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<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">Front. Cognit.</journal-id>
<journal-title>Frontiers in Cognition</journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title abbrev-type="pubmed">Front. Cognit.</abbrev-journal-title>
<issn pub-type="epub">2813-4532</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name>Frontiers Media S.A.</publisher-name>
</publisher>
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<article-meta>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.3389/fcogn.2025.1618381</article-id>
<article-categories>
<subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
<subject>Cognition</subject>
<subj-group>
<subject>Conceptual Analysis</subject>
</subj-group>
</subj-group>
</article-categories>
<title-group>
<article-title>Toward aitiopoietic cognition: bridging the evolutionary divide between biological and machine-learned causal systems</article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes">
<name><surname>Veloz</surname> <given-names>Tomas</given-names></name>
<xref ref-type="corresp" rid="c001"><sup>&#x0002A;</sup></xref>
<uri xlink:href="http://loop.frontiersin.org/people/243982/overview"/>
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<aff><institution>Departamento de Matem&#x000E1;ticas, Universidad Tecnol&#x000F3;gica Metropolitana</institution>, <addr-line>Santiago</addr-line>, <country>Chile</country></aff>
<author-notes>
<fn fn-type="edited-by"><p>Edited by: Andrew Tolmie, University College London, United Kingdom</p></fn>
<fn fn-type="edited-by"><p>Reviewed by: Sheila L. Macrine, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, United States</p>
<p>Lucas Fucci Amato, University of S&#x000E3;o Paulo, Brazil</p></fn>
<corresp id="c001">&#x0002A;Correspondence: Tomas Veloz <email>tomas.velozg&#x00040;utem.cl</email></corresp>
</author-notes>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>17</day>
<month>07</month>
<year>2025</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="collection">
<year>2025</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>4</volume>
<elocation-id>1618381</elocation-id>
<history>
<date date-type="received">
<day>25</day>
<month>04</month>
<year>2025</year>
</date>
<date date-type="accepted">
<day>18</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2025</year>
</date>
</history>
<permissions>
<copyright-statement>Copyright &#x000A9; 2025 Veloz.</copyright-statement>
<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
<copyright-holder>Veloz</copyright-holder>
<license xlink:href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"><p>This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.</p></license>
</permissions>
<abstract>
<p>We examine and compare autopoietic systems (biological organisms) and machine learning systems (MLSs) highlighting crucial differences in how causal reasoning emerges and operates. Despite superficial functional similarities in behavior and cognitive abilities, we identify profound structural differences in how causality is operationalized, physically embodied, and epistemologically grounded. In autopoietic systems, causal reasoning is intrinsically tied to self-maintenance processes across multiple organizational levels, with goals emerging from survival imperatives. In contrast, MLSs implement causality through statistical optimization with externally imposed objectives, lacking the material self-reorganization that drives biological causal advancement. We introduce the concept of &#x0201C;aitiopoietic cognition&#x0201D;&#x02014;from Greek &#x0201C;aitia&#x0201D; (cause) and &#x0201C;poiesis&#x0201D; (creation)&#x02014;as a framework where causal understanding emerges directly from a system&#x00027;s self-constituting processes. Through analyzing convergence pathways including evolutionary algorithms, material intelligence, homeostatic regulation, and multi-scale integration, we propose a research program aimed at bridging this evolutionary divide. Such integration could lead to artificial systems with genuine intrinsic goals and materially grounded causal understanding, potentially transforming our approach to artificial intelligence and deepening our comprehension of biological cognition.</p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd>artificial intelligence</kwd>
<kwd>emergence</kwd>
<kwd>causal reasoning</kwd>
<kwd>autopoieisis</kwd>
<kwd>metasystem transitions</kwd>
<kwd>embodied cognition</kwd>
<kwd>synthetic biology</kwd>
</kwd-group>
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<equation-count count="1"/>
<ref-count count="120"/>
<page-count count="13"/>
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<custom-meta>
<meta-name>section-at-acceptance</meta-name>
<meta-value>Reason and Decision-Making</meta-value>
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</front>
<body>
<sec id="s1">
<title>1 Introduction</title>
<p>Machine learning systems (MLSs) are rapidly increasing their influence in our lives, transforming sectors from healthcare to entertainment (Marcus and Davis, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B63">2019</xref>; LeCun et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B54">2015</xref>), and where substantial investments are flowing into their sophistication (Maslej et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B65">2025</xref>), there is an increasing need to understand the fundamental differences between &#x0201C;us and them&#x0201D; (Bengio et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B9">2024</xref>). For clarity and analytical precision, we will refer to &#x0201C;them&#x0201D; as MLSs, acknowledging their primary mechanism of development and adaptation.</p>
<p>Considering the perspective of a child first learning to distinguish entities in a computer-interface level, or for an alien visiting our planet, there is no major difference between humans and MLSs. Both can read, understand text and images, type and draw, speak, and engage in a stream of complex actions including planning abilities, communication skills, and even abstract reasoning about concepts, causal relationships, and reflexive understanding of self and others. This similarity is recognized as well in robotic interfaces that allow for physical interaction and movement (Moro et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B71">2019</xref>; Manzi et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B61">2020</xref>). This seemingly remarkable similarity is often explained through the lens of computational functionalism (Putnam, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B82">1967</xref>; Chalmers, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B12">1996</xref>), which posits that mental states are defined by their functional roles rather than their physical substrate. Under this view, if MLSs functionally replicate human cognitive processes, even from a completely different substrate, they can be considered fundamentally equivalent&#x02014;and hence subjected to comparison at the agential level (Goertzel, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B36">2007</xref>).</p>
<sec>
<title>1.1 The &#x0201C;equivalence hypothesis&#x0201D; for testing causal cognition in human and machines</title>
<p>By looking more closely at how we compare ourselves and machines, we arrive at the strong influence that has played the Turing test, which is assumed to be known by the reader. While it aims at testing thinking, it more precisely tests the ability to engage in a conversation using previously learned information, and hence it does not test thinking directly, but learning and the ability to express such learning (Moor, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B68">1976</xref>). In this article we do not want to dig into the definitions of learning, thinking and intelligence and how that impacts our understanding of artificial intelligence (see Wang, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B111">2019</xref> for such analysis). Instead, we want to explore the consequences of comparing the causal cognitive abilities of a machine and a human using input-output architectures. Mainstream cognitive science implicitly assumes that these architectures &#x0201C;mean the same&#x0201D; for both humans and machines. In fact, the input-output architecture is, as well, generally believed to be responsible for the learning process, in an equivalent way, for both humans and MLSs. The latter is accepted and well-justified by a large number of successful scientific programs in a variety of fields including various branches of psychology and cognitive science (Anderson, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B2">2007</xref>), linguistics (Fodor, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B26">1975</xref>; Chomsky, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B13">1986</xref>; Pinker, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B80">1994</xref>), computer science (Russell and Norvig, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B86">2020</xref>), ethology (Lorenz, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B58">1981</xref>), and others (Clark, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B14">2001</xref>). These have shown that the design of processes and experiments based on input-output architectures have a high inductive power and allow to explain how learning, adaptation, and the development of increasingly complex responses (behaviors) to environmental challenges can be generated/stopped or enhanced/inhibited. Therefore, it is assumed that the way in which the &#x0201C;processing unit&#x0201D; that transforms input to output, i.e. the &#x0201C;black-box&#x0201D; for MLSs or &#x0201C;the mind&#x0201D; for humans, has no particular difference for what concerns defining cognition (Chalmers, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B12">1996</xref>; Clark and Chalmers, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B15">1998</xref>).</p>
<p>However, the above implicit equivalence assumption masks profound differences in how the inner workings of the material implementations of the input and output, and more crucially of them together with the &#x0201C;processing unit&#x0201D; forming a full system, shapes the existential, developmental and evolutionary features of cognition in MLSs and humans (Deacon, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B18">2011</xref>).</p>
