Nigeria is located on the western coast of Africa. It is a federation of 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory (FCT; see Figure 1). Each of the 36 states is a semi-autonomous political unit that shares powers with the federal government as enumerated under the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Nigeria is divided into six geopolitical zones: North-East, North-West, North-Central, South-East, South-West, and South–South, with a total land area of 923,768 square kilometers and an extensive coastline of approximately 853 km. Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, with a population exceeding 200 million. With an abundance of natural resources, notably large deposits of petroleum and natural gas, Nigeria has developed a fossil-fuel-dependent economy, with oil and gas exports representing a significant share of its foreign exchange income and trade balance. With its status as an important fossil fuel producer, Nigeria is the fourth biggest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter on the continent (Climate Action Tracker, 2023), coming after South Africa, Egypt, and Algeria.

Nigeria has a diverse geography, with climates ranging from arid to humid equatorial; and characterized by three distinct climate zones: a Sahelian hot and semi-arid climate in the North, a tropical wet climate in the South and a tropical savannah climate in significant parts of Northcentral region. There are two main precipitation regimes: a low precipitation in the North and high precipitation in most parts of the South. Climate change vulnerability analyses indicate that states located further north are more vulnerable than those located further south. The challenges associated with climate change vary across the country, as exposure factors differ regionally. Subsistence agricultural activity is generally seen as the most significant economic activity that is vulnerable to climate change.

Nigeria is ranked as the 8th most climate-vulnerable country in the world, according to the Climate Risk Index (Adil et al., 2025). According to the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN), Nigeria ranks 154th out of 185 countries on its country index, placing it among the 30 most vulnerable countries globally (ND-GAIN Index, 2021). Nigeria’s susceptibility to climate change is linked to its extensive geographic distribution. Weather extremes, such as drought, desertification, gully and coastal erosion, flooding, and erratic rainfall, are some of the effects of climate change in Nigeria (Federal Government of Nigeria (FGoN), 2020; Shiru et al., 2020). Flooding is a dominant climate impact in the Northcentral states of Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, FCT, and Niger. The main impact of climate change in the North is desertification, land degradation, and drought (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, [UN OCHA], 2017; Azare et al., 2020). For the South, the major types of climate change impacts are flooding, gully erosion, and coastal erosion, which have led to the loss of arable land.

More frequent climate extremes with an increased loss of life and property, as well as damage to ecological systems and infrastructure are reported (Shiru et al., 2020). Moreover, climate change is a source of conflict over waterholes in the Northern region, while in the South, communal conflicts arise over freshwater resources as they become scarce (Azare et al., 2020). The estimated cost of climate change to Nigeria is between 6 and 30% of its GDP by 2050, worth between USD 100 billion and USD 460 billion (DFID, 2009; Federal Government of Nigeria (FGoN), 2020). Threats to food security are high as agriculture bears the brunt of the effects of climate change. Moreover, related issues such as lack of basic amenities, insufficient infrastructure, and inequality have been exacerbated by climate change (Owebor et al., 2025).

Climate change is increasingly featured in national discussions and political debates, but there is a sense that many government policy pronouncements are made in response to donor pressure and global climate events and are rarely translated into practical action. The Nigerian government is committed to achieving Net Zero by 2060 and has initiated some projects at different levels to facilitate the process. Despite the climate change initiatives at the federal level, the state of climate policy development and the capacity of states and local governments to address the challenge of climate change has hardly been seriously considered in national policy debates.

The research approach comprised (i) desk review, (ii) a national survey of a diverse range of stakeholders, and (iii) a national stakeholder workshop involving over 600 participants. First, the research team conducted an extensive search and review of climate policies and actions in the 36 states of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Data were collated from secondary sources, including published materials, policy statements, reports, newspapers, and websites. Consistent with the study’s objective, the team searched for evidence of the availability of a climate policy and/or action plan in the states, evidence of climate vulnerability, and evidence of the inclusion of climate change in the state budgets. The research team also downloaded and reviewed the budgets of the states to assess the extent to which they have allocated funds for climate action.

