Since the Paris Agreement’s adoption in 2015, the establishment of ‘net zero’ as the dominant framing of climate policy has made carbon dioxide removal (CDR) a necessary part of future climate responses, given the impossibility of eliminating absolutely all greenhouse gas emissions. The contribution that CDR can make to climate policy is crucial. However, the social and environmental consequences of removals are not equivalent to those of reductions (Carton et al., 2021), the amounts of sustainable removals will be limited (Deprez et al., 2024; Dooley et al., 2022a,b), and future amounts of available CDR are highly uncertain (Fuhrman et al., 2025). Still, it can be tempting for governments and businesses to over-rely on CDR in efforts to achieve net-zero (Stuart-Smith et al., 2025; Day et al., 2024). A we ‘need to do both’ framing around CDR and emissions reductions is common, but often lacks substance. This gives the impression of empty rhetoric that does little to address the risk that pursuing CDR could delay essential emission cuts.

CDR appears to align continued fossil fuel use and high-emission production and consumption with climate policy objectives, undermining emission reduction efforts (Carton et al., 2023; Palm et al., 2024; Hougaard, 2024). But CDR may fail to be deployed on a large enough scale, leaving societies locked into high-emissions pathways (Grant et al., 2021; Schleussner et al., 2024). The risk that over-reliance on CDR may cause delay to emissions reduction is expressed through a growing body of research on ‘mitigation deterrence’ (McLaren, 2016; Markusson et al., 2018). Paris Agreement 1.5 °C pathways that are viable in the context of the coupled biodiversity and climate crises are those that do not over-rely on CDR (Deprez et al., 2024; Dooley et al., 2024). Mitigation deterrence could be causing a very substantial 0.3–1.5 °C overshoot of the 1.5 °C limit (McLaren, 2020; Grant et al., 2021). Carbon removal is therefore crucially important, both as a (relatively minor) part of the climate mitigation solution, but also as a large part of the problem of delay.

The risk of mitigation deterrence can ensue from the pursuit of CDR, that is, just the expectation that there will be CDR available in the future can be enough to deter and delay emissions reductions, even before much investment has occurred. The stronger the assumption about equivalence and substitutability between CDR and emissions reductions, the bigger the risk of over-reliance on CDR (McLaren, 2016; Carton et al., 2021), and the bigger the impact if CDR fails to materialise (Schleussner et al., 2024). The precise mechanisms for causing deterrence varies by the type of CDR (e.g., different risks of storage failure, or different rebound effects, see McLaren, 2020), but there is also a risk from CDR as an overall category, since a state or business may not care or even specify what kind of CDR they plan to use to offset their emissions. Finally, while CDR has a crucial role under net zero policy, as mentioned above, it is far from the only thing that could deter mitigation; emissions reductions/avoidance offsets, or other technology promises could too (Low and Boettcher, 2020).

There is a substantial literature on the framing of CDR. It covers framing in both relatively technical, expert contexts (e.g., Bellamy, 2022), or in public understanding (e.g., Cox et al., 2022; Low et al., 2024; Shrum et al., 2020). Many different frames have been identified, including CDR techniques as either natural or engineered (alternatively technical, or novel), and CDR as a climate solution or useful in other ways (e.g., Waller et al., 2021). While some studies identify framings of CDR as a substitute for emissions reductions (Bellamy and Raimi, 2023; Carton et al., 2023), only von Rothkirch et al. (2024) address the specific question of how framings promoting the simultaneous use of removals and emissions reduction might downplay the deterrence risk.

While some awareness about deterrence risks exists among CDR stakeholders, including scientists, policy makers and entrepreneurs (e.g., von Rothkirch et al., 2024), a key concern remains that ‘discursively addressing mitigation deterrence risks might help legitimize CDR without leading to coordinated action to reduce [these risks]’ (von Rothkirch et al., 2024). In this opinion piece, we discuss how communication on CDR at times mentions these risks, but often only in a relatively limited and fleeting manner. In contrast, precise framings would state the reasons that make CDR inadequate to do the heavy lifting, recognise the established mitigation hierarchy of prioritising reductions over removals (IPCC, 2022) and clarify what prioritising steep reductions specifically entails.

We develop a typology of varieties of the ‘do both’ framing, arranged along a spectrum from inadequate and vague to precise and present examples of good practice. The typology and examples build on framings collected from recent scientific, governmental, and corporate publications. We argue that the discussion about CDR and deterrence is now mature enough for CDR stakeholders to be more careful in their communication about what legitimate roles CDR can play or not in climate policy.