<p>At the existential level, cognition in Humans and other biological organisms is implemented within autopoietic systems&#x02014;self-creating and self-maintaining entities that constantly regenerate their components through metabolic processes that harness energy from its environment (Boden, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B11">1999</xref>; Maturana and Varela, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B66">2012</xref>; Thompson, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B102">2007</xref>). In contrast, cognition in MLSs is implemented in physically static machines whose embodiment remains unchanged. At the developmental level autopoietic systems develop through multi-level structures based on cells made of molecular networks (Fields and Levin, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B25">2022</xref>; Witkowski et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B118">2023</xref>), each level having its own sense of self and its own competences resembling cognitive abilities aligned to their particular physical instantiation (which might or might not implement universal Turing computation), while for MLSs their development is based on external assemblage without multi-level structures and no internalized sense of self, and a &#x0201C;single level of intelligence&#x0201D; evolves through algorithmic adjustments and data-driven feedback in a universal Turing machine setting.</p>
<p>At the evolutionary level, these differences amplify what cognition means at each substrate. Autopoietic systems have evolved through natural selection operating on genetic variations across billions of years, with multiple major transitions creating hierarchical levels of organization (Smith and Szathm&#x000E1;ry, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B94">1995</xref>; Szathm&#x000E1;ry, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B99">2015</xref>). This evolutionary process has resulted in systems where purposeful behavior emerges from the intricate interplay between material constraints and informational dynamics at multiple scales (West et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B113">2015</xref>; Heylighen, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B40">2023</xref>). In stark contrast, MLSs &#x0201C;evolve&#x0201D; through directed human engineering, following developmental trajectories on a fixed Von Neumann architecture, optimized for specific). purposes involving performance, economic cost, size, and computation speed, rather than survival in open-ended environments (Stanley and Lehman, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B97">2015</xref>). Their evolutionary trajectory lacks the self-organized complexity and emergent properties characteristic of biological evolution, instead following design principles imposed externally by human developers with predetermined objectives (Lake et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B51">2017</xref>).</p>
</sec>
<sec>
<title>1.2 Goals as a criteria for comparing causal cognition</title>
<p>Instead of focusing on performance to test causal cognition, we can focus on &#x0201C;goal-directedness,&#x0201D; as goals reflect the source of actions in the processing unit (Heylighen, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B40">2023</xref>). Following this idea, goals serve as a crucial pivot point for comparing the causal cognition between humans and machines (Deacon, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B18">2011</xref>). In autopoietic systems, goals are defined by the relation between the imperative for the system&#x00027;s physical existence through self-preservation and the ways available to interact with its environment (Kolchinsky and Wolpert, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B48">2018</xref>). For MLSs, goals are externally defined optimization targets disconnected from any necessity of material self-preservation. This difference in the origin and nature of goals highlights an important gap in how their causal cognition operates. This aspect raises issues regarding the comparison of other significant aspects of cognition such as intelligence and adaptation (see Stano et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B98">2023</xref>, and other articles in that special issue).</p>
<p>This paper examines the fundamental characteristics of autopoiesis and machine learning, analyzes their key differences using goals as a reference concept that concern causal cognition, and explores potential convergence in futuristic systems that integrate their diverse &#x0201C;cognitive scaffoldings&#x0201D; (Ziemke et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B120">2004</xref>). Finally we outline a path toward bridging this evolutionary divide (Witkowski et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B118">2023</xref>; Seth, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B90">2021</xref>), by proposing &#x0201C;aitiopoietic cognition&#x0201D;&#x02014;from Greek &#x0201C;aitia&#x0201D; (cause) and &#x0201C;poiesis&#x0201D; (creation)&#x02014;as a framework where causal understanding emerges directly from a system&#x00027;s self-constituting processes, creating a recursive relationship between physical organization and causal reasoning.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="s2">
<title>2 Autopoietic systems: from survival to goals</title>
<p>Autopoietic systems, introduced by biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela in the 1970s, are defined as networks of processes that produce the components necessary for their continued existence and boundary maintenance. This concept provides a cybernetic-inspired framework for understanding biological autonomy (Maturana and Varela, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B66">2012</xref>). Unlike mechanistic or vitalistic accounts of life, autopoiesis offers a naturalistic perspective that emphasizes the dynamic, process-oriented nature of living systems (Weber and Varela, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B112">2002</xref>).</p>
<sec>
<title>2.1 The inner-outer structure</title>
<p>From a biochemical perspective, autopoietic systems operate through metabolic networks that continuously transform matter and energy to regenerate their components while maintaining organizational stability. This self-production occurs through thermodynamically open processes that sustain the system far from equilibrium (Moreno and Mossio, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B70">2015</xref>). The continuous production of a semi-permeable boundary distinguishes the system from its environment while regulating internal processes and external exchanges, creating a fundamental inside-outside asymmetry crucial for biological autonomy (Luisi, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B59">2003</xref>).</p>
<p>A defining characteristic of autopoietic systems lies in their hierarchical organization across spatial and temporal scales. This multi-level architecture enables nested autonomy: molecular networks maintain metabolic closure, cells exhibit decision-making via signaling pathways (Gao et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B32">2023</xref>), and tissues coordinate via biophysical feedback (Forgacs and Newman, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B27">2005</xref>). Each level sustains operational closure while contributing to higher-order autopoiesis, exemplifying Varela&#x00027;s concept of &#x0201C;autonomous identity at several levels&#x0201D; (Varela, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B104">1979</xref>). This organization aligns with Salthe&#x00027;s (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B87">1985</xref>) hierarchical evolution framework and enables bidirectional causality: &#x0201C;downward causation&#x0201D; (Ellis, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B24">2012</xref>), where higher levels modulate lower-level processes, and &#x0201C;upward constraints,&#x0201D; where molecular dynamics limit higher-level possibilities (Kauffman, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B44">1993</xref>; West-Eberhard, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B114">2003</xref>).</p>
<p>The operational closure of autopoietic systems does not preclude dynamic engagement with environments; rather, it enables multi-level structural coupling&#x02014;a process by which recurrent interactions trigger compensatory changes while preserving organizational coherence (Di Paolo, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B20">2005</xref>; Moreno and Mossio, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B70">2015</xref>). This coupling operates hierarchically: molecular networks couple with intracellular conditions, cells with tissue microenvironments, and organisms with ecological niches, each level maintaining its autonomy while contributing to the system&#x00027;s viability (Maturana and Varela, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B66">2012</xref>; Salthe, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B87">1985</xref>). Evolutionary pressures sculpt this hierarchy, favoring modularity for robustness (Wagner, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B109">1996</xref>) and degeneracy (Edelman and Gally, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B23">2001</xref>) to buffer against perturbations.</p>
<p>Crucially, coupling is asymmetrical and structurally determined: the environment does not dictate changes but perturbs the system, whose architecture&#x02014;shaped by evolutionary and developmental history&#x02014;filters which perturbations are salient (Barandiaran and Moreno, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B6">2008</xref>; Juarrero, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B42">1999</xref>). A cell&#x00027;s membrane receptors selectively respond to extracellular ligands while its metabolic state constrains receptor expression, illustrating how multi-level dependencies mediate environmental interactions (West-Eberhard, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B114">2003</xref>; Huang, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B41">2012</xref>; Rafelski and Theriot, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B83">2024</xref>).</p>
