, more adaptable lease solutions and a wider variety of energy storage will be taken into account.

 Data availability statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/Supplementary Material; further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding authors.

 Author contributions

YS: conceptualization, writing–original draft, data curation, methodology, resources, validation, and writing–review and editing. NL: methodology, software, validation, conceptualization, resources, supervision, and writing–review and editing. IK: formal analysis, investigation, methodology, project administration, resources, supervision, writing–review and editing, validation, and writing–original draft. Y-CP: data curation, supervision, methodology, and writing–review and editing. Y-CB: supervision, validation, and writing–original draft. DM: data curation, formal analysis, funding acquisition, investigation, methodology, project administration, supervision, validation, visualization, writing–original draft, and writing–review and editing.

 Funding

The author(s) declare that financial support was received for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. This result was supported by the “Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS)” through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education (MOE).

 Conflict of interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be constructed as potential conflict of interest.

 Publisher’s note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors, and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

 Supplementary material

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenrg.2023.1267579/full#supplementary-material

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