<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Publishing DTD v1.3 20210610//EN" "JATS-journalpublishing1-3-mathml3.dtd">
<article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:ali="http://www.niso.org/schemas/ali/1.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" article-type="review-article" dtd-version="1.3" xml:lang="EN">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">Front. Blockchain</journal-id>
<journal-title-group>
<journal-title>Frontiers in Blockchain</journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title abbrev-type="pubmed">Front. Blockchain</abbrev-journal-title>
</journal-title-group>
<issn pub-type="epub">2624-7852</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name>Frontiers Media S.A.</publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">1644115</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.3389/fbloc.2025.1644115</article-id>
<article-version article-version-type="Version of Record" vocab="NISO-RP-8-2008"/>
<article-categories>
<subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
<subject>Review</subject>
</subj-group>
</article-categories>
<title-group>
<article-title>Decentralized physical infrastructure networks (DePIN) tokenomics</article-title>
<alt-title alt-title-type="left-running-head">Alshater</alt-title>
<alt-title alt-title-type="right-running-head">
<ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2025.1644115">10.3389/fbloc.2025.1644115</ext-link>
</alt-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes">
<name>
<surname>Alshater</surname>
<given-names>Muneer Maher</given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"/>
<xref ref-type="corresp" rid="c001">&#x2a;</xref>
<uri xlink:href="https://loop.frontiersin.org/people/3095262"/>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Conceptualization" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/conceptualization/">Conceptualization</role>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Methodology" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/methodology/">Methodology</role>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Software" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/software/">Software</role>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Validation" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/validation/">Validation</role>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Formal analysis" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/Formal analysis/">Formal analysis</role>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Investigation" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/investigation/">Investigation</role>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Resources" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/resources/">Resources</role>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Data curation" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/data curation/">Data curation</role>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Writing &#x2013; original draft" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/writing-original-draft/">Writing &#x2013; original draft</role>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Writing &#x2013; review &#x26; editing" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/Writing - review &#x26; editing/">Writing - review and editing</role>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Visualization" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/visualization/">Visualization</role>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Supervision" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/supervision/">Supervision</role>
<role vocab="credit" vocab-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/" vocab-term="Project administration" vocab-term-identifier="https://credit.niso.org/contributor-roles/project administration/">Project administration</role>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="aff1">
<institution>Department of Islamic Banking, The University of Jordan</institution>, <city>Amman</city>, <country country="JO">Jordan</country>
</aff>
<author-notes>
<corresp id="c001">
<label>&#x2a;</label>Correspondence: Muneer Maher Alshater, <email xlink:href="mailto:muneermaher@gmail.com">muneermaher@gmail.com</email>
</corresp>
</author-notes>
<pub-date publication-format="electronic" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2026-03-09">
<day>09</day>
<month>03</month>
<year>2026</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date publication-format="electronic" date-type="collection">
<year>2025</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>8</volume>
<elocation-id>1644115</elocation-id>
<history>
<date date-type="received">
<day>09</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2025</year>
</date>
<date date-type="rev-recd">
<day>18</day>
<month>11</month>
<year>2025</year>
</date>
<date date-type="accepted">
<day>25</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2025</year>
</date>
</history>
<permissions>
<copyright-statement>Copyright &#xa9; 2026 Alshater.</copyright-statement>
<copyright-year>2026</copyright-year>
<copyright-holder>Alshater</copyright-holder>
<license>
<ali:license_ref start_date="2026-03-09">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</ali:license_ref>
<license-p>This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY)</ext-link>. The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.</license-p>
</license>
</permissions>
<abstract>
<p>Decentralized Physical Infrastructure Networks (DePIN) utilize crypto-economic incentives to orchestrate the crowdsourced deployment and operation of real-world infrastructure. The design and long-term viability of their tokenomic systems are central to their potential but represent a complex and rapidly evolving field. This scoping review provides a structured synthesis of DePIN tokenomics, moving beyond descriptive mapping to organize its core design primitives into a coherent analytical model. Following the Arksey and O&#x27;Malley framework and PRISMA-ScR guidelines, this review charts and synthesizes data thematically. Key findings reveal a prevailing &#x201c;DePIN Flywheel&#x201d; pattern grounded in a Burn-and-Mint Equilibrium, where demand is monetized through fiat-denominated usage credits created by burning the network&#x2019;s native token. This mechanism, alongside governance-calibrated issuance and collateral requirements, forms the core of DePIN&#x2019;s economic architecture. However, the literature consistently highlights significant challenges: the impact of token price volatility on provider economics, ensuring robust incentive alignment, generating sufficient non-speculative demand, and navigating regulatory uncertainty. We conclude with a research agenda prioritizing empirical event studies of governance changes, quality-adjusted reward measurement, and the development of valuation frameworks appropriate for these hybrid utility-governance assets.</p>
</abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd>decentralized physical infrastructure networks (DePIN)</kwd>
<kwd>scoping review</kwd>
<kwd>tokenomics</kwd>
<kwd>crypto-economics</kwd>
<kwd>blockchain</kwd>
<kwd>incentive mechanisms</kwd>
<kwd>flywheel model</kwd>
<kwd>network economics</kwd>
</kwd-group>
<funding-group>
<funding-statement>The author(s) declared that financial support was received for this work and/or its publication. The Article Processing Charges (APC) for this article were funded by The University of Jordan. No specific grant funding was received for the conduct of the research.</funding-statement>
</funding-group>
<counts>
<fig-count count="2"/>
<table-count count="2"/>
<equation-count count="2"/>
<ref-count count="45"/>
<page-count count="13"/>
</counts>
<custom-meta-group>
<custom-meta>
<meta-name>section-at-acceptance</meta-name>
<meta-value>Blockchain Economics</meta-value>
</custom-meta>
</custom-meta-group>
</article-meta>
</front>
<body>
<sec sec-type="intro" id="s1">
<label>1</label>
<title>Introduction</title>
<p>Public blockchains, popularized by Bitcoin (2008), extend a lineage of cryptographic timestamping that enables tamper-evident, append-only records (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B21">Haber and Stornetta, 1991</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B40">Nakamoto, 2008</xref>). This paper analyzes how these primitives coordinate real-world infrastructure via tokenized incentives&#x2014;systems increasingly referred to as Decentralized Physical Infrastructure Networks (DePIN). The focus is economic: how DePIN verifies useful work, prices demand and keeps participants&#x2019; incentives aligned.</p>
<p>DePIN is a blockchain-mediated marketplace that performs three main functions (i) verifies contributions of useful physical work from resource suppliers (e.g., radio coverage, storage, GPU cycles, geospatial imagery), (ii) monetizes demand, <italic>often</italic> through prepaid, non-transferable credits priced in USD (e.g., Helium Data Credits; Render Credits; Hivemapper Map Credits) that are created via on-chain token burns, <italic>although other models such as direct payment in the native token (e.g., Filecoin) or stablecoins (e.g., Akash) are also utilized</italic>, and (iii) calibrates new token issuance, security deposits (pledge collateral), and verification rules via on-chain voting system known as chain governance&#x2014;to manage the network&#x2019;s economic rules, like token rewards and security deposit requirements.</p>
<p>This design is significant because it separates the stable price paid by users from the volatile token rewards received by suppliers. It ensures that real-world usage directly creates economic activity for the token, primarily through the burn mechanism. Conceptually, this structure is what economists call a &#x2018;multi-sided platform,&#x2019; as it creates a marketplace between suppliers and users. Framing DePIN this way allows us to apply established economic models (like the Rochet&#x2013;Tirole framework) to analyze how to best design fees and rewards for sustainable growth (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B51">Rochet and Tirole, 2003</xref>).</p>
<p>The emergence of DePIN represents a logical and significant evolution in the application of blockchain technology. Initial innovations, exemplified by Bitcoin, focused on creating decentralized monetary systems. The subsequent wave, often labeled Decentralized Finance (DeFi), replicated and re-engineered traditional financial services like lending and exchange on-chain. DePIN marks a third wave, moving beyond purely digital or financial applications to orchestrate real-world, non-financial activities. By integrating with the Internet of Things (IoT) and other cyber-physical systems, DePIN leverages tokenomics not merely to secure a ledger, but as a mechanism for mobilizing and managing distributed physical capital, a challenge that requires robust economic design to succeed where centralized models face limitations.</p>
<p>DePIN represents a fundamental departure from the centralized paradigms that historically required immense upfront capital investment (CapEx) by large corporations or government agencies, a model that created high barriers to entry and often resulted in monopolistic market structures. In contrast, DePIN utilizes a bottom-up approach, employing native tokens to incentivize a distributed network of providers to contribute physical resources&#x2014;such as wireless hotspots, data storage, or GPU compute cycles&#x2014;to a shared network. The economic significance of this model is rapidly growing, with analysts targeting traditional infrastructure markets valued in trillions of dollars and the aggregate market capitalization of DePIN-related tokens surging into the tens of billions across diverse global jurisdictions (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B20">Forbes Technology Council, 2024</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B38">Messari Research, 2025</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B10">Bane and Gala, 2025</xref>). As the sector has coalesced, scholars distinguish between Physical Resource Networks (PRNs), which deliver non-fungible, location-specific services (e.g., wireless connectivity), and Digital Resource Networks (DRNs), which supply fungible digital resources (e.g., compute, storage) (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B35">Lin et al., 2025</xref>). In simple terms, a PRN provides a resource that is unique to its location, like the signal from a specific Wi-Fi hotspot. A DRN provides a resource that is interchangeable, like a gigabyte of cloud storage, which is the same regardless of which computer it&#x27;s stored on.</p>
<p>The operational logic and economic viability of any DePIN project are inextricably linked to its tokenomics&#x2014;the design of the economic system governing the network&#x2019;s native token(s) (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B16">Cong et al., 2021</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B32">J&#xfc;rjens et al., 2022</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B36">Malinova and Park, 2023</xref>). Within DePIN, tokenomics acts as the core coordination mechanism, orchestrating a self-reinforcing growth loop often termed the &#x201c;DePIN Flywheel&#x201d;. The engine of this flywheel has two key parts: it captures value from user payments through mechanisms like token burns, and then it directs that value to fund the rewards for infrastructure providers. Effectively, DePIN tokenomics represents a complex exercise in applied economic engineering, situated at the intersection of multi-sided platform economics (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B51">Rochet and Tirole, 2003</xref>), mechanism design, and contract theory.</p>