<p>Thus, autopoietic systems enact their worlds through multi-scalar, history-laden interactions&#x02014;a process where autonomy and dependency coexist, and every perturbation becomes an opportunity for meaning-making (Varela et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B105">1991</xref>; Barandiaran et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B5">2009</xref>).</p>
</sec>
<sec>
<title>2.2 Autopoietic cognition</title>
<p>The connection between autopoiesis and cognition emerges from the system&#x00027;s need to maintain itself through adaptive interactions with its environment. As Maturana and Varela provocatively stated, &#x0201C;living is knowing,&#x0201D; suggesting that even basic autopoietic systems exhibit a primitive form of cognition through their selective environmental coupling (Thompson, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B102">2007</xref>). This perspective reframes cognition not as information processing but as sense-making&#x02014;transforming neutral environmental stimuli into meaningful distinctions relevant to continued existence (Di Paolo and Thompson, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B19">2014</xref>).</p>
<p>The transition of autopoietic systems into sense-making adaptive agents hinges on their capacity to develop multi-level regulatory hierarchies that monitor and modulate viability conditions across scales (Di Paolo, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B20">2005</xref>; Moreno and Mossio, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B70">2015</xref>). From these processes goal-directedness becomes naturally linked to autopoietic organization. Autopoietic systems exhibit &#x0201C;purposive&#x0201D; behavior because their structure&#x02014;forged through structural coupling (Juarrero, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B42">1999</xref>)&#x02014;embodies historical solutions to viability challenges (Deacon, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B18">2011</xref>). For instance, slime molds optimize nutrient networks via self-organizing gradients (Nakagaki et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B74">2000</xref>). This naturalized teleology (Weber and Varela, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B112">2002</xref>) proposes a solution to the paradox of purpose as entities in the future influencing its past: goals are emergent properties of systems that recursively couple action to self-maintenance across scales (Barandiaran et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B5">2009</xref>).</p>
<p>The formal representation of goals in autopoietic systems presents unique modeling challenges precisely because goals emerge from the system&#x00027;s organization rather than being explicitly encoded (Veloz, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B106">2021</xref>). Several mathematical frameworks have been developed to capture this emergence, each highlighting different aspects of how purpose arises from process.</p>
<p>Dynamical systems theory provides the broadest framework, representing autopoietic goals as attractor states in state space that maintain viability amid perturbations (Heylighen, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B40">2023</xref>; Kauffman, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B44">1993</xref>). Crucially, these attractors shift based on the system&#x00027;s internal state, creating a landscape where goals are context-dependent rather than fixed. This adaptive landscape model has been formalized in work on viability boundaries and adaptive control (Barandiaran and Egbert, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B7">2014</xref>), providing mathematical tools to analyze how autopoietic systems generate and modify goals in response to changing conditions.</p>
<p>More specific mathematical frameworks address different aspects of goal-directedness. Chemical Organization Theory (Dittrich and Speroni di Fenizio, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B21">2007</xref>; Veloz and Razeto-Barry, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B107">2017</xref>) models self-maintaining chemical networks where closure and self-production create stability conditions that serve as implicit goals. This approach enables rigorous analysis of how chemistry creates persistent identity&#x02014;a precondition for purpose&#x02014;by identifying organizational closure in reaction networks. Meanwhile, Free Energy Principle models (Friston, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B29">2010</xref>; Priorelli et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B81">2025</xref>) formalize how predictive regulation serves autopoietic maintenance, representing goals as probability distributions over viable states that systems act to maintain through active inference. This Bayesian approach provides a computational bridge between autopoietic goals and machine learning frameworks. Agent-based modeling has become increasingly important for modeling how goals emerge from simple behavioral mechanisms tied to viability constraints, demonstrating how selection pressures can drive the emergence of increasingly complex goal hierarchies through simulated evolution (Froese and Ziemke, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B31">2009</xref>; Packard et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B76">2019</xref>).</p>
<p>While the conceptualization of goals is thoroughly integrated with theoretical frameworks of autopoiesis, and the relationship between goal-directedness and biological purpose is well-established in philosophical terms, the formal mathematical representation of these concepts remains in its infancy. Current models capture aspects of emergent purpose but struggle to represent the full richness of biological goal-directedness&#x02014;particularly the multi-scale competencies that comprise biological intelligence (Witkowski et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B118">2023</xref>; Fields and Levin, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B25">2022</xref>). These competencies, from basal cognition in single cells to the abstract reasoning of complex organisms, suggest multiple forms of intelligence operating across different scales and materialities, challenging our current modeling capabilities. As autopoietic theory continues to evolve, bridging the gap between rich theoretical accounts and precise formal representations remains a crucial frontier&#x02014;one that will not only deepen our understanding of biological cognition but also provide insights for developing artificial systems with more naturalistic forms of goal-directedness (Veloz, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B106">2021</xref>; Thompson, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B102">2007</xref>; Di Paolo, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B20">2005</xref>).</p>
</sec>
<sec>
<title>2.3 From autopoiesis to aitiopoiesis</title>
<p>The transition from autopoietic to aitiopoietic cognition, i.e., going from achieve material self-preservation to embody affordances through behaviors that resemble causal reasoning, represents a fundamental leap where systems transcend mere organizational closure to actively constitute causal knowledge through their very existence (Deacon, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B18">2011</xref>). This transition becomes evident when examining how autopoietic systems generate what we term &#x0201C;agential causality&#x0201D;&#x02014;causal understanding that emerges not from abstract computation but from the material processes of self-constitution and environmental coupling. Consider bacterial chemotaxis: the cell&#x00027;s sensory-motor apparatus doesn&#x00027;t simply detect gradients but constitutes a knowledge-generating system where the phosphorylation cascade dynamics simultaneously maintain cellular organization and create understanding about environmental cause-effect relationships (Davies and Levin, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B17">2023</xref>; Levin, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B56">2019</xref>). The bacteria&#x00027;s tumble-and-run behavior emerges from constitutional processes where causal learning and self-maintenance are inseparably intertwined&#x02014;the system literally embodies its causal models through the recursive dynamics of its own material organization.</p>
<p>Recent advances in synthetic multicellularity illuminate this transition by revealing how collective systems can exhibit emergent aitiopoietic properties that exceed their individual components&#x00027; autopoietic capabilities. Xenobots, constructed from amphibian skin and cardiac cells, demonstrate a primitive form of aitiopoietic cognition where collective behavior emerges from cellular self-organization without genetic programming or external control circuits (Moreno and Etxeberria, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B69">2005</xref>; Newman and Bhat, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B75">2009</xref>; Kriegman et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B49">2020</xref>). These &#x0201C;living robots&#x0201D; navigate their environment through constitutive processes&#x02014;their locomotion, object manipulation, and collective coordination arise from the same self-maintaining dynamics that preserve their multicellular integrity. Crucially, their behavioral competencies represent endogenous properties of agential materials rather than externally imposed algorithms, suggesting that aitiopoietic cognition scales naturally from autopoietic foundations when appropriate organizational architectures emerge. Similarly, Anthrobots self-assemble from human lung cells into motile spheroids with cilia-driven propulsion and tissue-repair capabilities, demonstrating how multicellular collectives can exhibit goal-directed behaviors that emerge from, rather than being programmed into, their constitutional dynamics (Sol&#x000E9; et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B96">2024</xref>).</p>
