Neurocognitive theories of EF have traditionally focused on the role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in cognitive development (Diamond, 1988; Diamond and Goldman-Rakic, 1985), often neglecting the role of bodily actions. However, to fully understand EF development, it is crucial to examine how bodily actions and sensory experiences specifically shape EF abilities. For instance, Thelen and Smith (1994) highlight that EF, like other cognitive processes, emerges from the intricate interplay between sensory-motor experiences and neural development. They argue that EF development cannot be fully understood without considering how motor actions and sensory interactions with the environment contribute to neural growth and cognitive processes. Thus, the development of EF is deeply interconnected with bodily actions and sensory experiences. The development of the PFC and EF is not isolated from these embodied experiences but is shaped by them. This perspective challenges traditional views that separate brain mechanisms from embodied experiences and supports Shapiro's notion that cognitive functions, including EF, are not solely brain-based but are significantly influenced by interactions between neural processes and bodily actions.

Neurocognitive theories posit a need for internal mediating states (i.e., mental representations) that transform input into behavioral output (Lachman et al., 2015; Shapiro, 2007). While these theories suggest a form of representation in the brain, it is important to clarify that this representation is not necessarily a traditional “mental representation” of a goal. Instead, it may involve distributed elements that concern the body and its interactions with the environment (Wilson, 2002; Chemero, 2011). This form of representation can be considered embodied, as it involves neural processes that are closely linked to bodily experiences and actions (Foglia and Wilson, 2013; Clark, 1999). Therefore, the representation in neurocognitive theories may be more nuanced and distributed than a simple mental representation, and it can be seen as an embodiment of cognitive processes within the brain (Shapiro and Spaulding, 2021).

Neurocognitive theories predominantly attribute EF to brain regions, often overlooking the body and environment as significant cognitive factors (Shapiro, 2011). Early neurocognitive models of EF, such as Stuss and Benson's (1986), emphasize the role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and surrounding areas in behavioral control and alertness. These models describe how interactions and information processing within these brain regions enable planning, attentional control, monitoring, and response to external stimuli to achieve a goal (Stuss and Benson, 1986; Stuss et al., 1995). Consequently, impairments in executive functioning are often linked to damage in these brain areas (Benton, 1968; Milner, 1963; Stuss and Alexander, 2000).

While early theories emphasize neural activation in the brain as central to EF development, Diamond (1999) highlights the importance of movement and environmental interaction in shaping the neural regions critical for complex cognition. However, much of the literature on EF in early childhood continues to focus primarily on brain mechanisms, with studies like Moriguchi and Hiraki (2013) demonstrating correlations between prefrontal activation and EF abilities in young children. These studies often show abnormal functioning in the prefrontal areas in children with EF-related conditions like attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autism spectrum disorder (ASD; Moriguchi and Hiraki, 2013).

Although some efforts have been made to integrate movement into neurocognitive theories, these attempts typically serve as extensions to information-processing models. For instance, theories like that of Koziol et al. (2012) and Koziol and Lutz (2013) suggest that the brain evolved to support action, emphasizing interactions between motor-based brain regions (e.g., cerebellum, basal ganglia) and the PFC. While these perspectives acknowledge the importance of the body in cognitive development, they still prioritize internal processing through mental representations as the primary cognitive mechanism. This alignment with information-processing approaches suggests that according to neurocognitive theories, brain processes like those in the PFC primarily drive EF development, regardless of the body's role in environmental interaction and movement.

Attentional theories of early executive function (EF) development emphasize the role of attention as a mechanism for improving the internal processing of mental representations. These theories suggest that the activation of an attentional system is necessary for acquiring rule representations, which guide behavior (Shallice, 1988). While attentional theories focus on the mental processes of attention and representation, they pay less attention to the relationship between the body and concepts (Shapiro, 2011). Recent research has highlighted the connection between information gathering driven by attention and cognitive skills, such as problem-solving (Ossmy et al., 2020, 2022). This research suggests that attention plays a crucial role in gathering information from the environment to support cognitive processes. By directing attention to relevant stimuli and inhibiting irrelevant information, individuals can enhance their ability to focus on specific aspects of a task (Garon et al., 2008).