The second aspect of the research method involved an extensive survey involving 1,306 participants from across the country. To identify survey respondents, including Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) engaged in the development and implementation of climate policies at the subnational level, we first conducted a stakeholder mapping exercise, following which the team sent both online and physical surveys. The stakeholder mapping and survey administration were done in close collaboration between the research team, the Nigeria Governors Forum, and the Department for Climate Change (DCC) of the Federal Ministry of Environment. The use of the Google platform for the online survey instrument facilitated the extensive distribution of the survey among subnational stakeholders. Figures 2–5 show the distribution of the respondents based on states (2), gender (3), age group (4), and employment (5). The information shows that the vast majority of the people who completed the survey are civil servants.

The survey questionnaire was distributed between July and September of 2023 to 1,510 respondents across the 36 states of Nigeria. A total of 1,306 people returned their completed surveys, yielding an over 90% return rate (See Appendix 1 for the consent form and survey questions). Having analyzed the survey results and triangulated the responses through further independent research and speaking with seven experts, a preliminary report was drafted and used as a basis for a national stakeholder workshop. The hybrid workshop, held in Abuja in December 2023, involved the participation of over 600 stakeholders, many of whom were among those who completed the survey. The workshop involved the presentation and discussion of the reports, including key takeaways, governance, and policy implications.

The research measured perceptions of climate impact, level of climate knowledge and awareness, as well as the quality of climate governance in the 36 states of Nigeria, including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Specific indicators of governance include the presence or absence of a subnational climate policy and climate action, evidence of climate change appropriations in states’ budgets, and the quality of collaboration with state and non-state actors in the states. Documents from ministries, departments, and agencies, as well as current national climate policies, serve as the foundation for information obtained from secondary data sources. The Google form facilitated analysis, and simple percentages and ranking were used in the data analysis; the results were cross-checked with existing literature.

As previously mentioned, this study represents the first attempt to systematically map climate awareness across Nigeria’s states. It fills a gap in existing scholarship. While subnational climate governance has been studied in places like Latin America, comparable work remains scarce in Nigeria and much of Africa. By focusing on state institutions and governance structures, this research creates a clear baseline that others can build upon. The survey tools and analytical framework were intentionally designed so they can be replicated and adapted elsewhere, offering a foundation for both comparative studies and shared learning across different regions.

However, despite the novelty, certain methodological limits must be acknowledged. The questionnaire has not undergone statistical validation, such as tests of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) or factor analysis, which would have confirmed whether the questions consistently capture the same underlying ideas. Furthermore, there were no tools and analysis to mitigate the challenges associated with self-reporting of climate knowledge awareness of the respondents. These are fruitful areas for future studies. Our choice of method is justified by the exploratory aim of mapping variation across regions rather than developing a standardized scale. Hence our approach not only contributes a first baseline but also provides a framework that can be reproduced and adapted in other contexts.

Survey findings indicate a fragmented landscape of climate knowledge among subnational stakeholders (Table 1). Of the 1,306 respondents, 51.2% rated their climate knowledge as low, 42.5% rated it as moderate, and only 7.3% reported having high levels of understanding. The high percentage of respondents that report low to medium knowledge of climate change is particularly concerning given most respondents are civil servants that one would have expected to be very familiar with climate change, sustainability, and environmental decision making.

A low or an uneven knowledge base of climate change obviously constitutes a major institutional bottleneck for effective policy development and implementation at the subnational level. While some studies have found that individual awareness or knowledge of climate change does not always translate to institutional or communal capacity (Amundsen et al., 2010; Tanner et al., 2009), there is plenty of work that has found that a persistent knowledge gap and low technical capacity among civil servants hinders effective policy formulation and implementation. Meckling and Benkler (2024), find that sound knowledge and capacity to enforce, monitor and implement are core determinants of climate policy ambition and effectiveness. A systematic review of barriers to adaptation policy at the national scale (Lee et al., 2022) finds that several studies identify limited staff expertise a key barrier that degrade policy quality and execution. The work of Biesbroek et al. (2018) which studied the link between public administration and climate adaptation shows that limited literacy, skill and learning system compromise the quality of climate ambition and implementation.

State-level disaggregation revealed that only four states—Ebonyi, Katsina, Nasarawa, and Plateau—exhibited the highest self-reported climate knowledge (50% or more). In contrast, Delta and Taraba states recorded the lowest levels, with 9 and 27% of respondents, respectively. These disparities highlight structural imbalances in capacity and investment in public awareness and institutional development, a pattern consistent with other federal systems grappling with decentralized climate governance (Fenton and Gustasfsson 2017).