<p>The synthetic biology framework reveals aitiopoiesis as fundamentally involving multi-scale agency where causal competencies emerge through hierarchical coupling between different levels of organization (Sol&#x000E9; et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B95">2016</xref>). In organoid systems, individual cells contribute to tissue-level morphodynamic reasoning&#x02014;the collective navigation of anatomical morphospace through perception-action loops that simultaneously maintain tissue architecture and generate knowledge about spatial relationships (Sol&#x000E9; et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B96">2024</xref>). This represents a form of &#x0201C;collective aitiopoietic cognition&#x0201D; where causal understanding emerges from the constitutional dynamics of cellular collectives, not from pre-programmed instructions. The tissue &#x0201C;learns&#x0201D; about its environment through the very processes that constitute its existence&#x02014;growth gradients, mechanical forces, and bioelectrical patterns become both the medium of self-maintenance and the substrate of causal reasoning. Importantly, this scaling of aitiopoietic competency reveals a crucial principle: higher-order causal understanding doesn&#x00027;t reduce to lower-level mechanisms but emerges through what Levin terms &#x0201C;agential materials&#x0201D;&#x02014;substrates with intrinsic competencies that can be guided through behavioral interventions rather than mechanical control.</p>
<p>The implications for artificial aitiopoietic systems are profound. Current synthetic approaches reveal that genuine aitiopoiesis cannot be engineered through traditional top-down design but must emerge from substrates that exhibit &#x0201C;competency in transcriptional, anatomical, and physiological problem spaces&#x0201D; (Davies and Levin, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B17">2023</xref>). The failure of purely computational approaches to achieve constitutional causality suggests that future aitiopoietic systems will require physical substrates where information processing affordances such as pattern recognition and causal reasoning as well as self-maintenaning affordances such as reparation and duplication are materially unified rather than functionally separated (Gill et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B35">2025</xref>). This points toward a research program focused not on programming artificial agents but on cultivating synthetic systems where aitiopoietic cognition can emerge from the recursive dynamics of embodied self-organization, potentially through hybrid bio-synthetic architectures that combine the constitutional properties of living materials with the scalability of artificial substrates.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="s3">
<title>3 Machine learning systems: from goals to causality</title>
<p>Machine learning represents the current paradigm to artificial intelligence by allowing algorithms to improve through experience by learning from data (Russell and Norvig, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B86">2020</xref>). Early machine learning focused on representational approaches and decision trees, but the field underwent a transformation with the advent of deep learning architectures that could automatically extract hierarchical features from raw data (LeCun et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B54">2015</xref>). This evolution reflects a broader transition from engineering-centric to data-centric approaches, where system behavior emerges from statistical patterns rather than explicit design.</p>
<sec>
<title>3.1 Machine learning instantiations of causal cognition</title>
<p>At its core, machine learning operates through statistical inference and optimization processes that adjust internal parameters to minimize prediction errors or maximize reward signals. MLSs operationalize causality through statistical associations rather than mechanistic or teleological reasoning. Rooted in pattern recognition, these systems optimize for predictive accuracy by minimizing loss functions (e.g., cross-entropy, mean squared error) that measure deviations from training data distributions (Goodfellow et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B37">2016</xref>). According to Pearl&#x00027;s (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B78">2019</xref>) Causal Hierarchy, ML systems operates at Level 1 (observational inference), lacking capacity for intervention (Level 2) or counterfactual reasoning (Level 3). For instance, deep neural networks trained on medical datasets may correlate hospital beds with patient mortality without inferring beds as sites of treatment rather than causation (Geirhos et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B34">2020</xref>). Such spurious correlations stem from ML&#x00027;s reliance on statistical shortcuts&#x02014;surface features that maximize training accuracy but fail to capture causal invariance (Arjovsky et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B3">2019</xref>).</p>
<p>This process can be formalized mathematically as finding a function f<sup>&#x0002A;</sup> such that prioritizes empirical risk minimization:</p>
<disp-formula id="E1"><label>(1)</label><mml:math id="M1"><mml:mtable class="eqnarray" columnalign="left"><mml:mtr><mml:mtd><mml:msup><mml:mrow><mml:mi>f</mml:mi></mml:mrow><mml:mrow><mml:mo>*</mml:mo></mml:mrow></mml:msup><mml:mo>=</mml:mo><mml:mi>a</mml:mi><mml:mi>r</mml:mi><mml:mi>g</mml:mi><mml:mi>m</mml:mi><mml:mi>i</mml:mi><mml:msub><mml:mrow><mml:mi>n</mml:mi></mml:mrow><mml:mrow><mml:mi>f</mml:mi></mml:mrow></mml:msub><mml:mi>E</mml:mi><mml:mrow><mml:mo>[</mml:mo><mml:mrow><mml:mi>L</mml:mi><mml:mrow><mml:mo stretchy="false">(</mml:mo><mml:mrow><mml:mi>f</mml:mi><mml:mrow><mml:mo stretchy="false">(</mml:mo><mml:mrow><mml:mi>x</mml:mi></mml:mrow><mml:mo stretchy="false">)</mml:mo></mml:mrow><mml:mo>,</mml:mo><mml:mi>y</mml:mi></mml:mrow><mml:mo stretchy="false">)</mml:mo></mml:mrow></mml:mrow><mml:mo>]</mml:mo></mml:mrow><mml:mo>,</mml:mo></mml:mtd></mml:mtr></mml:mtable></mml:math></disp-formula>
<p>where <italic>E</italic> means expected value, <italic>L</italic> quantifies prediction error over a dataset <italic>D</italic>. While effective for interpolating training distributions, this formulation conflates correlation with causation, as models lack mechanisms to distinguish confounding variables (Sch&#x000F6;lkopf, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B88">2022</xref>). For example, ML systems trained on socioeconomic data often reproduce biased associations (e.g., race and loan default rates) due to dataset imbalances rather than causal relationships (Koh et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B47">2021</xref>).</p>
<p>Recent critiques highlight how this statistical foundation limits ML&#x00027;s causal robustness. Adversarial attacks&#x02014;minor input perturbations that deceive models (Szegedy et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B100">2013</xref>)&#x02014;expose the fragility of associational reasoning, while distribution shifts (e.g., hospital data from urban vs. rural settings) degrade performance catastrophically (Koh et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B47">2021</xref>). Unlike biological systems, which evolved to prioritize causally salient features (e.g., predators, nutrients), ML lacks evolutionary pressure to distinguish signal from noise, rendering its causal cognition inherently shallow (Marcus and Davis, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B64">2020</xref>).</p>
</sec>
<sec>
<title>3.2 Engineered causal architectures and the limits of extrinsic goals</title>
<p>Contemporary machine learning (ML) systems attempt to integrate causal reasoning through architectures that blend statistical learning with formal causal frameworks. Structural causal models (SCMs) represent one approach, applying Pearl&#x00027;s do-calculus (Pearl, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B78">2019</xref>) to infer interventions from observational data. Tools like DoWhy (Sharma and Kiciman, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B91">2020</xref>) and CausalNex based on Bayesian DAGs (Zheng et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B119">2018</xref>) operationalize this by encoding causal graphs, yet they require human-specified variables and struggle with latent confounders&#x02014;a critical limitation in real-world datasets (Sch&#x000F6;lkopf et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B89">2021</xref>). For example, in healthcare, SCMs often fail to account for unmeasured socioeconomic factors that mediate treatment outcomes (Kaddour et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B43">2022</xref>).</p>
<p>Causal reinforcement learning (CRL) extends this by training systems to learn intervention policies. DeepMind&#x00027;s Causal Meta-RL (Ke et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B45">2022</xref>) demonstrates how systems can infer task structure through trial-and-error interventions, yet their objectives remain static (e.g., maximizing game scores). Unlike biological systems, which dynamically repurpose goals (e.g., switching from foraging to predator evasion), CRL systems lack mechanisms to reconfigure objectives in response to existential needs (Lake et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B51">2017</xref>).</p>
<p>Neuro-symbolic hybrids merge neural networks with symbolic logic to enforce causal rules (Sheth et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B92">2023</xref>). However, these rules are externally imposed rather than emergent from self-constitution, rendering them brittle under novel scenarios where &#x0201C;goal-directed commonsense is needed&#x0201D; (Garcez and Lamb, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B33">2023</xref>). For instance, symbolic constraints in autonomous driving systems (e.g., &#x0201C;stop at red lights&#x0201D;) fail to adapt when road conditions defy predefined norms (e.g., emergency vehicles). <xref ref-type="table" rid="T1">Table 1</xref> summarizes the limitations of causality from our goal-oriented perspective.</p>
<table-wrap position="float" id="T1">
<label>Table 1</label>
<caption><p>Training method for achieving goals and limitation examples.</p></caption>