Furthermore, attentional theories prioritize attention as a mechanism for improving the internal processing of mental representations (Posner and Petersen, 1990; Rothbart et al., 2003). In attentional theories of EF development, the activation of an attentional system is necessary for acquiring a rule representation (Garon et al., 2008; Diamond, 2013; Zelazo, 2020; see Table 2). Therefore, any errors in executive function may arise when an individual fails to signal a mental representation for attending to appropriate stimuli in the environment and instead relies on a previously learned rule (Perner and Lang, 2002; Munakata et al., 2011.

Attentional theories of early executive function (EF) development emphasize an attention network of neural connections that regulate multiple brain regions in service of a goal (Rueda et al., 2004; Garon et al., 2008). While bodily action is not directly accounted for in attentional theories of EF, recent research suggests that embodiment may influence attention and EF development (Wunsch, 2013; Lockman, 2005, 2008; Ossmy et al., 2020).

The development of a core attentional system may rely heavily on motor skill development and engagement with the environment (Friedman et al., 2007; Lempers, 1979). For example, Smith and Gasser (2005) describe the development of attention systems through the coupling of sensory mechanisms, such as when infants look at an event that is producing sound. This interaction between sensory input and motor response highlights that attention is not solely a mental process but requires interactions between the body, mind, and environment to develop (Thelen et al., 2001).

Garon et al. (2014) and Diamond (2013) provide evidence that children's ability to perform more complex EF tasks improves with the development of attentional mechanisms. Many simpler EF tasks are motor-based, requiring the shifting of motor responses based on changes in the environment (Posner and Rothbart, 2007). As tasks become more complex, children utilize attention shifting, which involves shifting between mental representations of the environment. Tasks requiring high motor control may demand lower levels of attentional development, whereas tasks with higher internal processing may rely on the development of both the orienting and the anterior attentional systems (Posner and Rothbart, 2007). While attentional theories do not align with radical embodied perspectives, they may benefit from extending information-processing to incorporate the influence of movement in the development of a central attention system. However, empirical work examining movement within an attentional framework is limited.

A relationship between the body and concepts as mental representations have started to emerge within representational frameworks (see Table 2). For example, empirical work has examined movement as a method for encouraging the use of representation when cognitive control is needed (e.g., altering reaching patterns to encourage conscious reflection during EF tasks; Marcovitch et al., 2002; Clearfield et al., 2006), which advocates that the body and its interactions with external stimuli influence children's' ability to consciously direct behavior, so much so that movement may need to be included as a component within existing representational frameworks. However, the model does not currently recognize the ability to reflect and maintain mental representations as being body-dependent, which is the premise of conceptualization and the relationship between concepts and the body.

The representational theories of EF development generally oppose radical embodied cognition, primarily because the mechanism underlying EF development within representational theories is mental representation (see Table 2). Specifically, the formation and active retrieval of task-relevant information are stored and activated in the prefrontal cortex of the brain as mental representations. Any errors in executive function are a result of a failure to form an abstract representation and instead rely on a stimulus-specific representation (Munakata, 1998; Morton and Munakata, 2002).

Additionally, work has identified that early changes in motor skills may influence children's ability to form representations, therefore directly influencing the development of certain EF ability (Carlson et al., 2005; McClelland and Cameron, 2019), however, the model would identify the constituent of EF as mental representation with movement and contextual factors merely serving as a supplement to internal processing, therefore the cognitive system is composed of internal processes that store and manipulate mental representations (see Table 2).

Although there is evidence supporting components of radical embodied cognition, it is in its early stages and therefore, the role of the body has not been included in the existing representational frameworks. Furthermore, Shapiro (2011) notes that the three themes of radical embodied cognition are not individually exclusive and therefore because replacement is opposed in representational theories of EF development, these theories do not fall under a radical embodied perspective. They do, however, have the potential to incorporate some embodied perspectives within an existing information-processing model, but more work is needed to examine how movement can influence the formation and manipulation of mental representations.