At the same time, one must note that remarkable progress has been made on climate governance in some states. A relatively high level of awareness of climate change by respondents from Lagos State corresponds with remarkable bold steps on climate adaptation in that state, including a Lagos Climate Adaptation and Resilience Plan (LCARP, Lagos State Government, 2024) which is designed to address the vulnerabilities of the city to climate impact and equip decision makers with knowledge and data-driven assessment tools to calculate the economic cost of climate change and potential solutions. Similarly, its investments in electric vehicles, better public transport, and walking and cycling infrastructure are easing congestion while lowering emissions. Waste management reforms, including restrictions on single-use plastics, are addressing one of the city’s most significant environmental challenges (Olaoti, 2024). At the same time, coastal protection projects such as Eko Atlantic and grassroots efforts in communities like Makoko are helping residents adapt to flooding and erosion risks (Orimoogunje and Aniramu, 2025).

Although there is increasing engagement at the institutional level, public climate awareness remains critically low. Only 7% of respondents reported a perception of high levels of public awareness of climate change in their states, while more than 50% rated awareness as low (Figure 6). Zamfara exhibited the most pronounced climate awareness deficit, with 90% of respondents saying they believe the citizen of the state have low awareness of climate change. In contrast, respondents from Akwa Ibom and Jigawa posted perception of relatively high public awareness levels, likely attributable to localized NGO activity and targeted communication efforts. These results reinforce recent studies (Nkiaka et al., 2017) that identify limited or absence of sustained public engagement in promoting climate awareness in Nigeria. They also underscore the need for a communication-centered governance framework that makes climate discourse more accessible, especially in rural and underserved communities.

The research assessed the extent of climate policy development in the 36 states. Our investigation shows only seven (7) states and the FCT have climate policy documents that were publicly accessible (Figure 7). These states are largely those where political will, proactive political leadership, or “climate champions” facilitated the emergence of policy.

However, our analysis showed that most of the existing state-level policies were misaligned with the national climate policy framework, including the National Climate Change Policy (2021), the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), the Energy Transition Plan (ETP), and the National Adaptation Plan (NAP). Several of the policies were a long list of intended actions with no quantification of emissions and limited or no clear connection to the delivery of national or global climate targets. A sentiment widely shared by the workshop participants was that the development of climate policies by states was often a product of the action of few individuals that may not be strongly connected to mainstream economic development in the states or a response to some funding from international agencies rather than intended by the key political actors to radically alter the trajectory of development toward low-carbon paths. There was also a strong consensus among workshop participants that neither the federal government nor international donor agencies were doing enough to encourage states to translate national level targets (e.g., Net-zero by 2060, NDC, Energy Transition Plans) into state level climate goals.

Evidence from literature suggests that many other countries in both developed and developing countries struggle with vertical integration of climate governance, most especially in federal systems where there are limited standardized governance structures (Jörgensen et al., 2015b; Jogesh and Paul, 2020). Moreover, the absence of a unified national template or standards for climate policy development at the subnational level has widened the gap in ambition, structure, and implementation fidelity. This is also an outcome of structural imbalance between the federal and state governments, where power and instruments of governance are held by the former, with the latter facing political and economic barriers in financing climate action (Okoh, 2020).

According to the survey, only 12 states have any form of Climate Action Plan. However, only the Action Plan from Lagos included measurable long-term targets over a given time scale (2020–2025). Interestingly 19.4% of respondents affirmed the existence of climate plans where documentary evidence showed no such plan existed and 53% declared they were uncertain whether a plan existed or not (Table 2). These numbers reveal a critical knowledge and institutional gap, further complicated by the knowledge and awareness gap discussed in previous sectors. It also reveals ambiguity over what constitutes a climate change action plan and indicates the need for some kind of guidance or template to promote some level of standardization for subnational climate planning.