<table frame="box" rules="all">
<thead>
<tr style="background-color:#8f9496;color:#ffffff">
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Training paradigm</bold></th>
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Causal limitation</bold></th>
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Example</bold></th>
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>References</bold></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Supervised (accuracy)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Fails under distribution shift</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Medical diagnosis</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Geirhos et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B34">2020</xref></td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Reinforcement (reward)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">No adaptive repurposing of objectives</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Game score maximization</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Ke et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B45">2022</xref></td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Neuro-symbolic (rules)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Brittle to novel scenarios needing commonsense</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Autonomous driving</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Garcez and Lamb, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B33">2023</xref></td>
</tr></tbody>
</table>
</table-wrap>
<p>These architectures reveal a fundamental limitation regarding their goals: MLS goals are extrinsic optimizations (e.g., loss minimization), and hence they decouple causal reasoning from variables that underlie the actions their knowledge shall engage into Marcus and Davis (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B64">2020</xref>).</p>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="s4">
<title>4 Key causal reasoning differences between autopoietic systems and machine learning systems</title>
<p>We now organize the differences between how Autopoietic Systems and MLS relate to causal reasoning into key dimensions that help to identify further venues for their scientific study.</p>
<sec>
<title>4.1 Operationalization of goals and causality</title>
<p>Causality in autopoietic systems is fundamentally recursive and self-referential, rooted in their operational closure. These systems&#x00027; fundamental goal is to remain alive, i.e., maintain their identity through circular cause-effect chains that simultaneously produce and depend on their own boundaries (Maturana and Varela, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B66">2012</xref>). For instance, a cell&#x00027;s metabolic network synthesizes the very components&#x02014;enzymes, membranes, and organelles&#x02014;that enable its continued existence. Here, causality is inseparable from the system&#x00027;s teleological imperative: self-preservation. Perturbations to autopoietic systems (e.g., nutrient deprivation) trigger adaptive responses aimed at restoring homeostasis, illustrating how causal reasoning is intrinsically directed toward sustaining systemic coherence (Luisi, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B59">2003</xref>). The system&#x00027;s &#x0201C;goal&#x0201D; is not external but emergent of its self-reinforcing organizational structure.</p>
<p>In contrast, causality in machine learning (ML) systems is extrinsically defined by statistical correlations derived from training data. ML models, such as deep neural networks, infer patterns through gradient-driven optimization, with no inherent representation of counterfactuals or physical mechanisms (Pearl, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B78">2019</xref>). For example, a convolutional neural network trained to classify images associates pixel configurations with labels (e.g., &#x0201C;cat&#x0201D; or &#x0201C;dog&#x0201D;), but these associations lack intrinsic grounding in the system&#x00027;s structure. The &#x0201C;goal&#x0201D; of an ML system&#x02014;minimizing a loss function&#x02014;is imposed externally by designers, reflecting no existential imperative. While autopoietic systems exhibit endogenous causality (causal processes emerge from self-maintenance), ML systems rely on exogenous causality, where causal attribution is bounded by the scope and biases of training datasets (Marcus, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B62">2018</xref>) or rules imposed (Marcus and Davis, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B64">2020</xref>). We summarize our discussion in <xref ref-type="table" rid="T2">Table 2</xref>.</p>
<table-wrap position="float" id="T2">
<label>Table 2</label>
<caption><p>Summary of operational differences between autopoietic and machine learning causal reasoning systems.</p></caption>
<table frame="box" rules="all">
<thead>
<tr style="background-color:#8f9496;color:#ffffff">
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Dimension</bold></th>
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Autopoietic systems</bold></th>
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Machine learning systems</bold></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Causal mechanism</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Recursive, based on self-referential loops at multiple hierarchical levels</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Non-recursive, based on statistical correlations and gradient optimization</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Teleological basis</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Endogenous (self-maintenance)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Exogenous (loss minimization)</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Boundary definition</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Operational closure (self-produced membrane/organization)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Data distribution and algorithmic constraints</td>
</tr></tbody>
</table>
</table-wrap>
</sec>
<sec>
<title>4.2 Material embodiment and causal reasoning improvement</title>
<p>In autopoietic systems, causal reasoning improves through physical embodiment of increasingly complex goals. The material substrate available by its current operational organization, under the right mutations, directly enables the development of sophistication through what Heylighen (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B39">1995</xref>) calls meta-system transitions. These transitions enable new levels of control, i.e., the ability to handle perturbations in novel ways. This process is physically instantiated&#x02014;cellular differentiation creates novel causal potentials through material reorganization that enables emergent functions. Major evolutionary transitions (Szathm&#x000E1;ry, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B99">2015</xref>) demonstrate how material reorganization drives causal advancement. When independent autopoietic units integrate into higher-order collectives, they physically restructure to enable a larger entity with new causal capabilities not only in relation to its environment but also with respect to its own components via top-down control (Rosas et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B85">2020</xref>). This physical restructuring creates multi-level regulatory networks where causality operates across nested spatial and temporal scales&#x02014;from molecular recognition (microseconds) to memory formation (decades).</p>
<p>This material integration enables the expansion of goal-directed structures across wider spatial domains and longer temporal horizons, termed the &#x0201C;care cone&#x0201D; (Witkowski et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B118">2023</xref>). Long-term planning in mammals emerges not from computational scaling but from physical evolution of neural structures that materially integrate multiple internal states. In contrast, MLSs develop causal reasoning through pathways decoupled from their material embodiment. Their physical substrate remains static while abstract parameters adjust, creating a thermodynamic disconnect between energy expenditure and causal improvement. Neural networks expend identical energy regardless of whether they&#x00027;re refining causal models or reinforcing spurious correlations (Thompson et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B103">2020</xref>).</p>
<p>This thermodynamic decoupling constrains how causal reasoning improves in MLSs. Without material reorganization that extends control across scales, causal advancement becomes purely instrumental&#x02014;serving externally defined objectives without extending capacity for self-maintenance, or any other existential notion embedded in it. MLS causal improvements depend primarily on data quantity rather than material reorganization. While evidence suggests resemblances of major evolutionary transitions, by the identification of phase-transition-like improvements when crossing certain network size thresholds (Sch&#x000F6;lkopf et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B89">2021</xref>), these remain qualitatively different from evolutionary transitions. ML systems expand within predefined architectural constraints without generating novel material configurations that enable fundamentally new forms of causal reasoning.</p>
<p>The latter explains why biological causal reasoning exhibits open-ended improvement while artificial causality remains bounded by its instrumental nature and thermodynamic decoupling. We summarize our discussion in <xref ref-type="table" rid="T3">Table 3</xref>.</p>
<table-wrap position="float" id="T3">
<label>Table 3</label>
<caption><p>Differences on how autopoietic and ML systems improve their causal cognition.</p></caption>
<table frame="box" rules="all">
<thead>
<tr style="background-color:#8f9496;color:#ffffff">
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Aspect</bold></th>
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Machine learning systems</bold></th>