Like Shapiro's radical hypothesis of conceptualization, systems theories suggest that bodily movement within the environment is critical for cognition (see Table 2). Under systems theories, an organism's body and the surrounding environment directly influence whether concepts can be acquired and therefore a multi-component cognitive system is necessary. Specifically, Thelen and Smith (2006) developed a dynamic systems lifespan approach with the foundation being that knowledge is gained from everyday actions. They suggested that behavior is guided by multiple interacting systems that are inherently flexible and self-organize into habit-forming states. Ultimately, proposing that behavior is built around habit (Spencer et al., 2012; Thelen and Smith, 1994). In many EF tasks for example, children receive multiple sources of input (i.e., task demands, context, experimenter cues) to gradually develop a pattern of task behavior. Once there is a change in the task demands, children's behavior is already grounded in a habit, therefore reducing the likelihood of carrying out conscious goal-directed behavior (Thelen et al., 2001).

Furthermore, replacement of the need for mental representations to guide behavior is evident in systems theories (see Table 2). For example, Smith (2005) posits that cognition is embedded within a physical body and world, reducing the need for all knowledge to be stored in the brain through representations. However, it is important to note that the authors of the dynamic systems approach to EF development are strong proponents of mental representation when defined as the mental actions or events that change with changes to the surrounding environment (Thelen et al., 2001).

Given the systemic nature of dynamic systems theories, multiple components can be identified as part of the cognitive system (see Table 2). These theories align closely with the hypothesis of constitution in radical embodied cognition, which posits that cognition is the temporal coupling of the body, world, and mental processing (Smith, 2005). Without this real-time interaction among an individual and features of its environment, many cognitive processes cannot be adequately explained.

Dynamic systems theories are particularly robust in conceptualizing the interplay between motor and cognitive systems. Empirical work supporting these theories highlights the bidirectional relationships between motor control and EF. For instance, Gottwald et al. (2016) suggest that EF and motor control develop in the first few years of life with the shared goal of controlling action. Their study, which examined relationships between EF tasks and a prospective motor control task, found significant correlations between simpler EF tasks (e.g., inhibition, working memory) and motor control, supporting the notion that movement is integral to linking higher-order cognition to the current context.

However, dynamic systems theories differ from more traditional EF theories, such as those proposed by Diamond (2013) and Stuss and Alexander (2000), which emphasize the neural and representational mechanisms underlying EF development. These theories prioritize the role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and adjacent brain regions in supporting EF but are less explicit in addressing how motor actions and environmental interactions contribute to cognitive development. Embodied cognition perspectives, in contrast, argue for a more integrated view, wherein bodily actions are constitutive of cognition itself rather than merely supportive.

Radical embodied cognition frameworks take this integration further by suggesting that cognitive processes, including EF, cannot be understood in isolation from the agent's active engagement with its environment. While traditional EF theories often conceptualize cognition as occurring “in the head,” dynamic systems and embodied cognition frameworks emphasize the distributed nature of cognition across neural, bodily, and environmental systems.

Despite these advancements, work is still limited in evaluating the integral role movement plays within dynamic systems and radical embodied cognition perspectives of EF development. This gap is particularly evident when considering how these frameworks account for the persistence of EF abilities across the lifespan. Unlike traditional theories, which focus on age-related changes in neural structures, embodied cognition approaches could offer unique insights into how movement-based interventions might support EF at different developmental stages.

Although the theories discussed in this section are separated for the purposes of the proposed review, they share substantial overlap and are not necessarily in conflict. For example, all theories acknowledge the roles of cognitive mechanisms (e.g., attention and representations) and brain regions such as the PFC. However, they differ in the degree to which they incorporate the role of motor control and interaction with the environment. Understanding how an agent's movement within the environment is essential to EF development not only during the critical preschool years but also throughout the lifespan will require further theoretical and empirical exploration.