Today, it is rare to hear statements explicitly calling for CDR to compensate for slow emissions reductions. However, many scenarios in the IPCC deploying large-scale CDR de facto allow for slower transition away from fossil fuels (see, e.g., Deprez et al., 2024). Overshoot scenarios often rely on optimistic assumptions about future CDR compensating for inadequate early mitigation (Overshoot Conference, 2025). In the past, other technologies, such as carbon capture and storage and solar radiation management methods, have been suggested as a way to buy time for the implementation of other adaptation and decarbonisation strategies (Bauer, 2005; Neuber and Ott, 2020).

It is still common to introduce—or ‘frame’—CDR with a vague imperative to ‘do both’, i.e., to both develop CDR and make efforts to reduce emissions (WEF, 2023; ICDK, 2024). For example, the CDR market platform company Carbonfuture (2024) writes:

Such a framing does not clarify the priority of emissions reductions on the road to net zero, and thus allows misinterpretations of CDR doing the heavy lifting.

Other framings are somewhat clearer about the need for large and rapid emissions cuts, yet foreground the role of CDR. For example, researchers Prütz et al. (2024) write ‘To comply with the Paris Agreement and to limit global warming to 1.5 °C, rapid and deep reductions in gross CO₂ emissions need to be complemented by active carbon dioxide removal (CDR) from the atmosphere’. In turn, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) developer Airfix (2024) writes:

Further framings spell out that emissions reduction needs to make the most important contribution. For example, the insurance company Axa (2024) states that emissions should be reduced ‘first and foremost’. Similarly, the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (2022) states:

These framings are clearer in the prioritisation of emissions reductions over removals. They lack precision in that they: frame out the politics, trade-offs and conflicts that limit the potential of CDR (Carton et al., 2023), and fall short in describing what ‘reductions first’ concretely entails. The risk of mitigation deterrence is serious enough to merit more careful framing.

We propose that stakeholder framings of CDR must be explicit (qualitatively or quantitatively) about the relative magnitude of the contribution of emissions reduction versus CDR, clearly indicating the limits of CDR and why steep emission cuts are the near-term priority. The table below provides examples of good practice, which capture elements of responsible framing (Table 1).

Framings must also—where possible—be explicit about the amount of emissions reduction required, when they are needed, and from what key sectors (phasing out fossil fuels, halting deforestation, shifting diets, etc.) (Carton et al., 2023). For example, the Club of Rome’s (2023) COP28 Statement made an authoritative contribution to the debate stating that ‘The most recent assessments of pathways to limit warming at 1.5 °C show that by 2050 all unabated use of coal needs to be completely phased-out, while oil and unabated gas need to be phased down by 60–90%’. Such a statement leaves little room for interpreting that the bigger problem we face today in climate policy is getting CDR deployed at scale.

Beyond these minimum requirements, we make the following recommendations for how to limit mitigation deterrence risks when writing about CDR:

Better framing of discussions of CDR by stakeholders is necessary to create a shared understanding of CDR’s specific, limited role, but will not by itself solve the problem of mitigation deterrence. Careful framing alone cannot guarantee a ‘lagom’ (Swedish word, meaning not too much nor too little) proportion of CDR to emissions reductions. The risk of ending up with too little CDR is clear, especially closer to the time of net zero when we will need considerable amounts. The lacklustre history of carbon capture and storage applied to point sources of fossil-derived CO₂ does not bode well. But it is also easy to see how we could end up with too much unsustainable CDR that causes negative impacts on biodiversity and food security through reliance on large areas of land (Deprez et al., 2024; Dooley et al., 2024) or projects that do not in practice deliver removals. In order to bootstrap the development of CDR, it is necessary to promote the possibility these techniques offer, and so exaggerations and downplaying of risks are virtually unavoidable. Yet humility is needed about the scope for knowing the precise amount that can be deployed and what is a lagom level of sustainable CDR to argue for.

Under what conditions can mitigation deterrence be avoided, and a sustainable removals budget be implemented? A context is needed that does not favour empty promises or imprecise cautions. Careful CDR framing is crucial, as one among several important actions. Further popular mobilisation in support of ambitious climate policy and ensuing policy action is needed. Unregulated voluntary offset markets are not helping, and instead regulation (to avoid unsustainable or ineffective removals) and public planning (to get the amounts right) will be critical. Separation of carbon removal targets from emissions reductions targets is needed for creating transparency and ensuring the need for emission reductions are not obscured by CDR (McLaren et al., 2019; Allen et al., 2024). This would expose assumptions about incumbent industries, making net zero climate politics more transparent, and help government planning.

International cooperation is essential to advance these agendas. Framing CDR with clarity about the relative magnitude and priority of emission reduction versus removals is critical for ambitious mitigation strategies. While the risk of mitigation deterrence cannot be eliminated, vague pledges to pursue both emission cuts and CDR risk diluting accountability and undermining action. Clear and disciplined framing of CDR as a complement—not a substitute—for deep emissions reductions is therefore imperative.