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Autopoietic systems</bold></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Mechanism of Improvement</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Parameter optimization within fixed architecture</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Material reorganization across multiple scales</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Thermodynamic Relationship</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Energy use unrelated to causal advancement</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Energy expenditure aligned with control capabilities</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Temporal integration</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Reconstruction through increasingly smaller processing timescales</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Nested timescales from molecular to evolutionary</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Evolutionary potential</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Bounded by architectural constraints</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Open-ended through major transitions</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Self-reorganization</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">No physical restructuring during learning</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Continuous physical adaptation to maintain viability</td>
</tr></tbody>
</table>
</table-wrap>
</sec>
<sec>
<title>4.3 The attribution of causality</title>
<p>The epistemological foundations of causal attribution differ radically between autopoietic and machine learning systems, illuminating a philosophical dimension that combines their divergent material and operational principles.</p>
<sec>
<title>4.3.1 Mechanistic causality in autopoietic systems</title>
<p>In autopoietic systems, causal attribution is mechanistic and grounded in material interactions. The experimental methods used to understand biological causality&#x02014;such as knockout studies in yeast that reveal causal roles of genes in glycolysis (e.g., <italic>PGI1</italic> deletion halts glucose metabolism)&#x02014;directly manipulate physical components to observe system-wide effects (Kitano, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B46">2002</xref>), and can alter or be altered by features at other scales through mechanisms that might involve for example electrical, chemical and fluid-dynamics levels (Levin, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B56">2019</xref>). The epistemology of causation is tied to physically observable and manipulable processes, such as enzyme-substrate binding observed via crystallography or electron microscopy.</p>
<p>This mechanistic approach to causality reveals the ontic nature of autopoietic causation&#x02014;causal relationships are embedded in the system&#x00027;s physical structure and processes rather than being observer-dependent constructs. When biologists identify a gene as causal for a phenotype, they are identifying material pathways through which physical interactions propagate effects (Bechtel and Richardson, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B8">2010</xref>). The multi-level organization of these systems means that causality operates simultaneously across molecular, cellular, and organismal scales, with bidirectional influences between levels.</p>
</sec>
<sec>
<title>4.3.2 Instrumental causality in machine learning systems</title>
<p>In contrast, causal attribution in ML systems is instrumental and <italic>post hoc</italic>. Researchers employ techniques such as ablation studies (removing a neural network layer) or Shapley values (Lundberg and Lee, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B60">2017</xref>) to approximate feature importance, but these approaches provide statistical approximations rather than revealing physical causal mechanisms. When an ML researcher identifies a feature as &#x0201C;causal,&#x0201D; they are making an epistemic claim about statistical relationships rather than identifying a physical pathway.</p>
<p>The epistemology of ML causality remains fundamentally statistical&#x02014;a high Shapley value for a pixel in an image classification task doesn&#x00027;t imply a physical causal pathway but instead indicates a statistical correlation that the model has learned to exploit. This distinction becomes critical when deploying ML systems in real-world contexts where causal understanding (rather than correlation) is necessary for safe and effective operation.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="s5">
<title>5 Complementarity through evolutionary perspectives</title>
<p>Despite the fundamental differences between autopoietic systems and MLS outlined in previous sections, several promising pathways for complementarity are emerging. These approaches address the key gaps we&#x00027;ve identified&#x02014;particularly in goal formation, material embodiment, and causal understanding&#x02014;offering potential bridges across this evolutionary divide.</p>
<sec>
<title>5.1 Evolutionary algorithms and open-ended exploration</title>
<p>The application of evolutionary principles to machine learning design represents a significant step toward more biologically-inspired systems. Unlike traditional optimization approaches that focus on maximizing predefined metrics, evolutionary algorithms emphasize diversity, adaptation, and the emergence of novel solutions (Lehman and Stanley, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B55">2011</xref>). Recent advances in quality diversity algorithms and Multi-dimensional Archive of Phenotypic Elites (MAP-Elites) demonstrate how maintaining behavioral diversity rather than focusing solely on performance leads to more robust and creative solutions that better resemble biological adaptability (Mouret and Clune, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B72">2015</xref>; Cully et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B16">2015</xref>).</p>
<p>Open-ended evolution research extends this approach by creating computational environments where continuous innovation emerges without predefined fitness functions (Taylor et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B101">2016</xref>). These systems begin to address the goal-directedness gap identified in Section 4.1 by enabling the discovery of novel objectives rather than merely optimizing predefined ones. As Packard et al. (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B76">2019</xref>) note, truly open-ended artificial systems require mechanisms that support not just optimization but the continuous emergence of new ways to define and pursue goals&#x02014;a property inherent to biological evolution (Boden, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B10">1998</xref>).</p>
<p>However, these approaches still operate primarily at the algorithmic level, with limited impact on the material substrate gap highlighted in Section 4.2. The challenge remains integrating open-ended exploration with physical embodiment, a fundamental requisite for aitiopoietic cognitive systems.</p>
</sec>
<sec>
<title>5.2 Embodied cognition and material intelligence</title>
<p>A more direct approach to bridging the material gap involves developing artificial systems where materiality plays a constitutive role in cognition. Beyond conventional robotics, which often implements disembodied algorithms in physical shells, emerging research explores how material properties themselves can perform computational functions (Pfeifer et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B79">2007</xref>; Paul, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B77">2006</xref>).</p>
<p>Recent work in morphological computation demonstrates how physical dynamics can replace explicit computation, allowing systems to leverage material properties for intelligent behavior (Hauser et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B38">2011</xref>; M&#x000FC;ller and Hoffmann, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B73">2017</xref>). Soft robotics and programmable materials enable adaptive behavior through their intrinsic material properties rather than through explicit programming (Laschi and Cianchetti, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B52">2014</xref>; Rieffel et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B84">2009</xref>). These approaches begin to address the thermodynamic decoupling identified in Section 4.2 by creating systems where physical structure directly participates in information processing.</p>
<p>The challenge remains developing materials that not only compute but also maintain and regenerate themselves&#x02014;a defining aspect of autopoietic systems. However, the &#x0201C;aitiopoietic&#x0201D; integration of autopoietic structures into causal and other forms of reasoning is still in its infancy (McMillen and Levin, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B67">2024</xref>).</p>
</sec>
<sec>
<title>5.3 Homeostatic regulation and predictive processing</title>
<p>The active inference framework (Friston, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B29">2010</xref>; Friston et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B30">2017</xref>) offers a computational approach that potentially bridges autopoietic self-maintenance and machine learning. By framing cognition as the minimization of surprise (or free energy) through continuous prediction and updating, this framework provides a computational account of how systems maintain homeostasis while adapting to environmental challenges.</p>
<p>Recent implementations in artificial systems demonstrate how predictive architectures can develop intrinsic goals related to maintaining viable states (Baltieri and Buckley, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B4">2019</xref>). Particularly promising is research integrating homeostatic regulation directly into neural network architectures. Lechner et al. (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B53">2021</xref>) have demonstrated neural networks with homeostatic mechanisms that maintain internal stability while adapting to external challenges, exhibiting a primitive form of the intrinsic goal-directedness characteristic of autopoietic systems.</p>