<p>Analysis of prominent projects reveals four recurring design primitives that constitute the DePIN economic architecture. These are not sequential stages but rather interlocking models that address distinct design challenges: (i) Verification of Physical Work (PoPW) where the network must have a reliable, automated way (protocol) to prove that contributors are actually providing the physical service they claim to be, such as validating wireless coverage or confirming data storage, this means useful, off-chain work has been performed. Examples include Filecoin&#x2019;s Proof-of-Replication (PoRep) and Proof-of-Spacetime (PoSt) for storage (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B47">Protocol Labs, 2025</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B19">Fisch et al., 2018</xref>), and Helium&#x2019;s Proof-of-Coverage (PoC) for wireless network validation (Helium Foundation, 2025b). (ii) Fiat-Denominated Pricing Rails, to insulate service consumers from token price volatility, many DePIN networks employ fiat-denominated pricing rails, where services are monetized through prepaid, non-transferable credits priced in a stable currency (e.g., USD). These credits&#x2014;such as Helium Data Credits (Helium Foundation, 2025a) or Render Credits (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B49">Render Network Foundation, 2024</xref>)&#x2014;are typically minted by burning the native protocol token. This mechanism not only shields users from fluctuations in token value but also creates a direct link between network usage and token value accrual. (iii) Governance-Calibrated Value Accrual: A Burn-and-Mint Equilibrium (BME) is often used, where tokens are burned to create usage credits and new tokens are minted to reward providers (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B34">Lin et al., 2023</xref>). This mechanism ties supply-side issuance to realized demand and allows on-chain governance to adjust economic parameters over time to maintain sustainability. (iv) To ensure service reliability and deter malicious behavior, providers are typically required to stake the network&#x2019;s native token as collateral. This staked amount functions as a security deposit that can be partially or fully confiscated (&#x201c;slashed&#x201d;) in cases of poor performance, dishonest reporting, or other forms of misconduct, thereby creating a strong economic incentive for compliance and high-quality service provision.</p>
<p>The central challenge for DePIN lies in balancing these complex objectives in a dynamic environment. This economic balancing act is compounded by the novel challenges of decentralized governance via Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) and a nascent, often ambiguous global regulatory landscape. High initial inflation required to bootstrap supply can depress long-term token value if not met with sufficient demand-linked value capture, while the inherent volatility of crypto markets profoundly impacts provider Return on Investment (ROI) and network stability (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B14">Chiu M. T. et al., 2024</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B12">Caprolu et al., 2025</xref>). Despite growing industry activity, academic literature remains sparse and methodologically diverse, lacking a systematic synthesis of these economic models. This fragmentation justifies a scoping review, a methodology explicitly designed to map key concepts, sources, and evidence in an emerging research area (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B6">Arksey and O&#x27;Malley, 2005</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B41">Peters et al., 2020</xref>).</p>
<p>This scoping review addresses the overarching question: <italic>How does the existing literature conceptualize, implement, and evaluate the sustainability and core challenges of tokenomic models within DePIN, and what are the principal knowledge gaps?</italic> The specific research questions (RQs) are:<list list-type="bullet">
<list-item>
<p>RQ1: What are the core concepts, definitions, and theoretical frameworks used to analyze DePIN tokenomics?</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>RQ2: What is the range of tokenomic models, incentive structures, and token functions described across different DePIN sectors?</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>RQ3: What specific mechanisms aimed at achieving long-term economic sustainability and value accrual are documented in the literature?</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>RQ4: What are the commonly identified economic, financial, technical, governance, and regulatory risks associated with DePIN tokenomic models?</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>RQ5: What are the principal gaps in current research knowledge regarding DePIN tokenomics?</p>
</list-item>
</list>
</p>
<p>This review makes several contributions to the nascent literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, the work provides one of the first systematic syntheses in DePIN tokenomics, organizing a fragmented body of knowledge into a coherent overview grounded in multi-sided platform theory. Second, it identifies and defines the core design primitives&#x2014;such as Proof-of-Physical-Work (PoPW), fiat-denominated pricing rails, and Burn-and-Mint Equilibria&#x2014;that constitute the sector&#x2019;s dominant economic architecture. Third, it consolidates the key economic, governance, and regulatory challenges highlighted across academic and industry sources, assessing the risks to long-term sustainability. Finally, by delineating specific, actionable research gaps, it provides a clear agenda for future scholarly inquiry in finance and economics, emphasizing the need for rigorous empirical validation of these novel incentive systems.</p>
<p>The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: <xref ref-type="sec" rid="s2">Section 2</xref> details the scoping review methodology. <xref ref-type="sec" rid="s3">Section 3</xref> presents the results, including a synthesis of the core concepts, tokenomic models, and challenges identified. <xref ref-type="sec" rid="s4">Section 4</xref> discusses the key insights and implications and concludes by outlining the identified research gaps and future directions. <xref ref-type="sec" rid="s5">Section 5</xref> concludes the paper.</p>
</sec>
<sec sec-type="methods" id="s2">
<label>2</label>
<title>Methodology</title>
<sec id="s2-1">
<label>2.1</label>
<title>Methodological framework</title>
<p>This study employs a scoping review methodology, appropriate for mapping concepts and evidence in emerging fields where comprehensive causal synthesis is premature (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B42">Petticrew and Roberts, 2006</xref>). The review adheres to the five-stage framework developed by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B6">Arksey and O&#x2019;Malley (2005)</xref> and the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR) checklist (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B53">Tricco et al., 2018</xref>). Methodological rigor was enhanced using the recommendations of <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B33">Levac et al. (2010)</xref> and the iterative Population-Concept-Context (PCC) framework to define eligibility, as advised by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B41">Peters et al. (2020)</xref>.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s2-2">
<label>2.2</label>
<title>Search strategy</title>
<p>A comprehensive literature search was executed on 1 May 2025in two sources: Scopus and Google Scholar. Boolean operators and wildcards were used. The DePIN query included &#x201c;Decentralized Physical Infrastructure Network&#x2a;,&#x201d; DePIN, &#x201c;Token Incentivized Physical Infrastructure Network&#x2a;,&#x201d; TIPIN, &#x201c;Proof of Physical Work,&#x201d; PoPW, and MachineFi. After limiting to relevant subject areas and English, Scopus returned 42 records (<xref ref-type="sec" rid="s11">Supplementary Appendix B</xref>). Google Scholar queries (<xref ref-type="sec" rid="s11">Supplementary Appendix B</xref>) returned 19 records. Backward and forward citation chasing supplemented database searching. Backward and forward citation chasing supplemented database searching. Furthermore, to capture essential grey literature, 17 records were identified from targeted searches of industry websites and project repositories (see <xref ref-type="fig" rid="F1">Figure 1</xref>).</p>
<fig id="F1" position="float">
<label>FIGURE 1</label>
<caption>
<p>PRISMA Diagram for Scoping Reviews. Source: Page MJ, et al. BMJ 2021; 372:n71. doi: 10.1136/bmj.n71. <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</ext-link>.</p>
</caption>
<graphic xlink:href="fbloc-08-1644115-g001.tif">
<alt-text content-type="machine-generated">Flowchart outlining the study selection process.</alt-text>
</graphic>
</fig>
</sec>
<sec id="s2-3">
<label>2.3</label>
<title>Study selection and eligibility</title>
<p>The study selection was conducted in a two-stage process by the author. First, following deduplication of all retrieved records, titles and abstracts were screened against the predefined eligibility criteria. Second, the full texts of all potentially relevant records from the initial stage were retrieved and evaluated in detail. This process yielded a final sample of 46 sources. Recognizing that a substantial portion of the discourse in this nascent field occurs outside traditional academic publishing, the final sample deliberately included 24 academic articles (conferences, pre-prints, and articles) and 22 grey-literature sources (e.g., news articles, blog posts, white papers, reports), following Joanna Briggs Institute guidance on scoping-review evidence inclusion.</p>
<p>Studies were required to meet eligibility criteria defined by the PCC framework and publication type. The Population of interest was (DePIN), including specific projects, their protocols, or the sector as a whole. The Concept centered on tokenomics and crypto-economic phenomena within DePIN, such as economic models, token design, incentive mechanisms, and risk analyses. The Context was restricted to global literature published in English between 1 January 2021, and 1 May 2025. Included sources were peer-reviewed journal articles, conference proceedings, and substantive working papers or preprints. Conversely, studies were excluded if they were purely technical, focused on general blockchain or DeFi without a DePIN application, were brief market commentaries or promotional materials, were not in English, or fell outside the specified date range.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s2-4">
<label>2.4</label>
<title>Data charting and synthesis</title>
<p>A standardized data-charting form was developed to extract relevant information from all included studies. Key data points extracted included: bibliographic details; the DePIN sector(s) and specific project(s) analyzed; described tokenomics frameworks and incentive mechanisms; token utilities, sustainability features, and governance arrangements; identified economic and financial risks; any quantitative metrics reported; and stated research gaps or directions for future research. The author completed the extraction for all studies no formal pilot of the charting form was conducted. Instead, the template was iteratively refined during early extraction, and all corrections were retro-applied to previously charted records to ensure consistency.</p>
<p>The extracted data were collated and summarized using a narrative approach (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B45">Popay et al., 2006</xref>) supplemented by descriptive statistics on study characteristics. A thematic analysis was then conducted (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B52">Thomas and Harden, 2008</xref>), which involved systematically coding the charted information, grouping codes into descriptive themes, and developing higher-order analytical themes that collectively map the DePIN tokenomics landscape. Consistent with Joanna Briggs Institute (JBI) guidance for scoping reviews, we did not undertake a formal risk-of-bias assessment; instead, we narratively reflected on methodological transparency and the depth of economic analysis to contextualize findings. Industry-funded and project-authored documents were flagged during charting; claims drawn from such sources were treated as contextual and triangulated with peer-reviewed evidence where possible and were not used to make inferential claims about effect sizes or performance.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s2-5">
<label>2.5</label>
<title>Methodological limitations</title>
<p>This review is subject to several limitations. First, the restriction to English-language publications may have introduced a language bias, resulting in the exclusion of relevant research published in other languages. Second, the analysis is confined to publicly available data, meaning proprietary or unpublished performance metrics from DePIN projects were not captured. Third, the necessary inclusion of grey literature&#x2014;while enhancing coverage in a nascent field&#x2014;introduces risks of bias associated with non-peer-reviewed sources such as industry reports; we mitigated this by flagging funding and authorship, triangulating with peer-reviewed sources, and using such materials primarily for background and context. Finally, our use of Google Scholar was intentionally supplementary and limited to the top-ranked 100 results per query to enhance reproducibility; although this cap may miss lower-ranked items, evidence shows that Google Scholar is unsuitable as a sole source for systematic searching and is best paired with curated databases, which we did. Finally, the DePIN landscape is vast, with hundreds of active projects. The objective of this scoping review is to map the <italic>core concepts</italic> and <italic>dominant economic architectures</italic> documented in the accessible academic and substantive grey literature, not to conduct a comprehensive, quantitative comparison of all extant projects, which represents a distinct methodological undertaking beyond the scope of this review.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s2-6">
<label>2.6</label>
<title>Characteristics of the included evidence base</title>