With regard to implementation, 39.7% of respondents acknowledged being aware of ongoing climate projects in their states, 45% were unsure, and 15% reported there were none. Documentary evidence and discussion during the national workshop suggested that more climate or climate-related projects were actually going on in the states than suggested by the respondents. One major discussion point that proved controversial during the workshop was how to decide what counted as climate change project. While some thought a climate project must be solely decided dedicated to reducing emissions or enhancing climate resilience directly, others felt that projects like improved urban transportation or improved seedlings which have climate-co benefits should also be counted. Where there was more consensus was on the point that most climate and climate-related activities were fragmented, donor-driven, and lacked long-term sustainability mechanisms (Table 3).

In any case, there was a strong sense among workshop participants and the expert interviewees that state-level climate policies and action plans in Nigeria remains ill-defined and fragmented. As several interviewees noted, most relevant policies are scattered across sectors lacking the coherence needed for effective climate governance. This reflects not only limited institutional capacity but also a structural deficit in vertical coordination between federal and state governments. The survey confirms that across all 36 states, there is no standard template or framework for climate planning—a gap that perpetuates disparities in policy ambition, design, and implementation.

Fiscal support is key driver or enabler for climate action at all levels of government. Accordingly, we decided to explore the extent to which state governments make provisions for climate action in their budgets. This question was also intended to trigger awareness that developing country states could not reasonably rely solely on international climate finance to fund climate ambition. The analysis revealed that only six states had dedicated budget lines for climate change (Figure 8). It was also found that even where climate-related interventions exist, such as in sectors addressing erosion control, renewable energy, or afforestation, they are rarely coordinated under a unified thematic umbrella. According to the survey results, 55% of states do not explicitly budget for climate-related activities. Budgeting, where it existed, was found to be often ad hoc and lacking strategic coherence, undermining implementation efficiency and long-term planning. This fragmented funding structure aligns with critiques in the existing literature, which identify the lack of financial mainstreaming as a key barrier to subnational climate governance (Pindiriri and Kwaramba, 2024).

Jurisdictional overlaps, unclear mandates, and institutional silos inhibit effective collaboration between state agencies, civil society, and the private sector (Lee et al., 2022). The survey also revealed that 32% of respondents confirmed the existence of multi-stakeholder partnerships in their states, while 48.5% were unsure whether their states had such a structure. Imo state stood out negatively, with 42% of respondents indicating a complete absence of collaborative frameworks. This supports earlier analyses (Okoh and Okpanachi, 2023) emphasizing that policy fragmentation, lack of interagency coordination and limited collaboration with private and civil society organizations severely constrain climate action in Nigeria. The over-reliance on federal leadership further weakens the operational autonomy of subnational actors.

There is some evidence that private sector investments and public-private partnerships (PPPs) play pivotal roles in enhancing subnational climate governance in Nigeria. In Lagos State, for instance, private companies such as First Bank have funded drainage rehabilitation and flood mitigation projects, complementing state-led urban planning initiatives and reducing flood risks in vulnerable communities. Similarly, companies like D.light have partnered with state governments in northern Nigeria, including Kano and Jigawa, to deploy solar home systems and mini-grids, enhancing energy access in off-grid areas and supporting state renewable energy goals. However, political interferences have limited the widespread diffusion of renewable energy solutions in the country, as most PPPs are awarded to political patrons with limited capacity (Okoh, 2020).

Stakeholders identified multiple barriers to effective subnational climate governance. Chief among them are: (i) federal-subnational power asymmetries (40%), (ii) political contestation and elite interests (20%), (iii) limited planning capacity, (iv) inadequate intergovernmental coordination, and (v) a dearth of technically competent personnel. These constraints are deeply rooted in structural and institutional deficiencies, consistent with scholarly insights on the limits of decentralized climate governance (Eckersley, 2017; Pierre and Peters, 2020). To date, many states have prioritized immediate development challenges over climate goals, thereby relegating climate policy to a secondary or symbolic role.

While suggestions for strategies varied among respondents, a significant majority (50%) advocated for a non-structural, capacity-centered approach that prioritizes community-driven planning, backed by federal technical and financial support (Figure 9). Approximately 20% recommended integrating climate risk reduction into broader development plans, while 32% emphasized the deployment of low-carbon technologies, particularly solar energy. The majority (94%) agreed that subnational governments urgently require support in developing and implementing climate policies and green investment programs, especially in operationalizing the nascent carbon markets at the subnational level to rapidly increase revenue flows to green projects.