<p>These approaches begin to address the causality gap identified in Section 4.3 by grounding causal understanding in the system&#x00027;s own viability conditions rather than in purely statistical correlations. However, they still operate primarily within the computational domain, with limited connection to physical self-maintenance. In this vein, conceptual advancement has been made by Kolchinsky and Wolpert (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B48">2018</xref>) by defining the concept of &#x0201C;semantic information&#x0201D; that refers to the Shannon information responsible for its viability, i.e., its self-production in autopoietic terms. However, this measure has not been yet properly linked to self-production but to proxy viability formulas that are informational as well.</p>
</sec>
<sec>
<title>5.4 Multi-scale integration and hierarchical agency</title>
<p>The hierarchical nature of autopoietic systems&#x02014;with their nested levels of organization and regulation&#x02014;finds a parallel in emerging approaches to multi-scale artificial intelligence. Recent advances in hierarchical reinforcement learning and multi-agent systems demonstrate how collective intelligence can emerge from interactions between simpler agents operating at different scales (Domingo-Fern&#x000E1;ndez et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B22">2022</xref>).</p>
<p>When designed with appropriate structural coupling between levels, these systems can develop emergent goals and coordination patterns reminiscent of biological collectives (Levin et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B57">2023</xref>). This multi-scale approach potentially addresses the causal attribution gap identified in Section 4.3 by enabling both bottom-up and top-down causation across different levels of organization. This is consistent with evolutionary proposals that focus not only on individual but group selection and cooperation mechanisms, that have been proven useful in biology and culture (Wilson, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B115">1975</xref>; Foster et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B28">2017</xref>; Wilson et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B116">2023</xref>), and being recently adopted as an alternative foundational paradigm in economics (Wilson and Snower, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B117">2024</xref>).</p>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="s6">
<title>6 Discussion</title>
<p>We examined the fundamental differences between autopoietic systems (biological organisms) and machine learning systems (MLSs), focusing on how their different natures affect causal cognition. We proposed that goals serve as a crucial pivot point for comparing these systems and explored potential convergence paths toward autopoietic systems that can integrate with MLS to embody &#x0201C;aitiopoietic cognition.&#x0201D;</p>
<p>Our analysis proceeded by first establishing the apparent functional similarity but fundamental structural difference between humans and MLSs cognition. We then examined autopoietic systems in depth, highlighting their self-organizing nature, emergent goals, and multi-level organization. Next, we analyzed how MLSs implement causal reasoning through statistical inference and optimization with externally imposed goals. This comparative framework allowed us to identify key differences in causal reasoning between these systems across three crucial dimensions: the operationalization of goals and causality, material embodiment and improvement mechanisms, and the epistemological foundations of causal attribution. <xref ref-type="table" rid="T4">Table 4</xref> summarizes these fundamental operational, substrate, and epistemological differences, providing a concrete framework for understanding the evolutionary divide between biological and machine-learned causal systems.</p>
<table-wrap position="float" id="T4">
<label>Table 4</label>
<caption><p>Comparative analysis of autopoietic systems and machine learning systems across operational, substrate, and epistemological dimensions.</p></caption>
<table frame="box" rules="all">
<thead>
<tr style="background-color:#8f9496;color:#ffffff">
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Dimension</bold></th>
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Autopoietic systems</bold></th>
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Machine learning systems</bold></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Goal formation (operational)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Emergent from closure and self-maintenance imperatives</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Externally imposed by designers</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Causality implementation (operational)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Feedback-driven: within internal state via structural coupling</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Statistical correlations and pattern recognition in data distributions</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Physical embodiment of information (substrate)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Material substrate dynamically encode-decode information achieving computation through autopoietic processes</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Static mapping between a specific physical part in charge of information states and other independent part in charge processing</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Improvement process (substrate)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Physical reorganization across multiple scales enables enhanced control capabilities</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Abstract parameter adjustment while maintaining fixed material architecture</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Energy-cognition coupling (substrate)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Thermodynamic processes directly linked to cognitive enhancement and self-maintenance</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Thermodynamic disconnect between energy expenditure and causal improvement</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Causal knowledge source (epistemological)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Constitutional causality arising from material self-organization and boundary maintenance</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Statistical inference from training data patterns and correlational structures</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Causal attribution (epistemological)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Grounded in existential imperatives and viability conditions of the system itself</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Based on computational optimization of externally defined loss functions</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Learning foundation (epistemological)</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Sense-making through autonomous environmental coupling and meaning generation</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Information processing through supervised/unsupervised pattern extraction</td>
</tr></tbody>
</table>
</table-wrap>
<p>The differences illustrated in <xref ref-type="table" rid="T4">Table 4</xref> reveal profound implications for how we understand and develop artificial intelligence. Autopoietic systems exhibit recursive, self-referential causality rooted in their operational closure, with goals emergent from self-maintenance imperatives. Their causal reasoning improves through physical reorganization enabling multi-scale control, with material embodiment directly participating in cognition. In contrast, MLSs operate through extrinsic optimization and statistical correlations, with their physical substrate remaining static while abstract parameters adjust&#x02014;creating a thermodynamic disconnect between energy expenditure and causal improvement.</p>
<p>Our analysis suggest the need for integrating both cognitive architectures, including ML and autopoietic and perhaps others, with philosophical questions about causality and agency. Recent striking examples, reviewed in section &#x0201C;From Autopoiesis to Aitiopoiesis,&#x0201D; demonstrate how these philosophical concepts find concrete expression in biological examples. Xenobots and organoids illustrate how collective behavior can emerge from cellular self-organization without external programming, suggesting that aitiopoietic properties can scale naturally from autopoietic foundations when appropriate organizational architectures emerge (Kriegman et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B49">2020</xref>; Davies and Levin, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B17">2023</xref>).</p>
<p>Therefore, the aitiopoietic cognition research program should proceed through four complementary tracks: (1) minimal aitiopoietic systems&#x02014;engineering simple chemical/cellular systems that exhibit constitutional causality using synthetic biology techniques. For example, sensitivity and robustness of specific components might unveil causal-like behavior (Shinar et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B93">2009</xref>); (2) measurement frameworks for characterizing aitiopoiesis&#x02014;operationalizing goal-directedness by compatibilizing matter and information processing interplays. The latter requires an integration of notions from dynamical systems theory related to autopoiesis such as homeostatic recovery times, attractor basin and viability analysis, with information theoretical metrics explaining how the information of a system is processed in relation to its existence as a collective (Friston, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B29">2010</xref>; Kolchinsky and Wolpert, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B48">2018</xref>; Rosas et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B85">2020</xref>); (3) scaling constitutional cognition&#x02014;understanding how aitiopoietic properties emerge in a collective through multi-scale modeling approaches (Szathm&#x000E1;ry, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B99">2015</xref>); and (4) Hybrid Bio-Synthetic architectures&#x02014;combining living materials with artificial substrates to achieve increasingly complex goal-directed behavior (Witkowski et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B118">2023</xref>; Fields and Levin, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B25">2022</xref>).</p>