<p>The included literature (N &#x3d; 46) displayed characteristics typical of an emerging field. A significant portion consisted of academic conference papers (n &#x3d; 15), reflecting the rapid dissemination of ideas, while peer-reviewed journal articles (n &#x3d; 5) and working papers/preprints (n &#x3d; 6) provided more developed contributions. Grey literature (n &#x3d; 22) offered timely industry perspectives. The publication dates were heavily skewed towards recent years (2023-early 2025), indicating accelerating research interest. While many sources adopted a global perspective, case studies frequently centered on prominent North American or European projects in the Wireless, Storage, and Compute sectors. The predominant methodological approaches in academic sources were conceptual analysis, descriptive case studies, and taxonomy development. Rigorous, quantitative empirical studies focusing specifically on the financial or economic outcomes of tokenomics designs were notably unavailable in the selected literature.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec sec-type="results" id="s3">
<label>3</label>
<title>Results</title>
<p>The thematic analysis of the 46 included sources revealed four primary themes that characterize the DePIN tokenomics landscape: (1) the core conceptual frameworks used to define the sector, (2) a taxonomy of tokenomic models and incentive structures, (3) key mechanisms for achieving economic sustainability, and (4) the primary challenges and risks identified in the literature. These themes are detailed below.</p>
<sec id="s3-1">
<label>3.1</label>
<title>Theme 1: the &#x201c;DePIN flywheel&#x201d; as a prevailing incentive framework in leading deployments</title>
<p>The DePIN flywheel emerges as a widely used, usage-driven feedback loop for bootstrapping and sustaining physical-infrastructure networks (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B38">Messari Research, 2025</xref>). Think of it like a heavy merry-go-round which requires a significant effort to start, but once it is spinning, its own momentum helps it continue with minimal force, the DePIN model applies this concept to network growth. This framework highlights how token incentives are designed to drive network growth and sustainability in DePINs. In what follows, the core mechanics, verification requirements, and recurrent challenges are synthesized.</p>
<p>The operational logic of the DePIN Flywheel is driven by a complex interdependency between three primary actors, whose roles, incentives, and value flows are systematically decomposed in the following table (see <xref ref-type="table" rid="T1">Table 1</xref>).</p>
<table-wrap id="T1" position="float">
<label>TABLE 1</label>
<caption>
<p>DePIN actor-action-value flow matrix.</p>
</caption>
<table>
<thead valign="top">
<tr>
<th align="center">Actor category</th>
<th align="center">Specific roles</th>
<th align="center">Core function/Action</th>
<th align="center">Value flow/Token mechanism</th>
<th align="center">Economic outcome/Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody valign="top">
<tr>
<td align="center">I. Resource supplier (provider)</td>
<td align="left">Miner, hotspot owner, data uploader, node operator</td>
<td align="left">Deploys physical infrastructure. Performs useful physical work. Submits cryptographic proof-of-physical-work (PoPW). Stakes native token (T) as collateral</td>
<td align="left">Receives newly issued tokens (rewards). Faces slashing (loss of S) for non-compliance or poor service</td>
<td align="left">Faces high volatility risk due to tokenized rewards versus fiat costs (ROI uncertainty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center">II. Demand-side user (consumer)</td>
<td align="left">Enterprise client, developer, IoT device user, data buyer</td>
<td align="left">Consumes the physical service (e.g., bandwidth, storage, compute). Pays the network for usage</td>
<td align="left">Pays via fiat-denominated, non-transferable usage credits (CUSD). Triggers the token burn mechanism (T&#x2192;CUSD)</td>
<td align="left">Requires stable, predictable service pricing; drives non-speculative demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center">III. Governance body (DAO)</td>
<td align="left">Token holders, validators, core team/Foundation</td>
<td align="left">Votes on economic parameters (e.g., emission rate, fee splits, slashing requirements). Manages protocol upgrades and treasury allocation</td>
<td align="left">Calibrates new token issuance (I(t)) to maintain the burn-and-mint equilibrium. Receives fees/seigniorage revenue (if applicable)</td>
<td align="left">Faces risks of plutocracy, low turnout, and slow decision-making (governance risks)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table-wrap-foot>
<fn>
<p>Source: Author&#x2019;s synthesis based on <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B34">Lin et al. (2023)</xref> and <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B38">Messari Research (2025)</xref>.</p>
</fn>
</table-wrap-foot>
</table-wrap>
<sec id="s3-1-1">
<label>3.1.1</label>
<title>Core flywheel mechanics: incentivizing supply to generate demand</title>
<p>The fundamental concept underpinning the flywheel is the use of tokens to overcome the &#x201c;cold start&#x201d; problem inherent in building physical infrastructure networks. While traditional projects require significant upfront capital expenditure (CapEx) before any service can be offered, DePINs utilize tokens to incentivize individuals and organizations to deploy physical infrastructure from the bottom up (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B43">Pithadia and Ratanpara, 2024</xref>). As this incentivized infrastructure grows, it aims to attract demand-side users who pay for its services. The Helium network provides a clear example of this cycle in practice: Helium offers Helium Network Tokens (HNT) tokens to attract people to set up wireless hotspots (Incentivize Supply), thousands of hotspots create a global LoRaWAN network for Internet of Things (IoT) devices (Network Grows), companies that need this coverage pay to use it for their devices (Usage Increases), they pay by burning HNT to create stable-priced &#x201c;Data Credits&#x201d; (Value is Captured), this burning mechanism supports the value of HNT, strengthening the rewards for hotspot owners and encouraging further growth (Rewards Strengthen). Moreover, in leading implementations, end-user demand is priced in prepaid, non-transferable USD-denominated credits (e.g., Helium Data Credits, Render Credits, Hivemapper Map Credits); these credits are created by on-chain burns of the native token, so realized usage directly induces burns/fee flows that governance can combine with issuance to fund providers. This separation of the user&#x2019;s unit of account (USD-priced credits) from the reward asset (the volatile native token) is central to empirical evaluation of demand elasticity and value routing.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-1-2">
<label>3.1.2</label>
<title>Proof-of-Physical-Work (PoPW): verification as a prerequisite</title>
<p>A critical prerequisite for the flywheel is reliably verifying that providers are making genuine contributions. Simply distributing tokens based on claimed work would be vulnerable to manipulation and Sybil attacks. Therefore, DePINs rely on various (PoPW) mechanisms to cryptographically validate contributions. The literature describes PoPW methods tailored to infrastructure type. For wireless, Helium&#x2019;s (PoC) verifies hotspot location and radio coverage through challenges and witness observations, with an active roadmap to strengthen oracle design and reduce gaming. For storage, Filecoin separates sealing-time Proof-of-Replication (PoRep) from ongoing Proof-of-Spacetime (PoSt) audits to attest continued availability. Designing these verification mechanisms to be secure, resistant to gaming, and cost-effective is essential for maintaining network integrity and ensuring that token incentives are directed towards valuable contributions (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B22">Heiss et al., 2024</xref>).</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-1-3">
<label>3.1.3</label>
<title>The demand bottleneck and sustainability challenges</title>
<p>Despite effectively using tokens to ignite initial deployment, DePIN networks often stall at the &#x201c;demand bottleneck,&#x201d; where insufficient user uptake undermines long-term sustainability. Achieving the flywheel requires a critical mass of participants on both sides: providers need reliable rewards, while users demand value at predictable costs. To mitigate volatility pass-through, credits keep user pricing stable in USD while routing burns/fees on-chain; governance then calibrates issuance and reward weights. Recent governance actions illustrate these levers&#x2014;for example, Helium Improvement Proposal (HIP)-138 (late-2024, phased 2025) consolidating rewards back to HNT, and Hivemapper&#x2019;s MAP Improvement Proposal (MIP)-19 raising the Map Credit price effective 1 January 2025. However, true sustainability hinges on converting non-Web3 users into paying customers, thereby anchoring token value in real-world demand rather than speculation.</p>
<p>
<xref ref-type="fig" rid="F2">Figure 2</xref> illustrates the DePIN flywheel linking supply incentives, paid usage, and value capture.</p>
<fig id="F2" position="float">
<label>FIGURE 2</label>
<caption>
<p>An Extended Analytical Model of the DePIN Flywheel. Token incentives attract supply; improved coverage/quality increases paid usage; usage drives value capture via stable-priced credits/fees and burns/buybacks; realized value strengthens reward budgets and supports reinvestment, attracting further supply. The extended figure adds verification prerequisites, governance levers, and leakage points that shape steady-state sustainability.&#x201d; Sources: Author&#x2019;s synthesis, adapted from <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B38">Messari Research (2025)</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B23">Helium Foundation (2024)</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B49">Render Network Foundation (2024)</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B2">Akash Network (2025)</xref>; and <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B30">Hivemapper Foundation (2025)</xref>.</p>
</caption>
<graphic xlink:href="fbloc-08-1644115-g002.tif">
<alt-text content-type="machine-generated">An Extended Analytical Model of the DePIN Flywheel. Token incentives attract supply; improved coverage/quality increases paid usage; usage drives value capture via stable-priced credits/fees and burns/buybacks; realized value strengthens reward budgets and supports reinvestment, attracting further supply. The extended figure adds verification prerequisites, governance levers, and leakage points that shape steady-state sustainability.&#x201C; Sources: Author&#x0027;s synthesis, adapted from Messari Research (2025); Helium Foundation (n.d.-a); Render Network Foundation (2024a); Akash Network (n.d.-b); and Hivemapper Foundation (2025).</alt-text>
</graphic>
</fig>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-2">
<label>3.2</label>
<title>Theme 2: versatile token roles and structural diversity</title>
<p>The tokenomic designs of DePIN projects, while sharing core principles, exhibit significant diversity in their implementation across different sectors. <xref ref-type="table" rid="T2">Table 2</xref> provides a systematic comparison of the economic models of four leading projects, illustrating the variations in their verification, demand-side, and sustainability mechanisms.</p>
<table-wrap id="T2" position="float">
<label>TABLE 2</label>
<caption>
<p>Comparative tokenomics across leading DePIN projects.</p>
</caption>
<table>
<thead valign="top">
<tr>
<th align="center">Project</th>
<th align="center">Sector</th>
<th align="center">Verification</th>
<th align="center">User pricing</th>
<th align="center">Value capture</th>
<th align="center">Token architecture</th>
<th align="center">Rewards and staking (high level)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody valign="top">
<tr>
<td align="center">Helium</td>
<td align="left">Wireless (DeWi)</td>
<td align="left">PoC</td>
<td align="left">Data credits (USD-pegged)</td>
<td align="left">Burn HNT&#x2192;DC; fees</td>
<td align="left">Single token (HNT); consolidated via HIP-0138</td>
<td align="left">Scheduled emissions; validator staking; HIP governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center">Filecoin</td>
<td align="left">Storage</td>
<td align="left">PoRep &#x2b; PoSt</td>
<td align="left">Filecoin token (FIL)-denominated storage deals</td>
<td align="left">Network fees; storage payments</td>
<td align="left">Single token (FIL)</td>
<td align="left">Block rewards with collateral requirements and slashing; FIPs governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center">Render</td>
<td align="left">GPU compute</td>
<td align="left">Work verification and reputation</td>
<td align="left">Render credits (USD-priced, non-transferable)</td>
<td align="left">Burn RENDER&#x2192;Credits; emissions to operators</td>
<td align="left">Single token (RENDER)</td>
<td align="left">Epoch emissions; governance-set allocations; RNP proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center">Akash</td>
<td align="left">General compute</td>
<td align="left">On-chain marketplace (bids/leases)</td>
<td align="left">AKT or USDC (stable payments)</td>
<td align="left">Take rates; buyback and burn proposal</td>
<td align="left">Single token (AKT)</td>
<td align="left">PoS staking inflation (decay); cosmos governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center">Hivemapper</td>
<td align="left">Mapping</td>
<td align="left">Cross-device vision-based verification</td>
<td align="left">Map credits (USD-pegged)</td>
<td align="left">Burn HONEY&#x2192;Credits; usage-linked net emissions</td>
<td align="left">Single token (HONEY) &#x2b; credits</td>
<td align="left">Weekly rewards; MIP governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table-wrap-foot>
<fn>