Key priority areas identified include waste management (especially waste to wealth) (79%), climate education (72%), afforestation (65%), recycling (65%), renewable energy (64%), and climate finance (43%; Figure 9). Furthermore, 26% of respondents supported the creation of a subnational environmental disclosure and rating system to monitor industrial emissions and enhance transparency. This reflects knowledge of international best practices where voluntary or mandatory environmental disclosure mechanisms serve as performance levers for local governance (Wang et al., 2004).

Survey participants and national workshop participants share the view on the need for improved communication and expedited decision-making, which was central to their suggestions. They further called for more comprehensive, “action-orientated plans” at the subnational level—ones that are both detailed and responsive to local specificities while remaining aligned with national climate aspirations. Survey results show that 92% of responds strongly agree that subnational governments need technical and financial assistance in developing and implementing climate policy, programs, and action plans (74% of respondents). Similarly workshop participants emphasized that financial support for subnational climate programs and green investments is not merely desirable but constitute a structural imperative for effective multilevel climate governance in Nigeria. Over again it was reiterated that subnational governments lack the fiscal autonomy, technical capacity and the institutional frameworks necessary to design and implement robust climate initiatives. Targeted interventions are essential not only to strengthen programmatic development and investment pipelines but also to embed those within coherent national frameworks.

Another main governance innovation advanced during the workshop and by expert interviewees was to institute an environmental information and disclosure system at the subnational level as a means of stimulating a race to the top, rewarding exemplary practice and shaming the laggards. It was consistently emphasized that in the absence of strong political will and adequate capacity to enforce regulation, information disclosure in the form of ratings and rankings could be a major key to unlocking climate action at the subnational level. Participants noted that proliferation and seeming effectiveness of similar initiatives globally including in developing countries where pollution intensive economic activities are rated and information divulged as either voluntarily or mandated by law (Wang et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2013; Boatemaa Darko-Mensah and Okereke, 2013; Situ and Tilt, 2018; Alhaj and Mansor, 2019).

There was also a strong call to integrate local communities into subnational climate governance. It was noted that some states such as Lagos, Ebonyi, Taraba, and Gombe, had already demonstrated that climate governance can be more effective when local realities and community are allowed to drive policy design and implementation. Our work did not delve into the role of local governments which is the third and frequently the most neglected tier of governance structure in Nigeria. However, it was noted that Lagos State, for instance, combined institutional commitment, strategic planning, and engagement with local government and communities to create a climate governance model that aims to address both mitigation and adaptation. Through its Climate Adaptation and Resilience Plan (LCARP) and partnerships with the private sector, Lagos was deemed to have shown that state-led initiatives can complement federal policies while filling gaps left by top-down approaches.

The analysis shows that most Nigerian states lack comprehensive climate action plans or operate with fragmented strategies scattered across sectoral lines. Where policies exist, they are seldom aligned with national frameworks such as the NDC or the ETP. This condition reflects broader governance weakness in Nigeria where incoherent, incoherent mandates, overlapping jurisdictions, and limited inter-agency coordination undermine the effectiveness of public policy (Koblowsky and Ifejika-Speranza, 2012; Okafor et al., 2024). In multilevel governance (MLG) terms, this reveals a structural deficit in vertical coordination between federal and state governments. Rather than providing consistent guidance and harmonized standards federal organs have focuses on horizontal coordination at the national level, leaving states without templates or benchmarks for action.

Comparatively, federations such as India have attempted to address this by requiring state-level climate action plans under a national framework (Jörgensen et al., 2015b; Jogesh and Paul, 2020) while Brazil’s Amazonian states have developed jurisdiction-specific policies that are formally linked to federal climate and deforestation goals (DiGiano et al., 2020). The absence of such tools and mechanism in Nigeria is a constraint on effective multilevel governance of climate change and has resulted in disparities in ambition and implementation across states. Lack of institutional capacity is also manifest in the weakness of institutional processes, procedure needed to foster inter-agency coordination, policy integration, collaboration and feedback from private, CSO and community level actors.