<p>However, current convergence pathways face significant limitations: evolutionary algorithms encounter computational intractability in open-ended settings, material intelligence lacks genuine self-maintenance capabilities, homeostatic approaches remain primarily computational rather than constitutional, and multi-scale integration struggles with embodiment challenges. These represent current research frontiers rather than insurmountable barriers, suggesting that breakthrough progress will require novel approaches that transcend these individual pathway limitations. These convergence challenges are summarized in <xref ref-type="table" rid="T5">Table 5</xref>.</p>
<table-wrap position="float" id="T5">
<label>Table 5</label>
<caption><p>Convergence pathways between autopoietic and ML systems.</p></caption>
<table frame="box" rules="all">
<thead>
<tr style="background-color:#8f9496;color:#ffffff">
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Convergence pathway</bold></th>
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Addresses key gap</bold></th>
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Current limitations</bold></th>
<th valign="top" align="left"><bold>Exemplar research</bold></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Evolutionary algorithms</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Goal formation</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Limited material impact</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">MAP-Elites (Mouret and Clune, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B72">2015</xref>)</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Material intelligence</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Physical embodiment</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Lacks self-maintenance</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Soft robotics (Laschi and Cianchetti, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B52">2014</xref>)</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Homeostatic regulation</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Causal grounding</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Primarily computational</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Neural homeostasis (Lechner et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B53">2021</xref>)</td>
</tr> <tr>
<td valign="top" align="left">Multi-scale integration</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Causal attribution</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Limited embodiment</td>
<td valign="top" align="left">Multi-agent systems (Levin et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B57">2023</xref>)</td>
</tr></tbody>
</table>
</table-wrap>
</sec>
<sec id="s7">
<title>7 Conclusion</title>
<p>The future of artificial intelligence may lie in systems that are neither fully machine nor fully living, but that bridge this evolutionary divide through novel forms of embodied, self-maintaining cognition. From here, we suggest that a research program aiming to reach &#x0201C;aitiopoietic cognition&#x0201D; should be developed. This ambitious research program convergence pathway involves the development of synthetic systems that exhibit genuine autopoietic properties&#x02014;self-creation, self-maintenance, and self-boundary definition within their simulation domains. Research in synthetic biology and artificial life aims to create minimal chemical systems that display these properties (Luisi, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B59">2003</xref>; Stano et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B98">2023</xref>).</p>
<p>The realization of this research program will require studying metasystem transitions (Heylighen, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B39">1995</xref>) and major evolutionary transitions (Szathm&#x000E1;ry, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B99">2015</xref>) in open-ended evolutionary settings. Metasystem transitions represent moments when systems develop new levels of control and coordination, fundamentally transforming their problem spaces (Witkowski et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B118">2023</xref>) and enabling novel forms of causal reasoning. By creating artificial environments where such transitions can emerge naturally, we may navigate problem spaces with increasingly sophisticated &#x0201C;care-cones&#x0201D; (Witkowski et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B118">2023</xref>)&#x02014;expanding the spatial and temporal horizons over which they can exercise meaningful causal influence based on intrinsic rather than externally imposed goals (Deacon, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B18">2011</xref>). This expansion of the care-cone would represent a crucial step toward artificial systems that can adapt to complex, open-ended environments through genuine understanding rather than mere statistical optimization (Seth, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B90">2021</xref>). As Fields and Levin (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B25">2022</xref>) have argued, such systems would demonstrate competence across multiple domains through intrinsically motivated exploration and materially grounded causal reasoning (Walsh, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B110">2015</xref>), potentially transforming our understanding of both biological and artificial intelligence.</p>
<p>This ambitious synthesis suggests a new understanding of cognition and agency that might bring us closer to resolving the mind-body problem, not through theoretical abstraction, but through the concrete development of systems that embody both material self-maintenance and sophisticated causal understanding.</p>
<p>The development of artificial entities with genuine intrinsic goals and materially grounded causal understanding raises fundamental ethical considerations that must be systematically addressed within this research program. To maintain analytical rigor within current scientific understanding, this discussion focuses on early-stage developmental issues rather than interesting but more speculative scenarios, which have been explored elsewhere (Kurzweil, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B50">2005</xref>; Aerts and Argu&#x000EB;lles, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B1">2022</xref>; Vidal, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B108">2024</xref>). The proposed research program emphasizes minimal systems with constrained operational scope, necessitating the establishment of comprehensive safety protocols for self-modifying systems, ensuring beneficial alignment of early aitiopoietic prototypes that prioritize incremental progress with systematic monitoring of emergent capabilities.</p>
<p>A particularly significant ethical consideration involves understanding the fundamental material-informational dynamics underlying experiential states in general systems&#x02014;an investigation that must remain central throughout the development of this research program (Witkowski et al., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B118">2023</xref>). Given that aitiopoietic systems represent partially autonomous entities with potential experiential capacities, ethical protocols require continuous revision in accordance with evolving scientific understanding of agency, sentience, and consciousness, in artificial systems. This iterative ethical framework becomes essential precisely because the research program&#x00027;s object of study may possess forms of experience or proto-sentience that demand careful moral consideration as these systems develop greater autonomy and complexity.</p>
<p>This ambitious synthesis suggests a new understanding of cognition and agency that might bring us closer to resolving the mind-body problem, not through theoretical abstraction, but through the concrete development of systems that embody both material self-maintenance and sophisticated causal understanding. By developing artificial entities with truly intrinsic goals and materially grounded causal understanding, we may finally bridge the evolutionary divide between life and machine while maintaining commitment to careful, ethically-guided progress.</p></sec>
</body>
<back>
<sec sec-type="author-contributions" id="s8">
<title>Author contributions</title>
<p>TV: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Resources, Supervision, Validation, Visualization, Writing &#x02013; original draft, Writing &#x02013; review &#x00026; editing.</p>
</sec>
<sec sec-type="funding-information" id="s9">
<title>Funding</title>
<p>The author(s) declare that financial support was received for the research and/or publication of this article. This research was supported by the UTEM grant LCLI23-01 entitled &#x0201C;Modelamiento de fen&#x000F3;menos interdisciplinarios complejos utilizando redes de reacciones&#x0201D; and the ANID grant no. 11241020 Fondecyt Iniciacion entitled &#x0201C;Modeling multidimensional disturbances and stability in ecology with reaction networks.&#x0201D;</p>
</sec>
<ack><p>We would like to thank Selma Dundar-Coecke and Bob Coecke for the invitation to participate in this special issue, to Raphael Liogier, Olaf Witkowski and Stefan Leijnen for insightful discussions on the topic of this article, to the Systemic Modeling and Applications group at the Center Leo Apostel for internal discussion sessions, and to the reviewers for their dedicated reports.</p>
</ack>
<sec sec-type="COI-statement" id="conf1">
<title>Conflict of interest</title>
<p>The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s10">
<title>Generative AI statement</title>
<p>The author(s) declare that Gen AI was used in the creation of this manuscript. I used various LLMs to identify enhance my literature review, articulate subsections, and perform consistency checks regarding use of acronyms, grammar, and orthography.</p></sec>
<sec sec-type="disclaimer" id="s11">
<title>Publisher&#x00027;s note</title>
<p>All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.</p>
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