<p>Source: Author&#x2019;s synthesis based on <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B26">Helium Foundation (2025a)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B23">Helium Foundation (2024)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B47">Protocol Labs (2025)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B46">Protocol Labs (2024)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B49">Render Network Foundation (2024)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B2">Akash Network (2025)</xref>, and <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B29">Hivemapper Foundation (2024)</xref>.</p>
</fn>
</table-wrap-foot>
</table-wrap>
<p>The literature confirms that tokens in DePINs play multiple essential roles beyond simple payment and that the structural design of these token systems varies significantly across projects. Understanding these different functions and architectural choices is key to evaluating the mechanics and potential sustainability of any DePIN. This theme outlines the core functions of tokens, the architectural models employed, and how implementations differ across sectors.</p>
<sec id="s3-2-1">
<label>3.2.1</label>
<title>Core token functions: utility, governance, and staking</title>
<p>The analysis reveals that DePIN tokens most commonly serves three interrelated roles: (i) Utility: Tokens primarily act as the native currency required to access and pay for network services, whether it be storage, computing, bandwidth, or data. This utility function creates intrinsic demand for the token that is directly linked to the network&#x2019;s usage and the value of its services. For example, in Filecoin, clients pay FIL tokens to store and retrieve their data (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B17">Fan, 2023</xref>). (ii) Governance: Tokens often grant governance rights within a (DAO), empowering holders to participate in decision-making regarding protocol upgrades, treasury allocation, and adjustments to system parameters. Token holders can typically vote on various proposals, with different mechanisms in use, such as single choice, multiple selection, or quadratic voting (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B18">Fan, 2024</xref>). (iii) Staking: Staking is identified as a critical game-theoretical mechanism in DePINs. It requires participants to lock tokens as collateral to secure service provision (subject to slashing for misbehavior) or to earn yield from network rewards. In the PinFi protocol, resource staking is fundamental to enabling core functionalities (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B37">Mao et al., 2024</xref>). Importantly, in many deployed systems the user does not pay in the volatile native token but in prepaid, non-transferable credits minted by burning that token; this design insulates buyers from token price swings while maintaining an on-chain value link.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-2-2">
<label>3.2.2</label>
<title>Architectural choices: single vs. multi-token models</title>
<p>DePIN projects typically adopt either single-token or multi-token architecture, though hybrid models using credit systems are increasingly common. (i) Single-Token Systems, such as Filecoin&#x2019;s FIL and Render&#x2019;s RENDER, use one primary asset to carry all utility, governance, and staking functions. This model offers simplicity but can create conflicting interests among stakeholders (e.g., users who desire low service costs versus providers who seek high token value). Many single-token systems now employ hybrid approaches, using USD-pegged, non-transferable credits (like Render Credits or Data Credits) to insulate users from token volatility while maintaining on-chain value links through token burning mechanisms. (ii) Multi-Token Frameworks, historically exemplified by Helium&#x2019;s suite of HNT, IOT, and MOBILE tokens, use dedicated tokens for distinct purposes, such as rewarding specific contributions or stabilizing payments. This allows for more granular incentive design and can insulate consumer costs from the volatility of reward tokens, albeit at the expense of greater system complexity. Recent governance moved back to a unified rewards asset under HIP-138 (&#x201c;HNT is back&#x201d;), consolidating reward distribution while maintaining sub-network functionality, demonstrating how systems evolve along this design margin over time as projects balance complexity against operational efficiency (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B48">Puckrin, 2024</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B14">Chiu M. T. et al., 2024</xref>).</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-2-3">
<label>3.2.3</label>
<title>Sector-specific implementations</title>
<p>The emphasis placed on each token function, and the chosen architecture often varies by the DePIN application domain. Storage networks like Filecoin prioritize robust staking mechanisms to guarantee data integrity, while wireless coverage networks like Helium are built upon verifiable service metrics (see also <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B15">Choi et al., 2024</xref>). Compute platforms such as Render and Akash focus on efficient pay-per-use billing, and sensor-data networks like Hivemapper heavily incentivize the submission of high-quality data.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-2-4">
<label>3.2.4</label>
<title>Emerging concepts: real-world assets (RWAs) and fractionalization</title>
<p>A nascent stream of literature explores linking DePIN tokens to real-world assets (RWAs), which involves treating the physical hardware as tokenized collateral. This concept extends to facilitating fractional ownership of the hardware to lower the financial barrier to entry for new providers. While these ideas hold promise for deepening value capture and broadening access, concrete implementations remain sparse in the current literature (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B44">Polkadot, 2025</xref>).</p>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-3">
<label>3.3</label>
<title>Theme 3: mechanisms for economic sustainability</title>
<p>Recognizing the limitations of purely inflationary reward models, the literature describes various mechanisms designed to foster long-term economic sustainability by linking token value to network activity and managing supply. This theme details the specific strategies for usage-driven value capture, supply control, and staking, which together form the pathways for sustainable value accrual.</p>
<sec id="s3-3-1">
<label>3.3.1</label>
<title>Formalizing the DePIN economic architecture</title>
<p>To provide the analytical rigor necessary for a finance-focused assessment, the core mechanisms summarized in the DePIN flywheel are formalized below. These relationships govern the economic viability of the native utility token (T) by linking network usage to value accrual and managing the supply-side reward structure, which is crucial for addressing the dual challenge of bootstrapping infrastructure and ensuring long-term sustainability.</p>
<sec id="s3-3-1-1">
<label>3.3.1.1</label>
<title>The burn-and-mint equilibrium (BME) and value accrual</title>
<p>The BME, an economic model formalized by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B34">Lin et al. (2023)</xref>, is the central mechanism designed to tie the token&#x2019;s intrinsic value to non-speculative network usage and provide fiat-denominated pricing rails to users. Token burns occur when user demand (D<sub>USD</sub>) is monetized through the creation of stable-priced, non-transferable usage credits (C<sub>USD</sub>). This relationship is formalized by the Token Burn Rate (T<sub>BURN</sub>):<disp-formula id="equ1">
<mml:math id="m1">
<mml:mrow>
<mml:msub>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">T</mml:mi>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mtext>BURN</mml:mtext>
<mml:mo>&#x3d;</mml:mo>
</mml:mrow>
</mml:msub>
<mml:mtext>&#x2009;</mml:mtext>
<mml:msub>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">D</mml:mi>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mtext>usd</mml:mtext>
<mml:mtext>&#x2009;</mml:mtext>
</mml:mrow>
</mml:msub>
<mml:mo>/</mml:mo>
<mml:mtext>&#x2009;Price&#x2009;</mml:mtext>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mfenced open="(" close=")" separators="|">
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">T</mml:mi>
</mml:mrow>
</mml:mfenced>
</mml:mrow>
</mml:mrow>
</mml:math>
</disp-formula>
</p>
<p>where:<list list-type="bullet">
<list-item>
<p>T<sub>BURN</sub>: The rate of native token destruction (burns) per period.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>D<sub>USD</sub>: The fiat-denominated demand for network services (e.g., Data Credits, Map Credits).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>Price (T): The current fiat-denominated market price of the native token.</p>
</list-item>
</list>
</p>
<p>The BME dictates that the real economic value captured by the network is equal to D<sub>USD</sub>, and the magnitude of the deflationary pressure is inversely proportional to the token&#x2019;s market price. This mechanism routes fiat value into the token&#x2019;s economics.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-3-1-2">
<label>3.3.1.2</label>
<title>Provider economics and volatility exposure</title>
<p>The core risk highlighted in the literature is the exposure of infrastructure providers to token price volatility because their operational costs (C<sub>FIAT</sub>) are fixed in fiat currency while their rewards (R<sub>T</sub>) are denominated in the volatile native token (T). The Net Present Value (NPV) of a Provider&#x2019;s Investment (II) is a stochastic process:<disp-formula id="equ2">
<mml:math id="m2">
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">&#x3a0;</mml:mi>
<mml:mo>&#x3d;</mml:mo>
<mml:mstyle displaystyle="true">
<mml:munderover>
<mml:mo>&#x2211;</mml:mo>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mi>t</mml:mi>
<mml:mo>&#x3d;</mml:mo>
<mml:mn>0</mml:mn>
</mml:mrow>
<mml:mi>N</mml:mi>
</mml:munderover>
</mml:mstyle>
<mml:mfrac>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mfenced open="(" close=")" separators="|">
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">P</mml:mi>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">r</mml:mi>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">i</mml:mi>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">c</mml:mi>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">e</mml:mi>
<mml:msub>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mfenced open="(" close=")" separators="|">
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mi>T</mml:mi>
</mml:mrow>
</mml:mfenced>
</mml:mrow>
<mml:mi>t</mml:mi>
</mml:msub>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mtext>&#x02D9;&#x2009;</mml:mtext>
</mml:mrow>
<mml:msub>
<mml:mi>R</mml:mi>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mi>T</mml:mi>
<mml:mo>,</mml:mo>
<mml:mi>t</mml:mi>
</mml:mrow>
</mml:msub>
</mml:mrow>
</mml:mfenced>
</mml:mrow>
<mml:mo>&#x2212;</mml:mo>
<mml:msub>
<mml:mi>C</mml:mi>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mi>F</mml:mi>
<mml:mi>i</mml:mi>
<mml:mi>a</mml:mi>
<mml:mi>t</mml:mi>
<mml:mo>,</mml:mo>
<mml:mi>t</mml:mi>
</mml:mrow>
</mml:msub>
</mml:mrow>
<mml:msup>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mfenced open="(" close=")" separators="|">
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mn>1</mml:mn>
<mml:mo>&#x2b;</mml:mo>
<mml:mi>r</mml:mi>
</mml:mrow>
</mml:mfenced>
</mml:mrow>
<mml:mi>t</mml:mi>
</mml:msup>
</mml:mfrac>
<mml:mo>&#x2212;</mml:mo>
<mml:msub>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">C</mml:mi>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">a</mml:mi>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">p</mml:mi>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">E</mml:mi>
<mml:mi mathvariant="normal">x</mml:mi>
</mml:mrow>
<mml:mrow>
<mml:mi>F</mml:mi>
<mml:mi>i</mml:mi>
<mml:mi>a</mml:mi>
<mml:mi>t</mml:mi>
</mml:mrow>
</mml:msub>
</mml:mrow>
</mml:math>
</disp-formula>
</p>
<p>where:</p>
<p>&#x3a0;: The NPV of the provider&#x2019;s return.</p>
<p>Price(T)<sub>t</sub>: The expected volatile token price at time t.</p>
<p>R <sub>T,t</sub>: The token rewards received at time t, calibrated by Governance-alibrated Issuance and reward weights.</p>
<p>C <sub>Fiat,t</sub>: The fiat-denominated operational costs (e.g., energy, backhaul).</p>
<p>CapEx <sub>Fiat</sub>: The initial fiat-denominated hardware investment.</p>
<p>r: The appropriate discount rate reflecting risk.</p>
<p>The inherent uncertainty of Price (T)<sub>t</sub> necessitates the application of Real Options Analysis in future work to realistically model provider investment decisions (i.e., the option to abandon or expand infrastructure), which is a critical research gap.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-3-1-3">
<label>3.3.1.3</label>
<title>Staking, security, and deterrence</title>
<p>Provider staking serves as a key game-theoretic mechanism to ensure service quality and deter misconduct. Providers must lock a collateral amount (S) which is subject to slashing (L) upon validated poor performance or dishonest behavior. The effectiveness of this mechanism is measured by the Expected Loss (E [L]) from misconduct, which should exceed the expected gain from exploiting the network (Gain <sub>Exploit</sub>):</p>
<p>Deterrence Condition: E [L] &#x3d; P (Misconduct Verified)&#x22c5;Slashing Rate&#x22c5;S &#x3e; Gain <sub>Exploit</sub>
</p>
<p>This formal structure demonstrates how the token is utilized as a financial bond to secure real-world service delivery, functioning as a non-trivial economic lever for compliance and service reliability.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-3-1-4">
<label>3.3.1.4</label>
<title>Usage-driven value capture: Burns and fee distribution</title>
<p>Token burning and fee distribution are two primary mechanisms that align token value with real network activity.</p>
<p>In a burn model, tokens are permanently destroyed when users pay for services, creating deflationary pressure proportional to usage and increasing scarcity; Helium&#x2019;s Data Credits and Hivemapper&#x2019;s data-access burns are prime examples. Alternatively, fee distribution channels user-paid fees back to active participants like infrastructure providers or stakers, establishing a revenue stream tied to network utility rather than speculation (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B13">Chiu B. et al., 2024</xref>).</p>