The survey results reveal a low level of climate literacy among civil servants and uneven awareness among the public, with especially stark deficit in northern states. These disparities are significantly associated with educational attainment levels, echoing earlier findings by Odjugo (2013), Azeez et al. (2024) and Ogunji et al. (2025), which tend to indicate that a general higher level of education correlates with higher awareness and engagement with environmental issues. In governance terms, limited knowledge and awareness is not just a technical issue; it also weakness the legitimacy and sustainability of climate policies. Without an informed and engaged citizenry, climate policies struggle to gain legitimacy and public ownership, which in turn undermines participatory governance and the long-term effectiveness of adaptation strategies. The literature suggests that without broad-based awareness and participation, climate policy risks being elite-driven, symbolic, and short-lived (Odjugo, 2013; Nkiaka et al., 2017). In contrast, a good example exists in South Africa where public engagement and awareness campaigns in the provinces such as KwaZulu-Natal led to the securing of strong legitimacy provincial climate strategies.

In addition, our work shows that securing political buy-in from Nigerian states and citizens requires framing climate action as complementary to core development goals, such as poverty reduction and infrastructure development. Lagos, for instance, has linked its Climate Action Plan to urban development and private investment, and Taraba frame renewable energy initiatives as tools for rural electrification and livelihoods. Embedding sustainable development objectives into climate project and plans and linking it to financing opportunities reduces the perception of trade-offs, while incentives such as performance-based grants and recognition schemes, alongside coalitions of political and community leaders, can strengthen ownership and commitment (Avellaneda and Bello-Gómez, 2024).

The research found that lack of finance constitutes a major critical barrier in fostering subnational climate action in Nigeria. While national-level climate finance channels have improved, they are poorly aligned with subnational needs and capacities. Only a handful of states have a dedicated line for climate change and even these remain modest and fragmented. Often, climate-related expenditures are buried within general environmental budgets, blurring the lines of accountability and diluting the strategic intent of climate spending. In most cases, elites with vested interests determine the climate action implemented, pulling it toward divergent ends. This reinforces Xu (2021) argument that elite capture and distributive politics in federated systems often result in inequitable access to climate finance, hence undermining multilevel governance. As Olajide (2022) notes, such conditions foster rent-seeking behavior and institutional opacity, which further erode public trust in governance systems.

Limited and fragmented climate finance is not peculiar to Nigeria. Comparable challenges are observed in Mexico and Indonesia where decentralization has provided uneven fiscal capacity across subnational units, leading to fragmented or symbolic climate programs (Wilder and Romero Lankao, 2006; Valenzuela, 2014; Sulistiawati and Rembeth, 2025). For Nigeria increasing earmarked fiscal transfers and creating transparent, performance-based funding mechanisms will be critical to overcoming these distortions.

Despite these challenges the study highlights potential innovations that could transform Nigeria’s subnational climate governance landscape. Chief among these is the proposal for environmental/climate disclosure and rating system at the state level. By incentivizing competition, rewarding good practice and shamming laggards, such systems can stimulate a “race to the top,” even in context of weak enforcement capacity (Wang et al., 2004; Alhaj and Mansor, 2019). Importantly this approach aligns with global best practices and can be adapted to Nigeria’s institutional realities. Subnational climate rating, ranking and disclosure initiatives could serve as transparency-enhancing tools by tracking emissions and climate actions at both the subnational and industrial levels. In addition to increasing accountability and public engagement, such mechanisms could help synchronize local and national greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories, thereby improving Nigeria’s overall reporting under the Enhanced Transparency Framework of the Paris Agreement. However, their effectiveness is currently limited by the absence of robust and standardized policy criteria at the subnational level.

Equally significant is the potential of hybrid governance models that combine federal guidance, subnational experimentation and private sector partnerships. Federal institutions can provide overarching legal and reporting framework consistent with the Paris Agreement, while states tailor interventions to local realities—such as desertification in the North, flooding in the East and costal erosion in the Niger Delta. Private sector actors complement these efforts by financing green infrastructure, supporting standardized reporting, and introducing accountability mechanisms. Together, this hybrid model balances national coherence with local experimentation, fostering a multilevel governance system that avoids fragmentation and accelerates climate action. Examples from Lagos (urban resilience and transport reform) and Taraba (renewable energy for rural electrification) show that context-sensitive innovation is possible when climate action is framed as complementary to core development objective.