<p>However, the reliance on native tokens for rewards introduces a critical game-theoretic dilemma for providers. From this perspective, each provider is a rational economic agent whose operational costs (e.g., hardware, energy) are denominated in fiat currency, while their revenue is denominated in a volatile crypto-asset. A sharp decline in the token&#x2019;s market price can render participation unprofitable, creating a dominant strategy to exit the network. This situation can trigger an adverse feedback loop, or &#x201c;death spiral&#x201d;: as providers leave, network quality degrades, reducing user demand and the associated token burns or fees, which in turn may exert further downward pressure on the token&#x2019;s value, incentivizing more providers to exit. A game-theoretic analysis of this dynamic warns that pure burn-and-mint schemes risk systemic &#x2018;under-incentivization&#x2019; during market downturns. To mitigate this coordination failure, some models propose fixing contributor rewards in fiat currency to ensure provider solvency and network stability, irrespective of token price fluctuations (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B13">Chiu B. et al., 2024</xref>).</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-3-1-5">
<label>3.3.1.5</label>
<title>Supply control and inflation management</title>
<p>Careful management of token issuance is another pillar of long-term sustainability. Predetermined inflation schedules, such as halving events or gradual emission decay, are used to shift the network&#x2019;s economic reliance from block rewards to usage-based revenue as it matures. Some protocols also impose explicit supply caps, setting a finite maximum token supply to foster enduring scarcity and counter long-term inflationary dynamics. For example, CircularX caps its supply at 10 billion tokens and uses its earn-and-burn mechanism to dynamically re-mint tokens based on demand, tightly linking supply adjustments to real network usage.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-3-1-6">
<label>3.3.1.6</label>
<title>Staking as an economic lever</title>
<p>Beyond its security benefits, staking serves as a powerful economic tool to reduce circulating supply and encourage long-term holding. When participants lock tokens to secure the network, they remove them from active circulation, which can dampen sell-pressure, while earning yields often derived from actual network fees. Many DePINs also require devices to burn a certain amount of utility tokens as staking fees, and &#x201c;stake deposit&#x201d; mechanisms act as deterrents against malicious behavior, further aligning quality contributions with rewards.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-3-1-7">
<label>3.3.1.7</label>
<title>Synthesizing value accrual pathways</title>
<p>These mechanisms feed into a unified feedback loop where token burns or fee distributions tied to infrastructure use generate real economic value, which in turn drives demand for and value of the native token. By tightly coupling network growth and revenue capture, DePINs create fundamental token value beyond speculation.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-4">
<label>3.4</label>
<title>Theme 4: charting key challenges, risks, and limitations</title>
<p>Literature extensively documents the significant hurdles and various risks inherent in designing and operating sustainable DePIN tokenomic systems. These challenges can be categorized into five distinct domains: economic, operational, governance, legal, and market related.</p>
<sec id="s3-4-1">
<label>3.4.1</label>
<title>Economic and financial risks</title>
<p>DePINs face profound economic vulnerabilities, foremost among them token price volatility, which undermines provider ROI calculations since hardware and operational costs are fiat-denominated while rewards fluctuate. High volatility not only discourages infrastructure provision but also injects uncertainty for users paying in tokens. Projects attempt to anchor token value through utility and revenue-backing, but game-theoretic analyses warn that pure deflationary models risk &#x201c;under-incentivization&#x201d; over time and recommend fixing contributor rewards in fiat to stabilize returns. Closely related is the danger of incentive failure or &#x201c;death spirals,&#x201d; where poorly calibrated emission or burn rates leave networks unable to sustain rewards or cover operational costs (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B13">Chiu B. et al., 2024</xref>). Finally, DePINs must surmount the demand-generation &#x201c;cold start&#x201d; problem; without a critical mass of paying users, supply-side infrastructure remains underutilized and economically unproductive, making it impossible to trigger the value-capture mechanisms that underpin long-term sustainability (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B4">Andrew and Ballandies, 2024</xref>).</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-4-2">
<label>3.4.2</label>
<title>Operational and technical risks</title>
<p>Ensuring that tokenomics translate into real-world value requires robust, tamper-resistant systems for verifying physical contributions. In a trustless environment, verification and gaming concerns loom large: adversaries can falsify data (e.g., spoofing Helium hotspot locations) or exploit consensus protocols, eroding both incentive fairness and network integrity. Likewise, quality of service (QoS) can be uneven in a heterogeneous provider landscape, where diverse hardware and variable upkeep lead to inconsistent performance, which in turn reduces user willingness to pay (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B8">Assen et al., 2024</xref>). On the scalability front, DePINs inherit blockchain&#x2019;s throughput limitations; as device counts and transaction frequencies grow, block-confirmation delays and rising fees can choke the very incentive mechanisms they seek to enable. Integrating Layer-2 solutions like sharding or rollups without adding prohibitive complexity remains an open challenge.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-4-3">
<label>3.4.3</label>
<title>Governance risks</title>
<p>Decentralized governance via DAOs promises democratic decision-making but is beset by inefficiency and plutocracy. Low voter turnout, &#x201c;whale dominance,&#x201d; and the sheer complexity of technical proposals can stall critical updates to tokenomic parameters. Smart-contract&#x2013;based governance layers must also guard against security lapses and privacy inconsistencies when participants have vastly different technical proficiencies and commitment levels (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B11">Caprolu et al., 2024</xref>). Unaddressed, these dynamics can freeze protocol evolution or concentrate control in the hands of a few, undermining the very decentralization DePINs aim to achieve.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-4-4">
<label>3.4.4</label>
<title>Regulatory and legal risks</title>
<p>DePINs operate in a regulatory fog, with unclear global guidelines on token classification (security vs. utility), infrastructure-provider licensing, data-privacy regimes General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and Know Your Customer (KYC)/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) requirements, exposing projects to compliance burdens and legal liabilities (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B7">Aslam, 2025</xref>). The anonymity and immutability inherent to blockchain complicate enforcement, as protocol-level crackdowns often fail to reach actors hiding behind pseudonymous addresses. Moreover, decentralized services raise unique liability questions when users share resources with anonymous peers, making traditional legal remedies difficult to apply.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s3-4-5">
<label>3.4.5</label>
<title>Adoption and competition risks</title>
<p>Finally, DePINs must contend with user-experience barriers and intensifying competitive pressures. Complex onboarding, inconsistent service quality, and unpredictable transaction costs hinder adoption by mainstream users accustomed to centralized incumbents. Simultaneously, a burgeoning landscape of competing Web3 startups and established players racing to deploy similar infrastructure networks fragments both supply and demand, raising the bar for any single project to achieve the critical mass necessary for economic viability.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec sec-type="discussion" id="s4">
<label>4</label>
<title>Discussion</title>
<p>This scoping review systematically charts the literature on DePIN tokenomics, identifying a rapidly evolving design space alongside material economic constraints. This section discusses the key insights derived from the thematic analysis, considers the implications for practice, policy, and theory, reflects on the strengths and limitations of the current evidence base, and delineates a clear agenda for future research.</p>
<sec id="s4-1">
<label>4.1</label>
<title>Mapping the landscape and key insights</title>
<p>This review&#x2019;s findings provide a clear map of the DePIN tokenomics field. Answering RQ1 and RQ2, the analysis observes a <italic>prevailing</italic> &#x201c;DePIN flywheel&#x201d; pattern in leading deployments (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B38">Messari Research, 2025</xref>), in which end-user demand is priced in prepaid, USD-denominated credits while on-chain burns and governed issuance finance supply. In Helium, for example, one Data Credit equals $0.00001 and is minted by burning HNT; governance has recently consolidated rewards back to HNT under HIP-138 (approved late-2024; phased-in early-2025), simplifying value routing. Hivemapper enacted MIP-19 to raise Map Credit prices, effective 1 January 2025, to increase on-chain accrual; Render Network formalizes a similar burn-and-mint equilibrium (BME) for job settlement and emissions. The review also mapped the diverse functions of DePIN tokens&#x2014;primarily utility, governance, and staking&#x2014;and the variety of architectural choices, such as single versus multi-token models. In response to RQ3, key sustainability mechanisms were identified, including token burns and fee distributions designed to link token value directly to network usage and control inflation.</p>
<p>However, a crucial insight emerging from the mapping (addressing RQ4) is the inherent tension and design trade-offs within DePIN economic models. The literature reveals two dominant approaches to monetizing demand, each with distinct trade-offs. The first, the Fiat-Credit Model (BME), is utilized by projects like Helium, Render, and Hivemapper. This model uses fiat-denominated, non-transferable credits (e.g., Data Credits) minted by burning the native token. The primary advantage of this design is its ability to insulate end-users from token price volatility, thereby offering stable, predictable service pricing crucial for attracting non-speculative, enterprise demand. However, this benefit comes at the cost of greater system complexity and a heavy reliance on active governance to calibrate the BME parameters, which is necessary to ensure provider rewards remain sufficient during market downturns. In contrast, the Native Asset and Stablecoin Model&#x2014;utilized by projects like Filecoin (paying in FIL) and Akash (supporting native AKT or stablecoins like USDC)&#x2014;offers notable simplicity and a direct, uncensorable utility link for the native token. The significant drawback of this alternative, however, is that it exposes <italic>both</italic> users and providers to the token&#x2019;s price volatility, a factor that can create significant friction for user adoption and severely complicate provider ROI calculations.</p>
<p>The &#x2018;lessons learned&#x2019; from existing projects, visible in their governance proposals, demonstrate a continuous effort to manage these trade-offs. For instance, Helium&#x2019;s HIP-138 (consolidating rewards back to HNT) represents a move to reduce complexity and strengthen the HNT asset&#x2019;s value accrual. Similarly, Hivemapper&#x2019;s MIP-19 (raising Map Credit prices) is a direct governance intervention to calibrate the BME for long-term sustainability. These actions confirm that tokenomic design is not static but a dynamic process of balancing stakeholder incentives.</p>
<p>Regarding token performance, the scoping review&#x2019;s findings confirm that a principal gap in the literature is the lack of rigorous, independent empirical studies on performance. Therefore, while this review synthesizes <italic>design principles</italic> and <italic>governance actions</italic>, the quantitative validation of token performance remains a critical direction for future research, as detailed in <xref ref-type="sec" rid="s4-4">Section 4.4</xref>.</p>
<p>A critical assessment of the underlying project documentation (whitepapers and official network specifications) reveals that while the conceptual clarity of the <italic>actor-action</italic> model and value routing (e.g., the BME) is high, the analytical transparency is often insufficient. Specifically, documentation frequently functions as a design rationale rather than a rigorous economic proof, often prioritizing descriptive explanations over explicit mathematical models of stability, long-term equilibrium, or the specific cost-benefit analysis faced by providers. Furthermore, while tokenomics parameters are technically transparent on-chain, the lack of published independent performance metrics (e.g., quality-adjusted provider ROI or empirically measured price elasticity of demand) in public documentation makes rigorous due diligence challenging for financial analysts, reinforcing the need for empirical validation.</p>
<p>A second insight is that &#x201c;decentralization&#x201d; is spectrum-based rather than binary: development, treasury, and parameter updates often remain concentrated, a point echoed in analyses of decentralized governance for cyber-physical systems (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B39">Nabben et al., 2024</xref>). While mechanisms like token burns aim to counter inflationary pressures, their long-term effectiveness remains an open question requiring empirical validation. The literature strongly suggests that success hinges on transitioning from models subsidized by token inflation towards systems where real economic value, generated through user fees, sustains the network.</p>
<p>Verification stringency is a third cross-cutting insight. Wireless networks rely on (PoC) with a move toward oracle-assisted plausibility checks; storage networks separate sealing-time Proof-of-Replication from ongoing Proof-of-Spacetime audits. The economic salience is direct: weaker attestations propagate noise into payouts; stronger proofs constrain gaming but raise verification costs.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s4-2">
<label>4.2</label>
<title>Strengths and limitations of the evidence base</title>
<p>The reviewed literature offers rich, descriptive accounts of DePIN projects and a robust conceptual framework for tokenomic principles, drawing heavily on comprehensive industry reports and pioneering academic analyses (e.g., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B9">Ballandies et al., 2023</xref>). These studies excel at mapping intended tokenomic designs and articulating potential challenges.</p>
<p>However, the evidence base exhibits several limitations. First, rigorous, independent quantitative evaluations of tokenomic performance are scarce; many claims derive from project materials or industry reports. Second, methodological heterogeneity&#x2014;spanning technical specifications, design essays, and qualitative case studies&#x2014;complicates synthesis. Third, source bias is non-trivial in grey literature and in case studies concentrated on prominent projects. Finally, protocols iterate quickly; time-to-obsolescence is short, especially when governance changes alter emissions, fee splits, or pricing (e.g., HIP-138; MIP-19; BME deployments). These limitations justify our scoping-review choice and motivate a forward research agenda grounded in on-chain and governance data.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s4-3">
<label>4.3</label>
<title>Implications for practice, policy, and theory</title>
<p>The findings carry important implications for practitioners, policymakers, and theorists.</p>
<p>For Practitioners (Developers and Investors): The review underscores the imperative of rigorous due diligence centered on tokenomic sustainability and demand-generation potential. For developers, this highlights the need to design explicit mechanisms for demand-driven value accrual and to mitigate operational risks like incentive gaming. For investors and financial analysts, it emphasizes that analysis must extend beyond technological novelty to include a rigorous assessment of a project&#x2019;s demand-side viability, governance robustness, and the current lack of standardized valuation metrics.</p>
<p>For Policymakers: The pronounced regulatory ambiguity surrounding DePINs demands the swift development of technology-nuanced frameworks. Policymakers must engage with industry stakeholders to craft regulations that stimulate innovation while safeguarding financial stability and consumer protection. Given the transnational nature of these networks, international coordination is vital to achieve harmonized standards.</p>
<p>For Academic Theorists: DePIN tokenomic models offer fertile ground for advancing scholarship. They present real-world case studies for mechanism design, challenge traditional bootstrapping theories in network economics, raise novel questions for financial economics regarding the valuation of hybrid utility-governance assets, and test the limits of DAO-based governance in agency theory.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s4-4">
<label>4.4</label>
<title>Identified research gaps and future directions</title>
<p>Addressing RQ5, this review delineates several critical areas derived directly from the limitations and findings identified in the synthesized literature (Themes 1-4 and <xref ref-type="sec" rid="s4-2">Section 4.2</xref>) warranting further investigation to build a more robust, empirically grounded understanding of DePIN tokenomics.</p>
<p>First, Empirical Adjudication of Competing Models. The literature presents a clear theoretical debate between BME and Native Asset models, yet it lacks empirical evidence to validate the performance of either. Rigorous quantitative analyses using on-chain and market data are urgently needed to resolve this. Future research should conduct event-study analyses on the impact of major governance proposals, such as Helium&#x2019;s HIP-138 or Hivemapper&#x2019;s MIP-19, on token price volatility, trading volume, and on-chain metrics like daily token burns and provider growth. This approach would enable causal inference regarding the economic effects of protocol parameter changes, rigorously assessing how governance actions influence financial stability.</p>
<p>Second, Sophisticated Provider Economics and Demand-Side Analysis. Research should employ sophisticated financial modeling to assess provider profitability under realistic volatility conditions. Beyond Monte Carlo simulations, future work should apply real options analysis to model the investment decisions of DePIN providers. This would explicitly account for the value of waiting or abandoning participation given the high uncertainty of token-denominated revenue streams, offering a more realistic assessment of network sustainability. Concurrently, studies must investigate the demand bottleneck by analyzing adoption drivers and measuring the price elasticity of demand, particularly how consumption (via token burns) responds to changes in the fiat-denominated price of usage credits.</p>
<p>Third, Advanced Valuation Frameworks and Governance Effectiveness. Researchers should develop and test valuation frameworks tailored to DePIN tokens. These models must move beyond simple metrics to integrate discounted cash flow analysis (based on network fees and burns), the option value of governance rights, and appropriate risk adjustments for technological and regulatory uncertainty. Furthermore, empirical research is needed to examine how DAO characteristics&#x2014;such as voter participation rates and token distribution&#x2014;affect network performance, adaptability, and financial stability.</p>
<p>Fourth, Comparative and Longitudinal Studies. Comparative sectoral analysis is needed to empirically investigate why specific tokenomic models, such as the fiat-credit system, have prevailed in certain DePIN sectors (e.g., storage versus compute).</p>
<p>Finally, longitudinal studies tracking a cohort of projects over several years will be invaluable for identifying common failure modes, resilience factors, and the adaptive strategies that determine long-term viability.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec sec-type="conclusion" id="s5">
<label>5</label>
<title>Conclusion</title>
<p>This scoping review has systematically mapped the literature surrounding the tokenomics of Decentralized Physical Infrastructure Networks (DePIN), synthesizing insights from foundational industry reports and the nascent academic field. The findings confirm the conceptual dominance of the &#x201c;DePIN Flywheel&#x201d; model (RQ1), which is driven by intricate tokenomic designs that blend utility, governance, and staking functions (RQ2). While mechanisms like token burns and fee distributions aim for sustainability (RQ3), the analysis reveals a central tension: the innovative promise of these models is consistently challenged by significant hurdles, including profound token volatility, the critical need for demand generation, uncertain governance outcomes, and a fragmented regulatory environment (RQ4).</p>
<p>The primary contribution of this review is a structured overview of this rapidly evolving landscape, consolidating its key concepts, models, mechanisms, and documented challenges. The DePIN field is characterized by ambitious experimentation, offering a potentially transformative model for infrastructure deployment but carrying substantial inherent risks. Consequently, this review highlights the critical need for future research (RQ5) to move beyond descriptive mapping and conceptual analysis towards a new paradigm of empirical rigor. This includes the quantitative validation of economic models, comparative financial studies, and the development of robust frameworks for valuation and risk management.</p>
<p>Addressing the identified research gaps will be essential for understanding the true potential and limitations of DePIN and guiding its responsible development from a promising concept toward sustainable, impactful real-world applications.</p>
</sec>
</body>
<back>
<sec sec-type="author-contributions" id="s6">
<title>Author contributions</title>
<p>MA: Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Validation, Formal Analysis, Investigation, Resources, Data curation, Writing &#x2013; original draft, Writing &#x2013; review and editing, Visualization, Supervision, Project administration.</p>
</sec>
<sec sec-type="COI-statement" id="s8">
<title>Conflict of interest</title>
<p>The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.</p>
</sec>
<sec sec-type="ai-statement" id="s9">
<title>Generative AI statement</title>
<p>The author(s) declared that generative AI was not used in the creation of this manuscript.</p>
<p>Any alternative text (alt text) provided alongside figures in this article has been generated by Frontiers with the support of artificial intelligence and reasonable efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, including review by the authors wherever possible. If you identify any issues, please contact us.</p>
</sec>
<sec sec-type="disclaimer" id="s10">
<title>Publisher&#x2019;s note</title>
<p>All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.</p>
</sec>
<sec sec-type="supplementary-material" id="s11">
<title>Supplementary material</title>
<p>The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbloc.2025.1644115/full#supplementary-material">https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbloc.2025.1644115/full&#x23;supplementary-material</ext-link>
</p>
<supplementary-material xlink:href="Supplementaryfile1.pdf" id="SM1" mimetype="application/pdf" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/>
</sec>
<ref-list>
<title>References</title>
<ref id="B2">
<mixed-citation publication-type="web">
<collab>Akash Network</collab> (<year>2025</year>). <article-title>Payments. Akash docs</article-title>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://akash.network/docs/getting-started/intro-to-akash/payments/">https://akash.network/docs/getting-started/intro-to-akash/payments/</ext-link> (Accessed September 6, 2025)</comment>.</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B4">
<mixed-citation publication-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Andrew</surname>
<given-names>M.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Ballandies</surname>
<given-names>M. C.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2024</year>). <source>Are you a DePIN? A decision tree to classify decentralized physical infrastructure networks</source>. <publisher-name>ResearchGate</publisher-name>. <comment>[Working Paper]. Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/379667668_Are_you_a_DePIN_A_Decision_Tree_to_Classify_Decentralized_Physical_Infrastructure_Networks">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/379667668_Are_you_a_DePIN_A_Decision_Tree_to_Classify_Decentralized_Physical_Infrastructure_Networks</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B6">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Arksey</surname>
<given-names>H.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>O&#x27;Malley</surname>
<given-names>L.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2005</year>). <article-title>Scoping studies: towards a methodological framework</article-title>. <source>Int. J. Soc. Res. Methodol.</source> <volume>8</volume> (<issue>1</issue>), <fpage>19</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>32</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1080/1364557032000119616</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B7">
<mixed-citation publication-type="web">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Aslam</surname>
<given-names>K.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2025</year>). <article-title>State of US DePIN regulation: where things stand in 2025. IoTeX blog</article-title>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://iotex.io/blog/state-of-us-depin-regulation/">https://iotex.io/blog/state-of-us-depin-regulation/</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B8">
<mixed-citation publication-type="confproc">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Assen</surname>
<given-names>J. V. D.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Killer</surname>
<given-names>C.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Carli</surname>
<given-names>A. D.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Stiller</surname>
<given-names>B.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2024</year>). &#x201c;<article-title>Performance analysis of decentralized physical infrastructure networks and centralized clouds</article-title>,&#x201d; in <source>2024 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)</source> (<publisher-name>IEEE</publisher-name>). <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1109/ICBC59979.2024.10634394</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B9">
<mixed-citation publication-type="confproc">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Ballandies</surname>
<given-names>M. C.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Wang</surname>
<given-names>H.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Chee Law</surname>
<given-names>A. C.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Yang</surname>
<given-names>J. C.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Gosken</surname>
<given-names>C.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Andrew</surname>
<given-names>M.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2023</year>). &#x201c;<article-title>A taxonomy for blockchain-based decentralized physical infrastructure networks (DePIN)</article-title>,&#x201d; in <source>2023 IEEE World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT)</source> (<publisher-name>Aveiro, Portugal: IEEE</publisher-name>), <fpage>1</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>7</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1109/WF-IoT58464.2023.10539514</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B10">
<mixed-citation publication-type="web">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Bane</surname>
<given-names>D.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Gala</surname>
<given-names>S.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2025</year>). <article-title>State of DePIN 2024. Messari</article-title>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://messari.io/report/state-of-depin-2024">https://messari.io/report/state-of-depin-2024</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B11">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Caprolu</surname>
<given-names>M.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Raffo</surname>
<given-names>L.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Satta</surname>
<given-names>R.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Contu</surname>
<given-names>F.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2024</year>). <article-title>Security and privacy issues in decentralized physical infrastructure networks (DePIN)</article-title>. <source>Aut. Comput. Patterns</source>. <comment>[Technical report]. Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://www.comitresearch.org/autonomous-computing-patterns/security-and-privacy-issues-in-depin">https://www.comitresearch.org/autonomous-computing-patterns/security-and-privacy-issues-in-depin</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B12">
<mixed-citation publication-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Caprolu</surname>
<given-names>M.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Raponi</surname>
<given-names>S.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Di Pietro</surname>
<given-names>R.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2025</year>). &#x201c;<article-title>Sharing is (S)caring: security and privacy issues in decentralized physical infrastructure networks (DePIN)</article-title>,&#x201d; in <source>Lecture notes in computer science</source> (<publisher-name>Springer</publisher-name>), <volume>15564</volume>, <fpage>301</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>318</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1007/978-981-96-3531-3_15</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B13">
<mixed-citation publication-type="confproc">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Chiu</surname>
<given-names>B.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Ho</surname>
<given-names>A.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Lu</surname>
<given-names>A.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Lee</surname>
<given-names>B.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Li</surname>
<given-names>L.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Yau</surname>
<given-names>M.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2024</year>). &#x201c;<article-title>CircularX regenerative resources DePIN</article-title>,&#x201d; in <source>2024 International Symposium on Networks, Computers and Communications (ISNCC)</source> (<publisher-name>IEEE</publisher-name>). <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1109/ISNCC62547.2024.10759033</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B14">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Chiu</surname>
<given-names>M. T.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Mahajan</surname>
<given-names>S.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Ballandies</surname>
<given-names>M. C.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Kalabi&#x107;</surname>
<given-names>U. V.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2024</year>). <article-title>DePIN: a framework for token-incentivized participatory sensing</article-title>. <source>arXiv</source>. <comment>[Preprint]. Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.16495">http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.16495</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B15">
<mixed-citation publication-type="confproc">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Choi</surname>
<given-names>S.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Xie</surname>
<given-names>Z.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Tan</surname>
<given-names>T. W.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Liu</surname>
<given-names>Y.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Wu</surname>
<given-names>Y.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Wang</surname>
<given-names>X.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2024</year>). &#x201c;<article-title>Towards a trusted and cryptocurrency-enabled decentralized wireless community network</article-title>,&#x201d; in <source>2024 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)</source> (<publisher-name>IEEE</publisher-name>). <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1109/ICBC59979.2024.10634396</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B16">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Cong</surname>
<given-names>L. W.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Li</surname>
<given-names>Y.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Wang</surname>
<given-names>N.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2021</year>). <article-title>Tokenomics: dynamic adoption and valuation</article-title>. <source>Rev. Financial Stud.</source> <volume>34</volume> (<issue>3</issue>), <fpage>1105</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>1155</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1093/rfs/hhaa089</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B17">
<mixed-citation publication-type="confproc">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Fan</surname>
<given-names>X.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2023</year>). &#x201c;<article-title>Towards a Rollup-Centric scalable architecture for decentralized physical infrastructure networks</article-title>,&#x201d; in <source>Proceedings of the 5th ACM International Workshop on Blockchain-Enabled Networked Sensor Systems</source> (<publisher-name>ACM DL Digital Library, Association for Computing Machinery</publisher-name>), <fpage>9</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>12</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1145/3628354.3629534</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B18">
<mixed-citation publication-type="confproc">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Fan</surname>
<given-names>X.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2024</year>). &#x201c;<article-title>New directions in decentralized physical infrastructure networks</article-title>,&#x201d; in <source>2024 6th International Conference on Blockchain Computing and Applications (BCCA)</source> (<publisher-name>IEEE</publisher-name>), <fpage>727</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>733</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1109/BCCA62388.2024.10844432</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B19">
<mixed-citation publication-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Fisch</surname>
<given-names>B.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Bonneau</surname>
<given-names>J.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Greco</surname>
<given-names>N.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Benet</surname>
<given-names>J.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2018</year>). <source>Scaling proof-of-replication for filecoin mining</source>. <publisher-name>Protocol Labs</publisher-name>. <comment>[Technical report]. Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://research.protocol.ai/publications/scaling-proof-of-replication-for-filecoin-mining/fisch2018.pdf">https://research.protocol.ai/publications/scaling-proof-of-replication-for-filecoin-mining/fisch2018.pdf</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B20">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<collab>Forbes Technology Council</collab> (<year>2024</year>). <article-title>The quiet rise of DePIN: why you should pay attention to decentralized physical infrastructures networks</article-title>. <source>Forbes</source>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbestechcouncil/2024/07/02/the-quiet-rise-of-depin-why-you-should-pay-attention-to-decentralized-physical-infrastructures-networks/">https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbestechcouncil/2024/07/02/the-quiet-rise-of-depin-why-you-should-pay-attention-to-decentralized-physical-infrastructures-networks/</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B21">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Haber</surname>
<given-names>S.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Stornetta</surname>
<given-names>W. S.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>1991</year>). <article-title>How to time-stamp a digital document</article-title>. <source>J. Cryptol.</source> <volume>3</volume> (<issue>2</issue>), <fpage>99</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>111</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1007/BF00196791</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B22">
<mixed-citation publication-type="confproc">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Heiss</surname>
<given-names>J.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Castillo</surname>
<given-names>F.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Fan</surname>
<given-names>X.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2024</year>). &#x201c;<article-title>Towards credential-based device registration in DApps for DePINs with ZKPs</article-title>,&#x201d; in <source>Proceedings - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)</source> (<publisher-name>IEEE</publisher-name>), <fpage>583</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>590</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1109/Blockchain62396.2024.00086</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B23">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<collab>Helium Foundation</collab> (<year>2024</year>). <article-title>HIP-138: return to HNT</article-title>. <source>GitHub</source>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://github.com/helium/HIP/issues/1120">https://github.com/helium/HIP/issues/1120</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B26">
<mixed-citation publication-type="book">
<collab>Helium Foundation</collab> (<year>2025a</year>). <source>Data credit (DC) fundamentals</source>. <publisher-name>Helium Docs</publisher-name>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://docs.helium.com/tokens/data-credit/">https://docs.helium.com/tokens/data-credit/</ext-link> (Accessed September 6, 2025)</comment>.</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B28">
<mixed-citation publication-type="web">
<collab>Helium Foundation</collab> (<year>2025b</year>). <article-title>Proof-of-coverage (PoC). Helium docs</article-title>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://docs.helium.com/iot/proof-of-coverage/">https://docs.helium.com/iot/proof-of-coverage/</ext-link> (Accessed September 6, 2025)</comment>.</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B29">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<collab>Hivemapper Foundation</collab> (<year>2024</year>). <article-title>Map improvement proposal 19 (MIP-19): map credit pricing</article-title>. <source>Medium</source>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://hivemapper.medium.com/mip-19-d5f2efe3156a">https://hivemapper.medium.com/mip-19-d5f2efe3156a</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B30">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<collab>Hivemapper Foundation</collab> (<year>2025</year>). <article-title>HONEY burn-and-mint (map credits)</article-title>. <source>Hivemapper Docs</source>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://docs.hivemapper.com/honey-token/honey-burn-and-mint">https://docs.hivemapper.com/honey-token/honey-burn-and-mint</ext-link> (Accessed September 6, 2025)</comment>.</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B32">
<mixed-citation publication-type="confproc">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>J&#xfc;rjens</surname>
<given-names>J.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Scheider</surname>
<given-names>S.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Yildirim</surname>
<given-names>F.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Henke</surname>
<given-names>M.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2022</year>). &#x201c;<article-title>Tokenomics: decentralized incentivization in the context of data spaces</article-title>,&#x201d; in <source>Designing Data Spaces: The Ecosystem Approach to Competitive Advantage</source> (<publisher-name>Springer International Publishing</publisher-name>), <fpage>91</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>108</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1007/978-3-030-93975-5_6</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B33">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Levac</surname>
<given-names>D.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Colquhoun</surname>
<given-names>H.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>O&#x27;Brien</surname>
<given-names>K. K.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2010</year>). <article-title>Scoping studies: advancing the methodology</article-title>. <source>Implement. Sci.</source> <volume>5</volume> (<issue>1</issue>), <fpage>69</fpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1186/1748-5908-5-69</pub-id>
<pub-id pub-id-type="pmid">20854677</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B34">
<mixed-citation publication-type="confproc">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Lin</surname>
<given-names>T.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Wang</surname>
<given-names>H.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Ballandies</surname>
<given-names>M. C.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2023</year>). &#x201c;<article-title>Burn-and-Mint: a tokenomics mechanism for DePIN</article-title>,&#x201d; in <source>2023 IEEE World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT)</source> (<publisher-name>IEEE</publisher-name>), <fpage>1</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>6</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1109/WF-IoT58464.2023.10539427</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B35">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Lin</surname>
<given-names>Z.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Wang</surname>
<given-names>T.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Shi</surname>
<given-names>L.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Zhang</surname>
<given-names>S.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Cao</surname>
<given-names>B.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2025</year>). <article-title>Decentralized physical infrastructure networks (DePIN): challenges and opportunities</article-title>. <source>IEEE Netw.</source> <volume>39</volume> (<issue>2</issue>), <fpage>91</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>99</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1109/MNET.2024.3487924</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B36">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Malinova</surname>
<given-names>K.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Park</surname>
<given-names>A.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2023</year>). <article-title>Tokenomics: when tokens beat equity</article-title>. <source>Manag. Sci.</source> <volume>69</volume> (<issue>11</issue>), <fpage>6568</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>6583</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1287/mnsc.2023.4882</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B37">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Mao</surname>
<given-names>Y.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>He</surname>
<given-names>Q.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Li</surname>
<given-names>J.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2024</year>). <article-title>LooPIN: a PinFi protocol for decentralized computing</article-title>. <source>arXiv</source>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.09422v1">https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.09422v1</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B38">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<collab>Messari Research</collab> (<year>2025</year>). <article-title>DePIN tokenomics part 1: token distribution models, incentive mechanisms, token trends, and more</article-title>. <source>Messari</source>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://messari.io/report/depin-tokenomics-part-1-token-distribution-models-incentive-mechanisms-token-trends-and-more">https://messari.io/report/depin-tokenomics-part-1-token-distribution-models-incentive-mechanisms-token-trends-and-more</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B39">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Nabben</surname>
<given-names>K.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Wang</surname>
<given-names>H.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Zargham</surname>
<given-names>M.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2024</year>). <article-title>Decentralised governance for autonomous cyber-physical systems</article-title>. <source>arXiv</source>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.16764">https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.16764</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B40">
<mixed-citation publication-type="web">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Nakamoto</surname>
<given-names>S.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2008</year>). <article-title>Bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system</article-title>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf">https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B41">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Peters</surname>
<given-names>M. D. J.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Marnie</surname>
<given-names>C.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Tricco</surname>
<given-names>A. C.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Pollock</surname>
<given-names>D.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Munn</surname>
<given-names>Z.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Alexander</surname>
<given-names>L.</given-names>
</name>
<etal/>
</person-group> (<year>2020</year>). <article-title>Updated methodological guidance for the conduct of scoping reviews</article-title>. <source>JBI Evid. Synth.</source> <volume>18</volume> (<issue>10</issue>), <fpage>2119</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>2126</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.11124/JBIES-20-00167</pub-id>
<pub-id pub-id-type="pmid">33038124</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B42">
<mixed-citation publication-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Petticrew</surname>
<given-names>M.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Roberts</surname>
<given-names>H.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2006</year>). <source>Systematic reviews in the social sciences: a practical guide</source>. <publisher-name>Wiley: Blackwell Publishing</publisher-name>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1002/9780470754887</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B43">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Pithadia</surname>
<given-names>N.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Ratanpara</surname>
<given-names>J.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2024</year>). <article-title>DePIN: reimagining physical infrastructure with decentralised model</article-title>. <source>J. Emerg. Technol. Innovative Res.</source> <volume>11</volume> (<issue>4</issue>), <fpage>234</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>239</lpage>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://www.jetir.org/view?paper=JETIR2404033">https://www.jetir.org/view?paper&#x3d;JETIR2404033</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B44">
<mixed-citation publication-type="book">
<collab>Polkadot</collab> (<year>2025</year>). <source>From digital collectibles to global infrastructure: how RWA, DePIN, and tokenization unlock real-world value</source>. <publisher-name>Polkadot Blog</publisher-name>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://polkadot.com/blog/real-world-assets-depin-tokenization-value/">https://polkadot.com/blog/real-world-assets-depin-tokenization-value/</ext-link> (Accessed September 6, 2025)</comment>.</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B45">
<mixed-citation publication-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Popay</surname>
<given-names>J.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Roberts</surname>
<given-names>H.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Sowden</surname>
<given-names>A.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Petticrew</surname>
<given-names>M.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Arai</surname>
<given-names>L.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Rodgers</surname>
<given-names>M.</given-names>
</name>
<etal/>
</person-group> (<year>2006</year>). <source>Guidance on the conduct of narrative synthesis in systematic reviews</source>. <publisher-name>ESRC Methods Programme</publisher-name>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.13140/2.1.1018.4643</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B46">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<collab>Protocol Labs</collab> (<year>2024</year>). <article-title>Storage proving (proof-of-spacetime)</article-title>. <source>Filecoin Docs</source>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://docs.filecoin.io/storage-providers/filecoin-economics/storage-proving/">https://docs.filecoin.io/storage-providers/filecoin-economics/storage-proving/</ext-link> (Accessed September 6, 2025)</comment>.</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B47">
<mixed-citation publication-type="web">
<collab>Protocol Labs</collab> (<year>2025</year>). <article-title>Proofs. Filecoin spec</article-title>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://spec.filecoin.io/systems/filecoin_proofs/">https://spec.filecoin.io/systems/filecoin_proofs/</ext-link> (Accessed September 6, 2025)</comment>.</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B48">
<mixed-citation publication-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Puckrin</surname>
<given-names>N.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2024</year>). <source>DePin: why this will be big in 2025</source>. <publisher-name>Coin Bureau</publisher-name>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://www.coinbureau.com/analysis/why-depin-will-be-big/">https://www.coinbureau.com/analysis/why-depin-will-be-big/</ext-link>.</comment>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B49">
<mixed-citation publication-type="book">
<collab>Render Network Foundation</collab> (<year>2024</year>). &#x201c;<article-title>Burn-mint equilibrium (BME)</article-title>,&#x201d; in <source>Render network knowledge base</source>. <comment>Available online at: <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://know.rendernetwork.com/basics/burn-mint-equilibrium">https://know.rendernetwork.com/basics/burn-mint-equilibrium</ext-link> (Accessed September 6, 2025)</comment>.</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B51">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Rochet</surname>
<given-names>J. C.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Tirole</surname>
<given-names>J.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2003</year>). <article-title>Platform competition in two-sided markets</article-title>. <source>J. Eur. Econ. Assoc.</source> <volume>1</volume> (<issue>4</issue>), <fpage>990</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>1029</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1162/154247603322493212</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B52">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Thomas</surname>
<given-names>J.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Harden</surname>
<given-names>A.</given-names>
</name>
</person-group> (<year>2008</year>). <article-title>Methods for the thematic synthesis of qualitative research in systematic reviews</article-title>. <source>BMC Med. Res. Methodol.</source> <volume>8</volume> (<issue>1</issue>), <fpage>45</fpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1186/1471-2288-8-45</pub-id>
<pub-id pub-id-type="pmid">18616818</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B53">
<mixed-citation publication-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname>Tricco</surname>
<given-names>A. C.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Lillie</surname>
<given-names>E.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Zarin</surname>
<given-names>W.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>O&#x27;Brien</surname>
<given-names>K. K.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Colquhoun</surname>
<given-names>H.</given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname>Levac</surname>
<given-names>D.</given-names>
</name>
<etal/>
</person-group> (<year>2018</year>). <article-title>PRISMA extension for scoping reviews (PRISMA-ScR): checklist and explanation</article-title>. <source>Ann. Intern. Med.</source> <volume>169</volume> (<issue>7</issue>), <fpage>467</fpage>&#x2013;<lpage>473</lpage>. <pub-id pub-id-type="doi">10.7326/M18-0850</pub-id>
<pub-id pub-id-type="pmid">30178033</pub-id>
</mixed-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
<fn-group>
<fn fn-type="custom" custom-type="edited-by">
<p>
<bold>Edited by:</bold> <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://loop.frontiersin.org/people/1476565/overview">Charalampos Alexopoulos</ext-link>, University of the Aegean, Greece</p>
</fn>
<fn fn-type="custom" custom-type="reviewed-by">
<p>
<bold>Reviewed by:</bold> <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://loop.frontiersin.org/people/2804367/overview">Xinxin Fan</ext-link>, IoTeX, United States</p>
<p>
<ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://loop.frontiersin.org/people/3145649/overview">Giulio Caldarelli</ext-link>, University of Turin, Italy</p>
</fn>
</fn-group>
<fn-group>
<fn fn-type="abbr" id="abbrev1">
<label>Abbreviations:</label>
<p>AML, Anti-Money Laundering; BME, Burn-and-Mint Equilibrium; CapEx, Capital Expenditure; DAO, Decentralized Autonomous Organization; DePIN, Decentralized Physical Infrastructure Network; DRN, Digital Resource Network; FIL, Filecoin Token; GDPR, General Data Protection Regulation; HIP, Helium Improvement Proposal; HNT, Helium Network Token; IOT, Internet of Things (Helium Sub-Network Token); KYC, Know Your Customer; MIP, Map Improvement Proposal; MOBILE, Helium 5G Sub-Network Token; PCC, Population-Concept-Context; PoC, Proof-of-Coverage; PoPW, Proof-of-Physical-Work; PoRep, Proof-of-Replication; PoSt, Proof-of-Spacetime; PRISMA-ScR, Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (Scoping Review Extension); PRN, Physical Resource Network; QoS, Quality of Service; ROI, Return on Investment; RQ, Research Question; RWA, Real-World Asset; USD, United States Dollar.</p>
</fn>
</fn-group>
</back>
</article>